The document summarizes the increasing partisan polarization in American politics, tracing its roots back to weaknesses in the original constitutional design that did not anticipate the rise of political parties. It analyzes how polarization has increased since the 1960s due to factors like civil rights laws, immigration, and economic inequality. The Republican party's embrace of the Southern Strategy and move to more extreme positions has exacerbated tensions. The Trump era has seen a further rise in polarization as both parties appeal more to their bases. This dynamic creates challenges but also opportunities for Japan's relationship with the U.S. in dealing with issues like China and North Korea.

1. American politics in the age of Trump:
Implications for Japan
Gregory W. Noble
Institute of Social Science
University of Tokyo
Temple University Japan
October 10, 2019

2. Overview
• Partisan polarization, particularly extremism of Republican pols.
• Product of ethnic transition, inequality, etc., NOT just Trump
• Also reflects weaknesses in design of the framers, who didn’t anticipate the
power of parties
• Still, not a direct threat to Japan, at least in short run

3. II. Madison’s Constitutional design: avoid tyranny
Constrain ill effects of ambition, faction via checks and balances
• Large country: many factions countering each other (‘cross-cutting cleavages’)
• Subsidiarity: 10th Amendment reserves residual power to states
• Bicameralism: different electoral systems (6 years vs. 2 years vs. 4 years)
• Separation of powers (from Montesquieu) or “sharing of power”
• Checks and balances by branch (“Department”)
• Federalist 51:
• But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who
administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and
personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others.

4. Madison, Federalist 51, 1788

5. Need compromise to pass laws, budgets, nominations (1/2)
• “Branch” ID can be overwhelmed by partisan ID
• Example: Mitch McConnell is Republican first
• He won’t ‘check’ the Executive Branch when the president is a Republican:
presidents have ‘long [electoral] coattails’; can punish disloyal representatives
• Conservative theorists: maybe partisan gridlock is OK! Need broad
agreement to pass laws—when in doubt, do nothing!
• But most citizens and even most conservative politicians disagree—
they want the government to address problems

6. Need compromise to pass laws, budgets, nominations (2/2)
• Can avoid polarized gridlock when
• One party controls all three branches—but then not checked-and-balanced!
• Parties not too polarized—need to appeal to floating, independent voters
• Elite agreement on norms, initially facilitated by homogeneous elite--domination of
wealthy, older white men
• But what happens when partisan polarization surges and norms weaken?
• Underspecified and sometimes undemocratic rules can cause real problems
• Disproportionality and resulting rural bias of Senate—undemocratic (Republican bias)
• Senate’s power to give “advice and consent” on presidential nominations--unclear
• Budgets (cf. special treatment of “money bills” in parliamentary systems)
• Majoritarian, first-past-the-post electoral system is disproportional, and with polarized
electorate and partisan primaries, can exacerbate extremism

7. "Advice & Consent"?
‘No One Really Knows What the Founders Had in Mind’
(historian Ray Raphael)

8. III. Partisan polarization is not new—
and it has been a severe problem at times in the past
• Early emergence of parties at elite level (despite critique of faction)
• Federalists (Washington-Hamilton, 1792-1800) vs.
• Democratic-Republican (Jefferson-Madison, 1801-1825)
• Mass parties 1820s-
• Democrats: Andrew Jackson 1829-1837; Martin Van Buren 1837-1841
• Sectional conflict, creation of Republican Party: Civil War (1861-65)
• Madison’s brilliant constitutional architecture couldn’t prevent disaster
• Post-Civil War “solution”: Republican domination (not Ch&Bs)
• But still polarized, much corruption, violence

9. 1860-1861: With election of Lincoln,
polarization was complete

10. Presidential election results 1896-1928
Republicans mostly dominant

11. Republicans dominated government and succeeded at
encouraging capitalist development—
but incited strikes, riots, and assassinations,
including Great Railroad Strike of 1877 (here, in Baltimore)

12. IV. Interregnum:
Decline in polarization, effective policymaking
• Republican domination through 1920s: shared (if unequal) prosperity
• Democratic domination, 1932-1970s (decline of inequality)
• 1930s: shared Depression
• 1940s: shared war effort
• 1950s-early 1970s: shared prosperity, cooperation
• Three party system: cross-cutting alliances  fluidity, compromise
• Southern Democrats (whites only): Socially conservative, economically liberal
• Northern Democrats: Catholics, Jews, urban working classes: Econ and soc. liberal
• Northern Republicans: Rural-suburban Protestant upper classes
• National media limited by radio/TV spectrum: ‘neutral’ gatekeepers
• “Fairness Doctrine” (1949, following Mayflower decision of 1941)
• Limits on cable television (from birth of cable TV in 1948)
• ‘All politics is local’—not so partisan

13. V. Return of polarization 1964- (1/2)
• From three parties to two
• Civil rights movement + war against Nazis + cold war competition to appeal to
developing countries = Civil Rights Act (1964); Voting Rights Act (1965)  black
voting
• Immigration reform, 1965- [case of largely unanticipated consequences)
• Welfare state (Medicare, expanded Social Security)  renewed fight over size
of state
• Goldwater (and Rep. donors) again reject welfare state, despite popularity,
1964-

14. V. Return of polarization 1964- (2/2)
• Victory of the top 1%; ‘the great sort’
• Gini coefficient at highest level since 1920s
• Concentration of economic activity in coastal cities
• Democrats: packed in cities while Republicans dominate states
• Republicans: upper-income individuals in declining areas
• Immigration: Second surge of foreign-born, mostly from LA, Asia
• 1890: 14.8% (peak)
• 1970: 4.7% foreign born (trough)
• 2017: 13.6% foreign born
• Ethnic/religious change: decline of white Christians
• 1976: 81% (55% white protestants)
• 2016: 43% (30% white protestants)

15. From three parties to two; from Democratic ”solid
south” to Republican dominance of south and heartland

16. VI. Fateful doubling-down of Republican party (1/2)
• Southern strategy, 1968- (took about three decades):
• Republican party appeals to Southern whites
• Minorities move from erstwhile ‘Party of Lincoln’ to Democrats
• Pluralization of media as spectrum becomes unlimited: Cable TV, internet
• Removal of controls on cable TV (1972-)
• End of ‘fairness doctrine’ (1987) after attack by conservatives on “mainstream” media
• Result: From media gatekeepers to direct contact by pols (Facebook, twitter, etc.)
• Reagan’s charisma holds together uneasy alliance of economic and social
conservatives, 1980-
• More extreme policies on taxes, guns, abortion, despite little change in public opinion
• Loss to Obama sparks debate, 2012-13, but
• Move to rethink attitudes toward race and immigration fails

17. VI. Fateful doubling-down of Republican party (2/2)
• Influence of donors and the rich pushes the Republicans to advocate
unpopular policies (minimum wage; taxes on rich; gun control, etc.)
• Republican positions are more extreme and further from public
opinion
• Rejection of bipartisan cooperation
• Norquist pledge to “never increase taxes  can’t meet needs of aging society
• Gingrich attack on neutral institutions, bipartisan cooperation
• Hastert Rule: any bill must have majority Republican support
Unpopular positions + demographic decline - Even before Trump,
Republicans were “forced” to
• Appeal to white nationalism
• Resort to undemocratic methods—gerrymandering, voter suppression (see,
e.g. North Carolina)

18. Public opinion: From bell curve to two humps
Loss of overlap and of swing votes in center

19. VII. Age of Trump (1/2)
• Trump appeals even more nakedly to white, Christian, less educated base
rejects Republican orthodoxy for nativism
• Anti-immigrant
• Hostile to international trade and investment
• Soft on Russia (they’re white Christians! …sort of…)
• Suddenly unconcerned about budget deficits
• But traditional Republican stance on taxes, regulation (donors), judges
(abortion)
• Direct communication with voters: Twitter, attacks on “fake news”
• Voter suppression intensified
• Trample on norms of cooperation
• Massive expansion of filibuster
• Shut down government
• Threaten to default on national debt
• Delay on Supreme Court nomination (Garland)

20. VII. Age of Trump (2/2)
• Democratic reaction
• Democratic whites move to left on race, immigration, social democracy
• Result: Polarization
• Few swing votes
• Heightened emotions: “I wouldn’t care if my child married a
supporter of the other party”
• 1958: 72%
• 2016: 45%
• 2018: Divided government
• 2019: Impeachment inquiry, gridlock

21. VIII. Republicans will be forced to reform within a decade
• Continued decline of white Christians, older generation
• Defection of young people, college educated and women
• Will have to abandon or at least water down BOTH Trumpism AND
low-tax Republicanism, becoming an ordinary conservative party
• Ease off white nationalism
• Limits to tax cuts for the rich
• But change will probably require a severe loss first—Will Trump’s
base accept it?

22. Trump casts doubt on willingness to abide by electoral
outcomes; re-tweets references to civil war

23. IX. Implications for Japan: mixed, not so bad in short run
• Bad news
• Lack of consistency and professionalism in US foreign policy
• Destructive attitude to international cooperation
• International trade and finance--WTO, IMF
• Iran nuclear agreement
• Global warming
• Mixed
• North Korea policy: diplomacy (but undisciplined)
• Bilateral trade policy pressure: not great, but could be worse…

24. IX. Implications for Japan (2/2)
• Good news
• Dems and Reps do agree on one thing: opposition to China sympathetic to
Japan
• Trump is skeptical of military intervention—and so are Dems and many
Republicans: less chance Japan will suffer entrapment
• Necessity/opportunity for Japan to play active role, e.g. revival of TPP
• If Republicans reform, can US
• Repair norms of truth, mutual accommodation? Maybe…
• Reform institutions?
• Many will be blocked by Republicans, vested interests (Senate; DC statehood, etc.)
• But some possible: Electoral College; Proportional representation? Alternative vote?
• Can Japan and the world get through the next decade?