A seminar ppt on domain networking tittled Data security in local network using distributed firewall

1. Data Security in LAN using
Distributed Firewall
1
Presented by
Sabreen Irfana
GMIT
Guided by:
Mr. Santosh Kumar
B.E ,M Tech
Asst prof ,Dept ISE
GMIT

2. Abstract
 Computer and networking have become inseparable
now .
 A number of confidential transaction occur every
second and today computers are used mostly for
transaction rather than processing of data, so Data
security is needed to prevent hacking of data and to
provide authenticated data transfer
2

3. .Contd
 Data security can be achieved by Firewall
 Conventional firewall relay on the notion of restricted
topology and controlled entry point
 Restricting the network topology difficult in filtering
certain protocols, expanding network and few more
problems leads to the evolution of DISTRIBUTED
FIREWALL
3

4. Contents
 Introduction to Security and Firewalls
 Problems with traditional Firewalls
 Distributed Firewall Concept
 Distributed Firewall Implementation
 Conclusions
4

5. Firewalls
 Firewall is a device or set of instruments designed to permit
or deny network transmissions based upon a set of rules and
regulations which are frequently used to protect networks from
unauthorized access
 In most systems today, the firewall is the software that
implements the “security policy” for a system
 A firewall is typically placed at the edge of a system and acts
as a filter for unauthorized traffic
5

6. Security Policy
 A “security policy” defines the security rules of a system.
 Without a defined security policy, there is no way to know
what access is allowed or disallowed
 An example policy: (simple)
◦ Allow all connections to the web server
◦ Deny all other access
6

7. Firewall Example
7
Internet
Company 2
Company 4
Company 1
Company 3
Firewall
FirewallFirewall
Firewall

8. Firewall Drawbacks
 Traditional Firewalls uses restricted topology of the network
 Donot protect networks from internal attack
 Certain protocols (FTP, Real-Audio) are difficult for
firewalls to process
 Assumes inside users are “trusted”
 single points of access make firewalls hard to manage
8

9. .contd
1.Restricted topology
9

10. .contd
2 .Assumes inside users are trusted
10

11. .contd
3.Single point of failure or access
11

12. .Data security Threats
 IP Spoofing or IP masquerading
12
A
10.10.10.1
B
134.117.1.60
B
10.10.10.1
Src_IP
134.117.1.60
dst_IP
Any (>1024)
Src_port
80
dst_port
11.11.11.1
Src_IP
134.117.1.60
dst_IP
Any (>1024)
Src_port
80
dst_port
spoofed

13. .cont IP spoofing
13
sender
victim
partner
Oh, my partner
sent me a packet.
I’ll process this.
impersonation

14. .contd
 Session hijacking
14

15. contd
 Denial of service(DOS)
15

16. Distributed Firewall Concept
 Destributed firewall is a mechanism to enforce a network
domain security policy through the use of policy language
 Security policy is defined centrally
 Enforcement of policy is done by network endpoint(s) where
is the hackers try to penetrate
16

17. .contd
 It filters traffic from both the internal and internet
network
 They overcome the single point of failure concept
17

18. 18

19. Architecture of Distributed
Firewalls
The whole distributed firewall system consists of four
main parts:
I. The management center
II. Policy actuator:
III. Remote endpoint connectors
IV. Log server
19

20. .contd
20

21. PBNA System
Policy Based Network Management System
21

22. Standard Firewall Example
22
Corporate Network
Corporate
Firewall
Internet
InternalExternal
External
Host
Internal
Host
1
Internal
Host
2
(untrusted)
Webserver
Intranet
Webserver
(company
private)

23. Standard Firewall Example
Connection to web server
23
Corporate Network
Corporate
Firewall
Internet
InternalExternal
External
Host
Internal
Host
1
Internal
Host
2
(untrusted)
Webserver
Intranet
Webserver
(company
private)

24. Standard Firewall Example
Connection to intranet
24
Corporate Network
Corporate
Firewall
Internet
InternalExternal
External
Host
Internal
Host
1
Internal
Host
2
(untrusted)
Webserver
Intranet
Webserver
(company
private)
blocked by
firewall connection
allowed,
but should
not be

25. Distributed Firewall Example
25
Corporate NetworkInternet
InternalExternal
External
Host
Internal
Host
1
Internal
Host
2
(untrusted)
Webserver
Intranet
Webserver
(company
private)
Internal
Host
(telecommuting)

26. Distributed Firewall Example to
web server
26
Corporate NetworkInternet
InternalExternal
External
Host
Internal
Host
1
Internal
Host
2
(untrusted)
Webserver
Intranet
Webserver
(company
private)
Internal
Host
(telecommuting)

27. Distributed Firewall Example to
intranet
27
Corporate NetworkInternet
InternalExternal
External
Host
Internal
Host
1
Internal
Host
2
(untrusted)
Webserver
Intranet
Webserver
(company
private)
Internal
Host
(telecommuting)

28. Components of Distributed
Firewalls
28
A Distributed Firewall is a mechanism to enforce a network domain
security policy through the use of the following:
 Policy Language
 Policy Distributed Scheme
 Certificates

29. .contd
29
Policy language
 The Policy language is used to create policies for each firewall.
 These policies are the collection of rules, which guides the firewall
for evaluating the network traffic. It also defines which
inbound and outbound connections on any component
of the network policy domain are allowed.

30. .contd
30
Policy Distribution Scheme
 The policy distribution scheme should guarantee the integrity
of the policy during transfer.
 This policy is consulted before processing the incoming or
outgoing messages.
 The distribution of the policy can be different and varies with
the implementation. It can be either directly pushed to end systems ,
or pulled when necessary

31. .contd
31
Certificates
 There may be the chance of using IP address for the
host identification by the distributed firewalls.
 But a mechanism of security is more important.
 It is preferred to use certificate to identify hosts.
 IPSec provides cryptographic certificates. Unlike IP address,
which can be easily spoofed, the digital certificate is much more
secure and the authentication of the certificate is not easily
forged. Policies are distributed by means of these

32. Advantages
32
1. Provides security for internet and intranet
2. Multiple access points
3. Insiders are no longer trusted
4. Security policy rules are distributed and established on
needed basis
5 End to End can be easily done and filtering packets is easy

33. Disadvantage
33
1. Compliance of the security policy for insiders is one of the
major issues of the distributed firewalls. This problem
especially occurs when each ending host have the right of
changing security policy. There can be some techniques to
make modifying policies harder but it is not totally impossible
to prevent it.
2 It is not so easy to implement an intrusion detection system in
a distributed firewall environment. It is possible to log
suspicious connections on local server but these logs need to
be collected and analyzed by security experts in central service

34. Distributed Firewall
implementation..
 Language to express policies and resolving requests
(KeyNote system)
 Using keynode and Ipsec allows control of mixed level
policies where authentication mechanism is applied
through public key cryptography
34

35. KeyNote
 A language to describe security policies (RFC 2704)
 Fields :
◦ KeyNote Version – Must be first field, if present
◦ Authorizer – Mandatory field, identifies the issuer of the assertion
◦ Comment
◦ Conditions – The conditions under which the Authorizer trusts the Licensee
◦ Licensees – Identifies the authorized, should be public key, but can be IP address
◦ Signature – Must be last, if present
 All field names are case-insensitive
35

36. KeyNote Example 1
36

37. KeyNote Example 2
37
KeyNote-Version: 2
Authorizer: “rsa-hex:1023abcd”
Licensee: “IP:158.130.6.141”
Conditions: (@remote_port < 1024 &&
@local_port == 22 ) -> “true”;
Signature: “rsa-sha1-hex:bee11984”
Note that this credential delegates to an IP address,

38. Application interaction with
keyNote
38

39. Example of Connection to a
Distributed Firewall
local host security policy:
KeyNote-Version: 2
Authorizer: “POLICY”
Licensees: ADMINISTRATIVE_KEY
Assumes an IPSEC SA between hosts
39

40. Example of Connection to a
Distributed Firewall
KeyNote-Version: 2
Authorizer: ADMINISTRATIVE_KEY
Licensees: USER_KEY
Conditions:
(app_domain == "IPsec policy" &&
encryption_algorithm == “yes" &&
local_address == "158.130.006.141")
-> "true";
(app_domain == "Distributed Firewall" &&
@local_port == 23 &&
encrypted == "yes" &&
authenticated == "yes") -> "true";
Signature: ...
40

41. Example of Connection to a
Distributed Firewall
41
source
local host
158.130.6.141
(running Policy
Daemon)
IPSEC SA
TCP connect (23)
context created
local port=23
encrypted="yes"
authenticated="yes"
Policy Daemon
checks context
vs.
credential
continue TCP
session
Returns TRUE

42. Conclusions
 Distributed firewalls allows the network security policy
to remain under control of the system administrators
 Insiders may no longer be unconditionally treated as
“trusted”
 Does not completely eliminate the need for traditional
firewalls
 More research is needed in this area to increase
robustness, efficiency,
42

43. Future Work
 High quality administration tools NEED to exist for
distributed firewalls to be accepted
 Allow per-packet scanning as opposed to per-connection
scanning
 Policy updating
43

44. References
 [1] Sotiris Ioannidis, Angelos D. Keromytis, Steve M. Bellovin, Jonathan
M. Smith, “Implementing a Distributed Firewall”, CCS ’00,Athens,
Greece.
 [2] Steven M. Bellovin, “Distributed Firewalls”, November 1999 issue of;
login: pp. 37-39.
 [3] W. R. Cheswick and S. M. Bellovin. “Firewalls and Internet Security”:
Repelling the Wily Hacker. Addison-Wesley, 1994.
 [4] [Robert Stepanek, “Distributed Firewalls”, rost@cc.hut.fi, T-110.501
Seminar on Network Security, HUT TML 2001.
 [5] Dr. Mostafa Hassan Dahshan “Security and Internet Protocol”,
Computer Engineering
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