1. John Williamson
IASPM Canada
25 May 2013

2.  HISTORY: the relationship between the MU and the
recording industry mainly in the form of
Phonographic Performance Ltd (PPL)
 CONTEXT: the role of government, musicians, and
the Union itself in the breakdown of previously
established relations.

3. 4 main points of interest:
 Copyright Act (1911)- the early recording and
copyright industries
 The formation of PPL in 1934 and immediate
aftermath
 The MU and PPL agreement of 1946
 The 1988 report of the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission

4.  1907-9: first downturn within British recording
industry
 1909 – Copyright Committee
 1911 – Copyright Act
 1914 – formation of Performing Right Society (PRS)
by music publishers
 1920s/ 30s – boom and bust in recording industry;
decline in employment for musicians

5.  Decca and EMI were the two major record
companies
 The Gramophone Company vs. Carwardine (1933) –
established right for manufacturer’s fee for public
performance.
 PPL established to pursue and collect income in
1934.
 Immediately sought deals with publishers and
musicians
 Ex-gratia payment to performers – 20% of nett
income

6.  Economic pressures on MU – growth in recording
industry – seen as threat to ‘conventional’ musical
employment (influence of AFM)
 PPL to pay Union: 10% (first 2 years) and 12.5%
(thereafter) of net income to compensate session
players
 PPL and BBC agreement on “needletime” in 1947 -

7.  First PPL payment to MU in 1951 – prompts debate over
how to use it.
 EC decide to use it “for benefit of all musicians” and not
distribute to those who played on them: minority of
members were recording; majority would suffer from
unrestricted use.
 Fear of being seen as “yellow” union
 Loans and grants to orchestras, etc. – emphasis on live
music
 Music PromotionCommittee – cf.AFM’s Music
PerformanceTrust Fund
 Internal and External impact of PPL funds / MMC

8.  MMC report on Collective Licensing (1988) –
implemented by UK government in 1989.
 Scard: “The Union’s controls over
needletime, employment quotas and the policy of
not allowing records to accompany live
performance all disappeared overnight.” (1991)
 PPL payments had become substantial: £1.3 million
in 1987.
 MU also had £5.1m reserve in Special Account

9.  Post-1989 dispute with PPL over distribution of
funds from point of MMC report.
 In 1994, Union received £8.5m to distribute to
musicians who played on sessions and whose work
had been broadcast post 1989.
 Formation of PAMRA in 1996 to distribute funds
 Destabilizing period: loss of control over
membership? (Challenges to leadership from
Freddie Staff / session musicians culminating in
election/ Scard’s defeat)

10.  Range of employment and anti-Union legislation
beginning in 1980s – secret ballots, limits on strikes
and weakening / end of the closed shop
 “media unions were seen as the last bastions of
Union power” (Scard, 1991)
 Government policy: “reinjection of marketisation in
to State owned enterprise and the rooting out of
restrictive practices” (McIlroy, 2009: 32)
 MU had benefited from both in MU/PPL/BBC
agreements

11.  McIlroy on neoliberalism: “marked a return to
human nature, individualism and
entrepreneurialism, rather than collectivism and
dependency culture” (1995: 76)
 Individual gain embraced by some union members –
encouraged by press and “ambulance chasing”
lawyers.

12.  Since 1946, Union involved in pursuit of
performance and performing rights with PPL –
outcome to benefit of record companies and
individual musicians. . .
 These rights were not accepted by all countries and
until 1996 were not fully enshrined in UK law.
 Rosen: use of collective bodies to protect the
“creativeness of individuals” (2012: xiii)

13.  Impact of 1988 MMC report: “for the benefit of all
musicians” no longer an acceptable ethos for
government, members or Union leaders.
 Emphasis now “less on the collective context for
Union activity and more on services that can be
provided to individual members” (Ackers et al,1996:
56)
 McIlroy: “industrial relations and trade unions were
no longer adversarial” (2009:50)