Falcon's Invoice Discounting: Your Path to Prosperity
Startup Reading List - Startup Strategy
1. STARTUP
READING
LIST
–
JUNE
2012
Startup
strategy
What
is
a
startup,
the
basic
strategy,
what
not
to
do,
generating
and
testing
an
idea,
establishing
customer
intent,
starting
build
and
iterating
product,
making
money,
reaching
product
market
fit,
scaling,
business
development,
changing
direction,
competition
incumbents
and
first
mover
advantage,
failure,
business
metrics
for
startups
2. 1
Contents
What
is
a
startup?
..................................................................................................................................................
8
What
is
a
startup?
–
Eric
Ries
.............................................................................................................................
8
The
first
principles
of
startup
–
Steve
Blank
.....................................................................................................
10
Why
to
do
a
startup
(is
the
idea
worth
it?)
–
Peter
Thiel
(Blake
Masters)
.......................................................
13
Entrepreneurship
as
management
science
–
Eric
Ries
.....................................................................................
18
The
basic
strategy
(what
to
do)
...........................................................................................................................
21
Startups
in
13
sentences
–
Paul
Graham
..........................................................................................................
21
How
to
start
a
startup
–
Paul
Graham
.............................................................................................................
24
Understand
the
market
–
Rob
Fitzpatrick
........................................................................................................
42
Milestones
to
startup
success
–
Sean
Ellis
........................................................................................................
43
What
makes
a
great
startup
–
Sean
Ellis
..........................................................................................................
46
The
startup
pyramid
(getting
to
product
market
fit)
–
Sean
Ellis
.....................................................................
48
Deconstructing
startup
growth
–
Sean
Ellis
.....................................................................................................
50
Speed
as
the
primary
business
strategy
–
Mike
Cassidy
..................................................................................
52
Startups
rarely
do
anything
well
–
Eric
Paley
...................................................................................................
54
No
plan
survives
contact
with
customers
–
Steve
Blank
...................................................................................
55
Building
a
web
startup
–
Steve
Blank
...............................................................................................................
57
One
way
to
start
a
startup
–
Naval
..................................................................................................................
62
Moving
fast
–
Nivi
............................................................................................................................................
62
The
benefits
of
thinking
small
–
Elad
Gil
.........................................................................................................
64
Elements
of
sustainable
companies
–
Sequoia
.................................................................................................
66
Is
stealth
mode
sensible
–
Elad
Gil
...................................................................................................................
67
No
stealth
–
Chris
Dixon
..................................................................................................................................
69
What
not
to
do
.....................................................................................................................................................
71
Mistakes
that
kill
startups
–
Paul
Graham
.......................................................................................................
71
The
most
common
mistakes
–
Mark
Suster
.....................................................................................................
82
The
9
deadly
startup
sins
–
Steve
Blank
...........................................................................................................
86
Why
startups
fail
–
David
Skok
........................................................................................................................
89
What
constitutes
a
startup
mistake?
–
Simeon
Simeonov
...............................................................................
92
3
Startup
Lessons
I
Learned
the
Hard
Way
–
David
Cancel
..............................................................................
94
Failing
by
not
knowing
what
you
don’t
know
–
Steve
Blank
............................................................................
96
Startup
DOA
–
Ben
Yoskovitz
...........................................................................................................................
98
The
top
20
reasons
startups
fail
–
Chubby
Brain
..............................................................................................
99
Premature
scaling
leads
to
death
–
Steve
Blank
............................................................................................
105
3. 2
Premature
scaling
–
Rip
Empson
....................................................................................................................
107
Don’t
be
creative
about
the
wrong
things
–
Chris
Dixon
................................................................................
113
Rewriting
code
is
suicide
–
Steve
Blank
..........................................................................................................
113
Refactoring
yourself
out
of
business
–
Eric
Ries
.............................................................................................
115
Generating
and
testing
an
idea
..........................................................................................................................
119
Ideas
for
startups
–
Paul
Graham
..................................................................................................................
119
Writing
a
business
plan
–
Sequoia
..................................................................................................................
127
Good
startup
ideas
are
secrets
–
Peter
Thiel
(Blake
Masters)
.......................................................................
128
How
I
come
up
with
new
startup
ideas
(in
4
steps)–
Rob
Fitzpatrick
.............................................................
139
Timing
your
startup
(Everything
has
been
tried
before)
–
Chris
Dixon
...........................................................
142
Paradigm
breaking
ideas
–
Steven
Carpenter
................................................................................................
144
You
Don't
Need
A
Good
Idea
To
Start
A
Great
Company
–
Elad
Gil
...............................................................
146
The
myth
of
the
Eureka
moment
–
Chris
Dixon
..............................................................................................
147
Developing
new
startup
ideas
–
Chris
Dixon
..................................................................................................
148
How
to
Build
a
Billion
Dollar
Startup
(Just
fulfil
a
need)
–
Steve
Blank
..........................................................
149
How
Can
You
Tell
If
Your
Market
Is
A
Good
One?–
Elad
Gil
...........................................................................
150
Start
from
the
heart
(Do
what
you
believe)
–
Roy
Rodenstein
.......................................................................
152
Before
product-‐market
fit,
find
passion-‐market
fit
–
Naval
...........................................................................
155
Why
Do
Market
Segments
Matter?
–
Brant
Cooper
......................................................................................
156
Use
the
tools
you’re
displacing
–
Rob
Fitzpatrick
..........................................................................................
158
Timing
is
everything
–
Chris
Dixon
.................................................................................................................
159
Why
smart
people
have
bad
ideas
–
Paul
Graham
........................................................................................
160
Big
technologies
come
from
toys
–
Chris
Dixon
..............................................................................................
167
Beware
of
the
word
interesting
–
Evan
Shore
................................................................................................
168
The
fast
follow
–
Steven
Carpenter
................................................................................................................
171
The
challenge
of
creating
a
new
category
–
Chris
Dixon
................................................................................
173
Establishing
customer
intent
..............................................................................................................................
174
The
customer
development
manifesto
–
Steve
Blank
.....................................................................................
174
Product
development
as
the
leading
cause
of
startup
death
–
Steve
Blank
..................................................
175
The
Customer
Development
Manifesto:
Reasons
for
the
Revolution
(part
1)
–
Steve
Blank
..........................
177
The
Customer
Development
Manifesto:
Reasons
for
the
Revolution
(part
2)
–
Steve
Blank
..........................
180
The
Customer
Development
Manifesto:
The
Startup
Death
Spiral
(part
3)
–
Steve
Blank
.............................
183
Customer
Development
Manifesto:
Market
Type
(part
4)
–
Steve
Blank
.......................................................
185
Customer
Development
Manifesto:
The
Path
of
Warriors
and
Winners
(part
5)
–
Steve
Blank
.....................
187
What
happens
when
you
fail
to
validate
customers
–
Steve
Blank
................................................................
189
4. 3
Customer
development
is
not
a
focus
group
–
Steve
Blank
............................................................................
192
What
is
customer
development?
–
Eric
Ries
...................................................................................................
194
The
Risk
Validation
Pyramid–
Rob
Fitzpatrick
................................................................................................
197
Customer
development
for
web
startups
–
Steve
Blank
.................................................................................
199
Customer
development
for
consumer
startups
–
Ash
Maurya
.......................................................................
202
How
to
find
early
adopters
–
Brant
Cooper
....................................................................................................
205
Customer
development
biases
–
Brant
Cooper
..............................................................................................
207
How
to
find
prospective
customers
–
Cindy
Alvarez
.......................................................................................
209
What
to
learn
from
customer
development
–
Cindy
Alvarez
.........................................................................
211
Segmenting
a
market
–
Cindy
Alvarez
............................................................................................................
214
Big
Picture
Customer
Development
Revisited
–
Sean
Ellis
..............................................................................
216
What
customer
data
to
collect
–
Steve
Blank
................................................................................................
217
Checklist
for
chaos
–
Steve
Blank
...................................................................................................................
220
The
customer
development
conversation
–
Brant
Cooper
.............................................................................
222
Let’s
Fire
Our
Customers
–
Steve
Blank
..........................................................................................................
225
Starting
user
research
–
Laura
Klein
...............................................................................................................
227
You
Need
Personas
–
Cindy
Alvarez
...............................................................................................................
230
A
day
in
the
life
of
your
customer
–
Ben
Yoskovitz
.........................................................................................
232
Survey
for
customer
development
–
Sean
Ellis
...............................................................................................
234
You
Need
to
Make
“Wanting”
No
Longer
Free–
Cindy
Alvarez
......................................................................
235
Strategy
is
not
a
to
do
list
–
Steve
Blank
........................................................................................................
236
Getting
customer
intent
–
Eric
Ries
................................................................................................................
238
Using
a
LOI
to
define
MVP
–
Eric
Ries
.............................................................................................................
241
Visionaries
lament
–
Eric
Ries
.........................................................................................................................
245
Validated
learning
about
customers
–
Eric
Ries
.............................................................................................
248
Vertical
markets
1
–
Steve
Blank
....................................................................................................................
251
Vertical
markets
2
–
Steve
Blank
....................................................................................................................
254
Vertical
markets
3
–
Steve
Blank
....................................................................................................................
255
Vertical
markets
4
–
Steve
Blank
....................................................................................................................
256
Starting
build
and
iterating
product
...................................................................................................................
260
What
is
Lean
about
the
Lean
Startup?–
Eric
Ries
...........................................................................................
260
Myths
about
lean
startup
–
Eric
Ries
..............................................................................................................
261
Lean
startup
myths
–
The
Lean
Startup
Wiki
.................................................................................................
262
Lean
Startups
aren’t
Cheap
Startups–
Steve
Blank
........................................................................................
264
Learning
is
better
than
optimisation
–
Eric
Ries
.............................................................................................
266
5. 4
Cash
is
not
king
–
Eric
Ries
.............................................................................................................................
270
Work
in
small
batches
–
Eric
Ries
...................................................................................................................
272
The
five
whys
for
startups
–
Eric
Ries
.............................................................................................................
274
Conducting
a
five
whys
–
Eric
Ries
..................................................................................................................
276
MVP
examples
–
Nivi
.....................................................................................................................................
280
MVP
doesn’t
mean
shit
–
Ben
Yoskovitz
.........................................................................................................
281
MVP
vs
MDP
-‐
Andrew
Chen
..........................................................................................................................
282
How
much
effort
to
spend
on
the
MVP
–
Vinicius
Vacanti
.............................................................................
285
Prioritising
features
–
Ben
Yoskovitz
..............................................................................................................
285
Adding
new
features
–
Ben
Yoskovitz
.............................................................................................................
287
Embrace
technical
debt
–
Eric
Ries
.................................................................................................................
288
The
pace
of
startup
–
Ben
Yoskovitz
..............................................................................................................
292
The
startup
rules
of
speed
–
Eric
Ries
.............................................................................................................
294
Rapid
iteration
with
hardware
–
Eric
Ries
......................................................................................................
295
Running
(anything)
lean
–
Ash
Maurya
..........................................................................................................
299
How
much
process
is
too
much
–
Eric
Ries
.....................................................................................................
301
Your
Best
Customers
Probably
Aren’t
–
Cindy
Alvarez
...................................................................................
302
Holding
entrepreneurs
accountable
–
Eric
Ries
..............................................................................................
305
Business
ecology
and
the
four
customer
currencies
–
Eric
Ries
......................................................................
307
Good
enough
never
is
(or
is
it?)
–
Eric
Ries
.....................................................................................................
311
Don’t
launch
–
Eric
Ries
..................................................................................................................................
315
No
corner
cases
–
Steve
Blank
........................................................................................................................
318
Mobile
first,
web
second
–
Fred
Wilson
..........................................................................................................
320
Making
money
(Business
models
and
monetisation)
.........................................................................................
321
The
business
model
/
customer
development
stack
–
Steve
Blank
.................................................................
321
Search
vs
execute
(the
relationship
between
customer
development
and
business
model
design)–
Steve
Blank
.......................................................................................................................................................................
324
The
Right
Business
Model
for
Your
Startup
–
Sean
Ellis
.................................................................................
329
8
questions
to
understand
the
business
model
–
Alex
Osterwalder
...............................................................
331
13
Consumer
Internet
Business
Models
(Part
I)–
Steven
Carpenter
...............................................................
335
13
Consumer
Internet
Business
Models
(Part
II)–
Steven
Carpenter
..............................................................
342
Business
model
discovery
–
Ash
Maurya
........................................................................................................
351
How
to
create
a
profitable
Freemium
startup
–
Andrew
Chen
......................................................................
354
Dividing
free
and
paid
features
in
“freemium”
products
–
Chris
Dixon
..........................................................
360
Freemium
as
a
model
–
Eric
Ries
....................................................................................................................
362
The
revenue
plan
needs
to
match
the
market
–
Steve
Blank
.........................................................................
363
6. 5
Business
Model
Analysis,
Part
1:
Key
Questions
–
Tom
Eisenmann
...............................................................
366
Business
Model
Analysis,
Part
2:
Platforms
and
Network
Effects
–
Tom
Eisenmann
.....................................
370
Business
Model
Analysis,
Part
3:
Switching
Costs
–
Tom
Eisenmann
.............................................................
374
Business
Model
Analysis,
Part
4:
Racing
for
Scale
–
Tom
Eisenmann
............................................................
376
Business
Model
Analysis,
Part
5:
Virality–
Tom
Eisenmann
...........................................................................
379
Business
Model
Analysis,
Part
6:
LTV
and
CAC
–
Tom
Eisenmann
..................................................................
381
Business
Model
Analysis,
Part
7:
Bundling
–
Tom
Eisenmann
........................................................................
384
Business
Model
Analysis,
Part
8:
Crossing
the
Chasm
–
Tom
Eisenmann
......................................................
385
Business
Model
Analysis,
Part
9:
Outsourcing
–
Tom
Eisenmann
..................................................................
387
Stop
asking
“But
how
will
they
make
money?”
–
Andrew
Chen
.....................................................................
388
Reaching
product
market
fit
..............................................................................................................................
392
Product
market
fit
is
the
only
thing
that
matters
–
Marc
Andreessen
...........................................................
392
Zero
to
product/market
fit
–
Andrew
Chen
....................................................................................................
396
When
has
a
consumer
startup
hit
product/market
fit?
–
Andrew
Chen
........................................................
404
What
is
a
market?
–
Eric
Ries
.........................................................................................................................
408
Scaling
(growing
the
business
post
product
market
fit)
.....................................................................................
411
Keys
to
unlocking
startup
growth
–
Sean
Ellis
................................................................................................
411
Taking
the
mystery
out
of
scaling
a
company
–
Ben
Horowitz
.......................................................................
412
Make
No
Little
Plans:
Defining
the
Scalable
Startup
–
Steve
Blank
................................................................
416
Add
another
zero
–
Brad
Feld
.........................................................................................................................
419
4
types
of
scale
–
Nivi
.....................................................................................................................................
420
Key
Elements
of
a
Massively
Scalable
Startup
–
Sean
Ellis
.............................................................................
420
Business
development
........................................................................................................................................
423
Business
Development
for
Early
Stage
Startups
–
Charlie
O’Donnell
.............................................................
423
Pitching
strategic
partners
–
Chris
Dixon
.......................................................................................................
424
Pitching
partners
–
Chris
Dixon
......................................................................................................................
426
Outsourcing
–
Fred
Wilson
.............................................................................................................................
427
Outsourcing
vs
offshoring
–
Fred
Wilson
........................................................................................................
428
Outsourcing
product
development
-‐
VIVEK
WADHWA
...................................................................................
430
Changing
direction
(The
pivot)
...........................................................................................................................
435
Pivot,
don’t
jump
–
Eric
Ries
...........................................................................................................................
435
Pivoting
–
Chris
Dixon
.....................................................................................................................................
437
Anatomy
of
a
pivot
–
Eric
Ries
........................................................................................................................
438
Pivoting
the
business
model
–
Steve
Blank
.....................................................................................................
441
Panic
at
the
Pivot
–
Aligning
Incentives
By
Burning
the
Boats
–
Steve
Blank
.................................................
444
7. 6
Competition,
incumbents
and
first
mover
advantage
........................................................................................
447
We’re
just
like
those
others
guys,
but
better
–
Steve
Blank
...........................................................................
447
First
mover
advantage
doesn’t
work
for
startups–
Steve
Blank
.....................................................................
451
Thoughts
on
incumbents
from
a
startup's
perspective–
Chris
Dixon
.............................................................
453
Indifference
is
Your
Real
Competitor
–
Sean
Ellis
...........................................................................................
454
Never
Enough
Competition
–
Charlie
O’Donnell
.............................................................................................
455
Competition
-‐
The
Pros
and
Cons
–
Fred
Wilson
.............................................................................................
456
Incumbents
–
Chris
Dixon
...............................................................................................................................
457
Competitive
analysis
kills
–
Steve
Blank
.........................................................................................................
458
Be
the
first
mover
–
Brad
Feld
........................................................................................................................
460
Competition
–
Brad
Feld
.................................................................................................................................
462
Competition
is
overrated
–
Chris
Dixon
..........................................................................................................
463
On
competition
and
markets
–
Peter
Thiel
(Blake
Masters)
...........................................................................
464
Starting
strategy
–
Steve
Blank
......................................................................................................................
474
Why
competition
is
not
failure
–
Mark
Suster
................................................................................................
475
Winning
by
being
better
(Bill
Gross)
–
Mark
Suster
.......................................................................................
479
Failure
................................................................................................................................................................
484
When
you
want
to
quit
–
Jason
Cohen
...........................................................................................................
484
When
Do
You
Throw
in
the
Towel
On
Your
Struggling
Project?
–
Vinicius
Vacanti
........................................
488
Patience
&
Persistence
–
Bijan
Sabet
.............................................................................................................
492
There’s
Always
a
Plan
B
–
Steve
Blank
...........................................................................................................
493
Achieving
a
failure
–
Eric
Ries
.........................................................................................................................
495
Built
to
fail
-‐
Andrew
Chen
.............................................................................................................................
497
Why
The
‘Fail
Fast’
Mantra
Needs
to
Fail,
Fast
–
Mark
Suster
.......................................................................
500
Business
metrics
for
startups
.............................................................................................................................
505
Learning
is
better
than
optimisation
–
Eric
Ries
.............................................................................................
505
Metrics
for
startups
–
Steve
Blank
.................................................................................................................
509
Daily
data
–
Brad
Feld
....................................................................................................................................
513
The
three
numbers
that
matter
–
Brad
Feld
...................................................................................................
514
More
metrics
for
startups
-‐
ALISTAIR
CROLL
..................................................................................................
516
Metrics
to
drive
good
behaviour
–
David
Skok
..............................................................................................
519
Using
metrics
in
startup
–
Mark
Suster
..........................................................................................................
526
Why
vanity
metrics
are
dangerous
–
Eric
Ries
................................................................................................
531
It’s
a
startup
not
a
spreadsheet
–
Eric
Ries
....................................................................................................
533
Assorted
ideas
and
inspiration
...........................................................................................................................
536
8. 7
The
future
of
the
internet
–
Chris
Dixon
........................................................................................................
536
Ambitious
ideas
–
Paul
Graham
.....................................................................................................................
537
Maximizing
capacity
utilization
as
a
startup
premise
–
Chris
Dixon
..............................................................
546
Understanding
the
history
of
the
tech
startup
market
–
Peter
Thiel
(Blake
Masters)
....................................
546
What
happens
after
web
2.0
(ideas)
–
Peter
Thiel
(Blake
Masters)
...............................................................
553
Luck
vs
Skill
(statistics
vs
calculus)
–
Peter
Thiel
(Blake
Masters)
...................................................................
566
Green
tech
(ideas)
–
Peter
Thiel
(Blake
Masters)
...........................................................................................
584
Visions
of
the
future
(ideas)
–
Peter
Thiel
(Blake
Masters)
............................................................................
606
On
Biotech
(ideas)–
Peter
Thiel
(Blake
Masters)
............................................................................................
619
Artificial
intelligence
(ideas)
–
Peter
Thiel
(Blake
Masters)
............................................................................
634
9. 8
What
is
a
startup?
What
is
a
startup?
What
is
a
startup?
–
Eric
Ries
http://www.startuplessonslearned.com/2010/06/what-‐is-‐startup.html
Monday, June 21, 2010
What is a startup?
I think most people have a fairly specific image that gets conjured up when they hear the word
startup. Maybe it’s the “two guys in a garage” made famous by HP, or the idea of Jobs and Wozniack
walking barefoot and shaggy through the Homebrew Computer Club. Maybe it’s the more recent
wunderkinds like Zuckerberg or Brin and Page. What all of these pictures have in common is a
narrative that goes something like this: scrappy outsiders, possessed of a unique genius, took
outrageous risks and worked incomprehensible hours to beat the odds.
But this cinematic view of entrepreneurs is flawed in many ways. Let’s start with the most basic. It
leads people to mistakenly believe that any time they see two guys in a garage attempting the
impossible, that’s a startup. Wrong. It also causes them to miss the numerous other kinds of startups
that appear in less-glamorous settings: inside enterprises, non-profits, and even governments. And
because both small businesses and startups have a high mortality rate, sometimes these images lead
us to believe that any small business is a startup. Wrong again.
So let’s begin with a definition of a startup that captures its essential nature, and tries to leave behind
the specific associations of the most famous startups.
A startup is a human institution designed to deliver a new product or service under conditions of
extreme uncertainty.
Let’s take each of these pieces in turn. First, I want to emphasize the human institution aspect,
because this is completely lost in the “two guys in a garage” story. The word institution connotes
bureaucracy, process, even lethargy. How can that be part of a startup? Yet, the real stories of
successful startups are full of activities that can rightly be called institution-building: hiring creative
employees, coordinating their activities, and creating a company culture that delivers results.
Although some startups may approach these activities in radical ways, they are nonetheless key
ingredients in their success.
Isn’t the word human redundant in this definition? What other kinds of institutions are there, anyway?
And yet, we so often loose sight of the fact that startups are not their products, their technological
breakthroughs, or even their data. Even for companies that essentially have only one product, the
value the company creates is located not in the product itself but with the people and their
organization who built it. To see proof of this, simply observe the results of the large majorities of
corporate acquisitions of startups. In most cases, essential aspects of the startup are lost, even when
the product, its brand, and even its employment contracts are preserved. A startup is greater than
10. 9
the sum of its parts; it is an acutely human enterprise.
And yet the newness of a startup’s product or service is also a key part of the definition. This is a
tricky part of the definition, too. I prefer to take the most expansive possible definition of product,
one that encompasses any source of value for a set of people who voluntarily choose to become
customers. This is equally true of a packaged good in a grocery store, an ecommerce website, a non-
profit social service or a variety of government programs. In every case, the organization is dedicated
to uncovering a new source of value for customers, and cares about the actual impact of its work on
those customers (by contrast, a monopoly or true bureaucracy generally doesn’t care and only seeks
to perpetuate itself).
It’s also important that we’re talking innovation, but this should also be understood broadly. Even the
most radical new inventions always build upon previous technology. Many startups don’t innovate at
all in the product dimension, but use other kinds of innovation: repurposing an existing technology for
a new use, devising a new business model that unlocks value that was previously hidden, or even
simply bringing a product or service to a new location or set of customers previously underserved. In
all of these cases, innovation is at the heart of the company’s success.
Because innovation is inherently risky, there may be outsized economic returns for startups that are
able to harness the risk in a new way – but this is not an essential part of the startup character. The
real question is: “what is the degree of innovation that this business proposes to accomplish?”
There is one last important part of this definition: the context in which the innovation happens. Most
businesses – large and small alike – are typically excluded by this context. Startups are designed to
confront situations of extreme uncertainty. To open up a new business that is an exact clone of an
existing business, all the way down to the business model, pricing, target customer, and specific
product may, under many circumstances, be an attractive economic investment. But it is not a
startup, because its success depends only on decent execution – so much so that this success can be
modeled with high accuracy. This is why so many small businesses can be financed with simple bank
loans; the level of risk and uncertainty is well enough understood that a reasonably intelligent loan
officer can assess its prospects.
Thus, the land of startups is a unique place, where the risks themselves are unknown. Contrast this
with other high-risk situations, like buying a high-risk stock. Although the specific payoff of a specific
risky stock is not known, investing in many such stocks can be modeled accurately. Thus a decent
financial advisor can give you a reasonably accurate long-term expected return for a set of risky
stocks. When the “risk premium” is known, we are not in startup land. In fact, when viewed in
retrospect, most startups appear like no-brainers. Probably the most famous example today is
Google: how did we ever live without it? Building that particular product was not nearly has risky as it
seemed at the time; in fact, I think it is a reasonable inference to say that it was almost guaranteed
to succeed. It just wasn’t possible for anyone to know that ahead of time.
Startups are designed for the situations that cannot be modeled, are not clear-cut, and where the risk
is not necessarily large – it’s just not yet known. I emphasize this point because it is necessary to
motivate large amounts of the theory of the lean startup. Fundamentally, the lean startup is a
methodology for coping with uncertainty and unknowns with agility, poise, and ruthless efficiency. It
is a completely different experience from the equally hard job of executing in a traditional kind of
business, and my goal is not to disparage those other practitioners – after all, most startups aspire to
11. 10
become non-startups someday.
Still, these differences matter, because the “best practices” that are learned in other contexts do not
transplant well into the startup soil. In fact the most spectacular startup failures result when people
were in a startup situation but failed to recognize it, or failed to recognize what it meant for their
behavior.
This definition is also important for what it excludes. Notice that it says nothing about the size of the
company involved. Big companies often fail because they find themselves in a startup situation but
are unable to reorient in time to cope with this situation; this specific pathology is explored in The
Innovator’s Dilemma. This kind of crisis can be precipitated by many external factors: macroeconomic
changes, trade policy, technological change, or even cultural shifts. But most often, the entrant of a
startup into a previously calm market precipitates this kind of crisis. This has significant implications
for general managers in enterprise, about which you can read more at HBR: Is Entrepreneurship a
Management Science?
The
first
principles
of
startup
–
Steve
Blank
What’s A Startup? First Principles.
Posted on January 25, 2010 by steveblank
Success consists of going from failure to failure without loss of enthusiasm .
Winston Churchill
Everyone knows what a startup is for – don’t they?
In this post we’re going to offer a new definition of why startups exist : a startup is an organization
formed to search for a repeatable and scalable business model .
A Business Model
Ok, but what is a business model?
A business model describes how your company creates, delivers and captures value.
Or in English: A business model describes how your company makes money.
(Or depending on your metrics for success, get users, grow traffic, etc.)
Think of a business model as a drawing that shows all the flows between the different parts of your
company. A business model diagram also shows how the product gets distributed to your customers
and how money flows back into your company. And it shows your company’s cost structures, how
each department interacts with the others and where your company fits with other companies or
partners to implement your business.
While this is a mouthful, it’s a lot easier to draw.
Drawing A Business Model
Lots of people have been working on how to diagram and draw a business. I had my students
drawing theirs for years, but Alexander Osterwalder’s work on business models is the clearest
description I’ve read in the last decade. The diagram below is his Business Model template . In
12. 11
your startup’s business model, the boxes will have specific details of your company’s
strategy.
Alexander Osterwalder's Business Model Template
(At Stanford, Ann Miura-Ko and I have been working on a simplified Silicon Valley version of this
model. Ann will be guest posting more on business models soon.)
But What Does a Business Model Have to Do With My Startup?
Your startup is essentially an organization built to search for a repeatable and scalable
business model. As a founder you start out with:
1) a vision of a product with a set of features,
2) a series of hypotheses about all the pieces of the business model: Who are the customers/users?
What’s the distribution channel. How do we price and position the product? How do we create end
user demand? Who are our partners? Where/how do we build the product? How do we finance the
company, etc.
Your job as a founder is to quickly validate whether the model is correct by seeing if customers
behave as your model predicts. Most of the time the darn customers don’t behave as you predicted.
How Does Customer Development, Agile Development and Lean Startups Fit?
The Customer Development process is the way startups quickly iterate and test each element of
their business model. Agile Development is the way startups quickly iterate their product as
13. 12
they learn. A Lean Startup is Eric Ries’s description of the intersection of Customer
Development, Agile Development and if available, open platforms and open source. (This
methodology does for startups what the Toyota Lean Production System did for cars.)
Business Plan Versus Business Model
Wait a minute, isn’t the Business Model the same thing as my Business Plan? Sort of…but
better. A business plan is useful place for you to collect your hypotheses about your
business, sales, marketing, customers, market size, etc. (Your investors make you write one,
but they never read it.) A Business Model is how all the pieces in your business plan
interconnect.
The Pivot
How do you know your business model is the right one? When revenue, users, traffic, etc.,
start increasing in a repeatable way you predicted and make your investors happy. The irony
is the first time this happens, you may not have found your company’s optimal model. Most
startups change their business model at least once if not several times. How do you know
when reached the one to scale?
Stay tuned. More in future posts.
Lessons Learned
A startup is an organization formed to search for a repeatable and scalable business model.
The goal of your early business model can be revenue, or profits, or users, or click-throughs –
whatever you and your investors have agreed upon.
Customer and Agile Development is the way for startups to quickly iterate and test their hypotheses
about their business model
Most startups change their business model multiple times.
14. 13
Why
to
do
a
startup
(is
the
idea
worth
it?)
–
Peter
Thiel
(Blake
Masters)
http://blakemasters.tumblr.com/post/20400301508/cs183class1
Peter Thiel’s CS183: Startup - Class 1 Notes Essay
Here is an essay version of my class notes from Class 1 of CS183: Startup. Errors and omissions are
my own. Credit for good stuff is Peter’s entirely.
CS183: Startup—Notes Essay—The Challenge of the Future
Purpose and Preamble
We might describe our world as having retail sanity, but wholesale madness. Details are well
understood; the big picture remains unclear. A fundamental challenge—in business as in life—is to
integrate the micro and macro such that all things make sense.
Humanities majors may well learn a great deal about the world. But they don’t really learn
career skills through their studies. Engineering majors, conversely, learn in great technical detail. But
they might not learn why, how, or where they should apply their skills in the workforce. The best
students, workers, and thinkers will integrate these questions into a cohesive narrative. This course
aims to facilitate that process.
I. The History of Technology
For most of recent human history—from the invention of the steam engine in the late
17
th
century through about the late 1960’s or so— technological process has been tremendous,
perhaps even relentless. In most prior human societies, people made money by taking it from others.
The industrial revolution wrought a paradigm shift in which people make money through trade, not
plunder.
The importance of this shift is hard to overstate. Perhaps 100 billion people have ever lived
on earth. Most of them lived in essentially stagnant societies; success involved claiming value, not
creating it. So the massive technological acceleration of the past few hundred years is truly incredible.
The zenith of optimism about the future of technology might have been the 1960’s.
People believed in the future. They thought about the future. Many were supremely confident that
the next 50 years would be a half-century of unprecedented technological progress.
But with the exception of the computer industry, it wasn’t. Per capita incomes are still rising,
but that rate is starkly decelerating. Median wages have been stagnant since 1973. People find
themselves in an alarming Alice-in-Wonderland-style scenario in which they must run harder and
harder—that is, work longer hours—just to stay in the same place. This deceleration is complex, and
wage data alone don’t explain it. But they do support the general sense that the rapid progress of the
last 200 years is slowing all too quickly.
II. The Case For Computer Science
Computers have been the happy exception to recent tech deceleration.
Moore’s/Kryder’s/Wirth’s laws have largely held up, and forecast continued growth. Computer tech,
with ever-improving hardware and agile development, is something of a model for other industries. It’s
obviously central to the Silicon Valley ecosystem and a key driver of modern technological change.
So CS is the logical starting place to recapture the reins of progress.
15. 14
III. The Future For Progress
A. Globalization and Tech: Horizontal vs. Vertical Progress
Progress comes in two flavors: horizontal/extensive and vertical/intensive. Horizontal or
extensive progress basically means copying things that work. In one word, it means simply
“globalization.” Consider what China will be like in 50 years. The safe bet is it will be a lot like the
United States is now. Cities will be copied, cars will be copied, and rail systems will be copied. Maybe
some steps will be skipped. But it’s copying all the same.
Vertical or intensive progress, by contrast, means doing new things. The single word for this is
“technology.” Intensive progress involves going from 0 to 1 (not simply the 1 to n of globalization). We
see much of our vertical progress come from places like California, and specifically Silicon Valley. But
there is every reason to question whether we have enough of it. Indeed, most people seem to focus
almost entirely on globalization instead of technology; speaking of “developed” versus “developing
nations” is implicitly bearish about technology because it implies some convergence to the
“developed” status quo. As a society, we seem to believe in a sort of technological end of history,
almost by default.
It’s worth noting that globalization and technology do have some interplay; we shouldn’t falsely
dichotomize them. Consider resource constraints as a 1 to n subproblem. Maybe not everyone can
have a car because that would be environmentally catastrophic. If 1 to n is so blocked, only 0 to 1
solutions can help. Technological development is thus crucially important, even if all we really care
about is globalization.
B. The Problems of 0 to 1
Maybe we focus so much on going from 1 to n because that’s easier to do. There’s little doubt
that going from 0 to 1 is qualitatively different, and almost always harder, than copying
something n times. And even trying to achieve vertical, 0 to 1 progress presents the challenge of
exceptionalism; any founder or inventor doing something new must wonder: am I sane? Or am I
crazy?
Consider an analogy to politics. The United States is often thought of as an “exceptional”
country. At least many Americans believe that it is. So is the U.S. sane? Or is it crazy? Everyone
owns guns. No one believes in climate change. And most people weigh 600 pounds. Of course,
exceptionalism may cut the other way. America is the land of opportunity. It is the frontier country. It
offers new starts, meritocratic promises of riches. Regardless of which version you buy, people must
grapple with the problem of exceptionalism. Some 20,000 people, believing themselves uniquely
gifted, move to Los Angeles every year to become famous actors. Very few of them, of course,
actually become famous actors. The startup world is probably less plagued by the challenge of
exceptionalism than Hollywood is. But it probably isn’t immune to it.
C. The Educational and Narrative Challenge
Teaching vertical progress or innovation is almost a contradiction in terms. Education is
fundamentally about going from 1 to n. We observe, imitate, and repeat. Infants do not invent new
languages; they learn existing ones. From early on, we learn by copying what has worked before.
That is insufficient for startups. Crossing T’s and dotting I’s will get you maybe 30% of the way
there. (It’s certainly necessary to get incorporation right, for instance. And one can learn how to pitch
16. 15
VCs.) But at some point you have to go from 0 to 1—you have to do something important and do it
right—and that can’t be taught. Channeling Tolstoy’s intro to Anna Karenina, all successful companies
are different; they figured out the 0 to 1 problem in different ways. But all failed companies are the
same; they botched the 0 to 1 problem.
So case studies about successful businesses are of limited utility. PayPal and Facebook
worked. But it’s hard to know what was necessarily path-dependent. The next great company may not
be an e-payments or social network company. We mustn’t make too much of any single narrative.
Thus the business school case method is more mythical than helpful.
D. Determinism vs. Indeterminism
Among the toughest questions about progress is the question of how we should assess a
venture’s probability of success. In the 1 to n paradigm, it’s a statistical question. You can analyze
and predict. But in the 0 to 1 paradigm, it’s not a statistical question; the standard deviation with a
sample size of 1 is infinite. There can be no statistical analysis; statistically, we’re in the dark.
We tend to think very statistically about the future. And statistics tells us that it’s random. We
can’t predict the future; we can only think probabilistically. If the market follows a random walk, there’s
no sense trying to out-calculate it.
But there’s an alternative math metaphor we might use: calculus. The calculus metaphor asks
whether and how we can figure out exactly what’s going to happen. Take NASA and the Apollo
missions, for instance. You have to figure out where the moon is going to be, exactly. You have to
plan whether a rocket has enough fuel to reach it. And so on. The point is that no one would want to
ride in a statistically, probabilistically-informed spaceship.
Startups are like the space program in this sense. Going from 0 to 1 always has to favor
determinism over indeterminism. But there is a practical problem with this. We have a word for people
who claim to know the future: prophets. And in our society, all prophets are false prophets. Steve
Jobs finessed his way about the line between determinism and indeterminism; people sensed he was
a visionary, but he didn’t go too far. He probably cut it as close as possible (and succeeded
accordingly).
The luck versus skill question is also important. Distinguishing these factors is difficult or
impossible. Trying to do so invites ample opportunity for fallacious reasoning. Perhaps the best we
can do for now is to flag the question, and suggest that it’s one that entrepreneurs or would-be
entrepreneurs should have some handle on.
E. The Future of Intensive Growth
There are four theories about the future of intensive progress. First is convergence; starting
with the industrial revolution, we saw a quick rise in progress, but technology will decelerate and
growth will become asymptotic.
Second, there is the cyclical theory. Technological progress moves in cycles; advances are
made, retrenchments ensue. Repeat. This has probably been true for most of human history in the
past. But it’s hard to imagine it remaining true; to think that we could somehow lose all the information
and know-how we’ve amassed and be doomed to have to re-discover it strains credulity.
Third is collapse/destruction. Some technological advance will do us in.
17. 16
Fourth is the singularity where technological development yields some AI or intellectual event
horizon.
People tend to overestimate the likelihood or explanatory power of the convergence and
cyclical theories. Accordingly, they probably underestimate the destruction and singularity theories.
IV. Why Companies?
If we want technological development, why look to companies to do it? It’s possible, after all,
to imagine a society in which everyone works for the government. Or, conversely, one in which
everyone is an independent contractor. Why have some intermediate version consisting of at least
two people but less than everyone on the planet?
The answer is straightforward application of the Coase Theorem. Companies exist because
they optimally address internal and external coordination costs. In general, as an entity grows, so do
its internal coordination costs. But its external coordination costs fall. Totalitarian government is entity
writ large; external coordination is easy, since those costs are zero. But internal coordination, as
Hayek and the Austrians showed, is hard and costly; central planning doesn’t work.
The flipside is that internal coordination costs for independent contractors are zero, but
external coordination costs (uniquely contracting with absolutely everybody one deals with) are very
high, possibly paralyzingly so. Optimality—firm size—is a matter of finding the right combination.
V. Why Startups?
A. Costs Matter
Size and internal vs. external coordination costs matter a lot. North of 100 people in a
company, employees don’t all know each other. Politics become important. Incentives change.
Signaling that work is being done may become more important than actually doing work. These costs
are almost always underestimated. Yet they are so prevalent that professional investors should and
do seriously reconsider before investing in companies that have more than one office. Severe
coordination problems may stem from something as seemingly trivial or innocuous as a company
having a multi-floor office. Hiring consultants and trying to outsource key development projects are,
for similar reasons, serious red flags. While there’s surely been some lessening of these coordination
costs in the last 40 years—and that explains the shift to somewhat smaller companies—the tendency
is still to underestimate them. Since they remain fairly high, they’re worth thinking hard about.
Path’s limiting its users to 150 “friends” is illustrative of this point. And ancient tribes
apparently had a natural size limit that didn’t much exceed that number. Startups are important
because they are small; if the size and complexity of a business is something like the square of the
number of people in it, then startups are in a unique position to lower interpersonal or internal costs
and thus to get stuff done.
The familiar Austrian critique dovetails here as well. Even if a computer could model all the
narrowly economic problems a company faces (and, to be clear, none can), it wouldn’t be enough. To
model all costs, it would have to model human irrationalities, emotions, feelings, and interactions.
Computers help, but we still don’t have all the info. And if we did, we wouldn’t know what to do with it.
So, in practice, we end up having companies of a certain size.
B. Why Do a Startup?
18. 17
The easiest answer to “why startups?” is negative: because you can’t develop new technology
in existing entities. There’s something wrong with big companies, governments, and non-profits.
Perhaps they can’t recognize financial needs; the federal government, hamstrung by its own
bureaucracy, obviously overcompensates some while grossly undercompensating others in its
employ. Or maybe these entities can’t handle personal needs; you can’t always get recognition,
respect, or fame from a huge bureaucracy. Anyone on a mission tends to want to go from 0 to 1. You
can only do that if you’re surrounded by others to want to go from 0 to 1. That happens in startups,
not huge companies or government.
Doing startups for the money is not a great idea. Research shows that people get happier as
they make more and more money, but only up to about $70,000 per year. After that, marginal
improvements brought by higher income are more or less offset by other factors (stress, more hours,
etc. Plus there is obviously diminishing marginal utility of money even absent offsetting factors).
Perhaps doing startups to be remembered or become famous is a better motive. Perhaps not.
Whether being famous or infamous should be as important as most people seem to think it is highly
questionable. A better motive still would be a desire to change the world. The U.S. in 1776-79 was a
startup of sorts. What were the Founders motivations? There is a large cultural component to the
motivation question, too. In Japan, entrepreneurs are seen as reckless risk-takers. The respectable
thing to do is become a lifelong employee somewhere. The literary version of this sentiment is “behind
every fortune lies a great crime.” Were the Founding Fathers criminals? Are all founders criminals of
one sort or another?
C. The Costs of Failure
Startups pay less than bigger companies. So founding or joining one involves some financial
loss. These losses are generally thought to be high. In reality, they aren’t that high.
The nonfinancial costs are actually higher. If you do a failed startup, you may not have learned
anything useful. You may actually have learned how to fail again. You may become more risk-averse.
You aren’t a lottery ticket, so you shouldn’t think of failure as just 1 of n times that you’re going to start
a company. The stakes are a bit bigger than that.
A 0 to 1 startup involves low financial costs but low non-financial costs too. You’ll at least
learn a lot and probably will be better for the effort. A 1 to n startup, though, has especially low
financial costs, but higher non-financial costs. If you try to do Groupon for Madagascar and it fails, it’s
not clear where exactly you are. But it’s not good.
VI. Where to Start?
The path from 0 to 1 might start with asking and answering three questions. First, what is
valuable? Second, what can I do? And third, what is nobody else doing?
The questions themselves are straightforward. Question one illustrates the difference between
business and academia; in academia, the number one sin is plagiarism, not triviality. So much of the
innovation is esoteric and not at all useful. No one cares about a firm’s eccentric, non-valuable output.
The second question ensures that you can actually execute on a problem; if not, talk is just that.
Finally, and often overlooked, is the importance of being novel. Forget that and we’re just copying.
The intellectual rephrasing of these questions is: What important truth do very few people
agree with you on?
19. 18
The business version is: What valuable company is nobody
building?
These are tough questions. But you can test your answers; if, as so many people do, one
says something like “our educational system is broken and urgently requires repair,” you know that
that answer is wrong (it may be a truth, but lots of people agree with it). This may explain why we see
so many education non-profits and startups. But query whether most of those are operating in
technology mode or globalization mode. You know you’re on the right track when your answer takes
the following form:
“Most people believe in X. But the truth is !X.”
Make no mistake; it’s a hard question. Knowing what 0 to 1 endeavor is worth pursuing is
incredibly rare, unique, and tricky. But the process, if not the result, can also be richly rewarding.
Entrepreneurship
as
management
science
–
Eric
Ries
http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2010/01/is_entrepreneurship_a_manageme.html
Is Entrepreneurship a Management Science?
After ten years as an entrepreneur, I started writing a blog called Startup Lessons Learned. My
original goal was to provide support and encouragement to other entrepreneurs who, like me, had
some unorthodox ideas about how to run companies. Along the way, I encountered two big surprises.
They led me to a question I had never previously considered: is it possible that entrepreneurship is
actually a management science?
For most of us, the phrase "management science" conjures up a decidedly non-entrepreneurial
image, and for good reason. The preeminent management science, for much of the twentieth century
was general management, pioneered by twentieth century giants like Peter Drucker and Alfred P.
Sloan. As an entrepreneur, I often saw the best practices of general management fail startups.
Applied out of context, they were dangerous.
This conflict has played out in many companies that I've worked with. My most recent startup created
a marketplace for customers to buy and sell virtual goods for their 3D avatar. So you can imagine how
I expected some skepticism when pitching ideas about technology innovation to, say, the U.S. Army.
This was my first surprise: they understood that innovation needs to be understood at the level of
principles, not just tactics.
Some tactics, like Continuous Deployment, are controversial, even among people with my
background. But the really vexing questions came from entrepreneurs who inundated me with
questions from other backgrounds. Could these techniques be used by enterprise software
companies? Hardware manufacturers? Biotech startups?
Answering those questions requires understanding the principles of entrepreneurship in a rigorous
way. I began to call this new methodology "the lean startup." It is a rigorous application of lean
principles to the problem of new product innovation.
Inspired by the lean manufacturing revolution (and excellent books like Lean Thinking), I started with
a first fundamental question: in a startup, what activities are value-creating and which are waste?
20. 19
Usually, new projects are measured and held accountable to milestones and deadlines. When a
project is on track, on time, and on budget, our intuition is that it is being well managed. This intuition
is dead wrong.
Most startups fail because they are building something that nobody wants. Enamored with a new
technology or a radical new product, many entrepreneurs never find a set of customers who will buy
it. Each new feature added to such a product is actually wasted effort, even if it's done on-time and
on-budget. In product that nobody wants, all the features get thrown away.
This problem vexes venture-backed founders and general managers alike. Anyone who is tasked with
creating disruptive innovation will find it familiar. In short, for an innovation on the wrong course,
executing well doesn't increase the odds of success. What's needed, I realized, is a new definition of
progress in a startup, one that recognizes that a startup's primary mission is to penetrate the fog of
the unknown and find out what their customers ultimately will want and accept. I call this unit of
progress "validated learning about customers." Because learning is the goal, the progress that
startups make requires a very different kind of management.
This led me to a second surprise. As I was traveling the country talking to people about the lean
startup, I kept meeting people in the audience who seemed out of place. They weren't what we
usually think of as entrepreneurs. They were general managers, most working in very large
companies, who were tasked with creating new product innovations. They were smart, well-read, and
understood Clay Christenson's Innovator's Solution cold.
They were adept at organizational politics: they knew how to form autonomous divisions with separate
P&Ls, and could shield controversial or disruptive teams from meddling. And — my biggest surprise
yet — they were visionaries. Like the startup founders I have worked with for years, they could see
the future of their industries, and were prepared to take bold risks to seek out new and innovative
solutions to the problems their companies would face.
They found the lean startup helpful. In fact, they considered it obvious that these principles — rapid
iteration, a focus on validated learning, and reducing cycle time from idea to learning — applied to
their situation. Here's why. In my quest to put the practice of entrepreneurship on a rigorous footing, I
had begun with this definition of a startup:
A startup is a human institution designed to create a new product or service under conditions of
extreme uncertainty.
Originally, I used this definition to help entrepreneurs understand why the "best practices" of general
management so often failed them. They can't thrive when transplanted into the soil of extreme
uncertainty that is the province of startups. But this definition is surprising: it doesn't say anything
about the size of the company, sector of the economy, or industry. Looking past my old
preconceptions, I realized that entrepreneurs are everywhere: in government, in the occasional
garage, and yes, in the traditional organization.
All entrepreneurs face the same fundamental challenges:
How do we know if we're making progress?
How do we know if customers will want the product we are building?
And, if they do, how do we know what kind of value we can create with it?
21. 20
But because every startup also strives to become an institution, answering these questions requires
more than just disciplined thinking at the whiteboard. It requires the coordination of many different
people, working in concert to answer them. In other words, it requires management.
The management challenges presented by entrepreneurship are different. For example, how do we
hold an entrepreneurial team accountable for making progress? This is a core challenge faced by
venture capitalists and corporate CFOs alike. A team might be making progress against their plan,
might be hitting milestones, might even be earning revenue. But none of those artifacts constitute
progress. Learning is progress. In short, it's demonstrating the ability to use what we've learned to
change customer behavior, with key metrics as the common source of evidence.
To measure learning requires a shift of attention from the output of models to their inputs. I'll show you
how to apply this to entrepreneurial situations in my next post.
Eric Ries is the author of StartupLessonsLearned.com and is an adviser to many startups,
companies, and venture capital firms.
22. 21
The
basic
strategy
(what
to
do)
The
basic
strategy
(what
to
do)
Startups
in
13
sentences
–
Paul
Graham
http://www.paulgraham.com/13sentences.html
Want to start a startup? Get funded by Y Combinator.
Watch how this essay was written on Etherpad.
February 2009
One of the things I always tell startups is a principle I learned from Paul Buchheit: it's
better to make a few people really happy than to make a lot of people semi-happy. I was
saying recently to a reporter that if I could only tell startups 10 things, this would be one
of them. Then I thought: what would the other 9 be?
When I made the list there turned out to be 13:
1. Pick good cofounders.
Cofounders are for a startup what location is for real estate. You can change anything
about a house except where it is. In a startup you can change your idea easily, but
changing your cofounders is hard. [1] And the success of a startup is almost always a
function of its founders.
2. Launch fast.
The reason to launch fast is not so much that it's critical to get your product to market
early, but that you haven't really started working on it till you've launched. Launching
teaches you what you should have been building. Till you know that you're wasting your
time. So the main value of whatever you launch with is as a pretext for engaging users.
3. Let your idea evolve.
This is the second half of launching fast. Launch fast and iterate. It's a big mistake to
treat a startup as if it were merely a matter of implementing some brilliant initial idea.
As in an essay, most of the ideas appear in the implementing.
4. Understand your users.
23. 22
You can envision the wealth created by a startup as a rectangle, where one side is the
number of users and the other is how much you improve their lives. [2] The second
dimension is the one you have most control over. And indeed, the growth in the first will
be driven by how well you do in the second. As in science, the hard part is not answering
questions but asking them: the hard part is seeing something new that users lack. The
better you understand them the better the odds of doing that. That's why so many
successful startups make something the founders needed.
5. Better to make a few users love you than a lot ambivalent.
Ideally you want to make large numbers of users love you, but you can't expect to hit
that right away. Initially you have to choose between satisfying all the needs of a subset
of potential users, or satisfying a subset of the needs of all potential users. Take the
first. It's easier to expand userwise than satisfactionwise. And perhaps more importantly,
it's harder to lie to yourself. If you think you're 85% of the way to a great product, how
do you know it's not 70%? Or 10%? Whereas it's easy to know how many users you
have.
6. Offer surprisingly good customer service.
Customers are used to being maltreated. Most of the companies they deal with are
quasi-monopolies that get away with atrocious customer service. Your own ideas about
what's possible have been unconsciously lowered by such experiences. Try making your
customer service not merely good, but surprisingly good. Go out of your way to make
people happy. They'll be overwhelmed; you'll see. In the earliest stages of a startup, it
pays to offer customer service on a level that wouldn't scale, because it's a way of
learning about your users.
7. You make what you measure.
I learned this one from Joe Kraus. [3] Merely measuring something has an uncanny
tendency to improve it. If you want to make your user numbers go up, put a big piece of
paper on your wall and every day plot the number of users. You'll be delighted when it
goes up and disappointed when it goes down. Pretty soon you'll start noticing what
makes the number go up, and you'll start to do more of that. Corollary: be careful what
you measure.
8. Spend little.
I can't emphasize enough how important it is for a startup to be cheap. Most startups fail
before they make something people want, and the most common form of failure is
running out of money. So being cheap is (almost) interchangeable with iterating
rapidly. [4]But it's more than that. A culture of cheapness keeps companies young in
something like the way exercise keeps people young.
9. Get ramen profitable.
"Ramen profitable" means a startup makes just enough to pay the founders' living
24. 23
expenses. It's not rapid prototyping for business models (though it can be), but more a
way of hacking the investment process. Once you cross over into ramen profitable, it
completely changes your relationship with investors. It's also great for morale.
10. Avoid distractions.
Nothing kills startups like distractions. The worst type are those that pay money: day
jobs, consulting, profitable side-projects. The startup may have more long-term
potential, but you'll always interrupt working on it to answer calls from people paying
you now. Paradoxically, fundraising is this type of distraction, so try to minimize that
too.
11. Don't get demoralized.
Though the immediate cause of death in a startup tends to be running out of money, the
underlying cause is usually lack of focus. Either the company is run by stupid people
(which can't be fixed with advice) or the people are smart but got demoralized. Starting
a startup is a huge moral weight. Understand this and make a conscious effort not to be
ground down by it, just as you'd be careful to bend at the knees when picking up a
heavy box.
12. Don't give up.
Even if you get demoralized, don't give up. You can get surprisingly far by just not giving
up. This isn't true in all fields. There are a lot of people who couldn't become good
mathematicians no matter how long they persisted. But startups aren't like that. Sheer
effort is usually enough, so long as you keep morphing your idea.
13. Deals fall through.
One of the most useful skills we learned from Viaweb was not getting our hopes up. We
probably had 20 deals of various types fall through. After the first 10 or so we learned to
treat deals as background processes that we should ignore till they terminated. It's very
dangerous to morale to start to depend on deals closing, not just because they so often
don't, but because it makes them less likely to.
Having gotten it down to 13 sentences, I asked myself which I'd choose if I could only
keep one.
Understand your users. That's the key. The essential task in a startup is to create
wealth; the dimension of wealth you have most control over is how much you improve
users' lives; and the hardest part of that is knowing what to make for them. Once you
know what to make, it's mere effort to make it, and most decent hackers are capable of
that.
Understanding your users is part of half the principles in this list. That's the reason to
launch early, to understand your users. Evolving your idea is the embodiment of
understanding your users. Understanding your users well will tend to push you toward
25. 24
making something that makes a few people deeply happy. The most important reason
for having surprisingly good customer service is that it helps you understand your users.
And understanding your users will even ensure your morale, because when everything
else is collapsing around you, having just ten users who love you will keep you going.
Notes
[1] Strictly speaking it's impossible without a time machine.
[2] In practice it's more like a ragged comb.
[3] Joe thinks one of the founders of Hewlett Packard said it first, but he doesn't
remember which.
[4] They'd be interchangeable if markets stood still. Since they don't, working twice as
fast is better than having twice as much time.
How
to
start
a
startup
–
Paul
Graham
http://www.paulgraham.com/start.html
Want to start a startup? Get funded by Y Combinator.
March 2005
(This essay is derived from a talk at the Harvard Computer Society.)
You need three things to create a successful startup: to start with good people, to make
something customers actually want, and to spend as little money as possible. Most
startups that fail do it because they fail at one of these. A startup that does all three will
probably succeed.
And that's kind of exciting, when you think about it, because all three are doable. Hard,
but doable. And since a startup that succeeds ordinarily makes its founders rich, that
implies getting rich is doable too. Hard, but doable.
If there is one message I'd like to get across about startups, that's it. There is no
magically difficult step that requires brilliance to solve.
The Idea
26. 25
In particular, you don't need a brilliant idea to start a startup around. The way a startup
makes money is to offer people better technology than they have now. But what people
have now is often so bad that it doesn't take brilliance to do better.
Google's plan, for example, was simply to create a search site that didn't suck. They had
three new ideas: index more of the Web, use links to rank search results, and have
clean, simple web pages with unintrusive keyword-based ads. Above all, they were
determined to make a site that was good to use. No doubt there are great technical
tricks within Google, but the overall plan was straightforward. And while they probably
have bigger ambitions now, this alone brings them a billion dollars a year. [1]
There are plenty of other areas that are just as backward as search was before Google. I
can think of several heuristics for generating ideas for startups, but most reduce to this:
look at something people are trying to do, and figure out how to do it in a way that
doesn't suck.
For example, dating sites currently suck far worse than search did before Google. They
all use the same simple-minded model. They seem to have approached the problem by
thinking about how to do database matches instead of how dating works in the real
world. An undergrad could build something better as a class project. And yet there's a lot
of money at stake. Online dating is a valuable business now, and it might be worth a
hundred times as much if it worked.
An idea for a startup, however, is only a beginning. A lot of would-be startup founders
think the key to the whole process is the initial idea, and from that point all you have to
do is execute. Venture capitalists know better. If you go to VC firms with a brilliant idea
that you'll tell them about if they sign a nondisclosure agreement, most will tell you to
get lost. That shows how much a mere idea is worth. The market price is less than the
inconvenience of signing an NDA.
Another sign of how little the initial idea is worth is the number of startups that change
their plan en route. Microsoft's original plan was to make money selling programming
languages, of all things. Their current business model didn't occur to them until IBM
dropped it in their lap five years later.
Ideas for startups are worth something, certainly, but the trouble is, they're not
transferrable. They're not something you could hand to someone else to execute. Their
value is mainly as starting points: as questions for the people who had them to continue
thinking about.
What matters is not ideas, but the people who have them. Good people can fix bad
ideas, but good ideas can't save bad people.
People
What do I mean by good people? One of the best tricks I learned during our startup was
a rule for deciding who to hire. Could you describe the person as an animal? It might be
hard to translate that into another language, but I think everyone in the US knows what
27. 26
it means. It means someone who takes their work a little too seriously; someone who
does what they do so well that they pass right through professional and cross over into
obsessive.
What it means specifically depends on the job: a salesperson who just won't take no for
an answer; a hacker who will stay up till 4:00 AM rather than go to bed leaving code
with a bug in it; a PR person who will cold-call New York Times reporters on their cell
phones; a graphic designer who feels physical pain when something is two millimeters
out of place.
Almost everyone who worked for us was an animal at what they did. The woman in
charge of sales was so tenacious that I used to feel sorry for potential customers on the
phone with her. You could sense them squirming on the hook, but you knew there would
be no rest for them till they'd signed up.
If you think about people you know, you'll find the animal test is easy to apply. Call the
person's image to mind and imagine the sentence "so-and-so is an animal." If you laugh,
they're not. You don't need or perhaps even want this quality in big companies, but you
need it in a startup.
For programmers we had three additional tests. Was the person genuinely smart? If so,
could they actually get things done? And finally, since a few good hackers have
unbearable personalities, could we stand to have them around?
That last test filters out surprisingly few people. We could bear any amount of nerdiness
if someone was truly smart. What we couldn't stand were people with a lot of attitude.
But most of those weren't truly smart, so our third test was largely a restatement of the
first.
When nerds are unbearable it's usually because they're trying too hard to seem smart.
But the smarter they are, the less pressure they feel to act smart. So as a rule you can
recognize genuinely smart people by their ability to say things like "I don't know,"
"Maybe you're right," and "I don't understand x well enough."
This technique doesn't always work, because people can be influenced by their
environment. In the MIT CS department, there seems to be a tradition of acting like a
brusque know-it-all. I'm told it derives ultimately from Marvin Minsky, in the same way
the classic airline pilot manner is said to derive from Chuck Yeager. Even genuinely
smart people start to act this way there, so you have to make allowances.
It helped us to have Robert Morris, who is one of the readiest to say "I don't know" of
anyone I've met. (At least, he was before he became a professor at MIT.) No one dared
put on attitude around Robert, because he was obviously smarter than they were and
yet had zero attitude himself.
Like most startups, ours began with a group of friends, and it was through personal
contacts that we got most of the people we hired. This is a crucial difference between
startups and big companies. Being friends with someone for even a couple days will tell
28. 27
you more than companies could ever learn in interviews. [2]
It's no coincidence that startups start around universities, because that's where smart
people meet. It's not what people learn in classes at MIT and Stanford that has made
technology companies spring up around them. They could sing campfire songs in the
classes so long as admissions worked the same.
If you start a startup, there's a good chance it will be with people you know from college
or grad school. So in theory you ought to try to make friends with as many smart people
as you can in school, right? Well, no. Don't make a conscious effort to schmooze; that
doesn't work well with hackers.
What you should do in college is work on your own projects. Hackers should do this even
if they don't plan to start startups, because it's the only real way to learn how to
program. In some cases you may collaborate with other students, and this is the best
way to get to know good hackers. The project may even grow into a startup. But once
again, I wouldn't aim too directly at either target. Don't force things; just work on stuff
you like with people you like.
Ideally you want between two and four founders. It would be hard to start with just one.
One person would find the moral weight of starting a company hard to bear. Even Bill
Gates, who seems to be able to bear a good deal of moral weight, had to have a co-
founder. But you don't want so many founders that the company starts to look like a
group photo. Partly because you don't need a lot of people at first, but mainly because
the more founders you have, the worse disagreements you'll have. When there are just
two or three founders, you know you have to resolve disputes immediately or perish. If
there are seven or eight, disagreements can linger and harden into factions. You don't
want mere voting; you need unanimity.
In a technology startup, which most startups are, the founders should include technical
people. During the Internet Bubble there were a number of startups founded by business
people who then went looking for hackers to create their product for them. This doesn't
work well. Business people are bad at deciding what to do with technology, because they
don't know what the options are, or which kinds of problems are hard and which are
easy. And when business people try to hire hackers, they can't tell which ones aregood.
Even other hackers have a hard time doing that. For business people it's roulette.
Do the founders of a startup have to include business people? That depends. We thought
so when we started ours, and we asked several people who were said to know about this
mysterious thing called "business" if they would be the president. But they all said no, so
I had to do it myself. And what I discovered was that business was no great mystery.
It's not something like physics or medicine that requires extensive study. You just try to
get people to pay you for stuff.
I think the reason I made such a mystery of business was that I was disgusted by the
idea of doing it. I wanted to work in the pure, intellectual world of software, not deal
with customers' mundane problems. People who don't want to get dragged into some
kind of work often develop a protective incompetence at it. Paul Erdos was particularly
29. 28
good at this. By seeming unable even to cut a grapefruit in half (let alone go to the store
and buy one), he forced other people to do such things for him, leaving all his time free
for math. Erdos was an extreme case, but most husbands use the same trick to some
degree.
Once I was forced to discard my protective incompetence, I found that business was
neither so hard nor so boring as I feared. There are esoteric areas of business that are
quite hard, like tax law or the pricing of derivatives, but you don't need to know about
those in a startup. All you need to know about business to run a startup are
commonsense things people knew before there were business schools, or even
universities.
If you work your way down the Forbes 400 making an x next to the name of each person
with an MBA, you'll learn something important about business school. After Warren
Buffett, you don't hit another MBA till number 22, Phil Knight, the CEO of Nike. There are
only 5 MBAs in the top 50. What you notice in the Forbes 400 are a lot of people with
technical backgrounds. Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Larry Ellison, Michael Dell, Jeff Bezos,
Gordon Moore. The rulers of the technology business tend to come from technology, not
business. So if you want to invest two years in something that will help you succeed in
business, the evidence suggests you'd do better to learn how to hack than get an MBA.
[3]
There is one reason you might want to include business people in a startup, though:
because you have to have at least one person willing and able to focus on what
customers want. Some believe only business people can do this-- that hackers can
implement software, but not design it. That's nonsense. There's nothing about knowing
how to program that prevents hackers from understanding users, or about not knowing
how to program that magically enables business people to understand them.
If you can't understand users, however, you should either learn how or find a co-founder
who can. That is the single most important issue for technology startups, and the rock
that sinks more of them than anything else.
What Customers Want
It's not just startups that have to worry about this. I think most businesses that fail do it
because they don't give customers what they want. Look at restaurants. A large
percentage fail, about a quarter in the first year. But can you think of one restaurant
that had really good food and went out of business?
Restaurants with great food seem to prosper no matter what. A restaurant with great
food can be expensive, crowded, noisy, dingy, out of the way, and even have bad
service, and people will keep coming. It's true that a restaurant with mediocre food can
sometimes attract customers through gimmicks. But that approach is very risky. It's
more straightforward just to make the food good.
It's the same with technology. You hear all kinds of reasons why startups fail. But can
you think of one that had a massively popular product and still failed?