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IM IN UR CODEZ
                         Securing Mobile Apps




Sunday, 2 October 11
Hello!


                                  My name’s Nick.

                        I work for Mobile Interactive Group

                       We’re going to talk about app security




                                    ...also cats




Sunday, 2 October 11
What this session is about...
                                Mobile application security
                               Developing apps defensively




                        ...and what it’s not about
                        User-based vulnerabilities (tap-jacking, etc)
                                   Mobile web security




Sunday, 2 October 11
Mobile Apps




                       Mobile Web




Sunday, 2 October 11
Hardcoded passwords
                       SQL injection
                                                                In-app XSS

                            Insecure Data Transmission

                                                   Buffer overflows
                         Storing user data

                                                         Data leakage

                        API impersonation


                                                  Remote code execution




Sunday, 2 October 11
Web & Apps have similar problems...

                         ...they just appear in different places




Sunday, 2 October 11
A fact (or two)
                       Your app will be reverse engineered

                            It’s only a matter of time

                        Obfuscation is not a be-all/end-all




Sunday, 2 October 11
You might think (comparatively) that your mobile
                                  platform is not compromised...




                       ...but how many rooted/jailbreaked phones are out there?




                               Assume your platform is compromised,
                               and your app will be reverse engineered




Sunday, 2 October 11
You must therefore strongly protect your APIs
                                and supporting application servers




                       Let’s look at three of the most common issues with apps




                               Two of these relate to API/server issues




Sunday, 2 October 11
...but first...




Sunday, 2 October 11
We’re all pretty smart developers
                                    (...hopefully!)




Sunday, 2 October 11
The chasm of misfortune
         Your Goals                                                   Your App



                           We are all cats - we have good intentions...
                       ...and sometimes can’t foresee the consequences


Sunday, 2 October 11
Your Goals                                        Your App



           Remembering     Storing credentials insecurely
                                                            Banking App
              Users




                                  Not using SSL
            Using an API                                    Blogging App




              Uploading     Hardcoding your API keys
               Content                                           ?
                                                             UCG App




Sunday, 2 October 11
Keys and Secrets




Sunday, 2 October 11
“API keys must be protected just like passwords.
                       This means they should not be [...] baked into non-obfuscated
                       applications that can be analysed relatively easily”
                       Cloud Security Alliance, April 18 2011




                                   (...assume this means all mobile apps)




1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details
Sunday, 2 October 11
Demo time


                                              Major paid for API
                                      About 1,000,000 downloads
                                              ...let’s take a look!




1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details
Sunday, 2 October 11
Demo time




                                User: iPhone
                           Password: PnkFdrYRh75N




1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details
Sunday, 2 October 11
Consequences



                       The bad
                          A competing app uses your API key to exceed your rate limits
                          Your users get frustrated and leave




                       The ugly
                          Somebody pulls your S3 secret key and charges £££ to your account




1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details
Sunday, 2 October 11
This API is now compromised




                       I can use it in my own apps without paying the license fee




                        Because it’s hard-coded in the app it can’t be revoked




1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details
Sunday, 2 October 11
This API is now compromised




                       I can use it in my own apps without paying the license fee




                        Because it’s hard-coded in the app it can’t be revoked




1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details
Sunday, 2 October 11
Prevention


                       Use an alternative method to authenticate
                       Facebook, Amazon, and other large providers provide these




                       Don’t trust key verification
                       If you have an API that uses a key, don’t assume you can trust the user




                       Think permissions
                       If you do have to use keys, limit the damage that can be done with them




                       Have a plan
                       ...think about the inevitable. What happens if your API is outed?




1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details
Sunday, 2 October 11
Leaking Information




Sunday, 2 October 11
This shouldn’t need a slide


                       If you’re sending passwords in the clear, leave the room



                                  ...no, wait - come back! I forgive you!




                               People share passwords. All the time.
                        My Tumblr password might be my Facebook password




1 keys and secrets 2 Leaking Information 3 storing details
Sunday, 2 October 11
Specific shaming:




                                                             ...but not the app!




1 keys and secrets 2 Leaking Information 3 storing details
Sunday, 2 October 11
“But Nick, everyone knows SSL/TLS is totally broken!”

                       “It’s the user’s fault for connecting to an insecure network”

                         “It’s too much effort / time-consuming to implement”

                       “My app isn’t important enough for this to be a problem”




1 keys and secrets 2 Leaking Information 3 storing details
Sunday, 2 October 11
Not using TLS is like leaving your house unlocked




                Nobody is saying locks are going to stop you from getting burgled...

                                 ...but not locking your door is stupid.




1 keys and secrets 2 Leaking Information 3 storing details
Sunday, 2 October 11
Storing Details




Sunday, 2 October 11
Very popular!




                                                             Username and password in plain text!




1 keys and secrets 2 leaking information 3 Storing Details                 According to ViaForensics, June 2011

Sunday, 2 October 11
Obvious information
                         Passwords, usernames
                         Account numbers, etc




                       Overlooked information
                         Location information
                         Personal information (date of birth, address,




1 keys and secrets 2 leaking information 3 Storing Details
Sunday, 2 October 11
Consequences



                       The bad
                          You get some bad PR
                          People laugh at you as you walk down the street




                       The ugly
                          You store passwords or account information unencrypted
                          This compromises your app, and users information is leaked
                          You are fined by the ICO




1 keys and secrets 2 leaking information 3 Storing Details
Sunday, 2 October 11
In Summary




                       ...we’re all smart developers...
                                (remember this bit? from earlier on?)




Sunday, 2 October 11
...but so are the...
              Bank of America, Citibank, National Rail Enquiries, Tumblr, AOL, Bump,
               Flirtomatic, Foursquare, Groupon, LinkedIn, Mint, Skype, Wells Fargo,
                WordPress, Match.com Yahoo! Messenger, and many many more...


                                      ...developers.



                 Nobody is perfect, no app is truly secure
                                           (including me!)




Sunday, 2 October 11
Remember the cat*


                       *unlike the cat, your app will not survive a fall from height
Sunday, 2 October 11
Thanks :)




                         nick.shearer@migcan.com
                                  (I don’t tweet - booo!)




                       Slides will be available on the OTA site soon!




Sunday, 2 October 11

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Mobile Apps Security: OTA11

  • 1. IM IN UR CODEZ Securing Mobile Apps Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 2. Hello! My name’s Nick. I work for Mobile Interactive Group We’re going to talk about app security ...also cats Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 3. What this session is about... Mobile application security Developing apps defensively ...and what it’s not about User-based vulnerabilities (tap-jacking, etc) Mobile web security Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 4. Mobile Apps Mobile Web Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 5. Hardcoded passwords SQL injection In-app XSS Insecure Data Transmission Buffer overflows Storing user data Data leakage API impersonation Remote code execution Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 6. Web & Apps have similar problems... ...they just appear in different places Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 7. A fact (or two) Your app will be reverse engineered It’s only a matter of time Obfuscation is not a be-all/end-all Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 8. You might think (comparatively) that your mobile platform is not compromised... ...but how many rooted/jailbreaked phones are out there? Assume your platform is compromised, and your app will be reverse engineered Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 9. You must therefore strongly protect your APIs and supporting application servers Let’s look at three of the most common issues with apps Two of these relate to API/server issues Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 11. We’re all pretty smart developers (...hopefully!) Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 12. The chasm of misfortune Your Goals Your App We are all cats - we have good intentions... ...and sometimes can’t foresee the consequences Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 13. Your Goals Your App Remembering Storing credentials insecurely Banking App Users Not using SSL Using an API Blogging App Uploading Hardcoding your API keys Content ? UCG App Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 14. Keys and Secrets Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 15. “API keys must be protected just like passwords. This means they should not be [...] baked into non-obfuscated applications that can be analysed relatively easily” Cloud Security Alliance, April 18 2011 (...assume this means all mobile apps) 1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 16. Demo time Major paid for API About 1,000,000 downloads ...let’s take a look! 1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 17. Demo time User: iPhone Password: PnkFdrYRh75N 1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 18. Consequences The bad A competing app uses your API key to exceed your rate limits Your users get frustrated and leave The ugly Somebody pulls your S3 secret key and charges £££ to your account 1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 19. This API is now compromised I can use it in my own apps without paying the license fee Because it’s hard-coded in the app it can’t be revoked 1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 20. This API is now compromised I can use it in my own apps without paying the license fee Because it’s hard-coded in the app it can’t be revoked 1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 21. Prevention Use an alternative method to authenticate Facebook, Amazon, and other large providers provide these Don’t trust key verification If you have an API that uses a key, don’t assume you can trust the user Think permissions If you do have to use keys, limit the damage that can be done with them Have a plan ...think about the inevitable. What happens if your API is outed? 1 Keys and Secrets 2 leaking information 3 storing details Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 23. This shouldn’t need a slide If you’re sending passwords in the clear, leave the room ...no, wait - come back! I forgive you! People share passwords. All the time. My Tumblr password might be my Facebook password 1 keys and secrets 2 Leaking Information 3 storing details Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 24. Specific shaming: ...but not the app! 1 keys and secrets 2 Leaking Information 3 storing details Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 25. “But Nick, everyone knows SSL/TLS is totally broken!” “It’s the user’s fault for connecting to an insecure network” “It’s too much effort / time-consuming to implement” “My app isn’t important enough for this to be a problem” 1 keys and secrets 2 Leaking Information 3 storing details Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 26. Not using TLS is like leaving your house unlocked Nobody is saying locks are going to stop you from getting burgled... ...but not locking your door is stupid. 1 keys and secrets 2 Leaking Information 3 storing details Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 28. Very popular! Username and password in plain text! 1 keys and secrets 2 leaking information 3 Storing Details According to ViaForensics, June 2011 Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 29. Obvious information Passwords, usernames Account numbers, etc Overlooked information Location information Personal information (date of birth, address, 1 keys and secrets 2 leaking information 3 Storing Details Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 30. Consequences The bad You get some bad PR People laugh at you as you walk down the street The ugly You store passwords or account information unencrypted This compromises your app, and users information is leaked You are fined by the ICO 1 keys and secrets 2 leaking information 3 Storing Details Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 31. In Summary ...we’re all smart developers... (remember this bit? from earlier on?) Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 32. ...but so are the... Bank of America, Citibank, National Rail Enquiries, Tumblr, AOL, Bump, Flirtomatic, Foursquare, Groupon, LinkedIn, Mint, Skype, Wells Fargo, WordPress, Match.com Yahoo! Messenger, and many many more... ...developers. Nobody is perfect, no app is truly secure (including me!) Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 33. Remember the cat* *unlike the cat, your app will not survive a fall from height Sunday, 2 October 11
  • 34. Thanks :) nick.shearer@migcan.com (I don’t tweet - booo!) Slides will be available on the OTA site soon! Sunday, 2 October 11