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June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
Vic Hargrave
JB Cheng
Santiago González Bassett
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed during this conference are those of
the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
held by the Information Systems Security Association (ISSA), the
Silicon Valley ISSA, the San Francisco ISSA or the San Francisco Bay
Area InfraGard Members Alliance (IMA). Neither ISSA, InfraGard, nor
any of its chapters warrants the accuracy, timeliness or completeness
of the information presented. Nothing in this conference should be
construed as professional or legal advice or as creating a professional-
customer or attorney-client relationship. If professional, legal, or
other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent
professional should be sought.
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
2
Log Normalization
 Syslog
 Comes default within *Nix operating systems.
 Sylog-NG
 Can be installed in various configurations to take the place
of default syslog.
 Free to use or enterprise version available for purchase.
 Many configuration types to export data.
 OSSEC
 Free to use
 Can export via syslog to other systems.
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
3
Solving the Open Source Security
Puzzle
 What are the standards?
 Why choose one product over another?
 How do the various security components work
together?
 How does this work in the real world, real
examples.
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
4
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
5
Understanding Rules
 Customizable rulesets - Enable a security practitioner to
add true intelligence of their environment.
Host Event Detection
AIDE(Advanced Intrusion
Detection Environment)
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
6
Network Detection Systems
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
7
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
8
Event Management
What is ?
 Open Source SECurity
 Open Source Host-based Intrusion Detection System
 Provides protection for Windows, Linux, Mac OS, Solaris
and many *nix systems
 http://www.ossec.net
 Founded by Daniel Cid
 Current project managers – JB Cheng and Vic Hargrave
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
9
OSSEC Capabilities
 Log analysis
 File Integrity checking (Unix and Windows)
 Registry Integrity checking (Windows)
 Host-based anomaly detection (for Unix – rootkit
detection)
 Active Response
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
10
HIDS Advantages
 Monitors system behaviors that are not evident from the
network traffic
 Can find persistent threats that penetrate firewalls and
network intrusion detection/prevention systems
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
11
tail -f $ossec_alerts/alerts.log
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
12
OSSEC
Server
OSSEC
Agents
logs
UDP
1514
logs
UDP
1514
OSSEC Architecture
alerts
File Integrity Alert Sample
** Alert 1365550297.8499: mail - ossec,syscheck,
2013 Apr 09 16:31:37 ubuntu->syscheck
Rule: 551 (level 7) -> 'Integrity checksum changed again (2nd time).'
Integrity checksum changed for: '/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/01autoremove-kernels'
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
13
Log Analysis Alert Sample
** Alert 1365514728.3680: mail - syslog,dpkg,config_changed,
2013 Apr 09 06:38:48 ubuntu->/var/log/dpkg.log
Rule: 2902 (level 7) -> 'New dpkg (Debian Package) installed.'
2013-04-09 06:38:47 status installed linux-image-3.2.0-40-generic-pae 3.2.0-40.64
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
14
PCI DSS Requirement
 10.5.5 - Use file-integrity monitoring or change-detection
software on logs to ensure that existing log data cannot
be changed without generating alerts (although new data
being added should not cause an alert)
 11.5 - Deploy file-integrity monitoring software to alert
personnel to unauthorized modification of critical system
files, configuration files, or content files; and configure
the software to perform critical file comparisons at least
weekly
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
15
 Annual gathering of OSSEC users and developers.
 Community members discuss how they are using OSSEC,
what new features they would like and set the roadmap
for future releases.
 OSSEC 2.7.1 soon to be released.
 Planning for OSSEC 3.0 is underway.
 OSSECCON 2013 will be held Thursday July 25th at Trend
Micro’s Cupertino office.
 Please join us there!
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
16
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
Santiago González Bassett
santiago@alienvault.com
@santiagobassett
Alien Vault
17
About me
 Developer, systems engineer, security
administrator, consultant and researcher in the last
10 years.
 Member of OSSIM project team since its inception.
 Implemented distributed Open Source security
technologies in large enterprise environments for
European and US companies.
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
http://santi-bassett.blogspot.com/
@santiagobassett
18
What is OSSIM?
OSSIM is the Open Source SIEM – GNU GPL version 3.0
 With over 195,000 downloads it is the most widely
used SIEM in the world.
 Created in 2003, is developed and maintained by
Alien Vault and community contributors.
 Provides Unified and Intelligent Security.
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
http://communities.alienvault.com/
19
Why OSSIM?
Because provides security Intelligence
 Discards false positives
 Assesses the impact of an attack
 Collaboratively learns about APT
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
Because Unifies security management
 Centralizes information
 Integrates threats detection tools
20
OSSIM integrated tools
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
Assets
 nmap
 prads
Behavioral monitoring
 fprobe
 nfdump
 ntop
 tcpdump
 nagios
Vulnerability assessment
 osvdb
 openvas
Threat detection
 ossec
 snort
 suricata
21
OSSIM +200 Collectors
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
22
OSSIM Architecture
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
Configuration &
Management
Normalized
Events
23
OSSIM Anatomy of a collector
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
24
[apache-access]
event_type=event
regexp=“((?P<dst>S+)(:(?P<port>d{1,5}))? )?(?P<src>S+) (?P<id>S+) (?P<user>S+)
[(?P<date>d{2}/w{3}/d{4}:d{2}:d{2}:d{2})s+[+-]d{4}] "(?P<request>.*)”
(?P<code>d{3}) ((?P<size>d+)|-)( "(?P<referer_uri>.*)" ”(?P<useragent>.*)")?$”
src_ip={resolv($src)}
dst_ip={resolv($dst)}
dst_port={$port}
date={normalize_date($date)}
plugin_sid={$code}
username={$user}
userdata1={$request}
userdata2={$size}
userdata3={$referer_uri}
userdata4={$useragent}
filename={$id}
[Raw log]
76.103.249.20 - - [15/Jun/2013:10:14:32 -0700] "GET /ossim/session/login.php HTTP/1.1" 200
2612 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_8_3) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
Gecko) Chrome/27.0.1453.110 Safari/537.36"
OSSIM Reliability Assessment
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
25
SSH Failed
authentication event
SSH successful
authentication event
10 SSH Failed
authentication events
100 SSH Failed
authentication events
Persistent
connections
SSH successful
authentication event
1000 SSH Failed
authentication events
SSH successful
authentication event
Reliability
OSSIM Risk Assessment
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
26
RISK = (ASSET VALUE * EVENT PRIORITY * EVENT RELIABILITY)/25
Source Destination
Event Priority = 2
Event Reliability = 10
Asset Value = 2 Asset Value = 5
OSSIM & OSSEC Integration
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
 Web management interface
 OSSEC alerts plugin
 OSSEC correlation rules
 OSSEC reports
27
OSSIM Deployment
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
PORT MIRRORING
SYSLOG
WMI
WMI
SYSLO`G
SDEE
SYSLOG
OPSEC
FTP
SDEE
OPSEC
SYSLOG
OSSECSCP
SQL
SAMBA
SYSLOG
SDEE
SYSLOG
SNMP
SYSLOG
LOG COLLECTION
NORMALIZED EVENTS
SENSOR 1
SENSOR 2
SENSOR 3
NORMALIZED DATA
SERVER
SYSLOG
28
OSSIM Attack Detection
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
Attack
Attacker
X.X.X.X
Accepted HTTP packet
from X.X.X.X to Y.Y.Y.Y
Attack: WEB-IIS multiple
decode attempt
Vulnerability: IIS Remote
Command Execution
Alert: Low
reputation IPOTX
Alert: IIS attack
detected
Target
Y.Y.Y.Y
29
OSSIM Demo Use Cases
Detection & Risk assessment
 OTX
 Snort NIDS
 Logical Correlation
 Vulnerability assessment
 Asset discovery
Correlating Firewall logs:
 Cisco ASA plugin
 Network Scan detection
Correlating Windows Events:
 OSSEC integration
 Brute force attack detection
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
30
June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity
31
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed during this conference are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views and
opinions held by the Information Systems Security Association (ISSA), the Silicon Valley ISSA, the San Francisco ISSA or the San
Francisco Bay Area InfraGard Members Alliance (IMA). Neither ISSA, InfraGard, nor any of its chapters warrants the
accuracy, timeliness or completeness of the information presented. Nothing in this conference should be construed as
professional or legal advice or as creating a professional-customer or attorney-client relationship. If professional, legal, or other
expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.
Thank you
Santiago Gonzalez Bassett
santiago@alienvault.com
@santiagobassett
Alien Vault

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Solving the Open Source Security Puzzle

  • 1. June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity Vic Hargrave JB Cheng Santiago González Bassett
  • 2. Disclaimer The views and opinions expressed during this conference are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions held by the Information Systems Security Association (ISSA), the Silicon Valley ISSA, the San Francisco ISSA or the San Francisco Bay Area InfraGard Members Alliance (IMA). Neither ISSA, InfraGard, nor any of its chapters warrants the accuracy, timeliness or completeness of the information presented. Nothing in this conference should be construed as professional or legal advice or as creating a professional- customer or attorney-client relationship. If professional, legal, or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 2
  • 3. Log Normalization  Syslog  Comes default within *Nix operating systems.  Sylog-NG  Can be installed in various configurations to take the place of default syslog.  Free to use or enterprise version available for purchase.  Many configuration types to export data.  OSSEC  Free to use  Can export via syslog to other systems. June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 3
  • 4. Solving the Open Source Security Puzzle  What are the standards?  Why choose one product over another?  How do the various security components work together?  How does this work in the real world, real examples. June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 4
  • 5. June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 5 Understanding Rules  Customizable rulesets - Enable a security practitioner to add true intelligence of their environment.
  • 6. Host Event Detection AIDE(Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment) June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 6
  • 7. Network Detection Systems June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 7
  • 8. June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 8 Event Management
  • 9. What is ?  Open Source SECurity  Open Source Host-based Intrusion Detection System  Provides protection for Windows, Linux, Mac OS, Solaris and many *nix systems  http://www.ossec.net  Founded by Daniel Cid  Current project managers – JB Cheng and Vic Hargrave June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 9
  • 10. OSSEC Capabilities  Log analysis  File Integrity checking (Unix and Windows)  Registry Integrity checking (Windows)  Host-based anomaly detection (for Unix – rootkit detection)  Active Response June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 10
  • 11. HIDS Advantages  Monitors system behaviors that are not evident from the network traffic  Can find persistent threats that penetrate firewalls and network intrusion detection/prevention systems June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 11
  • 12. tail -f $ossec_alerts/alerts.log June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 12 OSSEC Server OSSEC Agents logs UDP 1514 logs UDP 1514 OSSEC Architecture alerts
  • 13. File Integrity Alert Sample ** Alert 1365550297.8499: mail - ossec,syscheck, 2013 Apr 09 16:31:37 ubuntu->syscheck Rule: 551 (level 7) -> 'Integrity checksum changed again (2nd time).' Integrity checksum changed for: '/etc/apt/apt.conf.d/01autoremove-kernels' June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 13
  • 14. Log Analysis Alert Sample ** Alert 1365514728.3680: mail - syslog,dpkg,config_changed, 2013 Apr 09 06:38:48 ubuntu->/var/log/dpkg.log Rule: 2902 (level 7) -> 'New dpkg (Debian Package) installed.' 2013-04-09 06:38:47 status installed linux-image-3.2.0-40-generic-pae 3.2.0-40.64 June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 14
  • 15. PCI DSS Requirement  10.5.5 - Use file-integrity monitoring or change-detection software on logs to ensure that existing log data cannot be changed without generating alerts (although new data being added should not cause an alert)  11.5 - Deploy file-integrity monitoring software to alert personnel to unauthorized modification of critical system files, configuration files, or content files; and configure the software to perform critical file comparisons at least weekly June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 15
  • 16.  Annual gathering of OSSEC users and developers.  Community members discuss how they are using OSSEC, what new features they would like and set the roadmap for future releases.  OSSEC 2.7.1 soon to be released.  Planning for OSSEC 3.0 is underway.  OSSECCON 2013 will be held Thursday July 25th at Trend Micro’s Cupertino office.  Please join us there! June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 16
  • 17. June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity Santiago González Bassett santiago@alienvault.com @santiagobassett Alien Vault 17
  • 18. About me  Developer, systems engineer, security administrator, consultant and researcher in the last 10 years.  Member of OSSIM project team since its inception.  Implemented distributed Open Source security technologies in large enterprise environments for European and US companies. June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity http://santi-bassett.blogspot.com/ @santiagobassett 18
  • 19. What is OSSIM? OSSIM is the Open Source SIEM – GNU GPL version 3.0  With over 195,000 downloads it is the most widely used SIEM in the world.  Created in 2003, is developed and maintained by Alien Vault and community contributors.  Provides Unified and Intelligent Security. June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity http://communities.alienvault.com/ 19
  • 20. Why OSSIM? Because provides security Intelligence  Discards false positives  Assesses the impact of an attack  Collaboratively learns about APT June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity Because Unifies security management  Centralizes information  Integrates threats detection tools 20
  • 21. OSSIM integrated tools June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity Assets  nmap  prads Behavioral monitoring  fprobe  nfdump  ntop  tcpdump  nagios Vulnerability assessment  osvdb  openvas Threat detection  ossec  snort  suricata 21
  • 22. OSSIM +200 Collectors June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 22
  • 23. OSSIM Architecture June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity Configuration & Management Normalized Events 23
  • 24. OSSIM Anatomy of a collector June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 24 [apache-access] event_type=event regexp=“((?P<dst>S+)(:(?P<port>d{1,5}))? )?(?P<src>S+) (?P<id>S+) (?P<user>S+) [(?P<date>d{2}/w{3}/d{4}:d{2}:d{2}:d{2})s+[+-]d{4}] "(?P<request>.*)” (?P<code>d{3}) ((?P<size>d+)|-)( "(?P<referer_uri>.*)" ”(?P<useragent>.*)")?$” src_ip={resolv($src)} dst_ip={resolv($dst)} dst_port={$port} date={normalize_date($date)} plugin_sid={$code} username={$user} userdata1={$request} userdata2={$size} userdata3={$referer_uri} userdata4={$useragent} filename={$id} [Raw log] 76.103.249.20 - - [15/Jun/2013:10:14:32 -0700] "GET /ossim/session/login.php HTTP/1.1" 200 2612 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_8_3) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/27.0.1453.110 Safari/537.36"
  • 25. OSSIM Reliability Assessment June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 25 SSH Failed authentication event SSH successful authentication event 10 SSH Failed authentication events 100 SSH Failed authentication events Persistent connections SSH successful authentication event 1000 SSH Failed authentication events SSH successful authentication event Reliability
  • 26. OSSIM Risk Assessment June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 26 RISK = (ASSET VALUE * EVENT PRIORITY * EVENT RELIABILITY)/25 Source Destination Event Priority = 2 Event Reliability = 10 Asset Value = 2 Asset Value = 5
  • 27. OSSIM & OSSEC Integration June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity  Web management interface  OSSEC alerts plugin  OSSEC correlation rules  OSSEC reports 27
  • 28. OSSIM Deployment June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity PORT MIRRORING SYSLOG WMI WMI SYSLO`G SDEE SYSLOG OPSEC FTP SDEE OPSEC SYSLOG OSSECSCP SQL SAMBA SYSLOG SDEE SYSLOG SNMP SYSLOG LOG COLLECTION NORMALIZED EVENTS SENSOR 1 SENSOR 2 SENSOR 3 NORMALIZED DATA SERVER SYSLOG 28
  • 29. OSSIM Attack Detection June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity Attack Attacker X.X.X.X Accepted HTTP packet from X.X.X.X to Y.Y.Y.Y Attack: WEB-IIS multiple decode attempt Vulnerability: IIS Remote Command Execution Alert: Low reputation IPOTX Alert: IIS attack detected Target Y.Y.Y.Y 29
  • 30. OSSIM Demo Use Cases Detection & Risk assessment  OTX  Snort NIDS  Logical Correlation  Vulnerability assessment  Asset discovery Correlating Firewall logs:  Cisco ASA plugin  Network Scan detection Correlating Windows Events:  OSSEC integration  Brute force attack detection June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 30
  • 31. June 18, 2013 – Securing Ubiquity 31 Disclaimer The views and opinions expressed during this conference are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions held by the Information Systems Security Association (ISSA), the Silicon Valley ISSA, the San Francisco ISSA or the San Francisco Bay Area InfraGard Members Alliance (IMA). Neither ISSA, InfraGard, nor any of its chapters warrants the accuracy, timeliness or completeness of the information presented. Nothing in this conference should be construed as professional or legal advice or as creating a professional-customer or attorney-client relationship. If professional, legal, or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. Thank you Santiago Gonzalez Bassett santiago@alienvault.com @santiagobassett Alien Vault