This document discusses the importance of clearly defined private property rights. It contains three readings on this topic. The first reading discusses how private property rights provide incentives for people to make efficient use of resources and conserve them. It explains how lack of property rights can lead to the "tragedy of the commons" where resources are overexploited. The second reading further explains how private property rights encourage productive and beneficial development and use of property. It also promotes conservation for future generations. The third reading discusses how billions of poor around the world lack opportunities to generate wealth because they do not have clear property rights over the resources they possess. Well-defined property rights are important for economic growth and prosperity.

1. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
Political Economic Digest Series 3
Dear Political Economic Digest Series participant,
Welcome to the third series of the Political Economic Digest. In the last series we discussed about what
really motivates people to do (or not to do) something. Incentives, as we learned, are the reasons
behind people’s activities and having well designed incentive system is a must for sound public policies.
In this series we are going to talk about property rights. Why are property rights important? And what
incentives do property rights provide for people to work harder and better? How is protection of
property rights related to economic prosperity?
“A property right is the exclusive authority to determine how a resource is used, whether that resource
is owned by government or by individuals.” Private property rights are very crucial to economic growth
and prosperity because they provide an incentive for people to make the most efficient use of the
resources and conserve them too. Without private property rights, people have no incentive to work
hard or make new inventions or find better ways of doing things.
The first reading is the third chapter of the Nepali translation of the book, “The Adventures of Jonathan
Gullible”, in which you’ll find about tragedy of the commons. Tragedy of the commons is a situation
which occurs when a resource isn’t clearly owned by anyone but is a common resource and the resource
is plundered by everyone. When a resource is owned by everyone, no one cares to put effort and energy
into its conservation or efficient utilization because the rewards are likely to be taken by someone else.
Tragedy of commons is a strong argument in favor of property rights. Experience of communist
countries shows that attempt to abolish private property rights always ends in degradation of the
available resources and impoverishing people.
The second reading is a text extracted from the book “Common Sense Economics”, the authors have
explained the concept and importance of property rights with examples. Private property rights are
important because they encourage wise stewardship and also encourage people to use their property
productively. Property owners have a strong incentive to develop things that they own in ways that are
beneficial to others. Private ownership also promotes the wise development and conservation of
resources for the future.
The final reading is the first chapter of the book Mystery of the Capital, in which renowned Peruvian
economist Hernando DeSoto, explains how the absence of clearly defined property rights is preventing
the poor of the world from getting rich although they happen to have all the necessary resources and
capital required for creating wealth. De Soto notes, the poor people around the world have properties
worth more than $9.3 trillion but since they don’t have well defined property rights, they have been
able to use their properties to get richer.

2. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
Happy reading! If you are interested to further explore this issue, we have lots of texts and visuals on
the subject at Political Economic Resource Center of Samriddhi. Feel free to drop by!
Note: Scroll below to find the readings!

3. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation

4. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation

5. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
Importance of Private Property
(from the book Common Sense Economics, James D. Gwartney - Florida State University ,Richard L.
Stroup - Montana State University, Dwight Lee - University of Georgia)
The critical role of the legal system is to protect property rights. Trade depends on property
rights, and a legal system must protect property rights if an economy is to prosper. Property is a
broad term that includes ownership of labor services and ideas, including religious views, as well as
physical assets such as buildings and land. Private ownership of property involves three things: (a)
the right to exclusive use, (b) legal protection against invaders B those who would seek to use or
abuse the property without the owner’s permission, and (c) the right to transfer to (that is,
exchange with) another.
Private owners can decide how they will use their property, but private owners are held
accountable for their actions. People who use their property in a manner that invades or infringes
upon the property rights of another will be subject to the same legal forces that protect their own
property. For example, private property rights prohibit me from throwing my hammer through the
screen of your computer, because if I did, I would be violating your property right to your computer.
Your property right to your computer restricts me and everyone else from its use without your
permission. Similarly, my ownership of my hammer and other possessions restricts you and
everyone else from using them without my permission.
The important thing about private ownership is the incentives that emanate from it. There
are four major reasons why the incentives accompanying clearly defined and enforced private
ownership rights propel economic progress.
First, private ownership encourages wise stewardship. If private owners fail to maintain their
property or if they allow it to be abused or damaged, they will bear the consequences in the form of
a decline in the property’s value. For example, if you own an automobile, you have a strong
incentive to change the oil, have the car serviced regularly, and see that the interior of the car is
well maintained. Why is this so? If you are careless in these areas, the car's value to both you and
potential future owners will decline. If the car is kept in good running order, it will be of greater
value to you and to others who might want to buy it from you.
In contrast, when property is owned by the government or owned in common by a large
group of people, the incentive to take good care of it is weakened. For example, when the
government owns housing, no individual or small group of owners has a strong incentive to
maintain the property; no individual or small group will pay the costs of a decline in the value of the
property or benefit from its improvement. That is why government-owned housing, compared to
privately owned housing, is generally run down and poorly maintained. This is true in both capitalist
and socialist countries. Laxity in care, maintenance, and repair reflects the incentives that
accompany government ownership of property.
Second, private ownership encourages people to use their property productively. When
people are able to keep the fruits of their labor as private property, they have a strong incentive to
improve their skills, work harder, and work smarter. Such actions will increase their income.

6. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
Similarly, when people are permitted to keep what they earn, they will use land, buildings, and
other assets they own more productively.
Farming in the former Soviet Union shows how property rights stimulate productive activity.
Under the communist regime, families were permitted to keep or sell the goods they produced on
small private plots, which ranged up to an acre in size. These private plots made up only about 2
percent of the total land under cultivation; the other 98 percent consisted of huge collectively
owned farms where the output belonged to the state. As reported by the Soviet press,
approximately one-fourth of the total value of Soviet agricultural output was raised on this tiny
fraction of privately farmed land. This indicates that the output per acre on the private plots was
about 12 times the per-acre output of the state-owned farms.
Even a modest move away from state ownership toward private ownership produces
impressive results. In 1978 the communist government of China began a de facto policy of letting
farmers keep all rice grown on the collective farms over and above a specified amount that had to
be given to the state. In effect, the government turned a blind eye to farmers in the small village of
Xiaogang in China’s Anhui province. There, farmers began assigning responsibility for the cultivation
of particular plots of land to particular farmers, with each farmer keeping all production above his
contribution to the village’s quota for the state. The result was an immediate increase in
productivity. When the word got out, and the government ignored the official policy against such
“privatization,” the practice spread like wildfire, leading to rapid increases in agriculture output and
freeing farmers to move into non-agricultural sectors of the economy.9
Third, private owners have a strong incentive to develop things that they own in ways that
are beneficial to others. While private owners can legally do what they want with their property,
they can gain from actions that enhance its value to others. If they employ and develop their
property in ways that others find attractive, the market value of the property will increase. In
contrast, changes that others dislike, particularly if the others are customers or potential future
buyers, will reduce the value of one's property.
Consider the owner of an apartment complex. This person may not care anything about
having parking spaces, convenient laundry facilities, a nice workout room, or an attractive lawn and
swimming pool within the complex. But if consumers value these things highly (relative to the costs
of producing them), the owner has a strong incentive to provide them. These features will enhance
both the owner’s earnings – the rents – and the market value of the apartments. In contrast,
apartment owners who insist on providing only what they like, rather than the things that
consumers prefer, will find that their earnings and the value of their capital (their apartments)
decline.
Why are college students willing to endure long hours of study and incur the cost of a
college education? Private ownership of labor services provides the answer. Because they have an
ownership right to their labor services, their future earnings will be much greater if they acquire
knowledge and develop skills that are highly valued by others.
Fourth, private ownership promotes the wise development and conservation of resources for
the future. Using a resource may generate revenue. This revenue is the voice of present consumers,

7. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
reflecting what they want from the resource. But future consumers, too, have a voice, thanks to
property rights. An owner of a resource, say, a piece of land that could be developed now or
developed later, may believe that it will be more valuable in the future. In other words, its expected
future value exceeds its current value. This owner has an incentive to conserve B that is, hold back
on current use B to make sure that the resource will be available when it is more valuable. In a
sense, the owner is heeding the voice of future consumers. Private owners can increase their
personal wealth by balancing the demands in the present with the potential demand in the future.
Private owners gain by conservation whenever the expected future value of a consumable
resource exceeds its current value. This is true even if the current owner does not expect to be
around when the benefits accrue. Suppose that a 65-year-old tree farmer is contemplating whether
to cut his young Douglas fir trees. If the trees’ growth and the increased scarcity of wood are
expected to result in future revenues that exceed the current value of the trees, the farmer will gain
by conserving the trees for the future. As long as ownership is transferable, the market value of the
farmer's land will increase as the trees grow and the expected day of harvest moves closer. So, even
though the actual harvest may not take place until well after his death, the owner will be able to sell
the trees (or, more likely, the land including the trees) at any time, capturing their increasing value.
For centuries, pessimists have argued that we are about to run out of trees, critical
minerals, or various sources of energy. Again and again, they have been wrong because they failed
to recognize the role of private property. It is instructive to reflect on these doomsday forecasts. In
sixteenth-century England, fear arose that the supply of wood – widely used as a source of energy –
would soon be exhausted. Higher wood prices, however, encouraged conservation and led to the
development of coal. The wood crisis soon dissipated.
Even when a specific resource is not owned, the market for other resources that are owned
can often solve problems. In the middle of the nineteenth century, dire predictions arose that the
United States was about to run out of whale oil, at the time the primary fuel for artificial lighting.
No one owned the whales, which were being hunted to excess on the high seas, and their
population was declining. As whale oil prices rose, the incentive for individuals to conserve whales
for the future was missing, because they did not own the whales. However, as the prices increased,
individuals had an incentive to find substitute energy sources. If they could own the new energy
source, they could obtain substantial revenues. With time, this led to the development of kerosene,
a drop in the price of whale oil, and the end of the whale oil crisis.
Later, as people switched to petroleum, predictions emerged that this resource too would
be exhausted. In 1914, the Bureau of Mines reported that the total U.S. supply of oil was 6 million
barrels, an amount less than the United States now produces approximately every 20 months. In
1926, the Federal Oil Conservation Board informed people that the U.S. supply of oil would last only
seven years. A couple of decades later the Secretary of Interior forecast that the United States
would run out of oil in just a few more years. A study sponsored by the Club of Rome made similar
predictions for the world during the 1970s.
Understanding the incentives that emanate from private ownership makes it easy to see
why the doomsday forecasts have been so wrong. When the scarcity of a privately owned resource
increases, the price of the resource will rise. The increase in price provides producers, innovators,

8. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
engineers, and entrepreneurs with an incentive to (a) conserve on the direct use of the resource, (b)
search more diligently for substitutes, and (c) develop new methods of discovering and recovering
larger amounts of the resource. To date, these forces have pushed doomsday ever farther into the
future, and there is every reason to believe that they will continue to do so for resources that are
privately owned.10
A legal system that protects property rights and enforces contracts in an evenhanded manner
provides the foundation for capital formation and gains from trade, which are the mainsprings of
economic growth. In contrast, insecure property rights, uncertain enforcement of agreements, and
legal favoritism undermine both investment and gains from trade. Throughout history, people have
tried other forms of ownership such as cooperatives, socialism, and communism. These experiences
have ranged from unsuccessful to disastrous. To date, we do not know of any institutional
arrangement that provides individuals with as much freedom and incentive to serve others by using
resources productively and efficiently as does private ownership within the framework of the rule
of law.

9. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
k"FhLsf] /x:o
-xgf{G8f] l8 ;f]6f]
t];|f] ljZjsf / k"j{ ;fDojfbL b]zx?sf zx/df pBdLx?sf] 3'OFrf] 5 . tkfO{+ dWo k"jL{
ahf/df lx8b} x'g'xf]; of n]l6g cd]l/sfsf] s'g} Pp6f ufpFdf kbofqf ub}{ x'g'xf];, jf
d:sf]df Pp6f 6]S;L r9b} x'g'xf];, htf eP klg tkfO{+;Fu s;}n] s]xL g s]xL ;f}bf
ug{ vf]lh/x]sf] x'G5 . oL b]zsf lgjf;Lx?;Fu of]Utf 5 , pT;'Stf 5 / vf;} s]xL
geOsg gfkmf sdfpg ;Sg] crDdsf] Ifdtf 5 . pgLx? cfw'lgs k|ljlw u|x0f /
k|of]u ug{ ;S5g . cGoyf, cd]l/sg Joj;foLx?n] ljb]zdf eO{/x]sf] cfkmgf] :jfldtf
kqsf] -k]6]G6sf] _ u}/sfg"gL k|of]unfO{ lgoGq0f ug{ ls7gfO ´]Ng'kb}{gYof] ;fy}
cd]l/ls ;/sf/ t];|f] ljZjsf b]zx?sf] xftaf6 cfw'lgs xltof/sf k|ljlw arfpg
k|oTgzLn x'Fb}g lyof] . ahf/x? k|frLg / ;fj{ef}lds k/Dk/f x'g M O{;'n]
Jofkf/Lx?nfO{ b'O{ xhf/ jif{ cufl8 luhf{3/af6 wkfPsf x'g / sf]nDa; cd]l/sf k'Ug'
cl3 klg d]lS;sgx?n] cfkmgf] pTkfbgx? ahf/df nUy] .
t/, olb k"FhLjfb tkm{ nDs]sf b]zsf dflg;x? bogLo cj:yfdf /x]sf dfUg]x?
xf]Ogg eg], k'/fg} tl/sfdf cN´]sf 5}gg eg], / cls|ofTds ;+:s[ltsf s}bLx?
xf]Ogg eg], lsg k"FhLjfbn] klZrddf dfq ;kmntf r'Db} wgsf] cf]O/f] NofPsf] xf]nf<
lsg k"FhLjfb, Pp6f /x:odo 3}+6f]df 3]l/P ´}+, klZrddf dfq km:6fpF5 <
o; lstfadf d]/f] dg;fo s] k|:t't ug'{ xf] eg] , Tof] d'Vo afwf h;n] ljZjsf
afFlssf efunfO{ k"FhLjfbaf6 kmfObf lngaf6 /f]S5 Tof] ltgLx?sf] k"FhL pTkfbg ug{
;Sg] Ifdtfsf] cefj xf] . k"FhL o:tf] zlSt xf] h;n] Pp6f dhb"/sf]
pTkfbgsfl/tfnfO{ a9fpF5 / /fi6«sf nflu wgsf] ;+/rgf u5{ . of] k"FhLjfbL
Joj:yfkgsf] cleGg cË xf], pGgltsf] hu xf], / Pp6f o:tf] s'/f xf] h'g ul/a
d'n'ssf dflg;x? cfkmgf] nflu pTkfbg ug{ g;Sg] b]lvG5g, hlt;'s} k"FhLjfbL
cy{tGqsf sfo{x?df nfu] klg .
d}n] / d]/f] cg';Gwfg 6f]nLn] ;+sng u/]sf ;To tYo / u0fgfsf] cfwf/df d s] klg
b]vfpg rxfG5' eg] Plzof, clk|msf, dWo–k"jL{ efu / n]l6g cd]l/sfdf Ps efuaf6
csf]{ efu;Dd / Pp6f s[lif If]q b]lv csf]{ s[lif If]q;Dd w]/} h;f] ul/ax?;Fu k"FhL
pTkfbg ug{;Sg] ;DklQ /x]sf] 5 . ;a}eGbf ul/a d'n'sx?df klg ul/ax?n] art
u5{g . vf;df, ul/ax? aLr artsf] dfGotf cTolws 5 – O{=;+ !($% b]lv ljZj

10. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
el/af6 kfOPsf] ljb]zL ;xfotfeGbf rfnL; u'0ff w]/} . pbfx/0fsf nflu, O{lhK6df
ul/an] hDdf u/]sf] wgsf] df]n, clxn];Dd ToxfF /]s8{ ul/Psf] ;a} k|ToIf ljb]zL
nufgL, ;'Ph s]gn / c:jfg 8]d ;d]tsf] hf]8eGbf kRkGg u'0ff w]/} 5 . n]l6g
cd]l/sfsf] ;a}eGbf ul/a /fi6« xfO{6Ldf , ul/asf] s'n wg ;DklQ, o;n] k|mfG;;Fu
O{=;+ !*)$ df :jtGqtf kfP b]lvsf] ;a} ljb]zL nufgLsf] hf]8eGbf krf; u'0ff w]/}
5 . olb cd]l/sfn] cfkmgf] ljb]zL nufgLsf] ah]6 ;+o'St /fi6« ;+3n] l;kmfl/; u/]
cg';f/sf] tx;Dd a9fpg] xf] eg] -/fli6«o cfosf] )=& k|ltzt_ o; ljZjsf] ;a}eGbf
wgL /fi6«nfO{ ul/a;Fu klxn] g} ePsf] ;|f]tnfO{ e]§fpg !%) jif{eGbf a9L nfU5 .
t/ pgLx?;Fu oL ;|f]tx? q'l6k"0f{ cj:yfdf /x]sf 5g M ;xL ?kdf lghLs/0f
gul/Psf] hUufdf 3/, ckl/eflift C0f /x]sf] cJojl:yt Joj;fo, cy{zf:qLx? /
nufgLstf{x?n] gb]Vg] 7fpFdf /x]sf pBf]ux? . oL ;DklQx?sf] /fd|f];Fu u0fgf
gePsfn], oL ;DklQx?nfO{ t'?Gt} k"FhLsf] ?kdf ablng ;ls+b}g, hxfF dflg;x? Ps
csf{nfO{ lrG5g / ljZjf; u5{g To; ;Lldt :yfgLo If]qeGbf aflx/ Jofkf/ ug{
;ls+b}g, C0fsf nflu lwtf]sf] ?kdf k|of]u ug{ ;ls+b}g / nufgLsf] nflu Pp6f
efusf] ?kdf k|of]u ug{ ;ls+b}g .
o;sf] ljkl/t, klZrddf k|To]s cfgf hUuf, ejg, cf}hf/ jf j:t'–;"rLsf] ljj/0f,
;DklQ k|df0fkqdf pNn]v ul/Psf] x'G5 h'g oL ;a} ;DklQnfO{ afFls cy{tGq;Fu
hf]8g] Pp6f ljzfn gb]lvg] k|ls|ofsf] b]lvg] ;+s]t xf] . of] pNn]VgLo k|ls|of s} sf/0f
oL ;DklQx?sf] cfkmgf] ef}lts cl:tTjsf] ;fy} Pp6f cb[Zo / ;dfGt/ cl:tTj klg
/xG5g . oL pwf/f]sf] nflu lwtf]sf] ?kdf k|of]u x'G5g . cd]l/sfdf gofF Joj;fosf]
nflu Pp6} dfq dxTjk"0f{ ;|f]t eg]sf] pBdLsf] 3/ aGwsdf /fVg' xf] . oL ;DklQx?n]
xsjfnfsf] kl5Nnf] C0f hf]8g ;S5g, C0f / s/ ;+sng ug]{ e/kbf]{ dfWod aGg
;S5g , e/kbf]{ / ;j{JofkL k|of]u x'g] ;fj{hlgs ;fdfu|Lx?sf] l;h{gf ug]{ cfwf/
lbg;S5g / ;xfos ahf/df k'gM 5'6 lbO{ a]Rg ;Sg] ;]So"l/l6–-h:t} lwtf]k"0f{
aG8;_sf] l;h{gf ug]{ hu lbg;S5g . of] k|ls|ofaf6 klZrdL d'n'sn] ;DklQdf hLjg
xfN5 / To;af6 k"FhL lgsfN5 .
t];|f] ljZj / k"j{ ;fDojfbL /fi6«x?;Fu of] lg?k0f ug]{ Joj:yf 5}g . kl/0ffd :j?k,
tL dWo] w]/}h;f] ;Fu rflxPeGbf sd k"FhL 5, h;/L Pp6f Joj;fodf rflxPeGbf sd
k"FhL ta x'G5 ha o;n] cfkmgf] cfo / ;DklQn] wfGg ;Sg]eGbf sd ;]So"l/6L lgsf;
u5{ . ul/asf] ;+u7g, gofF nufgL p7fpg z]/ / aG8 lgsf; ug{ g;Sg] ;+:yfx?
h:t} x'G5 . k|ltlglwTj lagf, pgLx?sf] ;DklQ d[t k"FhL xf] .

11. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
oL /fi6«sf ul/a lgjf;Lx?;Fu -dfgjtfsf] %÷^ efu_ ;fdfu|L t 5 t/ pgLx?
cfkmgf ;DklQnfO{ b]vfpg / k"FhL l;h{gf ug{ c;Ifd 5g . pgLx?;Fu 3/ 5 t/ xs
5}g, afnL 5 t/ To;sf] b:tfj]h 5}g, Joj;fo 5 t/ To;sf] j}wflgs cfwf/ 5}g .
log} dxTjk"0f{ s'/fx? gePsfn] tL dflg;x? h;n] ;a} klZrdL cfljisf/ ckgfPsf
5g -sfut RofKg] b]lv Go"lSno/ l/PS6/;Dd_ pgLx?n] cfkmgf] 3/]n' k"FhLjfb rnfpg
rflxg] hlt k"FhL l;h{gf ug{ ;s]sf 5}gg .
oxL xf] k"FhLsf] /x:o . o;nfO{ ;'N´fpg s] a'´g k5{ eg] klZrd]x?n] xssf
cfwf/df ;DklQ b]vfP/ To;af6 k"FhLnfO{ x]g{ / lgsfNg ;s] . dflg;sf] dl:t;ssf
nflu Pp6f 7"nf] r'gf}lt eg]sf] tL s'/fx?sf] cfsng ug'{ xf] / To;sf] kx'Fr kfpg' xf]
h'g s'/fsf] cl:tTj 5 t/ xfdL b]Vg ;Sb}gf}+ . h'g s'/f jf:tljs / pkof]uL x'G5 Tof]
;a} 5'g ;Sg] jf b]lvg] x'Fb}g . pbfx/0fsf nflu, ;do jf:tljs xf] t/ o;nfO{ ta
dfq k|efjsf/L ?kdf Joj:yfkg ug{ ;lsG5 ha o;nfO{ 38L jf Sofn]G8/åf/f k|:t't
ul/G5 . Oltxf; x]g]{ xf] eg] dflg;x?n] y'k|} pNn]Vo k|0fflnx?sf] cfljisf/ u/]sf 5g
– n]v, ;+uLtsf] c+sg, 8an–PG6«L a"s llskª – h'g 5'g g;Sg] eP klg dflg;sf]
dl:tisn] a'´g ;S5 . To:t} u/L , k"FhLjfbsf 7"nf ljz]if1x?, ;lDdlnt xs k|0ffln
/ ;+:yfut e08f/ l;h{gf ug]{ b]lv dfO{sn ldNs]g ;Ddn] xfdL;Fu hDdf ePsf
;DklQaf6 ;+ej k"FhLnfO{ gofF pNn]Vo k|ls|ofaf6 b]vfpg / lgsfNg ;S5g .
olx ;dodf, tkfO{+ gb]lvg] o's|]g, rfO{gf / a|fhLnsf] 6]lnlehgsf] k|jfxaf6 3]l/g'
ePsf] 5 . tkfO{+ tL ;DklQx?af6 klg 3]l/g' ePsf] 5 h;df gb]lvg] k"FhL /x]sf] 5 .
h;/L o's|]gsf] 6]lnlehgsf] k|jfxnfO{ k|ToIf ?kdf dx;'; ug{ g;s] klg Pp6f
6]lnlehg ;]6 åf/f x]g{ / ;'Gg ;lsG5, To;/L g} k"FhLnfO{ klg ;DklQaf6 lgsfNg
;lsG5 . t/, klZrd;Fu dfq} gb]lvg]nfO{ b]lvg]df kl/0ft ug]{ k|ls|of 5 . oxL
c;dfgtfn] lj:tf/ u5{ lsg klZrdL d'n'sx?n] k"FhL l;h{gf ug{ ;S5g / t;|f] ljZj
/ k"j{ ;fDojfbL b]zx?n] l;h{gf ug{ ;Sb}gg .
ljZjsf oL ul/a If]qx?df -hxfF @÷# dflg;sf] af; 5_ of] k|ls|of gx'g' klZrdsf]
Psnf}6L if8oGqsf] kl/0ffd xf]Og . a? of] s] xf eg], klZrd]x?n] of] k|ls|ofnfO{ olt
;lhnf];Fu lnG5g ls pgLx?n] o;sf] cl:tTjnfO{ g} lal;{;s] . cd]l/sgx?,
o"/f]lkogx? / hfkfgLx? h;n] cfkmgf] ;a} wg o;nfO{ k|of]u ug]{ Ifdtdf nufpg'
kg]{ xf], of] k|ls|of ljzfn ePklg s;}n] klg o;nfO{ b]Vb}gg . of], pgLx?sf] ;DklQ
Joj:yfkg k|0ffln leq n's]sf] Pp6f c:ki6 sfg"gL k"jf{wf/ xf] – h;sf] :jfldTj
eg]sf] Pp6f a/kmsf] kj{tsf] 6'Kkf] xf] . o; kj{tsf] afFls efu dflg;n] agfPsf]
hl6n k|ls|of xf] h;n] ;DklQ / >dnfO{ k"FhLdf kl/0ft ug{;S5 . of] k|ls|ofsf] ;[hgf
Pp6f k|ltlrqaf6 ul/Psf] xf]Og / o;nfO{ Pp6f rlDsnf] lj1fkgkqdf j0f{g ul/Psf]

12. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
5}g . o;sf] cf/De c:ki6 5 / klZrdL k"FhLklt /fi6«x?sf] cy{tfGqLs cw{r]tgdf
o;sf] dxTj k'l/Psf] 5 .
o:tf] dxTjk"0f{ s'/f xfd|f] lbdfuaf6 s;/L lrlKng ;S5 < oL s'/fx? lsg sfd u5{g
eGg] ga'l´sg oLgLx?sf] k|of]u af/] yxfkfpg' xfd|f] nflu c;fdfGo s'/f xf]Og .
r'Dalso 1fgsf] lrQa'´bf] cWoog x'g' w]/} cuf8L b]lv 8'Ëf rnfpg]x?n] r'Dalso
l;of]sf] k|of]u ub{y]{ . u|]u/ d]G8]nn] j+zfg'ut l;4fGtx?sf] af/] lj:tf/ ug'{eGbf w]/}
cuf8L b]lv kz'kfng ug]{x?n] o;sf af/] ls|ofzLn 1fg xfl;n ul/;s]sf lyP .
klZrdL ljZj w]/} k"FhLn] ubf{ ;d[4 ePklg, s] dflg;x?n] k«"FhLsf] lgsf;nfO{ a'´]sf
5g < obL 5}gg eg], klZrdn] cfkmg} zlStsf] ;|f]tnfO{ ;+ejtM gf]S;fg k'/fpg ;S5
. k"FhLsf] ;|f]tsf af/] :ki6 x'gfn] cjZo cfpg] ;+s6af6 klZrd / ljZjsf afFls
efux?nfO{ cfkm} aRg tof/ u/fpF5 . To;kl5 cGt/fi6«Lo ;+s6sf a]nf ;'lgg] k|Zg
km]/L ;'lgG5 M ;d:of ;dfwfg ug{ s;sf] k};fsf] k|of]u ug]{ <
clxn] ;Dd, klZrdL d'n'sx? cfkmgf] k"FhL pTkfbgsf] k|0ffnLdf TotL Wofg glbgd} /
k'/fgf s'/fx?nfO{ sfuhL gug{d} v'zL 5g . t/ tL Oltxf;sf s'/fnfO{ e]§fpg' k5{ .
of] lstfa, k"FhLsf] ;|f]tsf] cg';GwfgnfO{ km]l/ vf]Ng] Pp6f k|of; xf] / ul/a
d'n'sx?sf] cy{tflGqs c;kmntfnfO{ s;/L ;Rofpg] eg]/ lj:tf/ ug'{ klg xf] . oL
c;kmntfx?l;t ;+:s[lt jf j+zfg'ut tTjsf] sdL;Fu s'g} ;/f]sf/ 5}g . s] s;}n]
n]l6g cd]l/sfnLx? / ?;Lx? aLr æ;f+:s[ltsÆ ;dfgtf b]vfpg ;S5 < t/klg
uPsf] bzsdf, ha b]lv b'j} If]qn] k"FhL lagf k"FhLjfbsf] lgdf0f{ ug{ yfn], pgLx?n]
;dfg /fhgLlts, ;fdflhs / cfly{s ;d:ofx? ´]Nb} cfPsf 5g M a9bf c;dfgtf ,
e"ldut cy{tGq, Jofks dflkmofx? , /fhgLlts cl:y/tf, k"FhL 36g', sfg"gsf]
cjx]ngf cflb . oL ;d:ofx?sf] pTklQ ?l9jflb lu/hf3/sf df]gf:6«Lx?df jf
O{gSof;sf af6f]x?df ePsf] xf]O{g .
t/, k"j{ ;fDojfbL / t];|f] ljZjsf b]zx? dfq} oL ;a} ;d:ofx?af6 kLl8t 5}gg .
o:tf] cd]l/sfdf klg ePsf] lyof] O{=;+ !&*# df , ha /fi6«klt hf]h{ jflzª6gn] æ
cj}w x:tIf]kLx?n] =====c?sf] gf]S;fgsf] abnfdf b]zsf] ;jf]{Qd cz+nfO{ lgsfNg] /
kmofSg u5{gÆ eGg] lzsfot u/]sf lyP . oL æ cj}w x:tIf]kLx?Æ eg]sf] tL
;'s'Daf;Lx? / ;fgf u}/sfg"gL pBdLx? lyP h;n] cfkmgf] clwsf/ gePsf hdLg /
3/ Dffly sAhf u/]sf lyP . cfpg] Ps ;o jif{df , oL ;'s'Daf;Lx?n] hdLgx? Dffly
sfg"gL xs kfpg n8fO{+ u/] / vfgLdf sfd ug]{ dflg;x?n] pgLx?sf] dfunfO{
dfg]gg lsgeg] xs ;DalGw sfg"g k|To]s zx/ / lzlj/df km/s lyof] . ;DklQsf]
clwsf/ ;'lglZrt ugf{n] cd]l/sf el/ o:tf] ;fdflhs cl:y/tf / k|lts"ntf k}bf

13. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
u/fof] ls , ;jf]{Rr cbfntsf k|d'v GofofwLz hf];]km :6f]/Ln] O{=;+ !*@) df ;f]r] s]
jlsnx?n] slxNo} o;sf] ;dfwfg ug{ ;Snfg <
s] ;'s'Daf;L, cj}w x:tIf]kL, / sfg"g gdfGg] h:tf s'/fx? ;'lgg] u/]sf 5g <
cd]l/sg / o"/f]lkogx?n] c? b]zx?nfO{ æcfkm" h:t} x'g'k5{Æ elg/x]sf 5g . vf;df
tL , Ps zts klxnfsf] ljsf; gePsf] cd]l/sf h:t} 5g . cfh ljsf;pGd'v / k"j{
;fDojfbL b]zsf g]tfx?n] ;fdgf ug'{ k/]sf h:t} klZrdL /fhgLlt1x?n] klg Ps
rf]6L o:t} gf6lso zt{x?sf] ;fdgf u/]sf lyP . t/, pgLx?sf pQ/flwsf/Lx?n] tL
lbgx?nfO{ la;]{sf5g ha cd]l/sfnL klZrd vf]Ng] cfljisf/sx?;Fu rflxPeGbf sd
k"FhL lyof] lsgeg] pgLx?n] lj/n} cfkmgf] hdLg / ;dfu|Lsf] xs kfPsf lyP, ha
P8d :dLyn] sfnf] ahf/df ;fdfg lsga]r u/] / c+u|]hL ;8ssf duGt] aRrfx?n]
y]D;sf] lxnfDo lsgf/df ko{6sx?n] kmfn]sf] k};f p7fP, ha hLg–a]kl6:6 sf]Na6{sf]
j}1flgsx?n] !^))) ;fgf pBdLx?nnfO{ kmfF;L lbP h;sf] ck/fw olt dfq lyof]
ls pgLx?n] k|mfG;]nL pBf]u gLlt ljk/Lt skf;sf] sk8fsf] pTkfbg / cfoft u/] .
Tof] e"tsfn y'k|} /fi6«x?sf] jt{dfg /x]sf] 5 . klZrdL /fi6«x?n] cfkmgf ul/anfO{
o;/L ;kmntf k"j{s cfkmgf] cy{tGqdf ufF;]sf 5g ls pgLx?n] s] lal;{;s] eg]
pgLx?n] of] s;/L u/]sf lyP, s;/L k"FhLsf] ;[hgf ;'? eof], cd]l/sg Oltxf;sf/
uf]8{g p8n] n]v] ´}+ æ s]xL k|efjf]Tkfbs s'/f ;dfh / ;+:s[ltdf eO{/x]sf] lyof] h;n]
cd]l/sg Oltxf;df lsxn] gePsf] pT;fx / hfFu/ 5f]l8/x]sf] lyof] .! Tof] æs]xL
k|efjf]TkfbsÆ eg]sf] s] lyof] eg], cd]l/sg / o"/f]lkogx?n] 7"nf] cf}krfl/s ;DklQ
sfg"g agfpg] / tL ;DklQ af6 k"FhL ;[hgf ug]{ Pp6f kl/jt{g k|0ffnLsf] cfljisf/
ug}{ cfF6]sf lyP . of] Tof] If0f lyof] ha klZrdn] ;kmn k"FhLjfb lt/ 8f]¥ofpg]
lgwf{l/t ;LdfnfO{ kf/ u/] – ha of] lghL ;d"xaf6 Pp6f nf]lsk|o ;+:s[ltdf kl/0ft
eof], ha hf]h{ jlzª6g 8/fP ls æcj}w x:tIf]kLx?Æ cfljisf/sx?df kl/0ft eP
h;nfO{ cd]l/sg ;+:s[lt clxn] cfb/ ub{5 .

14. Political Economic Digest Series 3 Samriddhi, The Prosperity Foundation
Questions to think about:
Do you think private property rights are important? What do you think is the role of private property
rights in the development of a country?
The success of community forests of Nepal in the protecting the forests, forest animals and creatures
and uplifting the living standards of the related community is well known. Can you relate the role of
property rights in the success of community forests? Why weren’t the people concerned about the
destruction of forests earlier although they are actively protecting and promoting the forests now?
In contrast to the example of community forests, community run schools have proved to be a failure.
Why do you think they failed? Has it something to do with property rights too? Do the people who run
community schools too get to make incomes from the schools like they do in case of community forests?
Most of our political parties are opposed to private property rights. Although the debate is still on, there
is a possibility that we might not have private property rights in the new constitution. What do you think
will happen if the private property rights aren’t guaranteed by the constitution?
What do you think about the land ceiling laws? Do they promote or discourage the efficient use of
lands?