Four aspects of Magindanawn sultanate polity vis-a-vis the Philippine national polity.

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http://kyotoreviewsea.org/KCMS/?p=81&lang=en
Williams 2009. Retrieved August 29, 2010.
Posted on December 13 2009 by admin
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Retrospect and Prospect of Magindanawn Leadership in
Central Mindanao: Four Vantage Points
Mark S. Williams
In the southern Philippines, the territory containing the influence of the
Magindanao Sultanate was extensive. So expansive was this territory that the Spaniards
named the entire southern island “Mindanao” in their honor (McKenna 1998, 27).
Through alliances, expertise and prowess in military affairs and economic practice, the
Magindanawn not only held their own against Spanish advances, but they also flourished
along with many other Southeast Asian Islamic sultanates.
This has been no less true in their establishment of social leadership and their
practice of governance – before, during and after the imperial onslaught of Spain for
nearly 400 years. When the United States acquired this Southeast Asian archipelago
from Spain by purchase at the turn of the twentieth century, Magindanawn leadership and
governance statutes did not truly change, although they certainly adapted in order to
survive the colonial impositions of the American period. This study examines four
vantage points under which Magindanawn leadership adapted and how it continues to
adapt to the present day.
First Vantage Point: Magindanawn Royal Bloodline Leadership
On the basis of genealogical records called tarsila, the record of Sharif
Kabungsuwan tracing his Malay nobility back to the bloodline of the Prophet Muhammad
was established (Saleeby 1976). Both the upriver laya (Buayan) and the downriver ilud

Mark S. Williams is Ph.D. (ABD) in Development Studies from the Ateneo de Davao University in Davao
City, Philippines. Working with a non-government organization (NGO) as a development anthropologist in
conflict-affected areas of Mindanao (CAAM) during the decade of the 1990s, Mr. Williams’ interests in the
Magindanawn Muslims of Central Mindanao builds directly into his dissertation research.

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(Magindanao) sultanates found legitimacy in claims to this royal bloodline. At different
times in the life of each sultanate, greatness exuded from such claims.
In the seventeenth century, the apex of the Magindanao Sultanate was reached
under the leadership of the redoubtable Sultan Muhammad Dipatuan Qudarat (Saleeby
1974, 189; et al). The legacy of Qudarat’s sultanate would be a structure that would rival
and compete with the existing sultanates of Sulu, Brunei, and Ternate (Laarhoven 1989,
36ff, esp. p. 40).
[U]nder the seventeeth-century sultan Kachil Kudrat, the divided Magindanao
communities – those belonging to sa-ilud (lower valley and coastal area), of which
Cotabato town was the known capital, and those in sa-raya (upper valley), of which
Dulawan was the capital – were unified, leading to the establishment of the first
centralized Magindanao sultanate…. (Abinales 2000, 47; italics in original)
Recounted in historical (Majul 1999, and Ileto 2007, 10-12) and folklore (Kilates 1993,
4-12) accounts, the legacy of leadership under Qudarat left an indelible mark on the
Magindanao Sultanate and those under its tutelage.
More than two hundred years later would come the zenith of the Buayan Sultanate
under “Sultan Anwar ud-Din Utto” (Majul 1999, 31), known more commonly as Datu
Utto. While upriver / downriver division led to constant internal dissension over the
many years, on the strength of ‘the descent principle,’ Utto sought to re-establish the
unified sultanate again:
In the Pulangi, many of these sub-sultanates pledged loyalty to the Sultan of Buayan,
Sultan Marajanuddin, who was in turn succeeded in 1865 by his brother, Sultan Bayao of
Kudarangan. In 1875, Datu Utto or Sultan Anwaruddin Utto, son of Sultan
Marajanuddin, took over as Sultan of Buayan…. [He] also maneuvered to be declared
jointly as Sultan of Maguindanao…. But the Spaniards opposed his inclination
vehemently. They saw in Datu Utto the making of a “second Qudarat.” Datu Utto was
able to unite the minor sultanates along the Pulangi, including those of Talayan, Buluan
and Kabuntalan. (Jubair 1999, 52; italics in original)
For nearly thirty years (Ileto 2007), Utto’s leadership would withstand penetration
from either inside or outside attackers. Before the end of the nineteeth century, however,
Spain would drive a wedge between warring factions of ilud and laya Magindanawn.
This is because “…Spain could scarcely have defeated Utu without Magindanao
[sultanate] help. She needed not only additional manpower, but local knowledge,
particularly of how to win over Utu’s restive supporters” (Beckett 1982, 399). One
contributing factor to the ability to divide-and-conquer the Magindanawn was related to
their concept of maratabat.
1. Maratabat
As a social mechanism to uphold bloodline nobility and enforce a class-based
hierarchy, “among the Magindanaon, ‘maratabat’ primarily connotes rank and
secondarily the honor due to rank. Maratabat is the quantifiable essence of status rank
and is measured most commonly as a monetary valuation…” (McKenna 1998, 51).
“[B]y taking into account the status of the mother as well as the father, it was possible to
make fine distinctions of maratabat” (Beckett 1982, 397; italics in original).

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For many royal-blood families, the preferred status was known as pulna: “[Pulna
is] a social status designation for those individuals able to trace direct descent through
both parents from Sarip Kabungsuwan…” (McKenna 1998, 338). Since from the early
years, “sultans, ideally, were distinguished by their pulna status…” (Ibid., 53; italics in
original), it was thought that, in order to attain this level of nobility, the similar means of
arranged marriage to high-ranking women was required to gain the desired goal. This
was very important to all families claiming royal-blood since “…a man without
maratabat is nobody; or a man who loses his maratabat becomes very, very small…”
(McAmis 2002, 61; italics in original).
Because maratabat is related to a “quantifiable essence” of “monetary valuation,”
it is sometimes used to make payment in order to avert a blood feud (McKenna 1998, 51;
cf. Stewart 1977, 282). Such family-feuding has been endemic to the history of the
Magindanawn and nowadays contributes to the phenomenon of pagkontla, called rido
(especially by the Maranao) in recent literature. In short, “rido refers to state of recurring
hostilities between families and kinship groups characterized by a series of retaliatory
acts of violence carried out to avenge a perceived affront or injustice” (Torres III 2007,
12; italics in original). Specifically, an
affront to maratabat as a cause for rido may range from unintended verbal insult,
perceived disrespect, slight injury, and even accident. The assessment of whether or not
maratabat was offended lies entirely on the evaluation of the presumably aggrieved
individual, his family or kinsmen. (Matuan 2007, 80; italics in original).
Because maratabat is such a personal thing for royal-blood families of the Maranao and
Magindanawn, it is difficult to know how this will factor into current and future
development initiatives given the effect it has had on Magindanawn society in the past.
2. Whither Royal-Blood Leadership?
Despite the in-fighting between ilud and laya Magindanawn, the ideal of what
bloodline leadership embodies has never truly waned.
The system of datuship has long kept the Muslims united and spiritually bound together.
So deeply ingrained into the fabric of Muslim life is this institution that the faith and
loyalty of the Muslims have withstood the severe vicissitudes of time and change. Down
to this day, many of them still hold the datus in characteristic religious awe and adulation.
(Alunan Glang, quoted in McKenna 1998, 134)
Nearly 35 years after the pronouncement of martial law, therefore, these ideals of royal
bloodline leadership – and the corollary concept of maratabat to uphold the honor and
the territory of the Magindanawn – continue to dominate and challenge the social,
economic, and political situation in Central Mindanao.
Second Vantage Point: Magindanawn Accommodation to the Philippine State
The issue of state-sanctioned leadership was never addressed while Spain was in
conflict with the Magindanawn up to the end of the nineteenth century. Under imperial
sanction of the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, “Moroland” (as that part

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of Muslim Mindanao came to be known) went from one pole of the promise of autonomy
and/or secession via the Bates Treaty to the other of being ushered into ‘proper
civilization,’ as well as preparation to be ‘integrated’ with Luzon and the Visayas by the
time of the First World War (Gowing 1983).
Fast-forwarding through the Philippine Commonwealth period of the 1930s,
World War II, and the establishment of the Philippine Republic after being granted
independence in 1946, issues surrounding the dialectic of autonomy-versus-integration
involved the historic tension between Magindanawn and foreign expatriates as well as
religious polarization between the longer-resident Filipino Muslims and their Christian
Filipino counterparts.
The Christianized and Islamized peoples of the Philippines are like these two
equatorial points. Theologically, we can find unity by rising up to the North Pole of a
Semitic divinity through the line of patriarchs and prophets beginning from Christ and
Mohammad….
[W]e can also turn our eyes to the South Pole through anthropology, there to find
an Asiatic humanity that links the Indonesians, the Malays, and the Filipinos in a
common ethnic foundation. (Casiño 1988, 36-37)
Accommodation to state-sanction should have little to do with religious concerns, at least
in the separation-of-church-and-state mentality of the Americans who instilled such a
value into the burgeoning center of Philippine national government in Manila.
Indeed, considering the religious rhetoric of Magindanawn leaders today, it is
interesting to note how one young Magindanawn leader was virtually ‘co-opted’ into
state-sanctioned leadership more than fifty years ago. That man was Salipada Pendatun.
In 1957, Pendatun won the congressional seat for Cotabato, attributing his
victory to the restoration of harmony between settlers and Magindanaos…. This was not
the complete story. Pendatun won because he did not rely solely on his provincial base,
but was backed by the Nacionalista leadership and by the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
Association (MINSUPALA), a bloc of Mindanao political leaders whose purpose was to
“get concessions from both the ruling party and the Nacionalista administration of Carlos
Garcia” (Mindanao Times, 26 March 1960…).
Amidst growing religious tension, calls to defend and preserve the “Muslim
community” began to be heard in the political arena…. Pendatun helped transform the
Muslim Association of the Philippines (MAP) into a bloc to fight for “Muslim interests”
within MINSUPALA. (Abinales 2000, 141,142)
The remarkable thing about Pendatun, and other Magindanawn who were being
led into political power via this route of state-sanction, was his ability to ‘tow both lines’
– the lines between traditional bloodline legitimacy claims and this new state-sanctioned
legitimacy for Magindanawn leadership.
Datu Pendutun’s early career was one of the most successful of any of the second-
generation colonial datus. He is representative, however, of a number of other Philippine
Muslim political figures of his generation…. By the founding of the Philippine republic
in 1946 they were politically well established with ties to the apparatus of national rule in
Manila and able to command local allegiance on the basis of traditional social relations.
(McKenna 1998, 112)

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1. A Veritable Vacuum Between Legitimacy Claims
The fact that the state-sanctioned option for leadership had been offered and
accepted by select Magindanawn began to cause an unraveling in the whole fabric of
legitimacy by bloodline alone. Other pressures that created a virtual wedge were
emotional and ideological, e.g., the Jabidah Massacre of the late 1960s (Vitug & Gloria
2000, 2-23). This led directly to the creation by a Magindanawn datu, Udtog Matalam, of
the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) in 1968 (Stewart 1977; Che Man 1990;
McKenna 1998). (More on Ideological motivations below)
The aggression, tension and war that would ensue between Manila and Central
Mindanao – especially during the 1970s, and then dormant on through the 1980s and
early-1990s – would lead eventually to a different form of state-sanction in the
establishment of RA 6743: the 1989 Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (Gaspar et al. 2001, 44; Tanggol 1998b, 672). While this seemed to
encapsulate all that both sides were looking for, some Magindanawn would still wonder
if this was working for a better Islamic situation in Muslim Mindanao or was it
surreptitiously co-opting them?
2. Effective Control from Manila
A case-in-point involves the nepotism and favoritism apparent under each
successive Governor for the ARMM. When it was Candao, Magindanawn benefited;
when it was Misuari, the Tausugs benefited. There was a shorter-lived tenure by a
Maranao Governor and, to be sure, the Maranao geographic areas and interests benefited
more under him. Now that it is Datu Puti Ampatuan, the Magindanawn are once again
reaping more benefits from the structure and programs of the ARMM. Generally
speaking, some grassroots Magindanawn have become disappointed because, rather than
reflecting the power and integrity of the sultanates of old, the Magindanawn Governors
(and the extended families they represent) have used the offices of the ARMM for their
own purposes. Such has been the tendency in this ‘carrot’ being offered from Manila to
Central Mindanao.
Third and Fourth Vantage Points: Magindanawn Ideological and Civil Society
Responses
The spirit of an ideological movement from within the ranks of the Magindanawn
had been coalescing for hundreds of years, whereas the type of non-violent response,
which is termed civil-society today, is a more recent creation.
1. Dialectic Catalyst for Ideological Response
Salah Jubair (1999), a Magindanawn, has chronicled how all Filipino Muslim
people groups are considered as one “distinct nationhood” (Lingga 2004a, 2) called
bangsamoro. The aggression, conflict, and war, incited upon the Filipino Muslims by the
Spanish, especially from the time of 1600 to 1860 (Rasul 2003, 38-39), was the primary

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catalyst for the ideological polarization that led to the realization and creation of the
bangsamoro ideal. Whereas popular (textbook) history has dismissed any ideological
movements that countered the Philippine national goal of integration in the past, the
advent of voices from the opposition are now being given audience. These are, however,
voices that have not always been popular in the general Filipino imagination:
When [a bangsamoro ideologue]…talks of a nation, foremost in his mind is the ordeal the
Moro people went through during the centuries of the Spanish conquest, decades of
American so-called tutelage, and now nearly a century of the Indios’ [i.e., non-Muslim
Filipinos] scheming and manipulation, which resulted in the destruction and mutilation of
their homeland. (Jubair 1999, xii)
Since autonomy or independence for Muslim Mindanao was never an option
while Spain was in colonial control, rhetoric and action for those ideals became more
vocal during the American protectorate period – from the end of the Spanish American
War in 1898 to the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935. When it was
apparent that autonomy or independence would not be forthcoming under the Philippine
Commonwealth, pockets of “armed resistance” formed, “…ranging from full-scale
battles to minor incidents…. [These] were motivated by the presence of the Americans
and Filipino Christians who were considered a threat to the position of Islam and the
interests of the Muslims” (Che Man 1990, 56). This, then, was the inception of a
movement with ideological goals and motivation. While most Filipino Muslims would
join the war effort against Japanese occupation during World War II (Ibid.), this hopeful
instance of ‘brotherhood and unity with other Filipinos’ waned quickly when the war
ended. Since that time, Muslims and non-Muslims have become more polarized.
Despite promises made from the United States to Mindanao Muslims via the
Bates Treaty and other government edicts, and despite the Filipino Muslim viewpoint
that bangsamoro was always to be distinct from other Filipino peoples, it became
apparent early on into the American administration of Mindanao that the interests of the
West would best be served if the archipelago of Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao were
‘integrated’ together under one national banner as the Philippines. The essence of what
Manila – and America – wanted in this regard is as follows:
The basic policy of the Philippine Government with regard to all of its cultural
minorities, including the 2.2 million Moros [at that time], reflects the attitude of the
Christian majority population of the Republic: the minorities should be integrated into
the mainstream of Philippine national life, culturally, politically, economically, and in
every other way. This attitude and policy spring from three sources: 1) from the Spanish
ambition to Christianize and hispanize all of the people of the Archipelago; 2) from the
American view that the “wild tribes” in the Philippines should be brought to the same
level of “civilization” as the lowland Christian Filipinos; and 3) from a corresponding
Filipino nationalist view that all Filipinos are basically one people…. (Gowing 1979,
208; italics in original)
2. Galvanizing Events for Ideological Awareness
While the Manila central government quietly went about instituting the American-
spawned integration policies, Central Mindanao contended with: 1) migrations of non-
Muslim Filipinos from Luzon and the Visayas up through the Philippine Commonwealth
years; 2) Japanese incursions during World War II; and 3) state-sanctioned enticing of

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promising young Magindanawn into national government service. All the while, the
royal bloodline leadership only paid lip-service to national government ideals and designs
for Central Mindanao. That mutual understanding unraveled after the terrible incident of
the Jabidah Massacre on Corregidor Island. As mentioned above, Governor Matalam
formed the MIM and a little-known Tausug student-cum-professor at the University of
the Philippines, Nur Misuari, was about to found the first politicized bangsamoro rebel
movement: the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).
Once this consciousness had galvanized into a forward-progressing movement,
the MNLF began to garner support and resources from outside of Mindanao, i.e., Libya,
as well as from MINSUPALA (Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan) interests. Not only did the
MIM (and therefore the MNLF) receive young recruits “from Malaysia to Cotabato,” but
also Datu Udtog Matalam himself had pledged resources “to finance arms purchases”
(McKenna 1998, 149). Though this is true especially for the 1970s, when hostilities
erupted again in the mid- to late-1990s, similar resources and mobilization practices were
still in place.
Fast-forwarding to the time when the MNLF laid down their arms and co-opted
into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) under the 1996 agreement, the MILF did
no such thing; rather, they escalated the tension with a renewed sense of championing the
bangsamoro cause. Their camps in Buldon and Pikit were accepting and training
recruits in large numbers throughout the last half of the 1990s, leading up to President
Estrada’s pronouncement of an “All-Out War” (Gaspar et al. 2001, 59f). The war was
intense and devastating for many Magindanao regions of Central Mindanao and, since the
ceasing of this war effort in 2000, there have still been sporadic skirmishes in areas such
as Pikit and Talayan for four years hence. In 2004, therefore, a report about the strength
and transitory nature of MILF recruits was published:
Based on reports from field commanders, Adan estimated that there are now
more than 4,000 new recruits in the MILF, which has an estimated strength of 10,000.
"The presence of military camps of MILF training recruits in explosive-making,
demolition and ‘jihad tactics’ are violations of trust and confidence-building. They are
talking peace but preparing for war and, certainly, this is not for any peace-building,"
Adan said.
"We are supportive of the peace process of the government. We hope these
things will work. But words must be backed by actions and the ceasefire agreement is
premised on trust and confidence. But if they (MILF) are preparing for war, this runs
counter to the peace process."
Adan said the IMT [International Monitoring Team] is unlikely to find any MILF
training camps because they are constantly being moved to avoid detection. The military
is currently searching for terrorist training camps run by al-Qaeda’s regional arm, Jemaah
Islamiyah, which was linked to the MILF in the past. (Villanueva 2004, 2-3).
Especially because of links to al-Qaeda, resources were thought to be inexhaustible,
while mobilizing recruits occurred either voluntarily or by conscription.
a. The Banner of Self-Determination
Whereas Magindanawn men had initially joined the MNLF as the expression of
the bangsamoro ideal, by the early 1980s some Magindanawn were wary of national
liberation and were swayed by their religious leaders, the imams and the ustadzes, to

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champion a break-away movement for Islamic liberation – hence, the founding of the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
A cause and a significant clarion for inspiring religious zeal among grassroots
Magindanao of Central Mindanao was an aspect found in the sixth premise of a veritable
“Moro people’s secessionist movement” charter: “…Muslim inhabitants have the duty
and the obligation to wage jihad (holy war) physically and spiritually to change the Moro
homeland to Dar al-Islam” (Mercado 1992, 161; italics in original).
b. The Dogma of Dar-ul Islam
Gowing (1979, 202) summarizes the import of this concept for bangsamoro: “In
the past, the region inhabited by Moros in the southern Philippines was clearly dar al-
Islam, that is, territorially part of the ‘Abode of Islam.’ But its conquest by non-Muslims
put that region in an ambiguous position from the standpoint of Islamic law (Shari’a).” If
territorial understanding leads to the view that the purity of dar-ul Islam has been defiled,
the following holds true: “In a traditionalist view of Islamic law, if a Muslim country is
conquered by non-Muslims, who then by their policies and actions turn it into dar al-Harb
[the territory of nonbelievers], it becomes lawful for the Muslim ‘prisoners’ to oppose the
non-Muslims and fight them in every possible way” (Ibid.).
Since the influence of the MNLF as the mouthpiece of bangsamoro is still in
dispute due to their 1996 accord with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP), it falls to the Magindanao-controlled MILF to uphold the Islamic ideal for dar-ul
Islam in Central Mindanao. True Islam, so it is said, can only be upheld by Muslims
when the whole world becomes dar-ul Islam – only when there are no longer any
vestiges of dar-ul Harb. This is certainly what motivates the fighting and the struggle
by those politicized Magindanawn in parts of Central Mindanao.
3. ‘Bangsamoro’ + ‘Civil Society’ = ‘Bangsamoro Civil Society’
Above in this article, previous discussion indicated diametric opposition of
bangsamoro interests to that of non-Muslims, whether expatriate or Filipino, expressed
normally in fierce, intense and violent means. The very nature of civil-society, on the
other hand, is to find nonviolent means to resolve conflict and encourage cooperation and
peaceful co-existence between two polarized factions. While some Jesuit priests (like
Father Pablo Pastells in the late nineteenth century) worked in the ilud township of
Tamontaka to foster an environment of peace and harmony between the Magindanawn
and surrounding lumad tribes (Schreurs 1994), the foundation for potential civil-society
responses would not truly come until the arrival of the so-called American “mandate in
Moroland” (Gowing 1983).
In the early twentieth century, when the Americans acquired the Philippines as
victors of the Spanish-American War, the American emphasis on democracy and “liberty
and justice for all” created a hopeful atmosphere for any and all future civil-society
responses. Even the more beneficent Americans, however, eventually gave into the
primary directive of ensuring integration of all Filipinos into a nation called the
Philippines; this sometimes at the expense of touted democratic ideals. Therefore, a two-
pronged polarization of grassroots Filipino movements against Manila-based

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Americanized policies emerged: 1) Marxist-socialist and communist reaction in the
expression of the Huk rebellion and ultimately the creation of the New People’s Army
(NPA); and, 2) Muslim rebellion and secessionist activities eventually crystallized in the
MNLF and MILF of the 1970s and 1980s.
As these two polarized fronts represented the extreme of discontent with the
system as it was imposed upon the young Philippine nation-state, the post-World War II
government in Manila was slowly coming into its own, as was its grassroots popular
counterpart, influencing responses akin to (American) democracy. This did not reach full
political maturation until the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos via the EDSA movement of the
mid-1980s. By this time, then, not only was the Catholic Church a champion for
democracy, freedom and justice, but other non-sectarian groups and non-government
organizations (NGO) joined in the movement. This was true mostly in Luzon within
metro-Manila, but some measure of this type of civil-society had also found its way
southward, especially regarding the plight and struggle of settler- and lumad-peasants
against the seemingly intractable machinery of Manila-led development. In a lesser
degree, then, civil-society began engaging with the conflict-affected areas of Muslim
Mindanao.
It is in this context, then, that the progression and formation of Mindanao civil-
society organizations (CSO), emanating from outside the influence of Islam, is
chronicled:
Figure 1 (below) shows Mindanao civil society as a political spectrum. It is by no means
exhaustive but it does include important sectors and sectoral organizations that have
established a name in civil society circles. To one side are groups perceived as either
‘legitimate’ or ‘conservative’, (because of their politics or their institutional connection)
and on the other are networks, service providers, people’s organizations, campaign
groups and the political organizations they are linked with. Public perceptions of these
groups range from politically ‘progressive’ or liberal to ‘subversive’. Civil society groups
of divergent political orientations quite often form broad-based alliances based on tactical
or pragmatic goals.

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Figure 1
'Subversive'/'Progressive'
NGOs Networks People’s organizations / Campaign Groups Ideological forces
Service providers Coalitions Networks / Coalitions
Community eg Women’s organizations Sectoral and issue- Political parties including
organizing Trade Unions based campaigns armed political
Research Advocacy Peasant’s Associations eg foreign debt movements
Social Development Urban and Rural
cooperatives Community organizations
Cultural Groups
'Conservative'/'Legitimate'
Church / Media Academe Business
Ummah
Inter-faith Print Institute of Higher Learning Local Chambers of
Dialogue Groups - Mindanao bureaus of Denominational State Commerce
Roman Catholic national dailie Universities / Colleges Banks
Protestant - Local weeklies/dailies Non-Denominational Private Multinational /
UMMAH Groups Broadcast Universities / Colleges foreign
- Local TV radio relay Civic Clubs
stations
- Broadcast networks
People’s organizations, non-governmental and civic organizations exist in almost all
provinces in Mindanao, but compared to Christian-led organizations, Moro civil society
groups are still relatively few. (Cagoco-Guiam 1999, 2; ‘Figure 1’ chart in original)
a. Advent of the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS)
Leading up to the escalation of military forces on both sides (bangsamoro and
Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP]), there was one concerted effort by like-minded
agencies to convene a consultation that led to a resolution to form the “Consortium of
BangsaMoro NGOs and POs in Mindanao” (Philsol 1998). It would not be until after the
culmination of the All-Out War under Estrada, however, that the atmosphere of common
Magindanao people and their leaders would be such that for them to consider other ways
to resolve the deteriorating peace and order situation in Central Mindanao. Hence, the
formation of the CBCS:
It was only in 2002 that a Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society was formed among
over 40 Muslim civil society organizations with Kadtuntaya Foundation, Inc. in Cotabato
City as its secretariat. These organizations have realized the need to bond together and be
in the forefront of peace and development work. Their programs in this regard focus on
capacity building, research and advocacy. (Santos 2005, 72; italics in original)
Today, the CBCS boasts “…a network of 164 Moro civil society organizations in
Mindanao” (Maulana 2008). How then does this network interact with the Magindanawn
bloodline leadership of old?

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b. Datus and Filipino Muslim Sultanates
Norms of historic Magindanawn society include the acceptance of, and obedience
to, the time-honored “datu system” (Ho & King 2003, 75; italics in original). Because of
the hierarchical nature of the Filipino Muslim sultanate structure, “…the Sultan’s or the
datu’s claim to power and prestige was not merely his birth into the nobility and control
over real estate, but also his active leadership or control over a large group of followers”
(Stewart 1977, 276-283). One of the guiding principles for CSO involvement is to have
respect for the culture and customs of the people receiving the assistance. Therefore, one
recent World Bank report on conflict-affected Central Mindanao asserts: “Because the
traditional leaders of a community have always played an important role in regulating the
relationship of the members of the community with the outside world, prerogatives
claimed by traditional leaders can be expected to exert an important influence on project
outcomes” (Judd & Adriano 2003, 26).
This directive resonates with certain civil-society NGOs in Central Mindanao, but
history shows that this is not the mandate that the GRP abides by. The words of the late
Dr. Peter Gowing continue to ring true:
It is in the light of this dar al-Islam / dar al-Harb dichotomy that many of the issues which
Moros raise with the National Government should be seen. Their past and present
anxieties over such matters as official recognition of the dignities and authority of their
traditional leaders (sultans and datus),…respect for their religious customs, and official
cognizance of Islamic and adat law (particularly in domestic and inheritance affairs),
should be understood as part of their general concern…. Many Muslim Filipinos feel that
their region is in great danger of slipping fully into dar al-Harb, and that Government
policies and actions are having that effect. (Gowing 1979, 203-204; italics in original)
Without question, it is Gowing’s last statement that speaks as loudly today as it
did thirty years ago. If events and activities in and around the Muslim world have caused
any stir in Central Mindanao in the last ten to twenty years, it has been to awaken an
“Islamic consciousness” (Che Man 1990, 57) concerning what is best for the
Magindanawn people and what serves to preserve their ummah (community of faith) as
they continue to work towards dar-ul Islam. This then is the driving force of
bangsamoro civil society, as represented by the CBCS, to champion solutions for peace
and development initiatives in Central Mindanao that synchronize with the ethos of
Islam.
Conclusion
The Magindanawn people have lived especially in the region of Central Mindanao
for countless centuries. Their attachment to, and love for, the land – their ancestral
domain – embeds deeply into the Magindanawn psyche and worldview. Despite colonial
incursions and imperialist advances against them and their land, by Europeans (especially
the Spanish) and the Americans, their manoeuvres ‘within’ American and Manila-
imposed political structures by accommodation-politics, and ‘without’ through rebel
social movements, have always been done with the goal in mind to keep the Magindanao
homeland for the benefit of the Magindanawn people alone.

12. 12
While there is a notion of “dar al-Aman,” in which the land can be shared in some
semblance of co-existence with non-Muslims (Gowing 1979:203; italics in original), the
concept of dar-ul Islam, especially within the context of their Malay Muslim neighbors in
Malaysia and Indonesia (McAmis 2002), is a stronger driving-force which guides the
direction of the GRP-MILF peace-talks to the present day, i.e., the “Memorandum of
Agreement” (MOA), especially with the stipulation of the MOA-AD (ancestral domain).
In the fourth quarter of 2008, the AD stipulation was ‘off the table,’ especially since the
Philippine Supreme Court ruled it as unconstitutional. While this is still an
insurmountable problem for continuing the peace-talks, the Magindanawn will continue
to move forward in their desire to see, once again, a homeland of their ancestral domain
for the future prosperity of their people.
Notes

This article represents research done by the author who is completing his Ph.D. dissertation in
Development Studies at Ateneo de Davao University.

The Roman-script orthography of Magindanawn words has been standardized to an extent in “A
Maguindanaon Dictionary” by Fr. Robert Sullivan, O.M.I. (1986). Prof. Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, of the
Mindanao State University in General Santos City, refers to that dictionary when she states that
“…Magindanao is the place while Magindanawn is the name to refer to the people of the flooded plains.”

“[Through the direction of Sharif Kabungsuwan,] a new system of government was instituted and its
records were registered. Tarsila were written and the noble lineage of the datus was carefully kept. Each
sultanate or datuship kept a separate genealogy” (Saleeby 1976, 1; italics in original).

“The descent principle received further elaboration in the constitution of nobility. All the title holders in
the [Pulangi river] valley were, at least in theory, descended from the sharif (who according to local
history, brought Islam to Mindanao) and so ultimately from the Prophet Mohammed. Although the
political order that this belief once supported has crumbled, the sense of nobility is very much alive among
those who can locate ancestors on the ancient genealogies” (Beckett 1994, 290).

This is obvious because the design for the whole archipelago was to be under colonial control of the
Spaniards. Only when the Americans won the Spanish-American War in 1898, and they were willing to
introduce more democratic principles in governance, was it even possible to discuss the notion of state-
sanctioned leadership.

My appreciation to Prof. Cagoco-Guiam who, being married to a Magindanawn and being a professional
educator and anthropologist, has unique insights on this from those perspectives:
“When traditional leaders choose to become ‘co-opted’ or consciously tow the line of a
predominant national leadership or government, I think it is not accommodation to it but rather an
expression of their own pragmatism, one that is borne of the desire to perpetuate their being within
the traditional royal family circle, as well as to enjoy the benefits of being part of the elected elite
politicians. For these people who were born to privilege and probably some nascent power in their
communities, it is doubly prestigious (and carry more maratabat) to be both traditional and
political leaders associated with the national dominant political leaders. These politicians do not
enter into this patron-client type of relationship with their eyes closed, nor without options. They
chose to do it because it makes them and the future generations of their families survive for quite
sometime. It is pragmatic and quite strategic, too. And when they invoke ‘Muslim interests’ as
their motivation for forging these alliances, such interests are limited to those of their extended
families – both by consanguinity and affinity. The interests of the vast majority of
Muslims/bangsamoro who are poor and politically marginalized have never been their concern.

13. 13
Moro political leaders have come and gone, and have distinguished themselves as articulate or
brilliant members of the Senate or Congress. But have they improved the lot of their poor,
ordinary Muslim constituents? If they have, ARMM should not have been the perennial economic
backwater in the Philippines since its creation.”

“The United States Congress put on record in 1926 the petition sent to it in 1924 by Moro leaders who
expressed their intention to declare themselves an independent Moro Nation should the United States grant
independence to the Philippines…. The Bacon Bill of 1926 also proposed that Mindanao and Sulu be
retained under the American flag…. Despite the attempts of Moros to resist integration, the official policy
of the United States remained always to incorporate Moroland into the Philippines” (Che Man 1990, 54).

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) had been formed in 1984 as a splinter-group from the MNLF
(Lucman 2000, 143), with which it was having some ideological and mostly religious differences.

This is also true if only one specific territorial area becomes completely controlled by Muslims, e.g., 1)
the city of Dar-es-Salaam in Africa, and 2) the Southeast Asian country of Brunei Darussalam.
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