How to anticipate and communicate crises ahead of teim. What are the warnings that we can give leaders?

1. Detecting Threats and WARNING LEADERS
Ken Knight
kenknight2@cox.net
703-220-8445

2. What is the Goal?
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• To “sound an alarm, give notice and
admonishing advice to policy-makers” (Gates)
• Especially:
̶ Provide explicit
warnings on “known”
issues of major concern
̶ Alert policy-makers to
the potential and
implications of
emerging challenges
and opportunities at
the earliest possible
juncture
Tunisian’s Suicide Will Go Viral!
Igniting Instability Across Arab World!
Egypt, Libya, Syria, Others Affected!
Global Impacts … IS, Migration Crisis, etc.!
You Need to do Something!

3. Enduring Challenges
• A tough business, even under the best circumstances
– complex issues, set in the future, significant uncertainties, high stakes
• Defining the mission
• 3-Bears expectations
• Product/output
• Success metrics
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• Finding the right place to
“plug in”
• Maintaining the mindset
• Training, time, resources
• Not wanting to be wrong

4. Temptation to Warn of Everything …
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… Or Report Anything

5. The Ideal Analytic Output
• Timely
– Detects the earliest signs
– Responsive to policy-maker timelines
• Credible
– Uncertainties, gaps, assumptions and confidence are transparent
– Considers and examines plausible alternatives
– Convincingly delivered (sound, concise, tailored)
• Actionable
– Evaluates impact (the event) and implications (aftermath)
– Addresses context, direction, speed, completeness
– Anticipates (posits) next steps … and potential triggers?
– Identifies potential points of leverage/influence
– Assesses potential for additional warning
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6. In a Perfect World
• Early, frequent, iterative
engagement with policy-makers
• Focused on changing risk equation
(not a predictive call)
• Generating timely, credible,
actionable insights
• Enabling better decisions, broader
options, increased resiliency
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• Promoting strategic action (dynamic analytic support to):
– Shape outcomes to achieve objectives
– Prepare better for outcomes that were not fully shaped
– Mitigate impacts of outcomes that were not fully prepared for
– Optimize the post-crisis environment

7. Not So Easy to Get Right
Assuming you see it coming …
• The audience is pre-occupied … they might not be receptive
• They have biases too … and other sources of information
• You’re asking them to embrace a major discontinuity … potential
changes that may never materialize … a very tough sell
• Your case likely rests more on rational possibilities than evidence
• You hope to leave them worried (thanks!) … they may just be
complacent … or angry
• They expect you to get it “just right” … not too early or too late
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• Other experts disagree … they may try to
push you toward consensus
• An ounce of prevention is hard to measure
• Nobody, especially you, wants to be wrong
• “Crying Sheep” (McCarthy)

8. So … You Should
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• Engage as early and often
as you can
• Avoid either/or calls
• Be careful not to hype the
issue
• Use any surrogate access
• Work hard to build trust
̶ The “Powell Dictum” (what you
know, don’t know, and think)
• Be persistent, tough-
minded, creative,
calculating …
• Remember: fundamentals
and system

9. It Helps to Have a System
• Understanding and articulating
“normal”
– Patterns, developments,
conditions, behaviors, actions,
etc. that define the steady state
• Being able to recognize
important deviations
– Sources, metrics, analytic
criteria, etc. that help you detect
significant change
• Knowing when (and when not)
to warn
– Reporting thresholds … how far
away from normal before you
tell somebody 9
Normal
Elevated
Significant
Concern
Critical

10. What Does Your Policy-Maker Need?
• What would they most like to know if they could
know anything?
• What is their definition (strategic vision) of
success?
• What are the top several things they most want
to accomplish? … most need to avoid?
• What are their biggest concerns/fears?
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• What are the implications of not achieving their vision?
• What needs to change in order for them to be successful?
• What developments (successes and failures) over the recent past
are most instructive?
• What must be done now/next (the priority first/next step)?
• What one thing would they do if they could do anything?

11. Other Questions for You
• What is the critical information
I must convey … in initial and
subsequent interactions?
• What factors are causing me
concern … how do I track and
measure them?
• Who is my audience?
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• What are the principal obstacles to my effectively communicating
this warning?
• What if I am not successful?
• What opportunities/advantages do I have?
• What is my most likely/effective means of conveyance?
• What questions can I anticipate?
• What are the main counter arguments?

12. Be Creative … and Persistent
Structured Analytic Techniques:
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• Point-Counterpoint Workshops
• Timeline-Indicator Assessments
• Key Assumptions Checks
• Drivers-Constraints
Analyses
• Engaging Outside
Experts
• Opportunity
Assessments
• Games
• Scenarios
• What-If
Exercises

13. Understand the Pitfalls
• Consensus cultures (don’t rock the boat)
• Functional specialization (experts rule)
• Integration (old/new, regional/functional, etc.)
• Imagination (that hasn’t happened before)
• Mirror imaging (they’ll do what we would do)
• Perception biases/pattern matching (seeing what we
expect to see)
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• Inappropriate analogies (true
before, so true again)
• Depending too much on the
information we have
• Ego (You can’t fool me)
• Negativity bias … remembering
the bad more than the good
• Holding on to entrenched beliefs

14. Deciding When to Warn?
• Has/is the risk equation
changed/changing?
• Likelihood and Impact?
• Approaching a threshold?
• Do other analysts share
my concern?
• Is the policy community
aware?
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• How long has it been since we last engaged?
• Are other narratives overly optimistic?
• Has the risk narrative been fragmented?

15. Helping with Mitigation Options
• Do we have the capacity to affect event
likelihood and/or impact? How?
• Do we have the option of doing nothing? … or
of “getting out of the business” altogether?
• How might we share or deflect the risk?
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• Do we have a warning system in place for
this contingency?
• Do we have contingency plans?
• Can we adapt? … or hedge
against it?

16. Assessing Analytic Confidence
• Complexity
• Information
• Analytic Expertise
• Plausible
Alternatives
• Time
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17. A Useful Writing Style
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•Chapeau paragraph
provides “bottom
line” assessments
•Bulleted sub-
paragraphs provide
supporting evidence
and rationale
•Examples at:
http://www.dni.gov
/index.php/about/o
rganization/national
-intelligence-
council-nic-
publications

18. Graphic Shorthand
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Indicator Status
Normal Elevated Significant
Concern
Critical
C2 Garrison Status Two Strategic
CPs Deployed
3-4 Strategic CPs
Deployed
More Than 4
Strategic CPs
Deployed
Logistics Stocks in Depots Local Depots
Out-Loaded
Regional Depots
Out-Loaded
National Depots Out-
Loaded
Combat
Forces
Garrison Status 20-25% Out of
Garrison
25-50% Out of
Garrison
More than 50% Out
of Garrison
Strategic
Forces
Deterrent Status 25% in Ready
Status
More than 25%
in Ready Status
Fully Mobilized and
Dispersed
Civil
Defense
Peacetime Status Reserve-Ready
Status
Reserve Call-up
Underway
Full Mobilization
National
Reserves
Peacetime Status Single Sector
Mobilization
Multiple Sector
Mobilization
Full Mobilization
Indicator
Status
15 Aug
Status
15 Sep Direction
Elite Cohesion (Overall Assessment)
Additional attacks on senior leadership
Key security elements unwilling to act
Desertions/defectionsamong leadershipor rank and file
Redeployment to elite heartland
Non-elite opposition to regime
Evidence of palace coup/attempt (arrests,purges,etc.)
Military/ Security Service/Key Leader Loyalty
(Overall Assessment)
Desertion/defections
Recruitment (conscriptionnumbers)
Casualties
Unwillingness to act
Coup/attempt (arrests of officers)
Military/Security Service Effectiveness (Overall
Assessment)
Declining effectiveness of key units
Shortages (numbers,arms, equipment)
Logistics shortfalls impacting operations
Capacity to seize/hold territory
Capacity to project forces anywhere
Dependenceon militias
Opposition Effectiveness (Overall
Assessment)
Numbers (recruits,arms, operations,etc.)
Reducingcapabilities gap in relationship to regime
forces
Clear structure/commandand control
Capacity to repel regime offensive operations
Improved coordination
Geographic scope of ops
Intelligence capacity
Capacity to establish safe-havens
Leadership’s Perspective/Outlook (Overall
Assessment)
Public profile
Indicator Lists
Stoplight Charts
Direction:
Current Status
Velocity: HIGH
Dashboard Displays
MED LOW
Integrated Risk Plots

19. 19

20. Drivers-Constraints Assessments
(Will Country “X” Attack Country “Y” by ZZ?)
DRIVERS
• “Y’s” Nuclear Progress
• Other Actor Equivocation
• “Y”s Level of Hostility
• Failure of Diplomatic
Processes
• “Y’s” Military Advances
----
• “Y’s” Domestic Turmoil
• “X’s” Leadership Crisis
• Situational Specifics
CONSTRAINTS
• Proxy Strategic Relations
• Uncertainties WRT Mission
Effectiveness
• Need to Exhaust Diplomatic
Options
----
• “Y’s” Capacity/Options for
Retaliation
• Impact on Commodity Prices
• Impact on Regional Allies
• International Reactions
Assessment: Constraints currently outweigh drivers, but risk increasing over time.
Likelihood in next 6 months: 20-30 % (consensus); analytic range <10-to-50%
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21. Specialized Warning Product “Index”
Consider Including:
• Clear articulation of the risk/warning issue
• Factors/rationale that are causing you concern … how you measure them
• How the risk might “plausibly” materialize
• Likelihood assessment (is the event becoming more or less likely, within specified
timeframe, with confidence statement)
– Problematic, but important
• Potential impact should it materialize
– Not strictly an analytical function
– Depends on threat/risk
and exposure/vulnerability
• Assumptions, uncertainties, alternatives
• Things to watch for next; triggering events
• Potential points of leverage /influence
• Potential for additional warning
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22. And Still They Don’t Listen …
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23. … So Keep Your Sense of Humor
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24. 24
Questions?

25. 25
Back-Ups

26. Why Warning Matters
• Turn on the news …
• Systematically explore the
implications of multiple
possible futures
• Build-in resiliency, flexibility
and adaptability ahead of time
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• Identify and deal more effectively and creatively with
critical uncertainties
• Highlight important potential opportunities
• “Test” the viability of key concepts, operating models,
processes, infrastructures, plans and the like against
multiple potential futures

27. Elements of a Systematic Process
• Continuous effort to identify
existing and anticipate emerging
threats
• Conscious prioritization and
evaluation (e.g. likelihood,
impact, capacity to influence key
factors, etc.)
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• Consistent monitoring of critical factors
impacting the warning/risk/opportunity event
• Regular communication with leadership and
other stakeholders
• Supporting evaluation of mitigation options?

28. Common Causes of Surprise
• Deliberate hostile actions
• Complex systems that cannot or
will not adapt to change
• Second-and-third-order
consequences of known trends
and/or complex linkages
• Key actors or institutions
behaving differently than in the
past
• Sudden technological and/or
operational changes
• Natural and human-induced
disasters 28

29. But We Can Improve the Odds
• Conscious, deliberate, systematic efforts … not just
the by-product of daily activity
• 3-dimensional capabilities
– Rapid detection for rapid response
– Persistent surveillance of known threats
– Strategic reconnaissance of emerging issues
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• Extensive collaboration and engagement
… well beyond your team
• Energizing and focusing the entire enterprise
• Specific training and tradecraft
• Senior leader endorsement (partnership with analytic
organizations)

30. Dealing With Experts
• What is your assessment of XX … in XX timeframe?
• Why do you think that? (assumptions, evidence,
rationale, uncertainties)
• How confident are you in your assessment?
• Does anyone disagree with you? … Why?
• How recent is your most critical information?
• Has your assessment changed over time?
• What is the latest big thing you have had
to factor in?
• What would change your assessment?
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• What would you like to know that you don’t?
• How are you most likely to be wrong?
• What are the implications if you are wrong?
• When was the last time you were wrong?

31. Matching Methodologies to Problems
• Where is the issue on the analytic continuum (known? …
knowable? … complex? … chaotic?)
• What information would you like to have to address your
issue with high confidence? How does that compare with
the information you have or are likely to get?
• Who is your primary intended consumer? What is his/her
decision ‘space’ … time horizon … risk tolerance?
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• How much time do you have?
• How do you plan to deal
(explicitly) with uncertainty?
• What is the best (or most likely)
method of conveyance?
• What methodologies are most
appropriate to your issue?

32. 5 Useful Things to Have in Place
• Structured analytic approaches tailored to
the problem
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• Comprehensive
information strategies
• Communities of interest
effectively linking
stakeholders
• Regular dialogue with
customers
• Designated analytic leads

33. Six Essential Warning Skills
• Capacity for strategic analysis
• Leadership, people, communications
• Understanding the analysis-policy nexus
• ‘Wisdom of the Ages’
• Full suite of analytic approaches
• Methodology-to-problem matching
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