Risk Informed Decision Making in fire risk management
•
3 gefällt mir•1,827 views
Presentation given at FPC Seminar on Crisis & Emergency management for large industrial sites at NTU@One, Singapore on 23 oct 2013
Empfohlen
Empfohlen
Weitere ähnliche Inhalte
Ähnlich wie Risk Informed Decision Making in fire risk management
Ähnlich wie Risk Informed Decision Making in fire risk management (20)
Mehr von FPC Risk
Mehr von FPC Risk (8)
Kürzlich hochgeladen
Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)
Risk Informed Decision Making in fire risk management
- 1. Your fire risk and emergency management expert Risk Informed Decision Making Ralf Bruyninckx, CEO FPC
- 2. Managing and organising Prevent, react, contain Risk Factors Identify & Measure What get’s measured get’s managed | | 25.10.2013
- 3. Regulatory Risk Regulatory Risk Financial Risk Tax Risk Operational Risk Product Risks | | 25.10.2013
- 4. | Pictures: National Geographic, www.enterpreneur.com TT Club | 25.10.2013
- 6. Layers of Protection Community Emergency Response Plant Emergency Response Mitigation Protection, controls, systems Industrial Facility Prevention Systems, Control, Procedures Design Process, Facility | | 25.10.2013
- 8. Traditional approach – Qualitative Identify Risks Assess Likelihood Determine Impact Classify | | 25.10.2013
- 9. RIM – Semi Quantitative Identification Analysis Performance 1 Risk Identification 3 Loss Scenario Development 2 Risk Tolerance Criteria 4 Initiating Event Likelihood 5 Assessment Exposure Profile Monitoring | | Layers of Protection 7 Risk Estimation and comparison 8 6 Cost – Benefit Analysis 25.10.2013
- 10. CBA (Kz/ fpm - K fpm )´ Fi ´ Pc > K fpm K z/ fpm = cost of incident/event without measure K fpm = cost of incident with measure Fi Pc K fpm = frequency of incident occurance = probability of control = cost of measure (capex & opex) | | 25.10.2013
- 11. RIM– Semi Quantitative Identification Analysis Performance 1 Risk Identification 3 Loss Scenario Development 2 Risk Tolerance Criteria 4 Initiating Event Likelihood 5 Assessment Exposure Profile Monitoring | | Layers of Protection 7 Risk Estimation and comparison 8 6 Cost – Benefit Analysis 25.10.2013
- 12. Layer 5 Layer 4 Layer 3 Layer 2 Layer 1 Loss Scenario Development 1 0€ 0€ 2 0% 0 k€ 0 k€ 3 0% 0k€ 0 k€ 4 0% 0€ 0€ 5 0% 0 k€ 0 k€ 6 0% 0k€ 0 k€ 7 0% 0k€ 0k€ 8 0% 0k€ 0 k€ 9 Initiating Event / year 0,% 0% 0€ 0€ 0 k€ Branch ID Likelihood | | Damage exposure % Damage Exposure Risk/year 25.10.2013
- 13. Case XYZ (example) General • Total area + 30 000 m2 • Storage of high valuable goods Layers of protection • Prevention programme • Automatic detection & alarm • First response team • Community fire service | | 25.10.2013
- 14. Case Warehouse : Damage Exposure Damage Exposure Loss of Warehouse 5 000 k€ Loss of Content 50 000 k€ Business Loss 65 000 k€ Total Potential Loss 120 000 k€ | | 25.10.2013
- 15. base case 0,5 1 1.43E-02 0,00% 0€ 0€ 0,95 2 1.36E-02 35,00% 42000 k€ 570 k€ 0,05 3 7.14E-04 100,00% 120000k€ 90 k€ 4 5.04E-04 0,00% 0€ 0€ 0,95 5 4.79E-04 35,00% 42000 k€ 20 k€ 0,05 6 2.52E-05 100,00% 120000k€ 3 k€ 0,05 7 2.01E-04 35,00% 42000 k€ 9 k€ 0,95 8 3.83E-03 100,00% 120000k€ 460 k€ 9 3.94E-02 0,00% 0€ 0€ 0,85 0,5 0,46 0,5 0,2 0,073 0,5 0,15 Fires per year 0,8 0,54 1150 k€ Branch ID Likelihood | | Property Damage exposure Damage Exposure Risk/year 25.10.2013
- 16. Risk Reduction Options 1 ✗ 2 3 | 16 | 21.08.2012
- 17. FRT 54/80 Capacity Staff numbers Facilities and equipment 100% 80 30s 60 40 20 70s 0 Team A Team B Team C Training Levels Team D Response Time | | Roles 25.10.2013
- 18. FRT CAR Roles 4 Score: 3 Training Plans 2 1 0 People Response Equipment Industry Practice Company XYZ | | 5 = industry leading 4 = above average 3 = average 2 = below average 1 = inadequate
- 19. improved FRT 0,7 1 2E-02 0,00% 0€ 0€ 0,95 2 8.13E-03 35,00% 42000 k€ 340 k€ 0,05 3 4.28E-04 100,00% 120000k€ 50 k€ 4 7.05E-04 0,00% 0€ 0€ 0,95 5 2.87E-04 35,00% 42000 k€ 10 k€ 0,05 6 1.51E-05 100,00% 120000k€ 20 k€ 0,05 7 2.01E-04 35,00% 42000 k€ 9 k€ 0,95 8 3.83E-03 100,00% 120000k€ 460 k€ 9 3.94E-02 0,00% 0€ 0€ 0,85 0,3 0,46 0,7 0,2 0,073 0,3 0,15 Fires per year 0,8 0,54 880 k€ Branch ID Likelihood | | Property Damage exposure Damage Exposure Risk/year 25.10.2013
- 20. automatic suppression 0,5 1 1.43E-02 0,00% 0€ 0€ 2 1.21E-02 5,00% 6000 K€ 70 € 0,95 3 2.03E-03 35,00% 42000 k€ 90 k€ 0,05 4 1.07E-04 100,00% 120000k€ 10 k€ 5 5.04E-04 0,00% 0€ 0€ 6 4.28E-04 5,00% 6000 k€ 3 k€ 0,95 7 7.18E-05 35,00% 42000 k€ 3 k€ 0,05 8 3.78E-06 100,00% 120000k€ 0,5 k€ 9 3.43E-03 5,00% 6000 k€ 20 k€ 0,05 10 3.02E-05 35,00% 42000 k€ 1 k€ 0,95 11 5.74E-04 100,00% 120000k€ 70 k€ 12 3.94E-02 0,00% 0€ 0€ 0,85 0,85 0,5 0,15 0,5 0,46 0,2 0,85 0,5 0,073 0,15 0,15 Fires per year 0,85 0,8 0,15 0,54 270 k€ Branch ID Likelihood | | Property Damage exposure Damage Exposure Risk/year 25.10.2013
- 21. Cost of improvement Upgrade FRT Cost/yr Additional Trained Resource 75 k€ Improve Training Program of Team 25 k€ Improve Procedures 20 k€ Total per year 110 k€ Automatic Suppression Capex 900 k€ 55 k€ Opex 25 k€ Total Per Year 80 k€ | | 25.10.2013
- 22. Summary 1,400,000 1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 Base Case FRT Improvement 600,000 Automatic Suppression 400,000 200,000 0 Loss/year Cost of Measure | 22 | Saving 21.08.2012
- 24. Cause-and-effect Cause Materials Checklist / Check Sheet Effect Task / Process Step Consolidated Count Repe at Mon. Tues. Wed. Thu. Fri. Sat. Sun. Process 1 Methods 1. Task Description D 2. Task Description D 3. Task Description AN 4. Task Description D <Val ue> <Val ue> Process 2 1. Task Description D 2. Task Description Type of Error / Reason AN 3. Task Description D Count Mon. Tues. 1. Description of Type //// // 2. Description of Type // <Val ue> Total Score Wed. Thu. Fri. // //// // //// / 22 // … /// /// //// / 16 … 3. Description of Type Manpower //// / //// //// / //// // 23 4. Description of Type //// / /// //// // /// 19 16 9 13 18 22 80 … Machinery … … Total Errors Site A Cause-and-effect Cause-and-effect Cause Materials Checklist / Check Sheet Effect Task / Process Step Checklist / Check Sheet Count Repe at Mon. Tues. Wed. Thu. Fri. Sat. Sun. Process 1 Methods 1. Task Description D 2. Task Description D 3. Task Description AN 4. Task Description D <Val ue> <Val ue> Process 2 1. Task Description Mon. Tues. D <Val ue> Total Score Wed. Thu. Fri. // //// // //// / 22 // /// //// / 16 / //// //// / //// // 23 //// / /// //// // /// 19 16 9 13 18 22 80 //// // 2. Description of Type // /// 3. Description of Type //// 4. Description of Type Machinery AN 3. Task Description Count 1. Description of Type Manpower D 2. Task Description Type of Error / Reason … … … … … Total Errors Site B | 24 | 21.08.2012
- 25. Why FPC • Independent – + 40 years of experience FPC aims to find the optimal balance between a company’s risk profile and the required level of safety, backed up by periodic audit cycles to monitor change. • Specialised people – engineered solutions • International expertise – local knowledge • Pragmatic approach – innovative methods | | www.safetycentre.eu www.fpc.be
Hinweis der Redaktion
- An approach to regulatory decisionmaking, in which insights from probabilistic risk assessment are considered with other engineering insights. Purpose is to give you all an appetite for risk informed dm
- Present a method & rationale to support costeffectivedecesion-making based on unique risk factors of a facility.The gods are stillsounkind as todenyusknowledge of what the futureholds but we have made twogiant steps :BetterunderstandlikelihoodLearning howto manage consequences
- Depending on the companysactivitiesWhentalkingcompany’s have to deal with different kinds of risks. We focus
- We have tobecause we have to. Compliance driven : completelyguidedby . Don’t have a safety culture embedded… Loss of life potententialWhy do we as a society and company invest in risk protection : tosafeguardloss of life, to picture risk : toprevent, reputation
- Different element definecompanyies risk profile.Every companyand facility has unique risk factors based. Neardefine the risk unique : duetolocation , culture , etc… Every company, communty. Deal withanotherfire brigade. A large corperationwith multiple or even identical sites distributes
- Today we will focus on mitigatie … but integrated approach Where do we invest /andhowmuch. Balancedexcersie..Prevention, security gates etc…Logisticfullyautomated
- Youalways have to accept a certain risk – in otherwordsyoucannot design for zero risk. Ifnot we wouldall live in bunkers, wichwouldnotbemuch
- Mc kinney. A cost benefit analysis. Probability of event occurence is set out Giveslimited Riks Up to C5 with off site concequences. It does notgiveusany information on the layers of protectionrequired .
- Do we needtoconsider a security risk,what is tolerable ??? Risk identification, loss scenario event tree analysis. Allowstoprovide information, notonlyabout the potential risk exposure but alsoabout the layers of your . Whatif, hozop
- Scientiifcformula . When is theimplementation of a safetymeasurecosteffective? What information
- Risk identification, hazop or whatif analysis : loss scenario event tree analysis. Allowstoprovide information, notonlyabout the potential risk exposure but alsoabout the layers of your
- Layer of protectionsOnly way to do cost benefit We look at scenario’s andcost, layers . The green path is a probabiliy of sc
- Cases todemonstrate the use of the method
- Notlooking at life safety.
- Onceevery 15 years. Soporbabblytwice over the lifetime of the asset. No risk to life safety but property & bus con Half open struture, potetntial . Serious risk potenti
- Score card FRT. We improve on training & resource
- Canaloswork onreducingfrequency of fireoccurence
- No organisation
- Method answers the key questions about the number and strength of protectionlayersbyproviding rational, semiquantitative, risk-based answers,reducingemotionalism,providingclarityandconsistency,documenting the basis of the decision,facilitating understanding among plant personnel.