Nadja ZELEZNIK: "Main challenges of public informa on in emergency preparedness in Europe" SEMINAR ON PUBLIC INFORMATION IN EP&R: http://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/activities/nuclear-emergency-preparedness-and-response/seminar-on-public-information-in-epr.html

1. Main challenges of public information in
emergency preparedness in Europe
Adressing the requirements on public information in EP&R from
BSS Directive (Articles 70 and 71)
Luxembourg, 1st December 2016
Nadja Železnik, Regional Environmental Center (REC), Slovenia
Chair of WG EP&R of Nuclear Transparency Watch

2. 2
Introduction
 Aarhus Convention:
 Art 5.1.c: ‘In the event of any imminent threat to human health or the environment,
whether caused by human activities or due to natural causes, all information which
could enable the public to take measures to prevent or mitigate harm arising from the
threat’…’is disseminated immediately and without delay to members of the public
who may be affected’.
 Stakeholder -“The public concerned” means the public affected or likely to be
affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decision-making; for the
purposes of this definition, non-governmental organizations promoting environmental
protection and meeting any requirements under national law shall be deemed to
have an interest. – Civil society and organisation – CSO.
 BSS Directive:
 Relevant articles:
 Art 70 and 71 with ann. XII: information to the members of the public likely to be
affected or actually affected in the event of an emergency: basic facts about impacts
of radioactivity, the emergency consequences, EP&R measures and actions.

3. 3
Information to the members of the public likely to be affected in
the event of an emergency
1.Member States shall ensure that the members of the public likely to be
affected in the event of emergency are given information about the
health protection measures applicable to them and about the
action they should take in the event of such an emergency.
2.The information supplied shall include at least the elements set out in
Section A of Annex XII.
3.The information shall be communicated to the members of the
public referred to in paragraph 1 without any request being made.
4.Member States shall ensure that the information is updated and
distributed at regular intervals and whenever significant changes
take place. This information shall be perma­nently available to the
public.
Article 70, BSS Directive

4. 4
Information to the members of the public actually affected in the
event of an emergency
1.Member States shall ensure that, when an emergency occurs, the
members of the public actually affected are informed without
delay about the facts of the emergency, the steps to be taken
and, as appropriate, the health protection measures applicable
to these members of the public.
2.The information provided shall cover those points listed in Section B
of Annex XII which are relevant to the type of emergency
Article 71, BSS Directive

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NTW investigation on related issues
 Questionnaire developed to address all arrangements, also
information provisions.
 Data provided from NTW members via discussions with regulators
and local CSO:
 Belgium by Greenpeace Belgium,
 France by ANCLLI and ACRO
 Slovenia, Croatia by REC Slovenia
 Greens Fichtelgebirge for Germany
 Greenpeace Luxembourg for Luxembourg
 Via Temelin Round Table responds from Slovakia and Czech R. were obtained.

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EU findings related to information -1
 Information, communication and awareness raising on off-site EP&R:
 National media will be engaged to inform the population by broadcasting messages
prepared by competent authorities. Phone-call centres are also in place.
 In all countries the information is provided on official web-sites of nuclear authorities
only in some countries information available on web-sites of NPP operators and
local authorities.
 Only Luxembourg is carrying out regular information activities, the basic information
on EP&R is provided in 8 languages
 The authorities admit that the communication strategy is too passive and there is an
obvious lack of public discussions on the issue.
 In Belgium the campaigns that are carried through national and local media are
combined with campaigns for pre-distribution of iodine pills in emergency planning
zones, last in March 2011.
 Belgian information strategy in addition also includes provision of GSM, sms and e-
mail tools.
 In France the campaigns are restricted to emergency protection areas while large
majority of respondents in public opinion polls demonstrate that risk culture is not
well integrated in the French population.
 Difficulties in Germany and in Slovenia in obtaining information indicating that
people are not well informed on the issue.

7. 7
EU findings related to information -2
 The communication strategy in France seems to have a comprehensive
approach: communication with the public aims to transmit feedback
information, continuous and credible; to maintain the trust; to make citizens
actors by transmitting different procedures to follow, promoting local
solidarity mechanisms.
 The strategy is based on a clear division of roles and responsibilities of
each source of information: the operator, the state authorities, Nuclear
Safety Authority and IRSN institute.
 During the emergency phase, immediate communication to the public (and
the media) is carried by the operator and by the authorities that provides
the use of different means of dissemination of the alert (sirens, a national
network of alert, mobile devices ...), complemented and supplemented by
various means of communication (agreements with Radio France, France
Television ... ) and dissemination of information.

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EU findings related to information -3
 Trust to information sources:
 Quality and timing of information to the public in case of a real
emergency situation, as well as coherence between information
sources at different levels engaged (national authorities,
provincial/communal authorities, operator of the facility) should
enhance trustworthiness of information.
 There is evidence of scepticism and disbelief about the emergency
information provided in a traditional manner by the authorities in todays’
highly complex European societies characterised by plurality of
information sources and views.
 The situation in Slovenia is characterised by paradox. While public
opinion polls demonstrate high levels of trust in nuclear safety and
information in the field, the large majority of the population in the
emergency zone believe that in the case of a severe nuclear accident
no action could save them from the worst.

9.  AIM: Analyse preparedness of local
population and institutions for
evacuation in case of nuclear accident
in NPP Krško
 Faculty of Social Sciences University of
Ljubljana
 Local population living within 3-km zone
around NPP Krško. (N=502): simple
random sampling:
 52% female and 48% male
 Methods: personal interviews with
standardized questionnaire
 Twelve qualitative interviews with
leading personnel in companies and
institutions in the Krško municipality
 In Octobre 2012
Example:
Opinion Survey at the NPP Krško

10. Evaluating the probability of a serious
nuclear accident at NPP Krško
 Not at all possible 9,8 %
 Unlikely 52,6 %
 Likely 24,5 %
 Highly probable 6,0 %
 Do not know 7,2 %
 Majority do not evaluate that serious nuclear
accident can happened.

11. Knowledge of measures

12. Preparedness to evacuate
 Keeping the leaflet on evacuation direction at
home:
 Yes 36,3 %
 No 45,6 %
 Do not know 18,1 %

13. Locations of the reception centres and
evacuation routes
 Locations of the reception centres:
 55,4 % answered „do not know”
 Rest of them (44,6%) have chosen one of the offered
locations.
 Additional 15,7 % have given a wrong answer, which
means 71,7% were not familiar with the locations of
their reception centre.
 Among those who claimed to know their evacuation
route, additional 24,6 % stated the wrong answer. So,
75,8% of the population were not familiar with their
evacuation route

14. Possible reactions to the announcement of
an evacuation

15. Main results from survey
 Perception of threat of nuclear accident: 2.59 out of 4 (more
women, married, family members with disabilities)
 Evaluation of likelihood of nuclear disaster: 52.6 % belive that
such a disaster in unlikely (30 % likely or probably - lower
education, income)
 Knowledge of protective measures in the event of nuclear
disaster: only partly familiar with measures (more than 50 % not
or only partly)
 Preparedness to evacuate: more than half do not have
knowledge of basic key information (distributed by municipality in
2008), 71 % do not know the place of their reception, 66 % do
not know the evacuation routes
 Preparedness at local institutions: organisation of evacuation
would be a problem, not included in drills, no protective
equipment

16. Conclusions on the survey
 Communication (always 2 way) with people in the potentially
affected area on the possibilities of a nuclear emergency and
evacuation is vital and needs to be addressed as a priority.
 People in the affected area have poor knowledge of escape routes
and places of reception, so it is necessary to improve this.
 Evacuation of children from primary and secondary schools and
kindergartens is the most critical point of the whole evacuation.
 Evacuation of caring facility for elderlies would be very difficult or
even impossible – lack of knowledge, equipment and resources.
 Fatalistic view of several competent people that in case of a
severe nuclear accident nothing can be done, because the
consequences are too serious and they are located too close to
the power plant to be evacuated in time – lack of understanding of
the accident‘s evolution – this should be included in the
information.

17. How to improve information
 It is well known exercise of communication and stakeholder
involvement plan:
 Define the stakeholders – stakeholder mapping
 Define and develop the channels and tools
 Prepare the main information – material to be developed
answering the elements as prescribed in Annex XII of BSS
 Design the communication and stakeholder plan
 Consult with local representatives (not only formal local
municipality representatives, but also different stakeholders)
and improve the plan
 Start with implementation of plan and evaluate the
effectiveness and quality (opinion survey, discussions, ….)
 Improve the plan and iterate

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Thank you for your attention!