1. Many times, when it comes to issues regarding governance, whether in
political statecraft or church polity, it will seem to me that we are not so much
dealing with theoretical differences vis a vis our essentialistic ideals but more
so with practical differences in strategies regarding their existential realization.
For example, classical liberalism might be reconceived as a pragmatic critique
of anarchism, for “limited governance” does not compete with “no
governance” as a theoretical ideal but, rather, as a practical accommodation
to human finitude and sinfulness. If we were angels, we would require and
could justify no governance. In the same way, when we employ distributist
and redistributist strategies (e.g. antitrust laws & social safety nets or
entitlements), it needn’t imply classical liberalism’s theoretical capitulation to
the social democratic critique but may, instead, simply represent the creative
tensions playing out in our practical application of subsidiarity principles.
What has often gotten in the way, seems to me, is the introduction of
distinctions that do not make a descriptive difference and therefore should not
imply a normative difference, whether grounded in the overly optimistic and
rationalistic metaphysics of the (often) catholic analogical imagination or the
overly pessimistic and biblically fundamentalistic anthropology of the (often)
protestant dialectical imagination.
To say this concretely, there is no, so to speak, “religious” epistemology or
“theological” anthropology. In a radically incarnational and profusely
pneumatological interpretive stance toward reality, epistemology is
epistemology is epistemology and anthropology is anthropology is
anthropology. And, best we can tell, thus far, they are evolutionary. We are
neither angels nor demons but animals.
Among the animals we are differentiated as the symbolic species (call it
ensoulment if you must) and thus enjoy an unparalleled degree of freedom
(call it inspirited if you like), which is love’s very horizon. And, as if that were
not true enough, beautiful enough and good enough, we’ve been “interrupted”
with some very Good News to which both individuals and peoples can only
respond in developmentally-appropriate ways. Through our evolutionary
epistemology and anthropology, it has been revealed (by the Spirit, no less?)
that an emergentist perspective is indispensable and must be brought to bear
on our practical responses to this Good News (ecclesiastically, evangelically,
catechetically, liturgically, etc) as well as our theoretical reformulations and
inculturations (theological, Christological, pneumatological, soteriological,
eschatological, etc). And this will inevitably invite a plurality of expressions, a
diversity of ministries and a great variety of spiritualities while, at the same
time, advancing our singular unitive mission.
In the Hauerwasian Spirit of offering gratuitous provocations: 1) It may well be
that, other than being an implicit rather than explicit response to the Spirit, the
secular, itself, has often comprised a distinction without a difference vis a vis
the religious (historically, culturally, socially, economically & politically). 2)
Humankind has always fancied itself as progressing theoretically from one
school or system to the next when, mostly, it has bumbled and fumbled
practically from one method or strategy to the next. Most of its modernist,
postmodernist, liberal, orthodox, radically orthodox & other “schools” have
issued forth from an unconsciously competent pragmatic semiotic reealism
that corrects our inveterate over- and under-emphases (except, of course, for
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2. us consciously competent but contritely fallible Peirceans).
+++
Good questions, complex issues - One might distinguish between
the merely moral norms of justice and the robustly unitive
norms of charity, which exceed the demands of justice.
Also, governments generally lack sufficient means to even meet
the most fundamental needs that might be demanded by
legitimate social justice ends and, hopefully constrained by
subsidiarity principles (grounded in basic human dignity), are
to be about merely providing for the basic public order and
not otherwise co-opting the rights & responsibilities of
individuals in meeting all the other demands of justice
(beyond merely maintaining the public order), much less those
of charity.
Even if the members and/or subjects of a government should
happen to share the same desired ends as a religion (motivated
by charity), still, governments and religions would differ
insofar as the former employs coercive means, by definition
(govt is inherently coercive), while the latter does not,
again, by definition (charity is inherently free).
Ironically, though, many who resist statist economic impulses
otherwise embrace a moral statism and vice versa. This is not
to say that such leanings may not lead to virtue; arguably,
they may even provide so-called schools of virtue. But such
virtues advanced through coercion are not what I would call
"theological" or charitable; instead, they are merely moral,
merely an enlightened self-interest?
Except for certain complex moral realities, ordinarily we
might reasonably be able to stipulate that politics remains
the art of the possible and that political dispositions less
so differ vis a vis their moral outlooks but more so regarding
practical strategies. With human dignity as our compass,
principles like subsidiarity, the common good & a preferential
option for the marginalized then guide our strategic decisions
employing what are proper biases toward limited government and
conservative approaches.
Our biases toward legitimate established authorities and the
conservation of accumulated human wisdom are weakly truthindicative,
though, and not strongly truth-conducive. That is
to say that just because that's how something was done in the
past is no guarantee that it will necessarily be the best way
to do it in the future, but it is a wise way to start out!
Sometimes we must conserve; sometimes we must progress. We do
not know a priori via rationalistic deductive logic grounded
in ideology which approach will be the most helpful. Rather,
we learn a posteriori via inductive testing which will work,
so to speak, pragmatically.
I prefer, then, to view conservatism and progressivism as
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3. charisms, with some folks being gifted with the talents of
settlers, who maintain the homefront, with others being gifted
with the talents of pioneers, who strike out on new frontiers.
This is not to suggest that people thus self-identify,
politically. Unfortunately, they treat what are merely proper
default biases of limited government and conservatism as
absolutes, turning them into ideologies and ignoring the
creative tensions of the subsidiarity principle. Or they treat
the proper socialization impetus of the subsidiarity principle
as an absolute, turning it into an ideology, forgetting that
it is otherwise merely a necessary evil that should revert
control and self-determination back to the lowest level
possible at the earliest practical opportunity.
As you wisely observe, this transcends political party
divisions. Still, I affirm the value of our two party system
and prefer to view its advocates as exercising differently
gifted practical charisms rather than as they imagine
themselves, which is as being in sole possession of absolute
truths ;)
Jacob re: the word "charism" 1) It was not employed analogically. 2) It has a
secular meaning in social psychology. 3) Even when used theologically, it has
both broad and narrow conceptions.
Jacob re: the Spirit's presence or absence from political
discourse, an incarnational (catholic) perspective would
recognize the Spirit's influence in this or any country -
historically, culturally, socially, economically, even
politically - as all good gifts flow from above, this despite
personal and social sin and human finitude.
Jacob - It is good that you recognize the prominent role
played by prudential judgment. As I mentioned earlier, most
governmental activities do not involve explicitly theological
or even moral positions but, rather, practical strategies.
Even regarding grave moral realities, people can agree on the
ontological descriptions, metaphysically, the deontological
prescriptions, morally, the canonical codifications,
ecclesiastically, and the legislative remedies, legally, while
disagreeing regarding the best practical strategies,
politically --- asking what is the best way to achieve the
goals we all share and which can we most likely advance now vs
later? Of course, engaging facile caricatures of others' views
and employing broad sweeping generalizations of political
parties, which are all comprised of diverse multifaceted
coalitions, is not helpful either.
Well, Jacob, I do traffic in nuance. And I have not addressed
any moral realities. So, good observation there. :)
And. more importantly, I note your uniform and thank you for
your service! (My son is in the Navy.)
What I am trying to do, however, is to introduce some
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4. important distinctions and to break open some new categories
that, in my view, could help discover some additional common
ground between the many divergent political viewpoints as well
as more precisely locate this or that political impasse. Of
course, it is also important to establish agreement on basic
definitions, avoiding broad generalizations and disambiguating
critical concepts. Finally, in a pluralistic society, we must
also translate what are explicitly religious positions into
arguments that are transparent to human reason.
All of that may be too abstract. So ...
Concretely, for example, roughly a third of republicans and GOP-leaning
independents support legal abortion, while the same
percentages apply to democrats and demo-leaning independents
who self-describe as pro-life. Further, since the question of
whether or not the criminalization of abortion would
effectively reduce abortion is empirical, a matter of
jurisprudence and social science, where one stands on its
legality is not necessarily dispositive of one's moral stance.
What we do know is that MOST people, regardless of their
religious, moral or political beliefs, which are manifold,
varied and heavily nuanced, want to reduce the number of
abortions, therefore, it is helpful to come together and
devise practical strategies to accomplish that shared goal. On
the other hand, it is not helpful, in my view, to assume that
political and legal and prudential judgments necessarily
reflect anyone's moral reasoning regarding this or any other
complex moral reality. It is especially unhelpful, then, to
characterize what are essentially political movements and
prudential judgments as evil or to apply sweeping categories
like "the left," "progressives" or "the right" to groups of
people whose underlying rationales are already known to
drastically differ within the various factions and coalitions
that comprise those groups.
My contributions to this thread are not theological. I'm not
analyzing moral realities here either. And I'm not advocating
any given political approach. I'm trying to introduce some
categorical distinctions to help parse and frame political
conversations at such a point where I think folks may have
already stipulated to a significant level of agreement
regarding certain political goals. I do resist the prevailing
tendency among so many in our society, across the political
spectrum, who insist on reflexively characterizing all
political positions in terms of moral dispositions, demonizing
others (and idolizing their own). You are spot on in that I do
hold the view that what is good and moral is transparent to
human reason without the benefit of special revelation and I
do resonate with catholic social justice methodologies.
To be fair to you and your articulate and spirited appeals,
Jacob, please don't be frustrated that I am not engaging those
specifics. It is because I have a personal policy of not
engaging political and moral debates on facebook. (I do that
at forums.philosophyforums.com from time to time.) My
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5. contribution here is philosophical, specifically metapolitical.
So, we're talking past each other a tad because of this.
For reasons stated above, I still have not discussed the moral
angle. Sticking with prudential judgment angles: Beyond this
facile caricature --- "I morally object to abortion, but the
law should not prohibit it" --- is a much more complex set of
considerations having a lot less to do with whether the law
SHOULD prevent it and a lot more to do with with whether the
law CAN prevent it. Again, regarding THAT the number of
abortions should be reduced, even eliminated, I hold that most
would agree; it is HOW to best realize that most worthy goal
where most people seem to differ. The statistics I have
studied are readily available in Pew Forum, Gallup and other
polls. Even then, in trying to devise legislative remedies,
beyond the matter of trying to figure out what will work,
there is also the extremely problematical matter of what is
politically feasible? If one ignores that dynamic, as have so
many ardent social conservatives for decades, there will be no
"fruits" to show either due to ineffectiveness. Finally, a
lack of bipartisan agreement regarding MEANS and STRATEGIES is
not evidence against a broad consensus regarding ENDS and
GOALS.
Oh, btw, Jacob, I cannot imagine why you would suspect that a distinctly
Roman Catholic approach would necessarily change either your moral
stances or recommended political strategies. In my view,you might well
discover that it would only bolster your arguments by making them both more
philosophically rigorous in the public square as well as theologically informed
from a faith-based perspective! ;)
Jacob, since you have politely expressed an interest and I happen to have the
time and inclination, presently, I will respond to: "it is likely you are a Catholic,
and have studied your philosophy and theology. I caution you against using
these studies to rationalize away the need for responsible, faith informed
citizenship."
There are so many aspects of being catholic (lower case) in one's approach
to reality and those with which I most resonate are found - not only in Roman,
but - Anglican and Orthodox and other catholic faith expressions throughout
the world. The both-and/universality of a catholic stance, because of a
profoundly incarnational outlook (and what is called an analogical
imagination), sees God at work in the world --- in science, culture and
philosophy, as well as religion. It places faith and reason in a proper
relationship.
This is an oversimplification but one could say that 1) sciences probe reality
and asks descriptive questions: What is that? 2) cultures probe reality and
ask evaluative questions: What's that to us? 3) philosophies probe reality and
ask normative questions: What's the best way to acquire or avoid that? 4)
Religions probe reality and ask interpretive questions: How might we tie all of
this back together? or re-ligate that?
Each of these sets of questions are distinctive, which is to say that they ask
distinctly different questions of reality. So, we could say that they are
methodologically autonomous and each is necessary in its own right. But,
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6. none of these methods are, alone, sufficient to mine reality's values, both the
transcendentals like truth, beauty, goodness and love, as well as lesser
goods. So, we could say that they are axiologically integral (axiological having
to do with value). Science thus remains science; philosophy remains
philosophy. We thus seek to "inculturate" our theologies and so on. Reason,
alone, does not yield such value-realization; that would be rationalism.
Religion, alone, doesn't either; that's fideism.
Catholic perspectives do believe that we can reason from an is to an ought,
from the descriptive to the prescriptive, from the given to the normative, over
against any, as you say, moral relativism. And they do affirm that moral
reasoning can proceed without the benefit of special divine revelation. We do
highly value special divine revelation, though, because its consolations and
unitive norms allow us to move much more swiftly and with much less
hindrance on this pilgrimage of life. And we want to share that Good News!
So, no, you won't find a Catholic version of science or philosophy or even a
particular type of culture, much less political stance. But you will find catholic
perspectives thriving in our nation's primary & secondary schools and
universities, hospitals, orphanages, relief organizations and we our
jurisprudential skills have been highly valued by all faith perspectives and
legal persuasions (check out the Supreme Court, for example).
I hope this helps. Thanks for your patience and willingness to dialogue.
I hope it is the last word on postmodernISM! For, as I see it -
The postmodern "critique" (not a "system") recognized that methods
precede systems, that science, philosophy, culture and religion were
methodologically-autonomous (each necessary, probing reality with
distinctly different questions) even though otherwise axiologically-integral (none,
alone, sufficient for human value-realizations).
Now, humanity had so long been immersed in systematic approaches that
some just could not bring themselves to JOTS (jump outside the system) to properly
enjoy this paradigm shift and so, ironically, perverted this critique into a system,
postmodernISM, which celebrated these new-found methodological autonomies
while forsaking their axiological integrality, "gifting" humankind with a faux apologetic
for a practical nihilism, which, itself, was nothing new insofar as it's always been a
bad apple from which humanity has occasionally taken a bite.
Some intuited a wisdom in the critique and thus retreated from what
was a terribly naive realism to a self-congratulatory "critical" realism
but, for similar reasons (having to do with an inveterate system-ism), could not fully
accomplish the paradigm shift and, instead, embraced a "weakened"
foundationalism, unable to even conceive how a nonfoundational epistemology could
deliver value (axiologically). Hence, because they were now - not only
methodologically, but also- axiologically divorced, different people (perhaps due to
temperament
or even aptitude?) desperately sought epistemic refuge in one method
or another (largely to the exclusion of the other methods) "gifting" humankind with
scientism (science), rationalism (philosophy), provincialism (culture) and fideism
(religion).
Some not only tasted but saw the wisdom in the critique and were able
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7. to JOTS into a nonfoundational epistemology that articulated -not a departure from
humankind's unconditional, existential orientations to such transcendental
imperatives as truth, beauty, goodness and love, but- a new theory of knowledge,
which expressed a new understanding of our autonomous methodological
approaches even while maintaining their axiological integrality. A paragon of
nonfoundational accounts can be found in the contrite fallibilism of the pragmatic
semiotic realism of Charles Sanders Peirce, who provided an "emergentist"
explanation of human knowledge properly consistent with an evolutionary
anthropology and epistemology.
Interestingly, throughout the history of Christianity, this type of
approach has always enjoyed at least a minority status in practice as well as some
inchoate expressions in theory, practices and expressions that, in my view, have
been well chronicled by Phyllis Tickle, well explicated by Brian McLaren and well
preserved by Richard Rohr and his Franciscan ancestors, all who, per my intuitions,
resonate with other "minority reports" throughout history (that it's been neither the
"dominant" discourse nor power structure, more so esoterica than exoterica, may be
much of the point?) dating back to the Kabbalah (Jewish) and Plotinus
(Neoplatonist), Origen and Pseudo Dionysius and John Scottus Eriugena, Meister
Eckhart and John Duns Scotus and John of St. Thomas (Poinsot), and Charles
Sanders Peirce, as well as some of our contemporaries like Thomas Merton and
Walker Percy.
Now, many will resist such accounts as ours because they have a subversive ring to
them. But that nagging gong they hear comes from their own systems, which are
self-subverting!
In a rather predictable way, there have always been persons
and even peoples at early stages of development (intellectual,
moral, aesthetic, social and/or religious) who have perverted
the meanings of humankind's latest authentic insights,
inevitably twisting them to their transparently selfish (and
puerile) ends of either avoiding pain (and fear) or pursuing
pleasure (and security), above all other goals (otherwise,
there's nothing intrinsically unworthy about those ends). To
wit: Science sometimes devolves into scientism, faith into
fideism, philosophy into rationalism, culture into
provincialism, ritual into ritualism, law into legalism, dogma
into dogmatism, common sense realism into fundamentalism(s)
and the postmodern critique into postmodernism.
What the critique had suggested is that the categories of our
modal ontology be changed from 'possible, actual & necessary'
to 'possible, actual & probable' and that our corresponding
epistemic categories reflect a new semantical vagueness where
such first principles as noncontradiction [NC] & excluded
middle [EM] alternately hold or fold for each of those
categories: possible [NC folds, EM holds], actual [NC & EM
hold] and probable [NC holds, EM folds].
What postmodernism did is to change our modal ontology to
'possible, actual and whatever' and, in doing so, broke open a
new epistemic category: 'huh?' [undecidability]. Now,
undecidability is a valid working concept, proven, in fact, by
7

8. Godel's incompleteness theorems, which tell us that we can
have either consistency or completeness but not both. But, as
even Stephen Hawking would later come to believe and point out
- the good money's always been placed on consistency, while
abiding with incompleteness. That is to say that postmodernism
erred in betting all its chips on inconsistency, as if that
were the 'complete ' non-answer.
The postmodern critique properly (& hygienically) challenged
our theory of knowledge, leaving our theory of truth
untouched. Postmodernism challenged truth, itself, but only
for all practical purposes, for there is no challenge to truth
on theoretical grounds, employing logical arguments. However,
while there is no logical adjudication of these alternate
approaches, the normative sciences have always had other tools
at their disposal, measures such as the practical and the
absurd.
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