Mario Bunge critiques dialectics as presented by philosophers such as Hegel, Engels, and Lenin. He argues that dialectics has a "plausible kernel" in recognizing that all things change over time and new qualities can emerge, but this is surrounded by a "mystic fog" consisting of three problematic theses: 1) that every object has an anti-object, 2) that all opposites are in conflict, and 3) that each stage of development negates and is negated by previous/next stages. Bunge believes that by clarifying ambiguous terms, dialectics could be made more intelligible, but it would then be a "weaker" theory limited to transformation rather than a universal

1. About Mario Bunge's 'A Critical Examination of Dialectics'
Author(s): Pavel Apostol
Source: Studies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Feb., 1985), pp. 89-136
Published by: Springer
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2. fPAVEL AP?STOL
ABOUT MARIO BUNGE'S 'A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF DIALECTICS'
We submit to analysis Mario Bunge's 4ACritical Examination of Dialectics',
which sums up and develops objections, some of which appeared previously
in his Method, Model and Matter (1973).
Our comments have to do with this text.1 The admissibility of some of
Bunge's theses and the rejection of some others seems to us to be justifiable
from the point of view of a theoretical horizon which cannot be described,
now and in this context in all of its logical articulations, but which represents
a tacit supposition of our argumentation. This theoretical horizon, equivalent
to thinking through and constructing a new version of Marxian dialectics,
will be briefly outlined at the end of our study.
0. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
0.1 The fact that we have chosen Bunge in this context is no mere whim. As
a matter of fact, he himself seems to await such a retort, when he writes:
"Should anyone feel dissatisfied with this version, he iswelcome to produce a
more satisfactory formulation. In fact it is high time that somebody did it."
(p. 64). Confrontation with Bunge in this matter presents two advantages:
(a) his argumentation is formulated with sufficient precision to permit a
profitable discussion, and
(b) his position is representative of some more recent orientations which
have assimilated acquisitions of the research on foundations of science and
those of analytic philosophy (in the large sense given to the term by W.
Stegm?ller).2
0.2 The discussion in extremely difficult conditions which add to
evolves
the usual difficulties which accompany philosophic rhetoric.
Without agreeing in many other respects with Jean-Fran?ois Revel, we will
acknowledge that "philosophy is the last domain to perpetuate two strong
illusions: religion and rhetoric - from which modern thinking in other
intellectual fields has tended and partially succeeded in liberating the human
spirit."3 We have to recognize openly that as regards dialectics we often
Studies in Soviet Thought 29 (1985) 89-136. 0039-3797/85/0292-0089 $04.80.
? 1985 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

3. 90 PAVEL AP?STOL
witness some unpleasant outbursts of religious dogmatism or of rhetorical
excesses. While Bunge's discourse is undogmatic it avoids the pitfalls of idle
rhetoric.
0.3 As a rule - and the author of these lines was no exception to this in
the past4 ? the Marxist and the Marxist-Leninist or Hegelian dialectics are
approached as if we possessed elaborated theories of Hegel, Marx, Engels
or Lenin dialectics. But, on the contrary, as Dieter Henrich notes
about
in his exegeses on Hegel's work: even in Hegel's monumental Science of
Logic, published 170 years ago, we find a logical practice', but neither an
'elaborated concept of the dialectical method', nor 'the law of unfolding' of
its operations, or even the statement of
'the peculiar conditions of then
application'.5 Similar remarks are to be made also with respect to Marx,
Engels, or Lenin. Certainly, we find also in their works isolated propositions
about dialectics - with really remarkable differences concerning how they
are understood. There are no elaborated theories on it. Yet we find in their
works a 'logical practice'
of dialectics, embodied in the social research they
did. This 'logical practice' can be considered as so many interpretations
of some abstract patterns of dialectics; but, since the latter have not been
explicitly formulated, the detecting of these patterns within the framework
of their interpretation is such a difficult task that it is often equivalent to
an invention.
0.4 On the contrary, we retain a didactically operational concept of
?
dialectics elaborated, of course, with reference to some theses of Marx,
Engels, and Lenin ? as a substitute for a theoretical concept of dialectics.
That 'didactic-operational concept of dialectics' represents a mere narrative
texture, in which are
integrated quotations and isolated from contexts
expressed through different terminologies and in various languages.
This didactically operational pattern of dialectics - which is to be found
in a great number of current handbooks and treatises - is largely indebted
to the exposition attributed to J. V. Stalin (in which can be easily discovered
elements from Adorackij and Rozenthal's lectures of the
1930s).6 The
Stalinian pattern is undoubtedly indebted to the mechanical-deterministic
interpretation of historical materialism, as formulated by K. Kautsky.7
0.50 Should then the discussion about dialectics be a mere scholastic
dispute about a pseudo-concept? Of course, not! Due to the ruse of 'historical'
reason {die List der Vernunft), present-day practice and theory-construction
demand a discussion about the elaboration or re-elaboration of the concept of

4. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 91
dialectics in order to meet both practical and theoretical needs. We will
enumerate these requirements.
0.51 One finds the acceleration and increasing complexity of today's
social processes and, especially, the need to invent new strategies of radical
transformation, without which there will be no democratic and socialist
issue from the present planetary crisis of civilization. These new revolutionary
strategies are asking for a conceptual and methodological framework which
actually means a new quest for a more flexible, more articulated, more open
dialectics, than the old didactical concept that somehow had been canonized.
The fact is that even the very complicated, troubled situations which
confront management and planning in democratic and socialist super-in
dustrialized countries also require a new thinking oriented on dialectics.
There are, for example, the achievements of C. West Churchman's school of
operational research which brings about, in practice, a validation of the idea
of dialectically programmed "inquiry systems", of a dialectical theory of
decision, management and planning.8 Present-day practice and the actual solu
tions of its problems leads one to rethink dialectics anew, in an operational
sense. No less relevant seems to me the recent trend in American political
science and international studies to resort to dialectical epistemologies and
methodologies in concepts the diverging and/or converging
for capturing
asymetrical interdependencies that prevail on the global scene.9
0.52 This social need is normal. Practice demands programs of efficient
(or good) action even if these do not provide analytic problem-solving algo
rithms since social problems which accumulate at a very rapid rate and
exert an ever-rising and sometimes overwhelming pressure for their solution
are, in a mathematical sense, "ill-formulated" or "ill-raised" problems.10
Coping with these presupposes a continuous reflexive return to the problem's
wording,11 because the most infinitesmal variation in the initial data can pro
voke excessive variations at the level of approximated solutions. Mathematics
approaches the matter of ill-formulated problems (that deny linearization)
in two ways which seem to be productive: the logic of fuzzy theory12, the
logic of exact operations with terms that designate by definition inexact
(i.e. fuzzy) concepts: and the mathematical theory of morphogenesis, T.
Thorn's13 theory of "catastrophes", an exact (i.e. topological) theory of
"qualitative leaps" (structure-building and structure-demolishing, stabilizing
and destabilizing change).
This confluence of some practical requirements with the elaboration of

5. 92 PAVEL AP?STOL
some suitable mathematical instruments necessarily leads, of course, to a
new defining of the essential concepts of dialectics.
0.53 Scientists' thinking about the foundations of their disciplines has
flowed in two directions: (a) an analytic one, deeply rooted in epistemic prob
lems for which solutions are found through adequately applied algorithms or
arithmomorphic formulae (after the terminology of N. Georgescu-Roegen)14
and (b) a dialectical one, in the large sense attributed to the term by F.
Gonseth and his review, Dial?ctica15, especially interested in epistemic
problems that resist a purely analytic approach: problems belonging to the
domain of scientific
theory-construction, to that of foundations, and basic
concepts of science in interaction with experiment and practice.
Looking at the problem more deeply, the very evolution of the analytic
approach has also been characterized by a drift towards dialectics (Popper,
the latter Wittgenstein)16, and by the relativization of the synchronie per
spectives because of the search for the diachronicity of scientific theories.17
0.54 Philosophic thought itself has led to ever new discoveries and inven
tions in dialectics.
First of all, the Hegelian and the more recent Marxian exegeses have funda
mentally changed the earlier naive images of dialectics. Today we are aware of
the extreme difficulties in interpreting these texts and especially in explaining
in an acceptable manner "the logical practice' characteristic of Hegel, Marx
or others.18
Onthe other hand, there are the attempts to formalize the Hegelian
? I
dialectics mean, especially, the works of G. G?nther, L. S. Rogowski,
M. Kosok and D. Dubarle.19 Even if they have not led so far to generally
accepted results, they have succeeded in pointing out: (a) the possibility
of describing in a precise language a certain 'logical practice' belonging to
dialectics, and (b) the existence of some specific dialectical approaches (what
we actually defined in 1964 as "dialectically operating with 'formal' logical
structures and operations", valid or productive from an epistemic point
of view, but unfounded from the point of view of conventional logical
formalism).
Third, the very process of proliferation of conceiving different visions or
perspectives about dialectics constitutes the practical proof that several
dialectics are possible, differentiated enough so that they not be totally and
directly derived one from the other 20, and creates a space ? or a "theoretical
? for a
topos", as Althusser calls it reflection on dialectics. Imean by this an

6. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 93
approach in philosophic theory-building similar to that for creating in science
ametatheory with regard to certain theories. In some previous works, I defined
such an approach as a quasi-meta-theoretical one. In the interpretation I gave
to Marx' position versus Hegel's dialectics I discovered elements of such a
meta-approach; namely Marx does not merely oppose his dialectics to that
of Hegel, but considers that in his own conception about dialectics that of
Hegel can be meaningfully interpreted. Such an approach seems to me to
offer the further possibility of constructing other dialectics.21
Finally, the very confrontation between Marxist philosophy and anti
? where the latter raises the
Marxist thought question of the responsibility
of Marxian theory for any social practice that claims to derive from it -
presupposes dialectics.22
?
These are some practical grounds including the contemporary ideo
? which
logical practice justify the present discussion. I assert this in the
name of the concept of dialectics which I draw from Marx' work compared
to that of Hegel, and not in the name of a definitive 'Marxist' or 'Leninist'
dialectics.
1. THE GENERAL THESES OF MARIO BUNGE
1.1 Dialectics is an ontological theory.
1.21 This dialectical ontology has a 'plausible kernel' constituted by two
hypotheses:
1.211 Everything is in some process of change or other, and
1.212 New emerge at certain moments of any process. But,
qualities
1.22 this 'plausible kernel' is surrounded by a 'mystic fog consisting
mainly in the assertion of the following three theses:
1.221 In rapport with every object (thing) there is an anti-object (anti
thing).
1.222 All opposites are in continuous conflict with
each other, this
"conflict resulting either in the annihilation of one of them, or in some new
object synthesizing both contradictories".
1.223 Every stage in a development negates the previous one and, fur
thermore, two successive
negations of this kind lead to a stage similar, but
somehow superior, to the original one (p. 63).

7. 94 PAVEL AP?STOL
2. THE GENERAL CRITICISM OF DIALECTICS BY MARIO BUNGE
As concerns 'the plausible kernel' of dialectics taken as ontology, in the
formulation that itwas given,
? ?
2.1 it is as Bunge states a common thesis for every meta
process
physics (as a theory of existence, or ontology).
2.2 In order to delimit dialectics against any process metaphysics, it has
to be expanded into "a general (and consistent) theory" (ontology).
As to 'themystic fog' that wraps dialectics, it proceeds from
2.3 the use of expressions, such as "dialectical and
ambiguous negation"
"dialecticalopposition".
Bunge thinks that by reducing somewhat the ambiguity of the terms
(indicated in 2.3) we can obtain "an intelligible doctrine", which is not
dialectics in its present form, but
2.41 this would be a "weaker dialectics" which could not claim univer
sality, necessity, essentiality; and would be
2.42 "at best", a limit-case of a richer of transformation.
theory
3. FIRST CRITICAL REMARK WITH A VIEW TO MARIO BUNGE'S
CRITICISM
3.10 In discussing dialectics, Bunge has in view some formulations of it given
by Hegel, Engels, and Lenin, as well as by I. Narski, G. Pawelzig, and G.
Stiehler.23
3.11 Dialectics is examined by Bunge as ontology (i.e. as universal),
although
3.12 in the intellectual constructs defining themselves as dialectics, it
appears explicitly in this sense only among certain authors;
3.13 others understand it as ontology and epistemology and methodology,
and even as logic (but not formal logic); other authors,
3.14 once again, dispute precisely its status as a universal ontology,
accepting only the other senses of dialectics (enumerated at 3.13.). Some
admit
3.15 dialectics only as social (historical) ontology, or
3.16 as social ontology, epistemology, methodology and logic of social
research, or
only as epistemology
3.17 and/or methodology (or logic with a special
meaning) of social cognition. Finally, it is understood

8. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 95
3.18 as epistemology and or methodology and/or logic of philosophic
thinking.24
3.2 The result is that 'the critical examination of dialectics' by Bunge
concerns neither dialectics as such nor dialecticsas a generic term, designating
the ensemble of dialectics explicitly formulated in the literature, but
3.3 a pattern of dialectics built up by Bunge and relying on his free inter
pretation of a rather arbitrary selection of texts and authors with a quite
unequal degree of representativity.
3.4 Without any one can assert that 'the critical examina
exaggeration,
tion of dialectics' by Mario Bunge concerns rather what we called (0.4.) 'the
? often met with in
didactic-operational concept of dialectics' treatises,
handbooks or monographs ? but even this one has been considered
by him
only in a very narrow sense, in the light of the restriction introduced ad hoc
? a restriction
through which dialectics is identified with universal ontology
which is not applied, as a rule, in the writings consulted.
Since 'the critical examination of dialectics' by Bunge operates with this
restriction, it does not relate to any possible dialectics, and, therefore, cannot
be considered a criticism of the actual or possible pattern of 'logical practice'
in Hegel's work, on the one hand, or in that of Marx, or
incorporated Engels,
Lenin, on the other hand, and still less of that incorporated or developed in
the writings of Gramsci, Luk?cs, Bloch, Raphael, Adorno, Gurvitch, Sartre,
Delia Volpe, De George, Bahm, Althusser, Markovic, etc.
3.5 This does not yet mean that the objections mentioned by Bunge do
not deserve our attention, although they cannot aspire to the generality
which they suggest.
4. CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRST CRITICAL REMARK
We have seen (0.54.) that, in fact, there are
4.11 many possible interpretations of some of the intellectual constructs
that present themselves and/or are defined by the scientific and philosophic
community as 'dialectical' and, at the same time, that there is
4.12 a diversity of concepts about dialectics.
4.13 We will designate this situation: 'the diversity of dialectics'.
4.20 The diversity of dialectics can be put in order:
4.21 in accordance with, either the author of a discourse about dialectics,
or of a work inwhich one can decipher a certain 'logical practice' of dialectics.

9. 96 PAVEL AP?STOL
Thus, we will speak about various types of dialectics: Heraclitian, Platonic,
. . . . . . . . .
Aristotelian, Hegelian, Fichtean, Marxian, Engelsian, Leninist,
Gramscian, Sartrean, Luk?csian, etc., etc.;
4.22 the philosophic domain where a certain dialectics
in accordance with
is found. We distinguish different levels of dialectics: dialectical ontology,
epistemology and, in a wider sense, methodology as well as "logic".25
4.23 Finally, admitting the possibility of some regional dialectical onto
logies, without accepting thereby the legitimacy of a general or fundamental
ontology, from which these could be derived, one can differentiate among
diverse dialectical fields: dialectics of history, of society, of communication,
etc.
4.30 A certain theoretical construct can refer to
4.31 either a certain type,
4.32 or a certain level,
4.33 or a certain dialectical
field,
4.34 or different possible combinations of these.
4.4 The generic term 'dialectics' designates the set of the sets enumerated
at 4.31-4.34.
4.5 We postulate, as an assumption which is to be checked, the possibility
?
of one or more meta-dialectics in the sense
building quasi-meta-theories
shown at 0.54 ? within which different dialectics could be meaningfully
interpreted and reformulated with relatively satisfactory precision.
5. A SHORT HISTORICAL EXCURSUS: THE PROBLEM OF
DIALECTICS AS GENERAL (FUNDAMENTAL) ONTOLOGY
5.1 The understanding of dialectics as a general ontology and its identity,
as such, with the process and theory of knowledge, method and logic, is
constitutive for the absolute idealism of G. W. F. Hegel: Absolute Spirit
is the ground and the fulfillment of its own self-development, this 'develop
ment' is for Hegel the essence of dialectics.26
5.2 But even inHegelian philosophy, dialectics, understood as ontology,
cannot be dealt with, as is done in the paper of Bunge, independently from
dialectics conceived as method, logic, process and theory of cognition.
5.30 Marx critically examined Hegel's dialectics of the Absolute21. His
criticism includes some elements of a possible (quasi-meta-theoretical) inter
pretation of the Hegelian dialectics, as part of which the Hegelian dialectics

10. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 97
is relativized (it is ascribed a definite domain of validity: the philosophy of
absolute idealism), but, at the same time,
5.31 I consider the Marxian approach to be asserting the possibility of
some other dialectics than what Marx calls the real one.
S32 This assertion can be bolstered by outlining ameta-approach (meta
dialectics, quasi-meta-theory of dialectics), in which can be meaningfully
interpreted not only the Hegelian version, but also any other possible dia
lectics.28 One can then identify, inMarx,
? the dialectical
5.33 'the logical practice' of a dialectics of the real
theory of the classical capitalistic economy's development,
5.34 the outlining of a dialectical theory of social development, 'the
materialistic view of history', and
5.35 the elements of an epistemology, methodology, and logic of social
sciences, from among which 'the critique of ideologies' represents a major
contribution.29
5.36 But we do not find, inMarx, any explicit reference to dialectics as
universalontology. It seems that such an intellectual enterprise appeared to
him both useless and impracticable.
5.37 This last supposition can be argued indirectly, namely,
5.38 when Marx makes up the regional ontology of a social-economic
structure (i.e. capitalism) in its development, he resorts in an authentically
critical way30 to a tridimensional approach:
(a) the study of the economic (and social) phenomenon as human
= das
activity Ding-fiir-uns,
(b) its confrontation with the intellectual constructions which different
authors and (ideologists) of the economic process elaborate
'theoreticians'
with referenceto this activity (= authentic or inauthentic; ideological, in a
negative sense) of knowledge and
(c) the study of the practice under both of its aspects, material (a) and
ideal (b) in order to reveal whether das Ding, as it showed itself to the actors,
is independent of their will or wish; and, therefore, that the relevant action
programs are feasible or not.
5.39 It seems, therefore, plausible to suggest that Marx did not allow for
the dogmatic construction of an ontology, separated from the relevant
epistemologies and practices, in which both of them are found and inwhich
alone they could be captured.
5.40 The position of Engels is somewhat different. On the one hand,

11. 98 PAVEL AP?STOL
5.41 he contests even the possibility as well as the utility of universal
ontology31, but admits of three correlated regional ontologies: nature,
society, thinking (knowledge). On the other hand,
5.42 he still speaks about dialectics in the sense of universal ontology of
developmental processes (the 'objective' dialectics) but only in interdepen
dence with an epistemology and a methodology (the 'subjective' dialectics),
both of which are continuously correlated with social-historical practice.
5.43 Anyhow, when Engels writes about dialectics as a universal theory
of development, from his point of view this is not a universal ontology
of the traditional type, but can actually be interpreted rather as a theory,
comparing descriptions and scientific theories dealing with peculiar devel
opments. Therefore, it is universal but conditioned; namely comparing
theories or case-descriptions of some developmental processes.
particular
5.50 As concerns Lenin's outlook, this has to be drawn especially from
his Philosophic Notebooks as well as from the study of the 'logical practice'
of dialectics in his social (economic, sociological, politological) research.
But the formulations from the Philosophic Notebooks cannot be taken
into account as such: they are reading notes, within which formulations
from the text cited often interfere. That iswhy their interpretation increases
the difficulties. We will mention the meanings that seem principal to us:
5.51 Lenin defines dialectics, in his well-known article about Karl Marx,
published in the Granat Encyclopaedia, as the "formulation of the prin
ciple of development", in nature and society, in the theory of cognition
(of cognition's development), as well as in methodology.32 In the Philo
sophic Notebooks dialectics is also defined as logic (different from formal
logic33).
5.52 Sometimes, Lenin seems to admit the Hegelian position of identity
(in a sense typical of dialectics: concrete, 'contradictory identity') of logic,
dialectics and theory of cognition.34
5.6 On the contrary, many authors, acknowledged as dialecticians of
?
Marxian as A. Gramsci35, G. Luk?cs36, L. Goldmann37 and
expression
H. Lef?bvre38, et al. ? interpret dialectics mainly as social (human) method
and ontology.
5.7 In the above examples, dialectics cannot be interpreted as universal
ontology, as Bunge seems to think.

12. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 99
6. COUNTER-ARGUMENT
6.11 Although Bunge's thesis about dialectics as universal ontology is not
consistent with the examples and interpretations above, it is abusive only
because of its claim to characterize any dialectics at all.
6.12 The thesis mentioned at 6.11 above is legitimate ? with some
restrictions as shown above (5.1?5.2) ? for Hegelian philosophy and others
that are similar (absolute idealism, objective idealism, etc.)
6.13 It is also compatible with some formulations found in Engels' and
Lenin's writings (and in those of some others who have taken over such an
interpretation), although, as has been shown (5.4 and 5.5), the general spirit
of these works does not admit
6.131 the equivalence between dialectics and universal ontology nor
6.132 the interpretation of (universal) ontology without its connection
with cognition (epistemology, methodology, logic) and practice.
6.20 of dialectics as universal ontology
Even if the definition is extremely
problematic, sometimes (with Hegel, for instance) this thesis is consistent
with an idealist, objective philosophic standpoint. Sometimes (in some of
Engels' and Lenin's
formulations) it is necessary to specify the meaning of
the interpretation of some formulae. For example, dialectics is the general
view on the development of nature, society, knowledge (thinking), i.e.
dialectics = the theory of development.
6.21 Considering Marx' and Lenin's or Engels' general conception, one
interpretation has to be excluded
the very beginning; namely that
from
proposed by Bunge: dialectics as universal ontology (theory of any possible
and actual, past, present and future existent [das Seiende] ?. Like the pre
vious speculative metaphysics out of which could be derived any particular
kind of existence or existent, this will not hold. Against such an interpre
tation one can unambiguous texts.
quote
6.22 The do not leave out the understanding of dialectics
texts which
as ontology refer to any existent or any existence, but to and only
do not
to existents in development and destruction, or to the development and
destruction of existents, or, in other words, it refers to existents in so far as
these represent constituent moments in some processes of development (and
destruction), and therefore could be intelligible only as such.
[Here and in what follows, I differentiate
change (any observable variation
of state, properties, relations) from transformation (any observable variation

13. 100 PAVEL AP?STOL
of structural i.e. qualitative determinations) and from development (a series
of oriented transformations, for instance from simple to complex, from the
embryo to the grown-up individual, etc.)]
6.231 Postulating that 'all that exists' is, finally, a moment of a devel
opment (and destruction) process, a hypothesis can be formulated that it
is possible to build up a general substantive theory of development (and
destruction)..
6.232 In this case, it has to be demonstrated that such a general theory
is also necessary, from a certain point of view, in comparison to particular
theories of development (and destruction) regarding certain ontological
regions.
6.24 Independently of the way in which we specify the meaning
assigned
to the expression "general theory of development (and destruction)", at least
in the works of Engels or Lenin, this theoretical position is not constructed
by replying only on direct observations of development (of some processes
of development and destruction), but by confronting such observations with
valid (verified or verifiable, tested or testable, confirmed or confirmable,
etc.) scientific descriptions or theories, as parts of a certain social-historical
praxis.
6.25 Such an intellectual
construct (as that shown in 6.24) is logically and
historically subsequent to the particular scientific theories about development
and destruction and to the social-historical practices within which these have
been formulated.
6.26 The situation presented at 6.25 evinces (as shown also in 5.32)
remarkable analogies with the function of meta-mathematics vis-?-vis mathe
matics, and of a meta-theory
vis-?-vis a theory (or theories). That is why,
6.27 we can specify dialectics (in the sense of 6.24) as a construct be
longing to the foundations of any conceptualization of development and
destruction as such, carrying out toward them a function similar to that of
a meta-theory toward a theory.
6.28 Thus, dialectics is concerned with the conditions for making develop
ment and destruction intelligible and, as such, underlies any conception or
intellectual construct that refers to these.
6.29 Taking into account the considerations mentioned above, it turns
out that dialectics ? even when interpreted as an ontology ? does not refer
to 'things' ('phenomena', 'complexes', 'systems' are preferable terms) but to
the development and destruction of these and, consequently, it cannot be

14. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 101
well-formulated in an objectifying (verdinglichende, chosifiant) language,
as done by Bunge.
6.30 Dialectics can be interpreted as an ontology (of development and
destruction of complexes, of systems, etc.) in the manner of the logic of
science and contemporary epistemology which associate with each theory
the respective ontology not as a description of the object as such, but as
a description of the object of a certain theory (or an intellectual construct)
within the framework of an approach that leaves out the practical (existential,
pragmatic) relationship among the theory, the object of the theory, and the
object of the praxis, with which the object of the theory and the respective
theory ought to be associated.
6.31 In this sense, which is not yet to be explicitly found in texts of
some authors dealing with dialectics, one can assert that dialectics is also
an ontology of development and destruction.
6.32 But, even on this hypothesis, its principles cannot be formulated in
the language used by Bunge (and described at 6.29).
6.40 Since the dialectics of Marx, Engels or Lenin have been formulated
within the Weltanschauung of a revolutionary movement, one may ask
6.41 whether the 'materialist dialectics' or 'dialectical materialism',
understood as universal ontology, is necessary for its legitimation?
6.420 There are at least three reasons for not answering 6.41 in the
affirmative.
6.421 First of all, there is a historical reason. The elaboration of Marx'
(and Engels') conception proceeds from the study of social praxis (the con
dition of the working-class in capitalist society and its fights for the improve
ment of its own status) and not from a purely revealed dialectics of the
development and implicitly of the destruction of some social 'systems' (the
materialist conception of history), as well as the dialectics of the cognitive
process about these. This dialectics of development and destruction of the
forms of human societies and of the adequate scientific and ideological
constructs grounded the option for revolutionary action. Only after drawing
this conclusion did the analysis of some scientific theories ? especially in
-
Engels' work bring out, in connection with these, a dialectics inherent in
the scientific image of the world (= nature), meaning a reconstitution of 'a
dialectics (in the sense of 6.3). With the help of a reflection about
of nature'
scientific issues, therefore, from a historical standpoint, the revolutionary
conception and action could be unfounded ? and was argued as such by

15. 102 PAVEL AP?STOL
Marx and Engels ? the elaboration of a 'dialectics of nature' The
before
latter, subsequentlysupported, in their eyes, the plausibility of the former.
6.422 Secondly, the validity of revolutionary conclusions emerge for
them from the social dialectics, the development and destruction of some
social realia and from reproduction of these (theories, quasi
the mental
theories, ideologies) and do not result and cannot result from some charac
teristics of nature (non-society). With respect to this, from a logical point of
conclusions are free from the admission or non-admission
view, revolutionary
of a dialectics of nature or from that of a dialectics understood as universal
ontology.
6.423 Finally, one could construct a (idealistic-objective, for instance)
dialectics of nature and of the Universe, as Teilhard de Chardin did, which
does not come to social-revolutionary consequences.
7. BUNGE'S FORMULATION OF 'THE PRINCIPLES OF
DIALECTICAL ONTOLOGY'
7.1. The principles of dialectical ontology are formulated by Bunge in a
language which I designated as being (6.29) objectifying and which I charac
terized as improper for meaningfully expressing any other interpretation of
dialectics than that of their author.
7.2 Bunge formulates five principles of dialectical ontology in as many
definitions (p. 64), to which he also adds some derived definitions (pp. 64,
67, 69, 70) and some corollaries. These five definitions and the corresponding
derivatives are:
Dl : "Everything has an opposite."
Dla: "For every thing (concrete object) there is an anti-thing."
Dlb: "For every property of concrete objects there is an anti-property."
This definition has also a Sveaker' form (p. 67):
Die: "For some properties there are others (called their anti-properties)
that counteract or neutralize the former."
D2: "Every object is inherently contradictory, i.e. constituted by
mutually opposing components and aspects."

16. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 103
Here also there is aVeaker' formulation (p. 69):
D2a: "Some systems have components that oppose one aspect in some
other system."
D3 : "Every change is the outcome of the tension of struggle of oppo
sites, whether within the system of interest or among different
systems."
Once more, the statement of the principle will be proposed in a 'weaker'
variant (p. 70):
D3a: "Some changes are brought about by the opposition (in some
respects) of different things or different components of one and
the same thing."
D4: "Development is a helix, every level of which contains, and at
the same time negates, the rung."
previous
D5: "Every quantitative change ends up in some qualitative change
and every new quality has its own new mode of quantitative
change."
7.3 It is obvious that Dl, D2, and D3 reproduce the content of textbooks
of dialectics, and treatises of dialectical materialism call them the principle
or the law of "dialectical contradiction", of and of contraries"
"unity fight
(or of opposites, as Anglo-Saxon authors would rather D4 corre
say).39
sponds to the principle or law of 'negation of the negation', while D5 is
the principle or law of 'the leap from quantitative changes to qualitative
transformations'.
7.4 For Bunge only Dl, D2, and D3 are 'typical' of dialectics.
8. BUNGE'S ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HIS CRITICISM OF
DIALECTICS
8.10 As regards each of the suggested definitions of dialectics and, especially,
Dl, D2, and D3, Bunge brings arguments aimed to prove
8.11 the groundless claim to universality.
Let us examine these arguments.
8.20 As regards Dl, (and Dla and Dlb), Bunge shows, and he is per
fectly right, that the definitions formulated in propositions using the terms

17. 104 PAVEL AP?STOL
"anti-object" and (pp. 64?65,
"anti-property" respectively 65?68) are
meaningless (are inconsistent, bring about formal contradictions). He adds,
again correctly, that this deficiency manifests itself differently
8.21 in idealist dialectics, which is possible though scarcely plausible
(p. 68), and
8.22 in materialist ones, which would be implausible and inconsistent
within an interpretation of knowledge as reflection.
[The argument used in connection with Dlb is as follows (p. 68): the
set of predicates of a certain order (arity) and a common reference (as in the
case of the totality of unitary predicates concerning mammals) is a Boolean
function, while the corresponding set of properties of the same individuals
(the mammals in the given example) is a semi-group, where the concatenation
is interpreted as the conjunction of properties. Bunge says that in
a materialist dialectics, which does not admit the real existence of negative
properties, one cannot state that the "structure of predicates mirrors the
structure of properties" (ibidem). In this respect, we will note that in most
dialectical-materialist epistemologies 'reflection' is not understood as an
'exact ideal copy' of an objectively real original, as Bunge supposes, but
rather as an relationship between the two terms and I have
equivalence
specified it is a congruence relationship (see my paper in Dial?ctica,
that
1972). Compared to these interpretations of 'reflection', the argument of
Bunge has probatory strength only if the impossibility of establishing any
possible relationship of equivalence between the set of predicates and the set
of properties could be demonstrated. But such a relationship of equivalence
is not conditioned by any homomorphism of the structures considered.]
8.23 This argumentation relies on the supposition that dialectics and its
principles would refer to things and properties of these, because it is in this
case and only in this case, that the rejection of the existence of dialectics
on the ground of the impossibility of anti-things and anti-properties can
effectively be asserted.
8.24 But is this supposition really confirmed by the texts in which are
formulated ? even without sufficient clarity and precision ? different views
on dialectics?
8.30 We will answer this question, after the examination of the arguments
used to show the inconsistency of the definitions D2, D2a, and D3.
8.310 Bunge formulates D2 in this way: "every thing is an unity of its
opposites".40

18. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 105
8.311considering that this "essential thesis of dialectics" could also be
interpreted with the help of the definition: "Property (or relation) P2 if
PI tends to check (neutralize, balance, or dim) P2 and conversely", while,
later.
8.312 he reformulates it in the statement: "all systems are contradictory".
8.213 All these formulations are meaningless, according to Bunge, who
admits only
8.314 "the weaker thesis" stated in D2a. More than this.
8.315 the idea of dialectical 'opposition' (contradiction or contrariety)
seems to him an "oversimplifying" one, belonging to a pre-scientific ("ar
chaic") mentality, unable to cope with "intermediate states" in whose
description and explanation there is no room for polarity (p. 69).
8.40 It should be stressed that here too dialectics is related to 'things'
(replaced, at a given moment (pp. 68 and 69), without an explicit justifica
tion, by the term 'system'), manifesting itself exclusively as opposition
8.41 between polar properties of things or
8.42 between components of systems.
8.5 We recall the question at 8.24 and we strengthen it with another:
is it true that in all the texts of some dialecticians or in most of these "the
unity of opposites" and similar expressions refer really to polar properties
of things, to polarized components of systems, or to something others
8.6 But there is one specific question raised: does dialectics mean a
conceptualization of change, as has been postulated by Bunge for instance,
or of development (which, as we have shown before, is not the same)?
8.7 This question is legitimate because Bunge rejects dialectics (pp. 70?
71) with the argument that it represents an unsatisfactory conceptualization
of change, which can be more adequately described through a series of
unpolarized states!
8.80 The principle stated in D4 is very superficially dealt with (p. 71) in
two sentences:
8.81 the terms "dialectical negation" and "sublation" are foggy, that is
why
8.82 D4 is also dim, confused, unintelligible ('misty'). The same for
8.90 the principle formulated in D5, called this time "the quality-quantity
thesis". It is superficially dealt with, showing that
8.91 the thesis about "the conversion of quality into quantity and con
versely" is unintelligible and

19. 106 PAVEL AP?STOL
8.92 that it cannot be obtained as "a theorem within a general theory
of change".
8.931 We also note here that the argumentation refers to sentences
formulated in object terms and
8.932 that dialectics is considered as a particular case of a theory of
change.
8.94 The study contains a chapter dealing with the relation between
"dialectics and formal logic" (pp. 73-76) which forms a special topic. Critical
examination of Bunge's opinions in this respect occurs below.
9. BUNGE'S CONCLUSIONS
9.11 The formulation of the principles of dialectics in the 'extant' literature
(rather, Bunge's arbitrary selection therefrom) is 'ambiguous and imprecise'.
Whence
9.12 the necessity of their reformulation.
91.3 Obviously, Bunge's study tries to offer the pattern for such a clearer
formulation:
9.21 Formulated more carefully, the principles of dialectics lose their
universality, get a 'weaker form', through the application of particularizers,
whereby
9.22 become mere 'platitudes'.
they
9.3 Even more clearly formulated and without any claim to universality,
the principles of dialectics do not offer a ground for a "modern theory of
change" which has to be "more precise, explicit and complete than that"
(p. 76).
9.41 Dialectics does not embrace formal logic, and
9.42 it is "incompatible with any realistic epistemology" (p. 77; about
this matter, see 8.94)
9.5 Yet Bunge concedes that one could designate a field proper to dia
lectics (see, especially 18.1-18.8), but,
9.6 a dialectical ontology relies obligatorily upon modern logic, mathe
matics, and science.

20. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 107
10. THE SECOND OBJECTION AGAINST BUNGE'S CRITICISM:
REJECTION OF THE FORMULATION GIVEN TO 'PRINCIPLES
OF DIALECTICAL ONTOLOGY'
10.01 I refused above the groundless restriction of the meaning of dialectics
to that of a 'universal ontology', underlying the 'critical examination' under
taken by Bunge, who neglects the most frequent meanings attributed to the
term.
10.02 That is why I concluded that the criticism calls for an ad hoc
concept of dialectics, which is far from being generally admitted. Now we
must go on presenting arguments.
10.11 Since the 'strongest' meaning of dialectics ? according to its
system-building (systembildende) function and its frequency in very represen
?
tative texts refers to 'development'.
10.12 of dialectics, of its field and principles in terms of
the formulation
? to which it is
'objects' and 'properties of objects' hereafter added, from
? is
outside, as a dynamic principle illicit, and as such,
10.13 can generate only meaningless and inconsistent statements. Relative
to the referent of dialectical discourse (development), one has to operate not
with objects and properties (and relations among these), but
10.14 with terms suitable for constructing meaningful statements about
development (and destruction).
10.15 The ontic referent of all materialist dialectics and also of some
non-materialist ones) is development (and destruction as mode of existence
of the 'things' (= phenomena, finite processes, systems, etc.) and by no means
the 'things' as such (and/or their properties and relations) seen separately
from their mode of existence.
10.16 In amaterialist
perspective, dialectics is not that 'universal ontology'
which Bunge presents, but a theoretical reflecting (of a quasi-meta-theoretical
type) upon some particular theories of development, aiming
10.17 not at discovering a priori principles out of which could be infered
any development, but
10.18 at establishing some firm criteria of intelligibility of development,
which could be retrieved, as they are applied, in any valid scientific theory
of the development (and destruction) of a certain peculiar ontological region.
These criteria of intelligibility work as principles of construction in particular
scientific theories of development (and destruction), and dialectics ? even

21. 108 PAVEL AP?STOL
taken as ontology, with the restrictions in our 'first objection' ?
specified
is no substitute for them.
10.19 Dialectics is not ontology. On the contrary, any ontology or intel
lectual construct with the function of an ontology ('the scientific image of
the Universe', Weltanschauung, etc.) has to be a dialectical one if it wants
itself compatible with particular scientific theories of development (and
destruction).
10.21 That is why we hold that the principles of dialectics ? as clearly
formulated as possible ? refer to the process of development (and destruction)
and not to 'things' (properties and relations) cut off from their 'natural' mode
of existence, which is 'dialectical'.
10.22 Observing this linguistic convention (compatible with the literature),
confused and meaningless expressions or terms, like 'opposition within the
things', 'opposition between thing and anti-thing' 'opposition between
property and anti-property (of the things)', 'negation' and 'sublation' in the
senses defined by Bunge, transform themselves into meaningful expressions:
'divergently polarized tendencies in and through which the development (or
destruction) constitutes itself, 'opposition (here taken as equivalent to con
tradiction and contrariety) between these (tensorially) divergent tendencies
specific to development, 'opposition between the determinations, moments,
etc. of development' (and destruction), 'negation' and 'sublation' not in the
formal logic sense (as operators), but as 'establishment and/or discarding of a
certain moment, determination, etc., of development (and destruction)', etc.
10.23 That which appears meaningless with respect to 'object' under
stood out of its mode of existence designated by the term 'development',
becomes intelligible and can be conceptualized with reference to this mode
of existence.
10.24 From a logical point of view, therefore purely formally, 'develop
ment' can be considered as a particular case of or 'transformation'
'change',
(but only in the sense of the distinctions introduced before); but dialectics
understood as a philosophic (quasi-meta-)theory of development (and de
struction) cannot be built up this way.
It can be elaborated only starting from the theories of development
10.25
(and destruction) actually accepted in science, with respect to determined
ontological regions (or fields), as they can be grasped at the level of a deter
mined practice, within the framework of the interaction between the con
structor of the theory and the object of the latter.

22. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 109
10.26 The way suggested by Bunge (cf. 10.24) refers to the logical re
construction of a theory of change (development), leading to an axiomatic
formulation, as meta-theory of any possible substantive theory of change;
but
10.27 that these substantive theories are or can be brought forth in an
exact form, is to be proved.
10.28 Or, such a 'general theory of change', fulfilling in fact a meta
theoretical function vis-?-vis the particular theories, cannot be 'stronger',
of course, than the referenced theories. If this is the state of things, then
10.29 the condition formulated by Bunge with respect to a future dia
lectics seems to be an excessive one, especially, a contentious role.
having,
10.30 Bunge is certainly right, when he says that discourse about dialectics
suffers from obscure and often confused and vague terms: but,
10.31 of the principles of dialectics suggested by
the reformulations
him do take account of the inconsistency of the theses (the Hegelian one,
the 'Marxist-Leninist', the didactic interpretation), as such, but only the
inconsistency of these against the theoretical horizon adopted by Bunge:
the Verdinglichung of an ontology claiming, at the same time, a dialectical
character.
10.32 Through this method has been expelled the effective ontic referent
which any materialist dialectics and many non-materialist ones known to us
?
had in view development and destruction.
10.33 From a logical point of view, the method used by Bunge is the
interchange of the significance of the terms (meaning change), without
any other justification except the appeal to 'evidence'.
The criticism of the 'critical examination of dialectics' by Bunge has obliged
us to formulate some objections. The refutation (elenchus) did not result
only in negative aspects; proceeding self-critically we tried to evince some
landmarks for a positive reconstruction of the dialectics. Before starting to
examine in detail Bunge's opinions concerning the relation between dialectics
and formal logic, we would like to present concisely some consequences of
the previous critical confrontation.
As was obvious, Bunge contests in particular the intelligibility of the
Hegelian concept of Aufhebung, 'dialectical negation' and 'negation of
the negation'. Without doubting the intelligibility of these Hegelian con
cepts, as Bunge actually does, there is no question that with Hegel, with

23. 110 PAVEL AP?STOL
his interpreters as well as with some dialecticians who claim themselves to
be Marxists but who do not want to pay the appropriate attention to the
criticism of the Hegelian dialectics, as dialectics, conceived by Marx (much
more developed in Kritik des Hegeischen Staatsrechts of 184341 and in the
?konomisch-philosophische Manuskripte of
184442), it is exactly on these
concepts that the 'fog' (the term belongs to Bunge) or the mystification of
dialectics concentrates itself. Let us proceed, then, with a problem largely
discussed in the Hegelian exegesis.
11. THE 'TERNARY STRUCTURE' OF THE DIALECTICAL LOGIC
IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY
11.1 The kernel of Hegel's dialectics, its constitutive principle is a ternary
schema.44
11.2 The triad is evident in the architectureof the system and not only as
an exterior cover but, on the contrary, it is blended with the very substance
of the Hegelian philosophy of the Absolute Idea's and of the Absolute Spirit's
self-development. This ternary structure, the 'triad', defined by Hegel's dis
?
ciples in its three moments thesis, antithesis and synthesis, is to overcome
the philosophic presuppositions of Absolute Idealism45
11.3 This determined Marx to concentrate his criticism of Hegel's dia
lectics on the category of the Aufhebung, even in his youth, and to take it
up again inDas Kapital, where he writes: "Die Entwicklung (der Ware) hebt
diese Widerspr?che nicht auf, schafft aber die Form, worin sie sich bewegen
k?nnen. Dies ist ?berhaupt die Methode, wodurch sich wirkliche Widerspr?che
l?sen."46
11.4 The philosophic and consequently the ideological over-saturation (in
the sense of L. Althusser's 'sur-d?termination') of the Hegelian triad47 does
not justify its simple rejection; we have to ask ourselves whether this ternary
structure aims to be more than the mere manifestation of the dialectics of
the Absolute1.
11.5 Our answer is in the affirmative. Within
the framework of his exposi
tion of 'divine logic', the logic of 'God's thinking', Hegel states quite
the
frequently theses of a 'human logic'.48 Taking into account this perspective,
we have to ask ourselves which is the real meaning of this ternary structure.
11.6 It is not the first time49 that I state that by the identification of
a ternary structure Hegel defines the necessary condition of the intelligibility

24. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 111
of development and destruction and for conceptualization of them (of
'becoming' in its Aristotelian acceptance: change, generation and corruption,
growth and diminution, alteration). In other words, this ternary structure
allows and only it allows one to make meaningful statements about 'develop
ment' and/or 'destruction', constituting the 'minimum for conceptualizing'
development and destruction, a minimum', the 'minimum of
'cognitive
intelligibility' for coherent discourse on development and destruction.
11.7 Development and/or destruction are interpreted as a series of
oriented transformations;
TlfT2, T3,...,Tn,
which can be in fact the conceptual threshold for distinguishing an oriented
transformation from whatever transformation is occuring. The first two
transformations (taking only them) warrant the conclusion that a transfor
mation occurred without any reference to its positive or orientation.
negative
Only allows us to specify if and to what extent the
the third transformation
respective series of transformations represent a development and/or destruc
tion (the maintaining, ? under a certain
improving explicitly formulated
? on
respect structuring, or, the contrary, the destruction, degeneration,
destructuring of the complex dynamic totality in view). This ternary struc
ture consisting of three asymetrically interdependent terms (determinations
=
Bestimmungen) (three transformations, three 'moments', thesis?antithesis
. . . and it is only this structure that us to estab
synthesis. ) permits permits
lish a conceptual limit between an indefinite series of any transformations
(which does not affect the complex and dynamic totality from a qualitative
and structural point of view), and a series of oriented transformations:
development and/or destruction.50
11.8 Thus the ternary structure identified by Hegel represents the neces
sary condition but obviously not also the sufficient one for the intelligibility
and the conceptualization of development and destruction; consequently
for any theory of development and/or destruction.
12. THE 'LAWS' OF DIALECTICS
12.11 In the literature, especially in that of 'Marxist' orientation, the 'laws
of dialectics' are often referred to. This way of speaking is derived from the

25. 112 PAVEL AP?STOL
classic German philosophic tradition, in which 'law' is used in its larger sense
of order, norm or rule, specific to a series of events.
12.12 By no means does 'law', in this context, claim to be equivalent to
'law' in the experimental or exact sciences, as the term is used in French and
linguistic areas.
Anglo-Saxon
12.13 It would to say that it represents the Aristotelian
be much better
arche (ta prot?) through which anything can be known ? a presupposition
which cannot be demonstrated but which represents in fact the starting point
of any cognition and rational argumentation.51
12.21 The laws or principles of dialectics revealed by the Hegelian and
Marxian exegesis represent a system of conceptual determinations according
to which 'development' and 'destruction', identified through the ternary
structure (presented at 11) ? identification which represents the necessary
condition of their intelligibility ? become understood or conceptually
determined and this is the sufficient condition of their intelligibility.
12.22 The principles are, therefore, criteria of the logical validation of the
correct use of the terms 'development' and 'destruction'.
12.23 Understoodas such they designate the logical field in which any
theory of development and/or destruction can be conceived with a sufficient
degree of consistency.
12.31 If we admit of dialectics as a theory of development and destruc
tion, we have to specify from the very beginning that we are actually dealing
with a philosophic theory (in the large meaning of the word, not in the
mathematical one),
in a position to formulate the conditions of intelligibility of devel
12.32
opment and destruction (as shown in 11.1?12.23),
12.33 as well as their significance for understanding and transforming the
human condition.52
12.34 Within this context a legitimate question arises as to whether or not
a 'philosophic theory of development and destruction', distinct from theories
of development and destruction belonging to other sciences (astronomy-cos
mogony, biology, history, sociology . . . ) has any justification when it is not
conceived in the exact language of a (formalized) meta-theory of those special
theories ? a meta-theory with the help of which some other such particular
scientific theories of development and destruction could be provided.
12.35 The problem requires a discussion which cannot be engaged in
here.53 Nevertheless,

26. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 113
12.36 there is a pragmatic argument in favour of the legitimacy of such
a philosophic theory of development and destruction (Ph.T.D.D.) with a
function; namely, even in their vague form such
quasi-meta-theoretical
? ?
Ph.T.D.D.'s have allowed one as if they were the very meta-theories to
elaborate dialectical
inquiry systems5*, planning patterns55, dialectical
dialectical theories56, dialectical methodologies
decision in economics and
social sciences57 Certainly these are only examples of possible positive
answers to the question reformulated in proposition 12.34, and not a demon
stration of an answer.58
I promised a reformulation of the principles of dialectics as a
12.40
system of the conceptual determinations of 'development' and/or 'destruc
tion'. Here and now, such a task cannot be carried out. We can only point
out the direction inwhich its achievement appears possible:
12.41 one
can make meaningful statements with reference to develop
ment and destruction if and only if it can be detected empirically or if it can
be presupposed in accordance with the scientific data available:
12.42 the presence of an ontic field made up by a series of asymmetrically
interdependent quantitative changes (growth) which, reaching a certain limit
specific to each category of 'object', (here meaning the bearer of a develop
ment process), complex totalities, dynamic systems etc., generate necessarily
a transformation
qualitative-structural (or transformations), namely,
12.431 that a new quality and/or structure emerges from the preceding
one, representing, at least, either
12.432 an enlarged, but selective and/or (at least under a certain perspec
tive) optimized reproduction of the 'object' (complex totality, system or
considered59, or
quasi-system) being
12.433 of a new complex totality, other than the preceding
a production
one (i.e. a significant part of the former goes directly into the structure
obtained by its transformation), or, contrariwise,
12.434 a disaggregation, disintegration, destruction, decomposing, destruc
turing, destabilization ... of this one, (I observe that 'destruction'
(and its
synonyms) do not mean complete annihilation, but 'destruction' of a given
complex totality (complexity), understood as mode of existence and, at the
same time, 'liberation' of its components which become in this way possible
components of other complex totalities).
12.5 These asymmetrically interdependent and oriented transformations
signify development and/or destruction // and only if they are the result of

27. 114 PAVEL AP?STOL
a collision (clashing, opposing) of at least two (in a vectorial sense) divergent
?
tendencies, immanent to the process considered diverging tendencies which
presuppose each other (at least for a lapse of time) and, simultaneously,
exclude each other reciprocally in the series of transformations taken into
consideration.
12.6 The system of these conceptual determinations designates the ontic
referent one has in view in the various formulations of the 'laws of dialectics'
or, as is preferable, of the system of the principles of dialectics.
12.71 The formulation proposed above does not resort to terms ex
traneous to the language of science and
12.72 does not neglect or reject the rules of formal logic.
12.8 Dialectics, understood like Ph.T.D.D. and relying on the study of
the theories of development and destruction belonging to different sciences,
establishes the conditions of intelligibility (the ternary structure) and the
criteria of intelligibility (the conceptual determinations, called principles of
dialectics), which are absolutely necessary to conceptualize (to describe
to explain . . . one
in rational terms, ) the referents that has in mind.
12.9 We cannot examine here the relations between the Ph.T.D.D. and the
human condition.
13. A SHORT ASIDE ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF FORMULATING
DIALECTICS MORE PRECISELY
13.1 There are several attempts to formalize dialectics (or at least the logic
of dialectics used by Hegel).60
13.2 Except for Dubarle, these attempts ignored von Neumann's critical
remarks on the one-sidedness of formal (mathematical) logic. He wrote in
1948: "Everybody who has worked in formal logic will confirm that
it is one of the technically most refractory parts of mathematics. The reason
for this is that it deals with rigid, all-or-none concepts, and has very little
contact with the continuous concept of the real or of the complex number,
that is, with mathematical analysis. Yet analysis is the technically most
successful and best-elaborated part of mathematics. Thus formal logic is, by
the nature of its approach, cut off from the best cultivated portions of mathe
matics, and forced onto the most difficult part of mathematical terrain, into
combinatorics."61
13.3 It is not our purpose to examine here the consequences of these

28. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 115
objections directed against logical-mathematical reductionism, but we will
mention Ren? Thorn's recent attempt to capture in amathematical formalism
'the origin and the end of the systems'62, and mathematical morphogenesis
understood as an exact study of any creative or destructive
process.63
13.41 So we are confronted with an approach based upon non-conven
tional mathematical means (different from the Boolean ones of mathematical
logic), which make possible a topological description of genesis and of the
destructive processes, which present remarkable analogies with the concepts
of 'development-destruction', and of 'dialecticity' that we have used above.
13.42 This analogy is revealed once more by the concept of 'generalized
catastrophe' introduced by Thorn to designate the emergence of something
new which is also aimed at by the so-called 'dialectical leap': "D'une mani?re
g?n?rale, l'apparition d'une nouvelle 'phase' dans un milieu initialement
conduit ? ce genre que nous
homog?ne d'apparence, appelons 'catastrophe
g?n?ralis?e'; tout processus dans lequel il y a rupture d'une sym?trie initiale
est de ce fait, structurellement instable, et conduit ? une catastrophe g?n
de tels processus ne sont pas formalisables: mais ...
?ralis?e, [l'] issue
finale [du processus], elle, peut-?tre bien d?termin?e ... La mort d'un
?tre vivant semanifeste par le fait que la dynamique de son m?tabolisme local
passe d'une r?currente a une de c'est,
configuration configuration gradient;
typiquement, une catastrophe g?n?ralis?e."64
13.5 The above-mentioned analogy becomes more convincing as the
'generalized catastrophe' is understood as the result of a 'conflict', of a
or of a 'struggle'65: "Dans la mesure o? l'on fait du 'conflit'
'competition',
un terme exprimant une situation g?om?trique bien d?finie dans un syst?me
dynamique, il n'y a aucune objection ? user de ce terme pour d?crire rapide
ment et qualitativement un syst?me dynamique."66
13.6 a Ph.T.D.D. can be thought again and reformulated
Consequently,
in the language and within the conceptual framework of the mathematical
theory of morphogenesis.67 But that is not the purpose of this study.
14. DIALECTICS VERSUS FORMAL LOGIC IN MARIO BUNGE'S
VIEW
14.1 Bunge attributes to the dialecticians the claim that "logic is a special
case of dialectics", which is, in fact, he states, a "false claim" (p. 73), because

29. 116 PAVEL AP?STOL
14.21 "formal logic . .. cannot be a particular case of dialectical ontology:
for the very reason that
14.22logic does not arise from an ontology and
14.23 any rational non-logic theory presupposes a logic."
14.24 To put it in another way: "formal logic refers to everything but
describes or represents nothing but its own basic concepts" (p. 74). So,
14.25 the logical concepts refer or can be applied to propositions and not
to materialobjects.
The argumentation
14.261 is based, Bunge pursues, on the disjunction
between physical objects and conceptual ones (p. 75).
14.262 Of course, this hypothesis cannot be proved but it can be made
plausible. On the contrary,
14.263 "the thesis of the oneness of logic and ontology is possible, nay
necessary, in an idealist system" (p. 75). He considers then that
14.3 "The idea that the understanding of change requires a logic of its
own, be it dialectical logic or some version of temporal logic, because formal
logic is incapable of dealing with change, is a relic from ancient philosophy"
(pp. 75-76).
14.4 From the perspective of contemporary science, says Bunge, we
would not think any longer in opposites, but in degrees, meaning that "we
no longer think dialectically, i.e. in opposites and without distinguishing
logic from the disciplines dealing with facts" (p. 76).
14.51 Consequently, "dialectics does not embrace formal logic" (p. 76),
and
14.52 "the claim that dialectics generalizes logic can be upheld only within
a Platonistic ontology and is incompatible with any realistic epistemology,
in particular with naive realism (the reflection theory of knowledge)" (pp.
76-77).
In conclusion,and Iwant to say from the very beginning that I completely
agree with these theses, although my reasons are different from Bunge's:
14.60 "the legitimate concerns of dialectics" consist in
14.61"the analysis and codification of the patterns (both valid and merely
plausible) (cf. Polyain 1958 on plausible reasoning) of actual argumentation",
14.62 "theory invention and problem solving" and, especially,
14.63 "the patterns of rational dialogue" and
14.64 those of "inductive inference" (p. 77).

30. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 117
15. A FIRST ARGUMENT AGAINST BUNGE'S THESES ON
DIALECTICS VERSUS FORMAL LOGICS
15.10 I. Narski68 is among the first to have responded to Bunge's conception
of the adepts of Hegelian or non-Hegelian dialectics.
15.11 We can only partly agree with his retort, for reasons that have
become evident through our discussion. It must be recalled that Bunge's
remarks with respect to the relationship between dialectics as ontology and
formal logic refer again rather
15.121 to the concept of dialectics which we have called the didactically
operational one,
15.122to the opinions of a small number of authors, in some cases of
a very doubtful representativity,
15.123 ignoring completely the positions that could not be subordinated
to the model built up by Bunge, claiming, without sufficient reason to be
very characteristic of the position of the Hegelian or Marxian dialecticians,
of the Marxist-Leninist or the non-Hegelian ones, and
15.124 neglecting especially many well-elaborated positions regarding
the relationship between formal and dialectical logic.
Remark No. I (to the proposition 15.11) In my books and studies published
up to 1965, Imade regrettable concessions, adopting the didactically opera
tional concept of dialectics but, replying on the texts, I largely argued that
Marx' dialectics is not a mere transposition of the Hegelian one onto a
material bearer but, on the contrary, it is radically different from it, as
dialectics, being in fact another dialectics in comparison with that expounded
in Hegel's works. The main difference lies in the fact that Marx rejected
the speculative identity between the Absolute Subject and the Absolute
Object69, the identity of ontology and dialectical logics70, the identification
of the name (designating logical objects) with the real referent (the physical
object).71 The 'materialist reversal' of the Hegelian dialectics does not refer
? as it is
only to the bearer of the dialectical process and to its 'causes' often
taken to be ? but it affects the most
intimate structure of dialectics. This
obliged us to introduce the distinction between Hegelian dialectical structures
and non-Hegelian ones. The differences between those two types of structures
can be shown up through the "dialectical cell" which I call 'ternary structure'
(set up for identifying a definite process of development). In the event of

31. 118 PAVEL AP?STOL
the Hegelian ternary structure the transition from the initial moment to
the other ones is achieved with the help of an operator of necessity (this
conception is quite legitimate within the framework of Absolute Idealism, in
which all these moments
represent determinations of the Absolute Spirit and
consequently they can 'move' only with absolute necessity); whence the uni
queness of the third moment. On the contrary, in the case of a non-Hegelian
ternary structure (e.g., that found in the economic analyses made by Marx)
the transition is achieved with the help of an operator of probability, hence,
the plurality of third moments. Marx' text is fully conclusive in this respect
if we remember that for Marx, the commodity is not a 'thing', but a dynamic
relationship: "Der der Ware immanente Gegensatz von Gebrauchswert und
Wert, von Privatarbeit, die sich zugleich als unmittelbar gesellschaftliche
Arbeit darstellen muss, von besonderer konkreter Arbeit, die zugleich nur
als abstrakt allgemeine Arbeit gilt, von Personifizierung der Sache und Ver
dinglichung der Personen ? dieser immanente Widerspruch erh?lt in der
Gegens?tzen der Warenmetamorphose seine entwickelten Bewegungsformen.
Die Formen schliessen daher die M?glichkeit, aber auch nur die M?glichkeit
der Krisen ein. Die Entwicklung dieser M?glichkeit erfordert einen ganzen
Umkreis von Verh?ltnissen, die vom Standpunkt der einfachen Warenzirkula
tion noch gar nicht existieren".72 Thus, let us take Tfor dialectical 'transition'
or transformation, Ml, Ml, M3 for the significant moments of a process
identified as dialectical (a process of development or destruction), v for an
-> for
operator of necessity, and m for an operator of probability and implica
tion, and then: in aHegelian ternary structure we will have
Tv(Ml,M2)^Tv(M2,M3)
For each sequence Ml, Ml, M3 there is only one M3, which occurs with
necessity.
On the contrary, a non-Hegelian ternary structure,
Tv (Ml,M2) ->Tm (M2, {M3})
for each sequence Ml, Ml, M3 there is a determined set of {M3}'s which are
not necessarily equiprobable.
Or, admitting the linguistic convention of designating the three moments
by thesis (T), antithesis (AT), and synthesis (S), in the first case we will have:

32. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 119
v(T->AT-+S)
and, in the second,
v(T-*AT)->m {S1,S2,S3...}
I have mentioned some possibilities of interpretation to make clear the
arbitrary characterthe simplification of Bunge's problem: dialectics or
of
logic? His arguments are justified only against the conceptions which operate
with the model of dialectics built up by himself.
Remark No. II Bunge's argumentation (14.1 and 14.21) a direct
establishes
relation between as ontology or the theory of the
dialectics (understood
physical object) and formal logic. Both the authors quoted by him and
many others tackle the problem differently; namely, mediating terms are
introduced between dialectics as ontology and formal logic; i.e., (a) dialectics
as method or methodology; and (b) dialectics as dialectical logic.
16. TERMINOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS
16.0 To avoid misunderstandings of a terminological nature, we want to
specify the meaning with which we use the terms: "(process of) cognition",
"knowledge", "epistemology", "methodology", "formal logic", and then
"dialectical logic".73
16.1 Thus we understand by cognition the processing of information
being input by some privileged material systems (e.g. human beings), with
?
cybernetic properties, which are able to develop some psychic (ideal) partly
?
conscious, partly unconscious, spontaneous and/or deliberately provoked
internal models, always formulated in an
interindividual communicative
language, of any other discernible real or ideal system and even of itself, func
tioning as 'referent' or 'object' (of the cognitive process under consideration).
16.2 By knowledge we understand the set of results of the process shown
in 16.1.
16.3In this context, epistemology appears to be the sole discipline
whose subject-matter is cognition and knowledge in all their complexity
and dynamics, in all their aspects and dimensions, as a dialectical unity
of their formal and informal components. Epistemology is a philosophic
discipline, too, since the finitist reduction of the potentially infinite set of

33. 120 PAVEL AP?STOL
dynamic relations which constitute the field of the cognitive process has only
a pragmatic validity with reference to human existence. In the philosophy
? or or philosophic
of knowledge (or philosophic epistemology) metaphysics,
? are considered in their explicitly
anthropology cognition and knowledge
formulated connection with human existence ?
(individuals interacting
? and in societies ? in their turn ?
among themselves grouped interacting
with specific parts of the explored universe), a connection only implicitly
involved in the properly epistemological approach.
16.4 The object of synchronie logic (formal and symbolic) is the structure
(elements, components) of and the possible relations among meaningful
statements, their properties, laws of combination and/or transformation
into logical complexes, following explicit rules. In addition to formalism,
mathematical logic studies abstract structures, some of which may be inter
preted as able to convey 'products' (results) of human cognition. As such,
mathematical logic explores not only the effectively used demonstrative
structures (texts), but also the possible ones.
16.5 Diachronie logic deals with the temporal status of the logical con
structs described by synchronie logic.
logic of science (synchronie and/or diachronic),
16.6 The in its turn,
studies the effectively utilized logical structures which convey actually, in
interhuman communicative languages, the results of scientific cognition
(knowledge), verified, confirmed, and conforming to explicit rules admitted
in the 'world of science'. Therefore, the logic of science concerns only a
subset of the structures described in symbolic logic.
16.7 Paraphrasing Rosser's and Turquette's expressive metaphorical term,
-
in general -
is dealing with the 'conduct' of propositions
logic (their
combinations, and transformations), whereas the methodology of cognition
or knowledge (and applying certain restrictive instances, that of scientific
research) deals with the conduct (behaviour) of determined cognitive subjects
(actors, agents) in making use of logical complexes (syntactic structures,
in corresponding semantic interpretations) for solving problems in some
epistemic situations (by means of acquisition, handling, transformation,
etc., of data).
Broadly
speaking, methodology is a strategy or an operational program
to apply noetically relevant logical and exological structures to cognitive
(epistemic) actions.
16.8 By dialectical logic we will understand, at least for the time being,