SlideShare ist ein Scribd-Unternehmen logo
1 von 15
Downloaden Sie, um offline zu lesen
Building a Weaponized Honeybot
Mohamed Bedewi - Senior Security Researcher at DTS Solution
Introduction and Facts
• Honeypots are decoy monitored systems configured to be intentionally vulnerable.
• The detection of a honeypot can get tricky but once it happens it can get abused.
• Honeypots can decrease the gap between security threats and security solutions.
• The technical price of deploying and maintaining a honeypot is pretty expensive.
• Honeypots may function as a stress reliever in case of persistent targeted attacks.
• The first publically available honeypot was Fred Cohen's Deception Toolkit in 1998.
Classification of Honeypots as per Design
• Low-interaction Honeypots
They work by emulating certain services
and operating systems and have limited
interaction when it comes to functionality.
The intruder’s interactions are limited to
the level of emulation provided by the
honeypot which makes it easily detected.
They consume relatively few hardware
resources and don’t take much effort in
terms of deployment and maintenance.
• High-interaction Honeypots
They work by fully emulating any service or
operating system and have full extensive
interaction when it comes to functionality.
The intruder’s interactions are limited to
the level of his imagination which makes
this type a time waster and hard to detect.
They consume relatively more hardware
resources and take much time and effort in
terms of deployment and maintenance.
Honeybots need to be well configured
otherwise they can pose a risk to your network
Why We Need Honeybots?
• Honeybots can frustrate malicious users at some extent and save network resources.
• Honeybots can effectively identify internal compromised hosts and malicious users.
• Honeybots can integrate with the deployed security solutions for less false positives.
• Honeybots can robustly feed the deployed SIEM solution with accrued attack cases.
• Honeybots can easily detect encoded and encrypted network malicious payloads.
Bots are around us but we barley notice!
If you mess with my stuff, I will mess with you
while I am sleeping because I am too lazy!
A Weaponized Honeybot, Really?
• Because why to frustrate malicious users when you can make their lives miserable.
• Because why to get your valuable information stolen without knowing who really did it.
• Because why to collect limited information about malicious users when you can get it all.
• Because why to be reactive to cyber breaches when you can be proactive and control it.
Passive Defense Vs. Active Defense
Detect and Attack at the Network Level
• Detect a Network Offense
Malicious traffic gets routed from the network
security solutions to the honeybot once any
indication of an attack gets detected.
The honeybot starts by validating if the ongoing
attack is automated or manually conducted and
once validated it will activate passive defense.
The honeybot will respond to an offense in case
of a manual break-in attempt and will delay any
other automated or semi-automated attempts.
• Respond to a Network Offense
Malicious traffic gets routed once more from the
honeybot to the exploitation environment where
all ports will be closed except for port 80.
The intruder will voluntarily change his attack
from a network attack to a web application attack
and this is when he turns into a clueless a victim.
The intruder will get fingerprinted and exploited
automatically in the middle of his attempts to
exploit the discovered web application.
Detect and Attack at the Application Level
• Detect an Application Offense
Malicious traffic can get routed from the
application security solutions or custom traps can
be implemented to enhance the detection ratio.
Honey Tokens: they're fake database records
which can be used to identify a database breach.
Honey Pages: they're hidden sprinkled web pages
which can be used to identify a persistent attack.
Honey Domains: they're dummy DNS published
sub-domains which can be used to identify recon.
• Respond to an Application Offense
Malicious traffic gets routed once more from the
honeybot or directly from the web application to
the web application exploitation environment.
The intruder will get fingerprinted and exploited
automatically in the middle of his attempts to
discover the web page he got redirected to.
Active Defense = Offensive Security + Artificial Intelligence
I can’t believe that you’re trying to pull this off
How to logically pull this off?
Attack
Any successful exploitation starts with discovering the target in question then enumerating the
target for potential vulnerabilities then exploiting the discovered vulnerabilities then finally
escalading privileges and backdooring the target in question to ensure further access.
The target in questions is anonymous and to
take the previous approach further, we need
to deanonymize and identify the target first
otherwise exploitation won’t be possible.
The entire process of deanonymizing,
identifying, attacking and profiling (DIAP) the
target needs to be automated via a smart
light weight offensive module.
Deanonymization
Identification
Enumeration
Exploitation
Escalation
Persistence
Now since we know how it should be done
let me introduce to you dynamicDetect
What is dynamicDetect?
Despite it’s friendly name, dynamicDetect is a very sophisticated offensive module which can
effectively and robustly deanonymize, identify, attack and profile (DIAP) malicious users
basically behind TOR, VPN and Proxies automatically and with zero human interaction.
dynamicDetect Technical Features:
• Capable of deanonymizing any malicious user flawlessly and accurately on the fly.
• Capable of identifying the malicious user’s IP address, country, city and coordinates.
• Capable of enumerating the malicious user’s machine to spot every single weakness.
• Capable of exploiting every single weakness identified in the malicious user’s machine.
• Capable of escalading privileges under most systems despite deployed security controls.
• Capable of maintaining access and staying stealthy even in the most strict environments.
• Capable of profiling every and each malicious user efficiently with detailed activity log.
How dynamicDetect Works?
Deanonymization
Identification
Enumeration
Exploitation
Escalation
Persistence
Excellent
Alice thinks that she's fully anonymous till she gets forwarded to a web page and out of the sudden,
her machine isn't hers anymore after being fully deanonymized and got her identity exposed!
The best way to deliver a malicious payload is over an encrypted channel and we don’t
even have to worry about raising any suspicions because Alice is the one who initiated it
Payload successfully
delivered and Alice
doesn’t even know!
Theories are easy and talk is cheap, show us
dynamicDetect and let’s break this technically

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

Cyber Security - IDS/IPS is not enough
Cyber Security - IDS/IPS is not enoughCyber Security - IDS/IPS is not enough
Cyber Security - IDS/IPS is not enough
Savvius, Inc
 
Lessons learned from hundreds of cyber espionage breaches by TT and Ashley - ...
Lessons learned from hundreds of cyber espionage breaches by TT and Ashley - ...Lessons learned from hundreds of cyber espionage breaches by TT and Ashley - ...
Lessons learned from hundreds of cyber espionage breaches by TT and Ashley - ...
CODE BLUE
 
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
HITCON GIRLS
 
Jaime Blasco - Fighting Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) with Open Source Too...
Jaime Blasco - Fighting Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) with Open Source Too...Jaime Blasco - Fighting Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) with Open Source Too...
Jaime Blasco - Fighting Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) with Open Source Too...
RootedCON
 
ION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal Auditors
ION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal AuditorsION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal Auditors
ION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal Auditors
mdagrossa
 
Advanced persistent threat (apt)
Advanced persistent threat (apt)Advanced persistent threat (apt)
Advanced persistent threat (apt)
mmubashirkhan
 
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Security B-Sides
 

Was ist angesagt? (20)

Vapt life cycle
Vapt life cycleVapt life cycle
Vapt life cycle
 
Common Techniques To Identify Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
Common Techniques To Identify Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)Common Techniques To Identify Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
Common Techniques To Identify Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
 
How secure are your systems
How secure are your systemsHow secure are your systems
How secure are your systems
 
Persistence is Key: Advanced Persistent Threats
Persistence is Key: Advanced Persistent ThreatsPersistence is Key: Advanced Persistent Threats
Persistence is Key: Advanced Persistent Threats
 
IBM ridefinisce la strategia e l'approccio verso gli Avanced Persistent Threa...
IBM ridefinisce la strategia e l'approccio verso gli Avanced Persistent Threa...IBM ridefinisce la strategia e l'approccio verso gli Avanced Persistent Threa...
IBM ridefinisce la strategia e l'approccio verso gli Avanced Persistent Threa...
 
Cyber Security - IDS/IPS is not enough
Cyber Security - IDS/IPS is not enoughCyber Security - IDS/IPS is not enough
Cyber Security - IDS/IPS is not enough
 
Lessons learned from hundreds of cyber espionage breaches by TT and Ashley - ...
Lessons learned from hundreds of cyber espionage breaches by TT and Ashley - ...Lessons learned from hundreds of cyber espionage breaches by TT and Ashley - ...
Lessons learned from hundreds of cyber espionage breaches by TT and Ashley - ...
 
Deception Technology: Use Cases & Implementation Approaches
 Deception Technology: Use Cases & Implementation Approaches Deception Technology: Use Cases & Implementation Approaches
Deception Technology: Use Cases & Implementation Approaches
 
Hiding in Plain Sight: The Danger of Known Vulnerabilities
Hiding in Plain Sight: The Danger of Known VulnerabilitiesHiding in Plain Sight: The Danger of Known Vulnerabilities
Hiding in Plain Sight: The Danger of Known Vulnerabilities
 
Advanced persistent threats(APT)
Advanced persistent threats(APT)Advanced persistent threats(APT)
Advanced persistent threats(APT)
 
AlienVault Brute Force Attacks- Keeping the Bots at Bay with AlienVault USM +...
AlienVault Brute Force Attacks- Keeping the Bots at Bay with AlienVault USM +...AlienVault Brute Force Attacks- Keeping the Bots at Bay with AlienVault USM +...
AlienVault Brute Force Attacks- Keeping the Bots at Bay with AlienVault USM +...
 
DC970 Presents: Defense in Depth
DC970 Presents: Defense in DepthDC970 Presents: Defense in Depth
DC970 Presents: Defense in Depth
 
Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism
Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivismIntroduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism
Introduction to the advanced persistent threat and hactivism
 
Security operation center (SOC)
Security operation center (SOC)Security operation center (SOC)
Security operation center (SOC)
 
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
逃避可恥還沒有用- 你不可不知的物聯網安全問題與挑戰(Ashley Shen & Belinda Lai)
 
Jaime Blasco - Fighting Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) with Open Source Too...
Jaime Blasco - Fighting Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) with Open Source Too...Jaime Blasco - Fighting Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) with Open Source Too...
Jaime Blasco - Fighting Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) with Open Source Too...
 
ION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal Auditors
ION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal AuditorsION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal Auditors
ION-E Defense In Depth Presentation for The Institiute of Internal Auditors
 
Advanced persistent threat (apt)
Advanced persistent threat (apt)Advanced persistent threat (apt)
Advanced persistent threat (apt)
 
VAPT - Vulnerability Assessment & Penetration Testing
VAPT - Vulnerability Assessment & Penetration Testing VAPT - Vulnerability Assessment & Penetration Testing
VAPT - Vulnerability Assessment & Penetration Testing
 
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept S...
 

Andere mochten auch

Real-time Static Malware Analysis Using NepenthesFE
Real-time Static Malware Analysis Using NepenthesFEReal-time Static Malware Analysis Using NepenthesFE
Real-time Static Malware Analysis Using NepenthesFE
Network Intelligence India
 
Improving intrusion detection system by honeypot
Improving intrusion detection system by honeypotImproving intrusion detection system by honeypot
Improving intrusion detection system by honeypot
mmubashirkhan
 
VIPER Labs - VOIP Security - SANS Summit
VIPER Labs - VOIP Security - SANS SummitVIPER Labs - VOIP Security - SANS Summit
VIPER Labs - VOIP Security - SANS Summit
Shah Sheikh
 
DTS Solution - Software Defined Security v1.0
DTS Solution - Software Defined Security v1.0DTS Solution - Software Defined Security v1.0
DTS Solution - Software Defined Security v1.0
Shah Sheikh
 

Andere mochten auch (20)

Why / How to become the Linux certified
Why / How to become the Linux certifiedWhy / How to become the Linux certified
Why / How to become the Linux certified
 
Real-time Static Malware Analysis Using NepenthesFE
Real-time Static Malware Analysis Using NepenthesFEReal-time Static Malware Analysis Using NepenthesFE
Real-time Static Malware Analysis Using NepenthesFE
 
Network Exploitation
Network ExploitationNetwork Exploitation
Network Exploitation
 
DTS Solution - Crypto Flow Segmentation addressing NESA IAF and ISO27001 comp...
DTS Solution - Crypto Flow Segmentation addressing NESA IAF and ISO27001 comp...DTS Solution - Crypto Flow Segmentation addressing NESA IAF and ISO27001 comp...
DTS Solution - Crypto Flow Segmentation addressing NESA IAF and ISO27001 comp...
 
Improving intrusion detection system by honeypot
Improving intrusion detection system by honeypotImproving intrusion detection system by honeypot
Improving intrusion detection system by honeypot
 
VIPER Labs - VOIP Security - SANS Summit
VIPER Labs - VOIP Security - SANS SummitVIPER Labs - VOIP Security - SANS Summit
VIPER Labs - VOIP Security - SANS Summit
 
Bonding Interface in MikroTik
Bonding Interface in MikroTikBonding Interface in MikroTik
Bonding Interface in MikroTik
 
Network Security-Honeypot
Network Security-HoneypotNetwork Security-Honeypot
Network Security-Honeypot
 
Anton Chuvakin on Honeypots
Anton Chuvakin on HoneypotsAnton Chuvakin on Honeypots
Anton Chuvakin on Honeypots
 
DTS Solution - Software Defined Security v1.0
DTS Solution - Software Defined Security v1.0DTS Solution - Software Defined Security v1.0
DTS Solution - Software Defined Security v1.0
 
10 Google Analytics Features You Need to Know
10 Google Analytics Features You Need to Know10 Google Analytics Features You Need to Know
10 Google Analytics Features You Need to Know
 
DTS Solution - Penetration Testing Services v1.0
DTS Solution - Penetration Testing Services v1.0DTS Solution - Penetration Testing Services v1.0
DTS Solution - Penetration Testing Services v1.0
 
NetWatcher crowdsourcing
NetWatcher crowdsourcingNetWatcher crowdsourcing
NetWatcher crowdsourcing
 
Password Recovery Untuk Cisco 2900 Integrated Service Router (isr)
Password Recovery Untuk Cisco 2900 Integrated Service Router (isr)Password Recovery Untuk Cisco 2900 Integrated Service Router (isr)
Password Recovery Untuk Cisco 2900 Integrated Service Router (isr)
 
DSS ITSEC CONFERENCE - Q1 Labs - Intelligent network security - next genera...
DSS   ITSEC CONFERENCE - Q1 Labs - Intelligent network security - next genera...DSS   ITSEC CONFERENCE - Q1 Labs - Intelligent network security - next genera...
DSS ITSEC CONFERENCE - Q1 Labs - Intelligent network security - next genera...
 
Sentralisasi Manajemen Hotspot Menggunakan Transparent Bridge EoIP over SSTP
Sentralisasi Manajemen Hotspot Menggunakan Transparent Bridge EoIP over SSTPSentralisasi Manajemen Hotspot Menggunakan Transparent Bridge EoIP over SSTP
Sentralisasi Manajemen Hotspot Menggunakan Transparent Bridge EoIP over SSTP
 
Logs & Visualizations at Twitter
Logs & Visualizations at TwitterLogs & Visualizations at Twitter
Logs & Visualizations at Twitter
 
Virtual honeypot
Virtual honeypotVirtual honeypot
Virtual honeypot
 
Building Domain Controller Using Windows Server 2008
Building Domain Controller Using Windows Server 2008Building Domain Controller Using Windows Server 2008
Building Domain Controller Using Windows Server 2008
 
Wireless Network Pentestration
Wireless Network PentestrationWireless Network Pentestration
Wireless Network Pentestration
 

Ähnlich wie DefCamp - Mohamed Bedewi - Building a Weaponized Honeypot

Cylance Ransomware-Remediation & Prevention Consulting Data-sheet
Cylance Ransomware-Remediation & Prevention Consulting Data-sheetCylance Ransomware-Remediation & Prevention Consulting Data-sheet
Cylance Ransomware-Remediation & Prevention Consulting Data-sheet
Innovation Network Technologies: InNet
 

Ähnlich wie DefCamp - Mohamed Bedewi - Building a Weaponized Honeypot (20)

Honey pots
Honey potsHoney pots
Honey pots
 
Honeypot
HoneypotHoneypot
Honeypot
 
Honeypot
HoneypotHoneypot
Honeypot
 
Honeypots
HoneypotsHoneypots
Honeypots
 
BalCcon 2015 - DTS Solution - Attacking the Unknown by Mohamed Bedewi
BalCcon 2015 - DTS Solution - Attacking the Unknown by Mohamed BedewiBalCcon 2015 - DTS Solution - Attacking the Unknown by Mohamed Bedewi
BalCcon 2015 - DTS Solution - Attacking the Unknown by Mohamed Bedewi
 
Honeypot ss
Honeypot ssHoneypot ss
Honeypot ss
 
Malware ppt final.pptx
Malware ppt final.pptxMalware ppt final.pptx
Malware ppt final.pptx
 
Honeypots and honeynets
Honeypots and honeynetsHoneypots and honeynets
Honeypots and honeynets
 
Honeypots
HoneypotsHoneypots
Honeypots
 
Cyber Security Terms
Cyber Security TermsCyber Security Terms
Cyber Security Terms
 
Cyber Security Awareness Month 2017-Nugget 6
Cyber Security Awareness Month 2017-Nugget 6Cyber Security Awareness Month 2017-Nugget 6
Cyber Security Awareness Month 2017-Nugget 6
 
Cylance Ransomware-Remediation & Prevention Consulting Data-sheet
Cylance Ransomware-Remediation & Prevention Consulting Data-sheetCylance Ransomware-Remediation & Prevention Consulting Data-sheet
Cylance Ransomware-Remediation & Prevention Consulting Data-sheet
 
Honeypot
HoneypotHoneypot
Honeypot
 
Defend Your Company Against Ransomware
Defend Your Company Against RansomwareDefend Your Company Against Ransomware
Defend Your Company Against Ransomware
 
Lecture 3.pptx
Lecture 3.pptxLecture 3.pptx
Lecture 3.pptx
 
Honeypots (Ravindra Singh Rathore)
Honeypots (Ravindra Singh Rathore)Honeypots (Ravindra Singh Rathore)
Honeypots (Ravindra Singh Rathore)
 
Get Smart about Ransomware: Protect Yourself and Organization
Get Smart about Ransomware: Protect Yourself and OrganizationGet Smart about Ransomware: Protect Yourself and Organization
Get Smart about Ransomware: Protect Yourself and Organization
 
Fight fire with fire draft
Fight fire with fire draftFight fire with fire draft
Fight fire with fire draft
 
PoS Malware and Other Threats to the Retail Industry
PoS Malware and Other Threats to the Retail IndustryPoS Malware and Other Threats to the Retail Industry
PoS Malware and Other Threats to the Retail Industry
 
information security (Audit mechanism, intrusion detection, password manageme...
information security (Audit mechanism, intrusion detection, password manageme...information security (Audit mechanism, intrusion detection, password manageme...
information security (Audit mechanism, intrusion detection, password manageme...
 

Mehr von Shah Sheikh

PT-DTS SCADA Security using MaxPatrol
PT-DTS SCADA Security using MaxPatrolPT-DTS SCADA Security using MaxPatrol
PT-DTS SCADA Security using MaxPatrol
Shah Sheikh
 
DTS Solution - SCADA Security Solutions
DTS Solution - SCADA Security SolutionsDTS Solution - SCADA Security Solutions
DTS Solution - SCADA Security Solutions
Shah Sheikh
 

Mehr von Shah Sheikh (19)

ISACA 2019 Amman Chapter - Shah Sheikh - Cyber Resilience
ISACA 2019 Amman Chapter - Shah Sheikh - Cyber ResilienceISACA 2019 Amman Chapter - Shah Sheikh - Cyber Resilience
ISACA 2019 Amman Chapter - Shah Sheikh - Cyber Resilience
 
DTS Solution - Company Presentation
DTS Solution - Company PresentationDTS Solution - Company Presentation
DTS Solution - Company Presentation
 
Cyber Security 101 - Back to Basics (HP Secure Print Event 2018)
Cyber Security 101 - Back to Basics (HP Secure Print Event 2018)Cyber Security 101 - Back to Basics (HP Secure Print Event 2018)
Cyber Security 101 - Back to Basics (HP Secure Print Event 2018)
 
DTS Solution - Company Presentation
DTS Solution - Company PresentationDTS Solution - Company Presentation
DTS Solution - Company Presentation
 
DTS Solution - Red Team - Penetration Testing
DTS Solution - Red Team - Penetration TestingDTS Solution - Red Team - Penetration Testing
DTS Solution - Red Team - Penetration Testing
 
DTS Solution - Cyber Security Services Portfolio
DTS Solution - Cyber Security Services PortfolioDTS Solution - Cyber Security Services Portfolio
DTS Solution - Cyber Security Services Portfolio
 
Building a Cyber Security Operations Center for SCADA/ICS Environments
Building a Cyber Security Operations Center for SCADA/ICS EnvironmentsBuilding a Cyber Security Operations Center for SCADA/ICS Environments
Building a Cyber Security Operations Center for SCADA/ICS Environments
 
DTS Solution - Hacking ATM Machines - The Italian Job Way
DTS Solution - Hacking ATM Machines - The Italian Job WayDTS Solution - Hacking ATM Machines - The Italian Job Way
DTS Solution - Hacking ATM Machines - The Italian Job Way
 
Shah Sheikh / ISACA UAE - Deep Dive on Evasive Malware
Shah Sheikh / ISACA UAE - Deep Dive on Evasive MalwareShah Sheikh / ISACA UAE - Deep Dive on Evasive Malware
Shah Sheikh / ISACA UAE - Deep Dive on Evasive Malware
 
DTS Solution - Outsourcing Outlook Dubai 2015
DTS Solution - Outsourcing Outlook Dubai 2015DTS Solution - Outsourcing Outlook Dubai 2015
DTS Solution - Outsourcing Outlook Dubai 2015
 
GISEC 2015 Your Network in the Eyes of a Hacker - DTS Solution
GISEC 2015 Your Network in the Eyes of a Hacker - DTS SolutionGISEC 2015 Your Network in the Eyes of a Hacker - DTS Solution
GISEC 2015 Your Network in the Eyes of a Hacker - DTS Solution
 
DTS Solution - ISACA UAE Chapter - ISAFE 2014 - RU PWNED - Living a Life as a...
DTS Solution - ISACA UAE Chapter - ISAFE 2014 - RU PWNED - Living a Life as a...DTS Solution - ISACA UAE Chapter - ISAFE 2014 - RU PWNED - Living a Life as a...
DTS Solution - ISACA UAE Chapter - ISAFE 2014 - RU PWNED - Living a Life as a...
 
DTS Solution - Wireless Security Protocols / PenTesting
DTS Solution - Wireless Security Protocols / PenTesting DTS Solution - Wireless Security Protocols / PenTesting
DTS Solution - Wireless Security Protocols / PenTesting
 
National Oil Company Conference 2014 - Evolving Cyber Security - A Wake Up Ca...
National Oil Company Conference 2014 - Evolving Cyber Security - A Wake Up Ca...National Oil Company Conference 2014 - Evolving Cyber Security - A Wake Up Ca...
National Oil Company Conference 2014 - Evolving Cyber Security - A Wake Up Ca...
 
ISACA Journal Publication - Does your Cloud have a Secure Lining? Shah Sheikh
ISACA Journal Publication - Does your Cloud have a Secure Lining? Shah SheikhISACA Journal Publication - Does your Cloud have a Secure Lining? Shah Sheikh
ISACA Journal Publication - Does your Cloud have a Secure Lining? Shah Sheikh
 
PT-DTS SCADA Security using MaxPatrol
PT-DTS SCADA Security using MaxPatrolPT-DTS SCADA Security using MaxPatrol
PT-DTS SCADA Security using MaxPatrol
 
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)
 
SeGW Whitepaper from Radisys
SeGW Whitepaper from RadisysSeGW Whitepaper from Radisys
SeGW Whitepaper from Radisys
 
DTS Solution - SCADA Security Solutions
DTS Solution - SCADA Security SolutionsDTS Solution - SCADA Security Solutions
DTS Solution - SCADA Security Solutions
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen

原版制作美国爱荷华大学毕业证(iowa毕业证书)学位证网上存档可查
原版制作美国爱荷华大学毕业证(iowa毕业证书)学位证网上存档可查原版制作美国爱荷华大学毕业证(iowa毕业证书)学位证网上存档可查
原版制作美国爱荷华大学毕业证(iowa毕业证书)学位证网上存档可查
ydyuyu
 
Abu Dhabi Escorts Service 0508644382 Escorts in Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi Escorts Service 0508644382 Escorts in Abu DhabiAbu Dhabi Escorts Service 0508644382 Escorts in Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi Escorts Service 0508644382 Escorts in Abu Dhabi
Monica Sydney
 
一比一原版(Flinders毕业证书)弗林德斯大学毕业证原件一模一样
一比一原版(Flinders毕业证书)弗林德斯大学毕业证原件一模一样一比一原版(Flinders毕业证书)弗林德斯大学毕业证原件一模一样
一比一原版(Flinders毕业证书)弗林德斯大学毕业证原件一模一样
ayvbos
 
在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查
在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查
在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查
ydyuyu
 
Russian Escort Abu Dhabi 0503464457 Abu DHabi Escorts
Russian Escort Abu Dhabi 0503464457 Abu DHabi EscortsRussian Escort Abu Dhabi 0503464457 Abu DHabi Escorts
Russian Escort Abu Dhabi 0503464457 Abu DHabi Escorts
Monica Sydney
 
pdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdf
pdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdfpdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdf
pdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdf
JOHNBEBONYAP1
 
一比一原版(Curtin毕业证书)科廷大学毕业证原件一模一样
一比一原版(Curtin毕业证书)科廷大学毕业证原件一模一样一比一原版(Curtin毕业证书)科廷大学毕业证原件一模一样
一比一原版(Curtin毕业证书)科廷大学毕业证原件一模一样
ayvbos
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)

原版制作美国爱荷华大学毕业证(iowa毕业证书)学位证网上存档可查
原版制作美国爱荷华大学毕业证(iowa毕业证书)学位证网上存档可查原版制作美国爱荷华大学毕业证(iowa毕业证书)学位证网上存档可查
原版制作美国爱荷华大学毕业证(iowa毕业证书)学位证网上存档可查
 
Abu Dhabi Escorts Service 0508644382 Escorts in Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi Escorts Service 0508644382 Escorts in Abu DhabiAbu Dhabi Escorts Service 0508644382 Escorts in Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi Escorts Service 0508644382 Escorts in Abu Dhabi
 
APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53
APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53
APNIC Updates presented by Paul Wilson at ARIN 53
 
20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240510 QFM016 Irresponsible AI Reading List April 2024.pdf
 
一比一原版(Flinders毕业证书)弗林德斯大学毕业证原件一模一样
一比一原版(Flinders毕业证书)弗林德斯大学毕业证原件一模一样一比一原版(Flinders毕业证书)弗林德斯大学毕业证原件一模一样
一比一原版(Flinders毕业证书)弗林德斯大学毕业证原件一模一样
 
Story Board.pptxrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
Story Board.pptxrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrStory Board.pptxrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
Story Board.pptxrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr
 
在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查
在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查
在线制作约克大学毕业证(yu毕业证)在读证明认证可查
 
best call girls in Hyderabad Finest Escorts Service 📞 9352988975 📞 Available ...
best call girls in Hyderabad Finest Escorts Service 📞 9352988975 📞 Available ...best call girls in Hyderabad Finest Escorts Service 📞 9352988975 📞 Available ...
best call girls in Hyderabad Finest Escorts Service 📞 9352988975 📞 Available ...
 
Call girls Service in Ajman 0505086370 Ajman call girls
Call girls Service in Ajman 0505086370 Ajman call girlsCall girls Service in Ajman 0505086370 Ajman call girls
Call girls Service in Ajman 0505086370 Ajman call girls
 
20240507 QFM013 Machine Intelligence Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240507 QFM013 Machine Intelligence Reading List April 2024.pdf20240507 QFM013 Machine Intelligence Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240507 QFM013 Machine Intelligence Reading List April 2024.pdf
 
20240508 QFM014 Elixir Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240508 QFM014 Elixir Reading List April 2024.pdf20240508 QFM014 Elixir Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240508 QFM014 Elixir Reading List April 2024.pdf
 
2nd Solid Symposium: Solid Pods vs Personal Knowledge Graphs
2nd Solid Symposium: Solid Pods vs Personal Knowledge Graphs2nd Solid Symposium: Solid Pods vs Personal Knowledge Graphs
2nd Solid Symposium: Solid Pods vs Personal Knowledge Graphs
 
Ballia Escorts Service Girl ^ 9332606886, WhatsApp Anytime Ballia
Ballia Escorts Service Girl ^ 9332606886, WhatsApp Anytime BalliaBallia Escorts Service Girl ^ 9332606886, WhatsApp Anytime Ballia
Ballia Escorts Service Girl ^ 9332606886, WhatsApp Anytime Ballia
 
Nagercoil Escorts Service Girl ^ 9332606886, WhatsApp Anytime Nagercoil
Nagercoil Escorts Service Girl ^ 9332606886, WhatsApp Anytime NagercoilNagercoil Escorts Service Girl ^ 9332606886, WhatsApp Anytime Nagercoil
Nagercoil Escorts Service Girl ^ 9332606886, WhatsApp Anytime Nagercoil
 
Russian Escort Abu Dhabi 0503464457 Abu DHabi Escorts
Russian Escort Abu Dhabi 0503464457 Abu DHabi EscortsRussian Escort Abu Dhabi 0503464457 Abu DHabi Escorts
Russian Escort Abu Dhabi 0503464457 Abu DHabi Escorts
 
Tadepalligudem Escorts Service Girl ^ 9332606886, WhatsApp Anytime Tadepallig...
Tadepalligudem Escorts Service Girl ^ 9332606886, WhatsApp Anytime Tadepallig...Tadepalligudem Escorts Service Girl ^ 9332606886, WhatsApp Anytime Tadepallig...
Tadepalligudem Escorts Service Girl ^ 9332606886, WhatsApp Anytime Tadepallig...
 
pdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdf
pdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdfpdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdf
pdfcoffee.com_business-ethics-q3m7-pdf-free.pdf
 
一比一原版(Curtin毕业证书)科廷大学毕业证原件一模一样
一比一原版(Curtin毕业证书)科廷大学毕业证原件一模一样一比一原版(Curtin毕业证书)科廷大学毕业证原件一模一样
一比一原版(Curtin毕业证书)科廷大学毕业证原件一模一样
 
Meaning of On page SEO & its process in detail.
Meaning of On page SEO & its process in detail.Meaning of On page SEO & its process in detail.
Meaning of On page SEO & its process in detail.
 
20240509 QFM015 Engineering Leadership Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240509 QFM015 Engineering Leadership Reading List April 2024.pdf20240509 QFM015 Engineering Leadership Reading List April 2024.pdf
20240509 QFM015 Engineering Leadership Reading List April 2024.pdf
 

DefCamp - Mohamed Bedewi - Building a Weaponized Honeypot

  • 1. Building a Weaponized Honeybot Mohamed Bedewi - Senior Security Researcher at DTS Solution
  • 2. Introduction and Facts • Honeypots are decoy monitored systems configured to be intentionally vulnerable. • The detection of a honeypot can get tricky but once it happens it can get abused. • Honeypots can decrease the gap between security threats and security solutions. • The technical price of deploying and maintaining a honeypot is pretty expensive. • Honeypots may function as a stress reliever in case of persistent targeted attacks. • The first publically available honeypot was Fred Cohen's Deception Toolkit in 1998.
  • 3. Classification of Honeypots as per Design • Low-interaction Honeypots They work by emulating certain services and operating systems and have limited interaction when it comes to functionality. The intruder’s interactions are limited to the level of emulation provided by the honeypot which makes it easily detected. They consume relatively few hardware resources and don’t take much effort in terms of deployment and maintenance. • High-interaction Honeypots They work by fully emulating any service or operating system and have full extensive interaction when it comes to functionality. The intruder’s interactions are limited to the level of his imagination which makes this type a time waster and hard to detect. They consume relatively more hardware resources and take much time and effort in terms of deployment and maintenance.
  • 4. Honeybots need to be well configured otherwise they can pose a risk to your network
  • 5. Why We Need Honeybots? • Honeybots can frustrate malicious users at some extent and save network resources. • Honeybots can effectively identify internal compromised hosts and malicious users. • Honeybots can integrate with the deployed security solutions for less false positives. • Honeybots can robustly feed the deployed SIEM solution with accrued attack cases. • Honeybots can easily detect encoded and encrypted network malicious payloads. Bots are around us but we barley notice!
  • 6. If you mess with my stuff, I will mess with you while I am sleeping because I am too lazy!
  • 7. A Weaponized Honeybot, Really? • Because why to frustrate malicious users when you can make their lives miserable. • Because why to get your valuable information stolen without knowing who really did it. • Because why to collect limited information about malicious users when you can get it all. • Because why to be reactive to cyber breaches when you can be proactive and control it. Passive Defense Vs. Active Defense
  • 8. Detect and Attack at the Network Level • Detect a Network Offense Malicious traffic gets routed from the network security solutions to the honeybot once any indication of an attack gets detected. The honeybot starts by validating if the ongoing attack is automated or manually conducted and once validated it will activate passive defense. The honeybot will respond to an offense in case of a manual break-in attempt and will delay any other automated or semi-automated attempts. • Respond to a Network Offense Malicious traffic gets routed once more from the honeybot to the exploitation environment where all ports will be closed except for port 80. The intruder will voluntarily change his attack from a network attack to a web application attack and this is when he turns into a clueless a victim. The intruder will get fingerprinted and exploited automatically in the middle of his attempts to exploit the discovered web application.
  • 9. Detect and Attack at the Application Level • Detect an Application Offense Malicious traffic can get routed from the application security solutions or custom traps can be implemented to enhance the detection ratio. Honey Tokens: they're fake database records which can be used to identify a database breach. Honey Pages: they're hidden sprinkled web pages which can be used to identify a persistent attack. Honey Domains: they're dummy DNS published sub-domains which can be used to identify recon. • Respond to an Application Offense Malicious traffic gets routed once more from the honeybot or directly from the web application to the web application exploitation environment. The intruder will get fingerprinted and exploited automatically in the middle of his attempts to discover the web page he got redirected to. Active Defense = Offensive Security + Artificial Intelligence
  • 10. I can’t believe that you’re trying to pull this off
  • 11. How to logically pull this off? Attack Any successful exploitation starts with discovering the target in question then enumerating the target for potential vulnerabilities then exploiting the discovered vulnerabilities then finally escalading privileges and backdooring the target in question to ensure further access. The target in questions is anonymous and to take the previous approach further, we need to deanonymize and identify the target first otherwise exploitation won’t be possible. The entire process of deanonymizing, identifying, attacking and profiling (DIAP) the target needs to be automated via a smart light weight offensive module. Deanonymization Identification Enumeration Exploitation Escalation Persistence
  • 12. Now since we know how it should be done let me introduce to you dynamicDetect
  • 13. What is dynamicDetect? Despite it’s friendly name, dynamicDetect is a very sophisticated offensive module which can effectively and robustly deanonymize, identify, attack and profile (DIAP) malicious users basically behind TOR, VPN and Proxies automatically and with zero human interaction. dynamicDetect Technical Features: • Capable of deanonymizing any malicious user flawlessly and accurately on the fly. • Capable of identifying the malicious user’s IP address, country, city and coordinates. • Capable of enumerating the malicious user’s machine to spot every single weakness. • Capable of exploiting every single weakness identified in the malicious user’s machine. • Capable of escalading privileges under most systems despite deployed security controls. • Capable of maintaining access and staying stealthy even in the most strict environments. • Capable of profiling every and each malicious user efficiently with detailed activity log.
  • 14. How dynamicDetect Works? Deanonymization Identification Enumeration Exploitation Escalation Persistence Excellent Alice thinks that she's fully anonymous till she gets forwarded to a web page and out of the sudden, her machine isn't hers anymore after being fully deanonymized and got her identity exposed! The best way to deliver a malicious payload is over an encrypted channel and we don’t even have to worry about raising any suspicions because Alice is the one who initiated it Payload successfully delivered and Alice doesn’t even know!
  • 15. Theories are easy and talk is cheap, show us dynamicDetect and let’s break this technically