Krishna thesis presentation

A Secure Communication Protocol For Wireless Biosensor Networks Masters Thesis by Krishna Kumar Venkatasubramanian Committee: Dr. Sandeep Gupta Dr. Rida Bazzi Dr. Hessam Sarjoughian

Overview ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Biomedical Smart Sensors ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Environment (Human Body) sensors Base Station Communication links

Motivation for biosensor security ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Problem Statement ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Cluster Topology Cluster head Cluster Cluster Member Base Station

Traditional Cluster Formation Protocol CH1 CH2 CH3 1 2 3 4 5 Environment Weaker signal

Security Flaws ,[object Object],1 2 3 Malicious Entity acting as a SINKHOLE Weaker signal CH2 CH1 ,[object Object],[object Object]

Security Flaws contd.. Node with dead battery Network Partitioning. ,[object Object],[object Object],Node with surrounding tissue at above normal temperature. Node with surrounding tissue at normal temperature. tissue

System Model ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Temperature sensor Glucose sensor

Trust Assumptions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Key Pre-Deployment ,[object Object],[object Object],K’ N-BS = H(NSK,2) K N-BS = H(NSK,1) K’ BS-N = H(NSK,4) K BS-N = H(NSK,3) MAC Keys Encryption Keys

Biometrics ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Issues with Biometrics ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Biometric Authentication Measure biometric: BioKey Generate data Compute Certificate: Cert [data] = MAC ( KRand, data), γ γ = KRand  BioKey Send Msg: data, Cert [data] Measure biometric: BioKey’ Receive Msg: data, Cert [data] Compute MAC Key: KRand’ = γ  BioKey’ f (KRand’) = KRand Compute Certificate MAC And compare with received: MAC (KRand, data) SENDER RECEIVER Biometric Measurement Schedule BMT 1 2 3 4 5 ST 6 Time-Period

Centralized Protocol Execution Node j  All: ID j , NonceN j , MAC(K’N j – BS, ID j | NonceN j ), Cert[ID j , NonceN j ] CH p  BS: ID j , NonceNi , MAC (K’N j – BS, ID j | NonceN i ), CH p , SS, E<K CH p -BS, Cntr>(KCH-N), MAC (K’CH p – BS, CH p | SS | E<K CH p -BS, Cntr>(KCH-N) | Cntr) BS  Node j : CH p , E<K BS-N j , Cntr’> (KCH-N), Cntr’, MAC(K’BS-N j , CH p | NonceN j | Cntr’ | E<K BS-N j , Cntr’> (KCH-N)) CH 1 Sensor Node Base Station CH 2 CH 3 CH1 CH 2 CH 3 CH 3

Distributed Protocol Execution CH j  All: CH j, NonceCH j , E<KRand, Cntr>(Ktemp), Cert[ID j , Cntr, NonceCH j ], λ λ = BioKey  KRand Node k  CH z : ID k , MAC (Ktemp, ID k | NonceCH z | Cntr | CH z ) CH 1 CH 2 CH 3 Sensor Node

Extensions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Security Analysis (Passive Adversary) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Security Analysis (Passive Adversary) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Security Analysis (Active Adversary) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Implementation ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Implementation contd.. ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Comparison ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],MAC size = 64 bits Sensor-BS distance = 0.75 m Inter-sensor distance = 0.1 m Number of Nodes = 100-1500 E cx = 100pJ/bit/m 2 E trans = E recp = 50 nJ/bit Signal Strength = 16 bits Key = 128 bits Nonce = Counter = 128 bits Node ID = 8 bits

Security Overhead Comparison of Secure (without extension) and Non-secure Cluster Formation Protocols (CH = 5%)

Extension Overhead Comparison for Secure Cluster Formation Protocols with their extensions (CH = 5%)

Conclusions & Future Work ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Reference ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Krishna thesis presentation

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