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1
Compositional Probabilistic Analysis
of Temporal Properties
over Stochastic Detectors
Ivan Ruchkin, Oleg Sokolsky, Jim Weimer,
Tushar Hedaoo, Insup Lee
PRECISE Center
Department of Computer and Information Science
University of Pennsylvania
The International Conference on Embedded Software (EMSOFT)
September 22, 2020
2
System example:
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV)
3
System example:
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV)
4
Forward sonar:
obstacles
Side sonar:
pipeline
GPS/IMU:
pose
Doppler radar:
seafloor
System example:
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV)
5
Forward sonar:
obstacles
Side sonar:
pipeline
GPS/IMU:
pose
Doppler radar:
seafloor
“The UVV should eventually re-discover the
pipeline after avoiding an obstacle.”
System example:
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV)
6
Motivating property
“The UVV should eventually re-discover the
pipeline after avoiding an obstacle.”
7
Motivating property
“The UVV should eventually re-discover the
pipeline after avoiding an obstacle.”
Run-time monitor
8
Motivating property
“The UVV should eventually re-discover the
pipeline after avoiding an obstacle.”
Run-time monitor
Detectors
9
Motivating property
“The UVV should eventually re-discover the
pipeline after avoiding an obstacle.”
Temporal relation
Run-time monitor
Detectors
10
Motivating property
“The UVV should eventually re-discover the
pipeline after avoiding an obstacle.”
Temporal relation
Run-time monitor
– What are the error rates of this property’s
monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
Detectors
11
Motivating property
– What are the error rates of this property’s
monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
12
Motivating property
Data-driven
●
Develop a monitor
●
Sample & label
monitor outputs
●
Empirically estimate
its error rate
– What are the error rates of this property’s
monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
13
Motivating property
Data-driven
●
Develop a monitor
●
Sample & label
monitor outputs
●
Empirically estimate
its error rate
Pro: accurate
Con: expensive data,
effortful development
– What are the error rates of this property’s
monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
14
Motivating property
Data-driven
●
Develop a monitor
●
Sample & label
monitor outputs
●
Empirically estimate
its error rate
Pro: accurate
Con: expensive data,
effortful development
Model-based
●
Specify a monitor
●
Model the system
●
Theoretically estimate
the error rate
– What are the error rates of this property’s
monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
15
Motivating property
Data-driven
●
Develop a monitor
●
Sample & label
monitor outputs
●
Empirically estimate
its error rate
Pro: accurate
Con: expensive data,
effortful development
Model-based
●
Specify a monitor
●
Model the system
●
Theoretically estimate
the error rate
Pro: no data needed
Con: inaccurate, poor
scalability
– What are the error rates of this property’s
monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
16
Motivating property
Data-driven
●
Develop a monitor
●
Sample & label
monitor outputs
●
Empirically estimate
its error rate
Pro: accurate
Con: expensive data,
effortful development
Model-based
●
Specify a monitor
●
Model the system
●
Theoretically estimate
the error rate
Pro: no data needed
Con: inaccurate, poor
scalability
Mixed
●
Specify a monitor
●
Sample & label
detector outputs
●
Estimate the error
rate using the spec
and detector data
– What are the error rates of this property’s
monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
17
Motivating property
Data-driven
●
Develop a monitor
●
Sample & label
monitor outputs
●
Empirically estimate
its error rate
Pro: accurate
Con: expensive data,
effortful development
Model-based
●
Specify a monitor
●
Model the system
●
Theoretically estimate
the error rate
Pro: no data needed
Con: inaccurate, poor
scalability
Mixed
●
Specify a monitor
●
Sample & label
detector outputs
●
Estimate the error
rate using the spec
and detector data
Pro: cheap data,
accurate, scalable,
low effort
– What are the error rates of this property’s
monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
18
Approach outline
Computational
assistant
Detector model
Monitor’s error rate
Detector data
Monitor spec
19
Approach outline
Computational
assistant
Detector model
Monitor’s error rate
Detector data
Monitor spec
20
Our detector model
21
Side sonar input
Front sonar input Obstacle det
Our detector model
Pipeline det
Detection
output
Detection
output
22
Side sonar input
Front sonar input Obstacle det
Our detector model
Pipeline det
Detection
output
Detection
output
Property monitor
Violation
23
Side sonar input
Front sonar input Obstacle det
Our detector model
Pipeline det
Detection
output
Detection
output
Error
Error
Property monitor
Error
Violation
24
Side sonar input
Front sonar input Obstacle det
Our detector model
Pipeline det
Detection
output
Detection
output
Error
Error
Property monitor
Error
Violation
P( ) = ?
25
Side sonar input
Front sonar input Obstacle det
Our detector model
Pipeline det
Detection
output
Detection
output
Obst. ground truth
Pipe ground truth
Error
Error
Property monitor
Error
Violation
P( ) = ?
26
Obstacle det
Our detector model
Pipeline det
Detection
output
Detection
output
Error
Error
Property monitor
Obst. ground truth
Pipe ground truth
Error
Violation
P( ) = ?
27
D2
Our detector model
D1
Detection
output
Detection
output
Error
Error
M
Ground truth
Ground truth
Error
Violation
P( ) = ?
28
D2
Our detector model
D1
Detection
output
Detection
output
Error
Error
M
r.v. GT2
r.v. GT1
Ground truth
Ground truth
Error
Violation
P( ) = ?
29
D2
Our detector model
D1
Detection
output
Detection
output
Error
Error
M
r.v. GT2
r.v. GT1
Ground truth
Ground truth
r.v. GT2
Values:
GT2
= true↔gtt(D2
)
GT2
= false↔gtf(D2
)
Error
Violation
P( ) = ?
30
D2
Our detector model
D1
Detection
output
Detection
output
Error
Error
M
r.v. DO2
r.v. DO1r.v. GT1
Ground truth
Ground truth
r.v. GT2
Values:
GT2
= true↔gtt(D2
)
GT2
= false↔gtf(D2
)
Error
Violation
P( ) = ?
31
D2
Our detector model
D1
Detection
output
Detection
output
Error
Error
M
r.v. DO2
Values:
DO2
= true↔dot(D2
)
DO2
= false↔dof(D2
)
DO2
= unknown↔dou(D2
)
r.v. DO1r.v. GT1
Ground truth
Ground truth
r.v. GT2
Values:
GT2
= true↔gtt(D2
)
GT2
= false↔gtf(D2
)
Error
Violation
P( ) = ?
32
D2
Our detector model
D1
Detection
output
Detection
output
Error
Error
M = φ(D1
, D2
)
r.v. DO2
Values:
DO2
= true↔dot(D2
)
DO2
= false↔dof(D2
)
DO2
= unknown↔dou(D2
)
r.v. GT1
r.v. DO1
Ground truth
Ground truth
r.v. GT2
Values:
GT2
= true↔gtt(D2
)
GT2
= false↔gtf(D2
)
Error
Violation
P( ) = ?
DOM
, GTM
33
D2
Our detector model
D1
Detection
output
Detection
output
Error
Error
Error
M = φ(D1
, D2
)
Violation
P( ) = ?r.v. GT2
Values:
GT2
= true↔gtt(D2
)
GT2
= false↔gtf(D2
)
r.v. DO2
Values:
DO2
= true↔dot(D2
)
DO2
= false↔dof(D2
)
DO2
= unknown↔dou(D2
)
r.v. GT1
FPR: Pr( dot(...) | gtf(...) )
FNR: Pr(¬dot(...) | gtt(...) )
DOM
, GTM
Ground truth
Ground truth
r.v. DO1
34
Three-valued LTL for detectors
● Syntax of LTL3d
Semantics is given by detector compositions
“The UUV should re-discover the pipeline
within d seconds after losing it”
Monitor for this property
35
Three-valued LTL for detectors
● Syntax of LTL3d
●
Semantics is given by detector compositions
“The UUV should re-discover the pipeline
within d seconds after losing it”
Monitor for this property
36
Three-valued LTL for detectors
● Syntax of LTL3d
●
Semantics is given by detector compositions
●
“The UUV should re-discover the pipeline
within d seconds after losing it”
Monitor for this property
37
Three-valued LTL for detectors
● Syntax of LTL3d
●
Semantics is given by detector compositions
●
“The UUV should re-discover the pipeline
within d seconds after losing it”
●
Monitor for this property
38
Approach outline
Computational
assistant
Detector model
Monitor’s error rate
Detector data
Monitor spec
39
Approach outline
Computational
assistant
Detector model
Monitor’s error rate
Detector data
Monitor spec
40
Approach outline
Computational
assistant
Detector model
Monitor’s error rate
Detector data
Monitor spec
41
Three estimators for error rates
42
Three estimators for error rates
●
Black-box calculation (BBC)
– Inputs: labeled monitor traces
– Baseline data-driven estimator
Exact compositional calculation (ECC)
Inputs: detector probabilities, independence
assumptions, reasoning rules
Noisy compositional calculation (NCC)
Inputs: labeled detector traces, independence
assumptions, reasoning rules
43
Three estimators for error rates
●
Black-box calculation (BBC)
– Inputs: labeled monitor traces
– Baseline data-driven estimator
●
Exact compositional calculation (ECC)
– Inputs: detector probabilities, independence
assumptions, reasoning rules
Noisy compositional calculation (NCC)
Inputs: labeled detector traces, independence
assumptions, reasoning rules
44
Three estimators for error rates
●
Black-box calculation (BBC)
– Inputs: labeled monitor traces
– Baseline data-driven estimator
●
Exact compositional calculation (ECC)
– Inputs: detector probabilities, independence
assumptions, reasoning rules
●
Noisy compositional calculation (NCC)
– Inputs: labeled detector traces, independence
assumptions, reasoning rules
45
Three estimators for error rates
●
Black-box calculation (BBC)
– Inputs: labeled monitor traces
– Baseline data-driven estimator
●
Exact compositional calculation (ECC)
– Inputs: detector probabilities, independence
assumptions, reasoning rules
●
Noisy compositional calculation (NCC)
– Inputs: labeled detector traces, independence
assumptions, reasoning rules
Computational assistant: https://github.com/bisc/prob-comp-asst
46
ECC/NCC steps
Step 1: rewrite with
event predicates
Step 2: reduce to known/
estimable probabilities
Step 3: check if an
independence holds
Step 4: numerically
estimate probabilities
Step 5: calculate rate
estimate
47
ECC/NCC steps
●
Step 1: simplify/rewrite
with event predicates
Step 2: reduce to known/
estimable probabilities
Step 3: check if an
independence holds
Step 4: numerically
estimate probabilities
Step 5: calculate rate
estimate
48
ECC/NCC steps
●
Step 1: simplify/rewrite
with event predicates
Step 2: reduce to known/
estimable probabilities
Step 3: check if an
independence holds
Step 4: numerically
estimate probabilities
Step 5: calculate rate
estimate
49
ECC/NCC steps
●
Step 1: simplify/rewrite
with event predicates
Step 2: reduce to known/
estimable probabilities
Step 3: check if an
independence holds
Step 4: numerically
estimate probabilities
Step 5: calculate rate
estimate
50
ECC/NCC steps
●
Step 1: simplify/rewrite
with event predicates
●
Step 2: reduce to known/
estimable probabilities
Step 3: check if an
independence holds
Step 4: numerically
estimate probabilities
Step 5: calculate rate
estimate
51
ECC/NCC steps
●
Step 1: simplify/rewrite
with event predicates
●
Step 2: reduce to known/
estimable probabilities
Step 3: check if an
independence holds
Step 4: numerically
estimate probabilities
Step 5: calculate rate
estimate
52
ECC/NCC steps
●
Step 1: simplify/rewrite
with event predicates
●
Step 2: reduce to known/
estimable probabilities
●
Step 3: check if an
independence holds
Step 4: numerically
estimate probabilities
Step 5: calculate rate
estimate
53
Independence assumptions
●
Assumption 1: detections determined by GTs
●
Assumption 2: detection determined by its GT
54
ECC/NCC steps
●
Step 1: simplify/rewrite
with event predicates
●
Step 2: reduce to known/
estimable probabilities
●
Step 3: check if an
independence holds
Step 4: numerically
estimate probabilities
Step 5: calculate rate
estimate
55
ECC/NCC steps
●
Step 1: simplify/rewrite
with event predicates
●
Step 2: reduce to known/
estimable probabilities
●
Step 3: check if an
independence holds
●
Step 4: numerically
estimate probabilities
Step 5: calculate rate
estimate
56
ECC/NCC steps
●
Step 1: simplify/rewrite
with event predicates
●
Step 2: reduce to known/
estimable probabilities
●
Step 3: check if an
independence holds
●
Step 4: numerically
estimate probabilities
Step 5: calculate rate
estimate
57
ECC/NCC steps
●
Step 1: simplify/rewrite
with event predicates
●
Step 2: reduce to known/
estimable probabilities
●
Step 3: check if an
independence holds
●
Step 4: numerically
estimate probabilities
Step 5: calculate rate
estimate
58
ECC/NCC steps
●
Step 1: simplify/rewrite
with event predicates
●
Step 2: reduce to known/
estimable probabilities
●
Step 3: check if an
independence holds
●
Step 4: numerically
estimate probabilities
●
Step 5: calculate the
rate estimate
59
Approach outline
Computational
assistant
Detector model
Monitor’s error rate
Detector data
Monitor spec
60
Approach outline
Computational
assistant
Detector model
Monitor’s error rate
Detector data
Monitor spec
61
Approach outline
Computational
assistant
Detector model
Monitor’s error rate
Detector data
Monitor spec
62
Evaluation of NCC estimates
63
Evaluation of NCC estimates
●
How accurate are they?
●
How are they affected by the quantity of
trace data?
●
How are they affected by the independence
assumptions?
●
What are their computational costs?
64
●
How accurate are they?
●
How are they affected by the quantity of trace
data?
●
How are they affected by the independence
assumptions?
– Sensitive to accurate assumptions
●
What are their computational costs?
– 0-10 seconds, depending on formula size
Evaluation of NCC estimates
65
Evaluation setup
●
Setup: UUV Gazebo sim, randomized missions
●
Goal: estimate error rates of two monitors
●
73 missions (total 7.7 hrs of sim time), each:
– Two pairs of traces: (DO, GT) for pipe det & monitor
https://github.com/uuvsimulator/uuv_simulator
66
Evaluation variables
●
Independent:
– Mission configuration
– Monitor formula; deadline d for pipe loss (sec)
– Detector/monitor traces, for NCC/BBC resp.
Dependent (error rate estimates):
ECC: the true value based on exact probabilities
NCC: our approach on cheap (detector) data
BBC: data-driven on expensive (monitor) data
67
Evaluation variables
●
Independent:
– Mission configuration
– Monitor formula; deadline d for pipe loss (sec)
– Detector/monitor traces, for NCC/BBC resp.
●
Dependent (error rate estimates):
– ECC: the true value based on exact probabilities
– NCC: our approach on cheap (detector) data
– BBC: data-driven on expensive (monitor) data
68
ECC estimate (true, exact value)
NCC estimate (ours, detector traces)
BBC estimate (baseline, monitor traces)
Interpretation: given enough data,
the estimates are close
69
NCC estimate (ours, detector traces)
BBC estimate (baseline, monitor traces)
Interpretation: less data favors NCC;
more data favors BBC
70
Summary
Logical composition of detectors with LTL3d
Probabilistic estimation of error rates
Rule-based computational assistant
Accuracy on par with data-driven estimates
While using cheaper data & scalable analysis
Preferred when little or no data available
Computational
assistant
Detector model
Monitor’s error rate
Detector data
Monitor spec
71
Summary
● Logical composition of detectors with LTL3d
Probabilistic estimation of error rates
Rule-based computational assistant
Accuracy on par with data-driven estimates
While using cheaper data & scalable analysis
Preferred when little or no data available
Computational
assistant
Detector model
Monitor’s error rate
Detector data
Monitor spec
72
Summary
● Logical composition of detectors with LTL3d
●
Probabilistic estimation of error rates
– Rule-based computational assistant
Accuracy on par with data-driven estimates
While using cheaper data & scalable analysis
Preferred when little or no data available
Computational
assistant
Detector model
Monitor’s error rate
Detector data
Monitor spec
73
Summary
● Logical composition of detectors with LTL3d
●
Probabilistic estimation of error rates
– Rule-based computational assistant
●
Accuracy on par with data-driven estimates
– While using cheaper data & scalable analysis
Computational
assistant
Detector model
Monitor’s error rate
Detector data
Monitor spec
74
Refences
●
The computational assistant and UUV case study data:
https://github.com/bisc/prob-comp-asst
●
The original paper:
https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TCAD.2020.3012643
●
Supplementary materials:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342993188_Suppl
ementary_Materials_for_Compositional_Probabilistic_Analy
sis_of_Temporal_Properties_over_Stochastic_Detectors
75
Additional slides
76
Our framework at glance
Inputs:
– Set of detectors with event/error probabilities
– Logical property over detectors
– Detector independence assumptions
– Labeled traces from detectors
Method: a modeling & analysis framework based on
– Logical composition model
– Algebraic probability calculations
– Axiomatic independence inference
– Probability estimation from data
Output: estimate of an error rate for the property monitor
77
Our framework at glance
78
Detector model as variables
● Given: mutually exclusive H1 and H0
●
Atomic detector D is a pair (DO, GT) of r.v.s:
– Detection outcome DO ∈  {T, F, U}
– Ground truth GT ∈  {T, F}
●
A probability space with marginal events:
dot(D) = (T, *) gtt(D) = (*, T)
dof(D) = (F, *) gtf(D) = (*, F)
dou(D) = (U, *)
79
Detector model as probability space
Given: mutually exclusive H1 and H0
Stochastic detector D – a triple (Ω, 𝓕, Pr):
– Ω: set of six possible outcomes for a pair of variables:
Detection Outcome (DO) ∈  {T, F, U}
Ground Truth (GT) ∈  {T, F}
– 𝓕: sigma-algebra of events over Ω (i.e., the powerset of Ω)
dot = (T, *), dof = (F, *), dou = (U, *)
gtt = (*, T), gtf = (*, F)
– Pr: 𝓕 → [0, 1], a probability measure over 𝓕
D T F U
T
dot dof dou
F
D T F U
T gtt
F gtf
D T F U
T o1
o2
o3
F o4
o5
o6
80
Detector examples
● Coin toss with faulty perception: H1 – heads, H0 – tails
● Detecting obstacles: H1 – obstacle ahead, H0 – no obstacle
● Perfect coin toss: H1 – heads, H0 – tails
OD dot dof dou
gtt 0.2 0.09 0.09
gtf 0.01 0.6 0.01
PCT dot dof dou
gtt 0.5 0 0
gtf 0 0.5 0
FCT dot dof dou
gtt 0.3 0.05 0.15
gtf 0.05 0.3 0.15
81
Composition of detectors (general)
● Operand detectors D1, D2 … DN
– A value pair (DO, GT) for each
●
Composition operator op
– 3-value version op3
– 2-value version op2
●
Composite detector is (DO, GT) such that
– DO = op3(DO1, … DON )
– GT = op2(GT1, … GTN )
82
Composition of detectors (ours)
● Operand detectors D1, D2 … DN
– A trace of value pairs (DO, GT) for each
●
LTL-like formula φ
– 3-value semantics [[[φ]]]
– 2-value semantics [[φ]]
●
Composite detector is (DO, GT) such that
– DO = [[[φ(DO1, … DON )]]]
– GT = [[φ(GT1, … GTN )]]
83
Conjunction composition
84
Strong negation
●
Flips hypotheses/outcomes
D CH1
CH0
NC
H1
0.3 0.05 0.15
H0
0.05 0.3 0.15
¬s
D CH1
CH0
NC
H1
0.05 0.3 0.15
H0
0.3 0.05 0.15
85
Weak negation
●
Flips hypotheses, true on unknown
D CH1
CH0
NC
H1
0.3 0.05 0.15
H0
0.05 0.3 0.15
¬w
D CH1
CH0
NC
H1
0.45 0.05 0
H0
0.2 0.3 0
86
Strong exclusive negation
●
Flips hypotheses, false on unknown
D CH1
CH0
NC
H1
0.3 0.05 0.15
H0
0.05 0.3 0.15
¬se
D CH1
CH0
NC
H1
0.3 0.2 0
H0
0.05 0.45 0
87
Binary composition example
Two independent faulty coin tosses
FCT1
Λ FCT2 dot dof dou
gtt 0.09 0.0475 0.1125
gtf 0.0325 0.53 0.1875
FCT1 dot dof dou
gtt 0.3 0.05 0.15
gtf 0.05 0.3 0.15
FCT2
ch1 dof dou
gtt 0.3 0.05 0.15
gtf 0.05 0.3 0.15
FCT1
V FCT2 dot dof dou
gtt 0.53 0.0325 0.1875
gtf 0.0475 0.09 0.1125
88
Negations, implications,
modalities
Strong negation: ¬s D
Weak negation: ¬w D
Strong exclusive negation: ¬se D
Strong implication: D1→s D2 := ¬s D1 V D2
Weak implication: D1 →w D2 := ¬w D1 V D2
Strong exclusive implication: D1 →se D2 := ¬se D1 V D2
Box modality:
Diamond modality:
89
Operator semantics
90
Error rates of detectors
●
False positive rate:
●
False negative rate:
91
Error rates for examples
● Coin toss with faulty perception: H1 – heads, H0 – tails
● Detecting obstacles: H1 – obstacle ahead, H0 – no obstacle
● Perfect coin toss: H1 – heads, H0 – tails
FCT dot dof dou
gtt 0.3 0.05 0.15
gtf 0.05 0.3 0.15
DO dot dof dou
gtt 0.2 0.09 0.09
gtf 0.01 0.6 0.01
PCT dot dof dou
gtt 0.5 0 0
gtf 0 0.5 0
fpr = 0.05
fnr = 0.2
fpr = 0.01
fnr = 0.18
fpr = 0
fnr = 0
92
Error rates for composition example
Two independent coin tosses
with faulty perception
CT1
Λ CT2 dot dof dou
gtt 0.09 0.0475 0.1125
gtf 0.0325 0.53 0.1875
CT1 dot dof dou
gtt 0.3 0.05 0.15
gtf 0.05 0.3 0.15
CT2 dot dof dou
gtt 0.3 0.05 0.15
gtf 0.05 0.3 0.15
CT1
V CT2 dot dof dou
gtt 0.53 0.0325 0.1875
gtf 0.0475 0.09 0.1125
fpr = 0.05, fnr = 0.2
fpr = 0.0325, fnr = 0.155 fpr = 0.0475, fnr = 0.22
93
Reasoning rules
● 𝓡log – tautologies of LTL3d
● 𝓡ev – tautologies of event predicates
● 𝓡prob – algebraic probability rules
● 𝓡indep – conditional independence rules
94
Related work: combining
detectors
●
Ensembles and cross-validation
– Good performance, weak guarantees
●
Hypothesis tests
– Either too simple or too complex
●
Logics of probability (probability operator)
– No need for explicit statements about probability
●
Probabilistic logics (probability of formulas)
– No need for uncertain statements
95
Related work: predicting error
rates
●
Model-free
– E.g., estimation from data
– Requires extensive data collection & labeling
– Difficulty in estimating rare cases
●
Model-based
– E.g., model checking probabilistic automata
– Requires comprehensive (~ inaccurate) modeling
– Limited scalability

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numericallyestimate probabilitiesStep 5: calculate rateestimate 48ECC/NCC steps●Step 1: simplify/rewritewith event predicatesStep 2: reduce to known/estimable probabilitiesStep 3: check if anindependence holdsStep 4

  • 1. 1 Compositional Probabilistic Analysis of Temporal Properties over Stochastic Detectors Ivan Ruchkin, Oleg Sokolsky, Jim Weimer, Tushar Hedaoo, Insup Lee PRECISE Center Department of Computer and Information Science University of Pennsylvania The International Conference on Embedded Software (EMSOFT) September 22, 2020
  • 4. 4 Forward sonar: obstacles Side sonar: pipeline GPS/IMU: pose Doppler radar: seafloor System example: Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV)
  • 5. 5 Forward sonar: obstacles Side sonar: pipeline GPS/IMU: pose Doppler radar: seafloor “The UVV should eventually re-discover the pipeline after avoiding an obstacle.” System example: Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV)
  • 6. 6 Motivating property “The UVV should eventually re-discover the pipeline after avoiding an obstacle.”
  • 7. 7 Motivating property “The UVV should eventually re-discover the pipeline after avoiding an obstacle.” Run-time monitor
  • 8. 8 Motivating property “The UVV should eventually re-discover the pipeline after avoiding an obstacle.” Run-time monitor Detectors
  • 9. 9 Motivating property “The UVV should eventually re-discover the pipeline after avoiding an obstacle.” Temporal relation Run-time monitor Detectors
  • 10. 10 Motivating property “The UVV should eventually re-discover the pipeline after avoiding an obstacle.” Temporal relation Run-time monitor – What are the error rates of this property’s monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors? Detectors
  • 11. 11 Motivating property – What are the error rates of this property’s monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
  • 12. 12 Motivating property Data-driven ● Develop a monitor ● Sample & label monitor outputs ● Empirically estimate its error rate – What are the error rates of this property’s monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
  • 13. 13 Motivating property Data-driven ● Develop a monitor ● Sample & label monitor outputs ● Empirically estimate its error rate Pro: accurate Con: expensive data, effortful development – What are the error rates of this property’s monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
  • 14. 14 Motivating property Data-driven ● Develop a monitor ● Sample & label monitor outputs ● Empirically estimate its error rate Pro: accurate Con: expensive data, effortful development Model-based ● Specify a monitor ● Model the system ● Theoretically estimate the error rate – What are the error rates of this property’s monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
  • 15. 15 Motivating property Data-driven ● Develop a monitor ● Sample & label monitor outputs ● Empirically estimate its error rate Pro: accurate Con: expensive data, effortful development Model-based ● Specify a monitor ● Model the system ● Theoretically estimate the error rate Pro: no data needed Con: inaccurate, poor scalability – What are the error rates of this property’s monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
  • 16. 16 Motivating property Data-driven ● Develop a monitor ● Sample & label monitor outputs ● Empirically estimate its error rate Pro: accurate Con: expensive data, effortful development Model-based ● Specify a monitor ● Model the system ● Theoretically estimate the error rate Pro: no data needed Con: inaccurate, poor scalability Mixed ● Specify a monitor ● Sample & label detector outputs ● Estimate the error rate using the spec and detector data – What are the error rates of this property’s monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
  • 17. 17 Motivating property Data-driven ● Develop a monitor ● Sample & label monitor outputs ● Empirically estimate its error rate Pro: accurate Con: expensive data, effortful development Model-based ● Specify a monitor ● Model the system ● Theoretically estimate the error rate Pro: no data needed Con: inaccurate, poor scalability Mixed ● Specify a monitor ● Sample & label detector outputs ● Estimate the error rate using the spec and detector data Pro: cheap data, accurate, scalable, low effort – What are the error rates of this property’s monitor given uncertain, unreliable detectors?
  • 21. 21 Side sonar input Front sonar input Obstacle det Our detector model Pipeline det Detection output Detection output
  • 22. 22 Side sonar input Front sonar input Obstacle det Our detector model Pipeline det Detection output Detection output Property monitor Violation
  • 23. 23 Side sonar input Front sonar input Obstacle det Our detector model Pipeline det Detection output Detection output Error Error Property monitor Error Violation
  • 24. 24 Side sonar input Front sonar input Obstacle det Our detector model Pipeline det Detection output Detection output Error Error Property monitor Error Violation P( ) = ?
  • 25. 25 Side sonar input Front sonar input Obstacle det Our detector model Pipeline det Detection output Detection output Obst. ground truth Pipe ground truth Error Error Property monitor Error Violation P( ) = ?
  • 26. 26 Obstacle det Our detector model Pipeline det Detection output Detection output Error Error Property monitor Obst. ground truth Pipe ground truth Error Violation P( ) = ?
  • 28. 28 D2 Our detector model D1 Detection output Detection output Error Error M r.v. GT2 r.v. GT1 Ground truth Ground truth Error Violation P( ) = ?
  • 29. 29 D2 Our detector model D1 Detection output Detection output Error Error M r.v. GT2 r.v. GT1 Ground truth Ground truth r.v. GT2 Values: GT2 = true↔gtt(D2 ) GT2 = false↔gtf(D2 ) Error Violation P( ) = ?
  • 30. 30 D2 Our detector model D1 Detection output Detection output Error Error M r.v. DO2 r.v. DO1r.v. GT1 Ground truth Ground truth r.v. GT2 Values: GT2 = true↔gtt(D2 ) GT2 = false↔gtf(D2 ) Error Violation P( ) = ?
  • 31. 31 D2 Our detector model D1 Detection output Detection output Error Error M r.v. DO2 Values: DO2 = true↔dot(D2 ) DO2 = false↔dof(D2 ) DO2 = unknown↔dou(D2 ) r.v. DO1r.v. GT1 Ground truth Ground truth r.v. GT2 Values: GT2 = true↔gtt(D2 ) GT2 = false↔gtf(D2 ) Error Violation P( ) = ?
  • 32. 32 D2 Our detector model D1 Detection output Detection output Error Error M = φ(D1 , D2 ) r.v. DO2 Values: DO2 = true↔dot(D2 ) DO2 = false↔dof(D2 ) DO2 = unknown↔dou(D2 ) r.v. GT1 r.v. DO1 Ground truth Ground truth r.v. GT2 Values: GT2 = true↔gtt(D2 ) GT2 = false↔gtf(D2 ) Error Violation P( ) = ? DOM , GTM
  • 33. 33 D2 Our detector model D1 Detection output Detection output Error Error Error M = φ(D1 , D2 ) Violation P( ) = ?r.v. GT2 Values: GT2 = true↔gtt(D2 ) GT2 = false↔gtf(D2 ) r.v. DO2 Values: DO2 = true↔dot(D2 ) DO2 = false↔dof(D2 ) DO2 = unknown↔dou(D2 ) r.v. GT1 FPR: Pr( dot(...) | gtf(...) ) FNR: Pr(¬dot(...) | gtt(...) ) DOM , GTM Ground truth Ground truth r.v. DO1
  • 34. 34 Three-valued LTL for detectors ● Syntax of LTL3d Semantics is given by detector compositions “The UUV should re-discover the pipeline within d seconds after losing it” Monitor for this property
  • 35. 35 Three-valued LTL for detectors ● Syntax of LTL3d ● Semantics is given by detector compositions “The UUV should re-discover the pipeline within d seconds after losing it” Monitor for this property
  • 36. 36 Three-valued LTL for detectors ● Syntax of LTL3d ● Semantics is given by detector compositions ● “The UUV should re-discover the pipeline within d seconds after losing it” Monitor for this property
  • 37. 37 Three-valued LTL for detectors ● Syntax of LTL3d ● Semantics is given by detector compositions ● “The UUV should re-discover the pipeline within d seconds after losing it” ● Monitor for this property
  • 41. 41 Three estimators for error rates
  • 42. 42 Three estimators for error rates ● Black-box calculation (BBC) – Inputs: labeled monitor traces – Baseline data-driven estimator Exact compositional calculation (ECC) Inputs: detector probabilities, independence assumptions, reasoning rules Noisy compositional calculation (NCC) Inputs: labeled detector traces, independence assumptions, reasoning rules
  • 43. 43 Three estimators for error rates ● Black-box calculation (BBC) – Inputs: labeled monitor traces – Baseline data-driven estimator ● Exact compositional calculation (ECC) – Inputs: detector probabilities, independence assumptions, reasoning rules Noisy compositional calculation (NCC) Inputs: labeled detector traces, independence assumptions, reasoning rules
  • 44. 44 Three estimators for error rates ● Black-box calculation (BBC) – Inputs: labeled monitor traces – Baseline data-driven estimator ● Exact compositional calculation (ECC) – Inputs: detector probabilities, independence assumptions, reasoning rules ● Noisy compositional calculation (NCC) – Inputs: labeled detector traces, independence assumptions, reasoning rules
  • 45. 45 Three estimators for error rates ● Black-box calculation (BBC) – Inputs: labeled monitor traces – Baseline data-driven estimator ● Exact compositional calculation (ECC) – Inputs: detector probabilities, independence assumptions, reasoning rules ● Noisy compositional calculation (NCC) – Inputs: labeled detector traces, independence assumptions, reasoning rules Computational assistant: https://github.com/bisc/prob-comp-asst
  • 46. 46 ECC/NCC steps Step 1: rewrite with event predicates Step 2: reduce to known/ estimable probabilities Step 3: check if an independence holds Step 4: numerically estimate probabilities Step 5: calculate rate estimate
  • 47. 47 ECC/NCC steps ● Step 1: simplify/rewrite with event predicates Step 2: reduce to known/ estimable probabilities Step 3: check if an independence holds Step 4: numerically estimate probabilities Step 5: calculate rate estimate
  • 48. 48 ECC/NCC steps ● Step 1: simplify/rewrite with event predicates Step 2: reduce to known/ estimable probabilities Step 3: check if an independence holds Step 4: numerically estimate probabilities Step 5: calculate rate estimate
  • 49. 49 ECC/NCC steps ● Step 1: simplify/rewrite with event predicates Step 2: reduce to known/ estimable probabilities Step 3: check if an independence holds Step 4: numerically estimate probabilities Step 5: calculate rate estimate
  • 50. 50 ECC/NCC steps ● Step 1: simplify/rewrite with event predicates ● Step 2: reduce to known/ estimable probabilities Step 3: check if an independence holds Step 4: numerically estimate probabilities Step 5: calculate rate estimate
  • 51. 51 ECC/NCC steps ● Step 1: simplify/rewrite with event predicates ● Step 2: reduce to known/ estimable probabilities Step 3: check if an independence holds Step 4: numerically estimate probabilities Step 5: calculate rate estimate
  • 52. 52 ECC/NCC steps ● Step 1: simplify/rewrite with event predicates ● Step 2: reduce to known/ estimable probabilities ● Step 3: check if an independence holds Step 4: numerically estimate probabilities Step 5: calculate rate estimate
  • 53. 53 Independence assumptions ● Assumption 1: detections determined by GTs ● Assumption 2: detection determined by its GT
  • 54. 54 ECC/NCC steps ● Step 1: simplify/rewrite with event predicates ● Step 2: reduce to known/ estimable probabilities ● Step 3: check if an independence holds Step 4: numerically estimate probabilities Step 5: calculate rate estimate
  • 55. 55 ECC/NCC steps ● Step 1: simplify/rewrite with event predicates ● Step 2: reduce to known/ estimable probabilities ● Step 3: check if an independence holds ● Step 4: numerically estimate probabilities Step 5: calculate rate estimate
  • 56. 56 ECC/NCC steps ● Step 1: simplify/rewrite with event predicates ● Step 2: reduce to known/ estimable probabilities ● Step 3: check if an independence holds ● Step 4: numerically estimate probabilities Step 5: calculate rate estimate
  • 57. 57 ECC/NCC steps ● Step 1: simplify/rewrite with event predicates ● Step 2: reduce to known/ estimable probabilities ● Step 3: check if an independence holds ● Step 4: numerically estimate probabilities Step 5: calculate rate estimate
  • 58. 58 ECC/NCC steps ● Step 1: simplify/rewrite with event predicates ● Step 2: reduce to known/ estimable probabilities ● Step 3: check if an independence holds ● Step 4: numerically estimate probabilities ● Step 5: calculate the rate estimate
  • 62. 62 Evaluation of NCC estimates
  • 63. 63 Evaluation of NCC estimates ● How accurate are they? ● How are they affected by the quantity of trace data? ● How are they affected by the independence assumptions? ● What are their computational costs?
  • 64. 64 ● How accurate are they? ● How are they affected by the quantity of trace data? ● How are they affected by the independence assumptions? – Sensitive to accurate assumptions ● What are their computational costs? – 0-10 seconds, depending on formula size Evaluation of NCC estimates
  • 65. 65 Evaluation setup ● Setup: UUV Gazebo sim, randomized missions ● Goal: estimate error rates of two monitors ● 73 missions (total 7.7 hrs of sim time), each: – Two pairs of traces: (DO, GT) for pipe det & monitor https://github.com/uuvsimulator/uuv_simulator
  • 66. 66 Evaluation variables ● Independent: – Mission configuration – Monitor formula; deadline d for pipe loss (sec) – Detector/monitor traces, for NCC/BBC resp. Dependent (error rate estimates): ECC: the true value based on exact probabilities NCC: our approach on cheap (detector) data BBC: data-driven on expensive (monitor) data
  • 67. 67 Evaluation variables ● Independent: – Mission configuration – Monitor formula; deadline d for pipe loss (sec) – Detector/monitor traces, for NCC/BBC resp. ● Dependent (error rate estimates): – ECC: the true value based on exact probabilities – NCC: our approach on cheap (detector) data – BBC: data-driven on expensive (monitor) data
  • 68. 68 ECC estimate (true, exact value) NCC estimate (ours, detector traces) BBC estimate (baseline, monitor traces) Interpretation: given enough data, the estimates are close
  • 69. 69 NCC estimate (ours, detector traces) BBC estimate (baseline, monitor traces) Interpretation: less data favors NCC; more data favors BBC
  • 70. 70 Summary Logical composition of detectors with LTL3d Probabilistic estimation of error rates Rule-based computational assistant Accuracy on par with data-driven estimates While using cheaper data & scalable analysis Preferred when little or no data available Computational assistant Detector model Monitor’s error rate Detector data Monitor spec
  • 71. 71 Summary ● Logical composition of detectors with LTL3d Probabilistic estimation of error rates Rule-based computational assistant Accuracy on par with data-driven estimates While using cheaper data & scalable analysis Preferred when little or no data available Computational assistant Detector model Monitor’s error rate Detector data Monitor spec
  • 72. 72 Summary ● Logical composition of detectors with LTL3d ● Probabilistic estimation of error rates – Rule-based computational assistant Accuracy on par with data-driven estimates While using cheaper data & scalable analysis Preferred when little or no data available Computational assistant Detector model Monitor’s error rate Detector data Monitor spec
  • 73. 73 Summary ● Logical composition of detectors with LTL3d ● Probabilistic estimation of error rates – Rule-based computational assistant ● Accuracy on par with data-driven estimates – While using cheaper data & scalable analysis Computational assistant Detector model Monitor’s error rate Detector data Monitor spec
  • 74. 74 Refences ● The computational assistant and UUV case study data: https://github.com/bisc/prob-comp-asst ● The original paper: https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TCAD.2020.3012643 ● Supplementary materials: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342993188_Suppl ementary_Materials_for_Compositional_Probabilistic_Analy sis_of_Temporal_Properties_over_Stochastic_Detectors
  • 76. 76 Our framework at glance Inputs: – Set of detectors with event/error probabilities – Logical property over detectors – Detector independence assumptions – Labeled traces from detectors Method: a modeling & analysis framework based on – Logical composition model – Algebraic probability calculations – Axiomatic independence inference – Probability estimation from data Output: estimate of an error rate for the property monitor
  • 78. 78 Detector model as variables ● Given: mutually exclusive H1 and H0 ● Atomic detector D is a pair (DO, GT) of r.v.s: – Detection outcome DO ∈ {T, F, U} – Ground truth GT ∈ {T, F} ● A probability space with marginal events: dot(D) = (T, *) gtt(D) = (*, T) dof(D) = (F, *) gtf(D) = (*, F) dou(D) = (U, *)
  • 79. 79 Detector model as probability space Given: mutually exclusive H1 and H0 Stochastic detector D – a triple (Ω, 𝓕, Pr): – Ω: set of six possible outcomes for a pair of variables: Detection Outcome (DO) ∈ {T, F, U} Ground Truth (GT) ∈ {T, F} – 𝓕: sigma-algebra of events over Ω (i.e., the powerset of Ω) dot = (T, *), dof = (F, *), dou = (U, *) gtt = (*, T), gtf = (*, F) – Pr: 𝓕 → [0, 1], a probability measure over 𝓕 D T F U T dot dof dou F D T F U T gtt F gtf D T F U T o1 o2 o3 F o4 o5 o6
  • 80. 80 Detector examples ● Coin toss with faulty perception: H1 – heads, H0 – tails ● Detecting obstacles: H1 – obstacle ahead, H0 – no obstacle ● Perfect coin toss: H1 – heads, H0 – tails OD dot dof dou gtt 0.2 0.09 0.09 gtf 0.01 0.6 0.01 PCT dot dof dou gtt 0.5 0 0 gtf 0 0.5 0 FCT dot dof dou gtt 0.3 0.05 0.15 gtf 0.05 0.3 0.15
  • 81. 81 Composition of detectors (general) ● Operand detectors D1, D2 … DN – A value pair (DO, GT) for each ● Composition operator op – 3-value version op3 – 2-value version op2 ● Composite detector is (DO, GT) such that – DO = op3(DO1, … DON ) – GT = op2(GT1, … GTN )
  • 82. 82 Composition of detectors (ours) ● Operand detectors D1, D2 … DN – A trace of value pairs (DO, GT) for each ● LTL-like formula φ – 3-value semantics [[[φ]]] – 2-value semantics [[φ]] ● Composite detector is (DO, GT) such that – DO = [[[φ(DO1, … DON )]]] – GT = [[φ(GT1, … GTN )]]
  • 84. 84 Strong negation ● Flips hypotheses/outcomes D CH1 CH0 NC H1 0.3 0.05 0.15 H0 0.05 0.3 0.15 ¬s D CH1 CH0 NC H1 0.05 0.3 0.15 H0 0.3 0.05 0.15
  • 85. 85 Weak negation ● Flips hypotheses, true on unknown D CH1 CH0 NC H1 0.3 0.05 0.15 H0 0.05 0.3 0.15 ¬w D CH1 CH0 NC H1 0.45 0.05 0 H0 0.2 0.3 0
  • 86. 86 Strong exclusive negation ● Flips hypotheses, false on unknown D CH1 CH0 NC H1 0.3 0.05 0.15 H0 0.05 0.3 0.15 ¬se D CH1 CH0 NC H1 0.3 0.2 0 H0 0.05 0.45 0
  • 87. 87 Binary composition example Two independent faulty coin tosses FCT1 Λ FCT2 dot dof dou gtt 0.09 0.0475 0.1125 gtf 0.0325 0.53 0.1875 FCT1 dot dof dou gtt 0.3 0.05 0.15 gtf 0.05 0.3 0.15 FCT2 ch1 dof dou gtt 0.3 0.05 0.15 gtf 0.05 0.3 0.15 FCT1 V FCT2 dot dof dou gtt 0.53 0.0325 0.1875 gtf 0.0475 0.09 0.1125
  • 88. 88 Negations, implications, modalities Strong negation: ¬s D Weak negation: ¬w D Strong exclusive negation: ¬se D Strong implication: D1→s D2 := ¬s D1 V D2 Weak implication: D1 →w D2 := ¬w D1 V D2 Strong exclusive implication: D1 →se D2 := ¬se D1 V D2 Box modality: Diamond modality:
  • 90. 90 Error rates of detectors ● False positive rate: ● False negative rate:
  • 91. 91 Error rates for examples ● Coin toss with faulty perception: H1 – heads, H0 – tails ● Detecting obstacles: H1 – obstacle ahead, H0 – no obstacle ● Perfect coin toss: H1 – heads, H0 – tails FCT dot dof dou gtt 0.3 0.05 0.15 gtf 0.05 0.3 0.15 DO dot dof dou gtt 0.2 0.09 0.09 gtf 0.01 0.6 0.01 PCT dot dof dou gtt 0.5 0 0 gtf 0 0.5 0 fpr = 0.05 fnr = 0.2 fpr = 0.01 fnr = 0.18 fpr = 0 fnr = 0
  • 92. 92 Error rates for composition example Two independent coin tosses with faulty perception CT1 Λ CT2 dot dof dou gtt 0.09 0.0475 0.1125 gtf 0.0325 0.53 0.1875 CT1 dot dof dou gtt 0.3 0.05 0.15 gtf 0.05 0.3 0.15 CT2 dot dof dou gtt 0.3 0.05 0.15 gtf 0.05 0.3 0.15 CT1 V CT2 dot dof dou gtt 0.53 0.0325 0.1875 gtf 0.0475 0.09 0.1125 fpr = 0.05, fnr = 0.2 fpr = 0.0325, fnr = 0.155 fpr = 0.0475, fnr = 0.22
  • 93. 93 Reasoning rules ● 𝓡log – tautologies of LTL3d ● 𝓡ev – tautologies of event predicates ● 𝓡prob – algebraic probability rules ● 𝓡indep – conditional independence rules
  • 94. 94 Related work: combining detectors ● Ensembles and cross-validation – Good performance, weak guarantees ● Hypothesis tests – Either too simple or too complex ● Logics of probability (probability operator) – No need for explicit statements about probability ● Probabilistic logics (probability of formulas) – No need for uncertain statements
  • 95. 95 Related work: predicting error rates ● Model-free – E.g., estimation from data – Requires extensive data collection & labeling – Difficulty in estimating rare cases ● Model-based – E.g., model checking probabilistic automata – Requires comprehensive (~ inaccurate) modeling – Limited scalability