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Paradigm Shift
The false premise of effortless prosperity
Paradigm Shift;  
 
1. the term first coined by Thomas Kuhn in his influential book The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (1962) to describe a change in basic assumptions within the 
ruling theory of science. It is in contrast to his idea of normal science. 
 
2. A complete change in thinking or belief systems that allows the creation of a new 
condition previously thought impossible or unacceptable 
 
 
Contrary to recent published thinking, the financial crisis was not an unpredictable ‘black 
swan’ event, nor was it solely the result of a collapse in the housing market, or solely to 
be blamed on the global imbalance between China and the US or on greedy bankers. 
 
 
Instead,  the  financial  crisis  was  caused  by  a  sustained  period  of  debt  financed 
consumption, made possible by the belief in the ‘paradigm shift’ that through economic 
policy and financial market innovation, we had created an economic model that would 
create  effortless  prosperity  and  growth,  whilst  enjoying  a  prolonged  period  of  low 
interest  rates.  Under  Alan  Greenspan  this  was  known  as  the  ‘Goldilocks  economy’, 
Gordon Brown called it the ‘end of boom and bust’. 
 
 
This premise was false. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STRICTLY PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL
2 
 
 
The financial crisis was caused by unsustainable debt financed consumption...not just built 
on mortgages but across borrower classes (corporate, consumer, government).... 
 
 
 
 
 
...allowed  by  low  interest  rates  and  financial  innovation  which  allowed  the  transfer  of 
counter‐party risk of borrowers by lenders like never before (‘originate & distribute’)... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
...but when interest and mortgage ‘teaser’ rates rose, borrowers defaulted and loan losses 
soared...whilst  the  innovation  had  allowed  diversification  of  risk,  this  was  actually 
concentrated in financial institutions who had to keep the residual ‘super‐senior’ of credit 
derivatives on their balance sheets which collapsed in value, destroying their bank capital  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total US Consumer Credit Debt ($ Trl) 2000‐2010
Source: Federal Reserve 
Total US Mortgage Debt ($ Trl) 2000‐2010 
Source: Federal Reserve 
Fed Funds Rate (%) 2000‐2008 
Source: Federal Reserve 
US Asset Backed Issuance 2000‐2008 ($ml) 
Source: SIFMA 
All Bank Loan Delinquency Rate (%) 2000‐2009
Source: Federal Reserve 
 
STRICTLY PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL
3 
 
 
 
Where were the regulators? 
 
The  ‘paradigm  shift’  in  thinking,  that  financial  market  innovation  and  economic  policy 
created effortless prosperity and growth with low interest rates, was false.  
 
Regulators  were  behind  the  curve  and  had  no  pressure  to  curb  the  credit  bubble  from 
governments and central banks who were not concerned because; 
 
‐ Credit  bubble  was  not  presented  in  the  inflation  measures  (RPI/CPI)  which  were 
subdued  because  of  deflationary  influence  of  increasingly  low  cost  production  of 
electronic and consumer goods from China and EM 
 
‐ Inflation measures did not include asset prices 
 
‐ Government policy to create ‘stakeholder’ economy beginning in 1990s promoted 
home ownership for all, even if they couldn’t afford it 
 
‐ Belief in the paradigm shift, ‘goldilocks economy’ 
 
 
 

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The False Premise of Policymakers That Was The Engine of The Financial Crisis

  • 1. 1    Paradigm Shift The false premise of effortless prosperity Paradigm Shift;     1. the term first coined by Thomas Kuhn in his influential book The Structure of  Scientific Revolutions (1962) to describe a change in basic assumptions within the  ruling theory of science. It is in contrast to his idea of normal science.    2. A complete change in thinking or belief systems that allows the creation of a new  condition previously thought impossible or unacceptable      Contrary to recent published thinking, the financial crisis was not an unpredictable ‘black  swan’ event, nor was it solely the result of a collapse in the housing market, or solely to  be blamed on the global imbalance between China and the US or on greedy bankers.      Instead,  the  financial  crisis  was  caused  by  a  sustained  period  of  debt  financed  consumption, made possible by the belief in the ‘paradigm shift’ that through economic  policy and financial market innovation, we had created an economic model that would  create  effortless  prosperity  and  growth,  whilst  enjoying  a  prolonged  period  of  low  interest  rates.  Under  Alan  Greenspan  this  was  known  as  the  ‘Goldilocks  economy’,  Gordon Brown called it the ‘end of boom and bust’.      This premise was false.                               
  • 2.   STRICTLY PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL 2      The financial crisis was caused by unsustainable debt financed consumption...not just built  on mortgages but across borrower classes (corporate, consumer, government)....            ...allowed  by  low  interest  rates  and  financial  innovation  which  allowed  the  transfer  of  counter‐party risk of borrowers by lenders like never before (‘originate & distribute’)...              ...but when interest and mortgage ‘teaser’ rates rose, borrowers defaulted and loan losses  soared...whilst  the  innovation  had  allowed  diversification  of  risk,  this  was  actually  concentrated in financial institutions who had to keep the residual ‘super‐senior’ of credit  derivatives on their balance sheets which collapsed in value, destroying their bank capital               Total US Consumer Credit Debt ($ Trl) 2000‐2010 Source: Federal Reserve  Total US Mortgage Debt ($ Trl) 2000‐2010  Source: Federal Reserve  Fed Funds Rate (%) 2000‐2008  Source: Federal Reserve  US Asset Backed Issuance 2000‐2008 ($ml)  Source: SIFMA  All Bank Loan Delinquency Rate (%) 2000‐2009 Source: Federal Reserve 
  • 3.   STRICTLY PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL 3        Where were the regulators?    The  ‘paradigm  shift’  in  thinking,  that  financial  market  innovation  and  economic  policy  created effortless prosperity and growth with low interest rates, was false.     Regulators  were  behind  the  curve  and  had  no  pressure  to  curb  the  credit  bubble  from  governments and central banks who were not concerned because;    ‐ Credit  bubble  was  not  presented  in  the  inflation  measures  (RPI/CPI)  which  were  subdued  because  of  deflationary  influence  of  increasingly  low  cost  production  of  electronic and consumer goods from China and EM    ‐ Inflation measures did not include asset prices    ‐ Government policy to create ‘stakeholder’ economy beginning in 1990s promoted  home ownership for all, even if they couldn’t afford it    ‐ Belief in the paradigm shift, ‘goldilocks economy’