Overview UNFCCC negotiations - Tamale - Doolan
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Overview UNFCCC negotiations - Tamale - Doolan
- 1. Climate Change Negotiations From Bali to Copenhagen via Accra & Tamale – Ghana has a stake & influence Sean Doolan NL Embassy, DFID Ghana Sean.Doolan@minbuza.nl S-Doolan@dfid.gov.uk Voice & Vision on Climate Change SEND Ghana, Tamale 27-28 August 2009
- 2. What does “climate change” mean? … for “poverty”, “development”… & Ghana?
- 3. Climate & human development Reaching tipping points – Productivity & food/water security – Humanitarian & disaster risk reduction – GDP impacts, energy – Health implications Not just extreme shocks – Eroding coping capacity – Protecting past & current progress on human development & growth – Preventing reversal in positive trajectory – Vulnerable groups & regions
- 4. Climate change negotiations ongoing Post-2012 framework negotiations - UNFCCC • Bali 2007 to Copenhagen 2009 • Fast-moving, fragmented, overload Implications of CC for development • Adaptation (how cope & reduce risk?) • Mitigation (how prevent? adapt energy? link to carbon markets) • Action at country & regional levels
- 5. Low income countries? Views differ Perceptions matter High income countries?
- 6. Climate change & disaster risk responses Significant governance challenges • Who is involved - top-down, bottom-up? • National & sector levels, Institutional structure? • How strategies are crafted – what content? Multiple stakeholders • MDAs, MoFEP, Castle • Different sector groups, local government • Civil society, academia, industry
- 7. Barriers • Financial downturn – political & economic distraction • Too much pressure on developing countries • Too many meetings • Strategic interests • Uncertainty on best strategies • Institutional patchwork • Fragmentation
- 8. Prospects for Copenhagen • Need political momentum & equity • Need mandate for country negotiators & politicians • Quantified targets by industrialised countries • General framings of key issues: technology, REDD, adaptation, financing → Framework deal → Discussions on modalities over next 3 years
- 9. Big picture 1? Sub-national National Sub-regional Regional Global Community Household UNFCCC African Group & negot’ns Adaptation Fund Board Technology transfer REDD Forest Carbon Facility Disaster risk reduction UNDP – GEF Africa Adapt Prog Economics of Adaptation UNFCCC NEEDS study Carbon finance Gas flaring CARE Adapt Learning
- 10. Food & agriculture Public Big picture 2? Health Private Civil society Finance & Economic Planning Environment, Science & Technology Nat CC committee Env & NR Council Technical officials, civil society Ministers, VP Energy Forestry EPA Civil society Nat Dev Planning Comm’sn Met Agency Foreign Affairs REDD committee
- 11. Informed ability to engage • How attract interest of politicians? – Need informed ability to engage – Economics (what value, costs?) – Scale (extent, number of voters) • Towards wider “programmatic approaches”? – Financing mechanisms & country systems - scale – Allocations & trade-offs across sectors – How integrate into sectoral & national plans & response? – Carbon markets • Institutional frameworks & dynamics • Capacity & training
- 12. Bali Roadmap Two negotiation tracks • UN Framework Convention on Climate Change • Kyoto Protocol Bali Action Plan 2007 • Shared vision, including long term goal • Mitigation- developed & developing countries • Adaptation • Technology to support Mitigation & Adaptation • Finance to support Mitigation & Adaptation
- 13. 13 International climate change negotiations 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 G8: Germany Japan Italy Canada Major Economies Meeting UNFCCC: COP 12 COP 13 COP 14 COP 15 Nairobi Indonesia Poland Denmark Convention Dialogue New Kyoto targets for developed Countries –Ad hoc Working Group KP BALI ROADMAP Accelerated work plan: •Convention Negotiations: AWG Long-term Coop Action •New Kyoto targets for developed countries: AWG Kyoto Protocol Deal on global & comprehensive post-2012 framework UN GA 4th AR IPCC UN GA Other “near-negotiations”: UN HLE, AU, AMCEN, Fin4Dev, APF, V10, APEC, G20, OECD, WTO, IEA … Major Economies Forum EU: Portugal Slovenia France Czech Sweden Spain Belgium
- 14. Current status & Parties’ positions Critical fault lines • Who does what? Who wants what? • All text options now on negotiations table Key questions • Legal form (binding or not) • Annex I targets • Developing country actions (& support) • Rules & methodologies on how targets/actions are achieved e.g. role of market-mechanisms (carbon markets), REDD, financing, technology transfer, Clean Development Mechanism …
- 15. Post-2012 deal - five development tests 1.Ambitious goal with credible near-term targets 2.A way of sharing greenhouse gas emissions that is fair & equitable 3.Support for technology development & transfer to benefit developing countries 4.Reformed carbon market to increase reach & impact of carbon finance for poor countries 5.Support for developing countries to build resilience & adapt to climate change
- 16. Actors Major country coalitions – European Union – Umbrella Group – G-77 & China • AOSIS (small island states) • LDCs • African Group • OPEC members
- 17. Non-governmental: over 600 observers – Environmental & development NGOs – Business NGOs – Research NGOs – Local & municipal authorities – Indigenous peoples & organisations Actors Env NGOs – Coordinator: Climate Action Network Business INGOs – Coordinator: International Chamber of Commerce – Major alliance: World Business Council for Sustainable Development
- 18. Major issues & bloc positions Mitigation – New emissions targets by developed countries – Actions by developing countries – Forests: REDD; sustainable forest management – Emissions trading – Sectoral approaches – Emissions from aviation and ships
- 19. Response to climate change must be rooted in development Development Mitigation Adaptation Climate- compatible development Climate- proofed abatement Climate- resilient Low-carbon … but aligned with mitigation & adaptation objectives
- 20. South Africa’s vision on climate change Source: Dept of Environment and Tourism, South Africa • Transition to climate resilient and low-carbon economy • Our climate response policy, built on six pillars, will be informed by what is required by science – to limit global temperature increase to 2°C above pre- industrial levels • Continue to pro-actively build the knowledge base and our capacity to adapt to the inevitable impacts of climate change • GHG emissions must peak, plateau and decline - stop growing at the latest by 2020-2025, stabilise for up to ten years, then decline in absolute terms • Long term: redefine our competitive advantage and structurally transform the economy by shifting from an energy-intensive to a climate-friendly path as part of a pro-growth, pro-development and pro-jobs strategy
- 21. Adaptation • Methodology / Assessment: vulnerability, financial needs, capacity-building • Impact focus: Risk management and risk reduction strategies; Disaster reduction strategies • Vulnerability focus: poverty eradication; building response capacity; economic diversification • Integration into national planning • Financing: UNFCCC as facilitator; damage costs?
- 22. Technology • Support of deployment & transfer • Removal of barriers (e.g. subsidies) • Creating favourable investment climates • R&D cooperation • Sectoral focus • Clean Development Mechanism reform • Funding
- 23. Finance • New & additional resources • Positive incentives for developing countries to mitigate & adapt • Mobilization of public- & private sector funding • One funding mechanism for mitigation & adaptation?
- 24. Stabilisation & change in temperature – limit to 2oC average global rise 1°C 2°C 5°C4°C3°C 400 ppm CO2e 450 ppm CO2e 550 ppm CO2e 650ppm CO2e 750ppm CO2e 5% 95% Eventual temperature change (relative to pre-industrial) 0°C
- 25. Emissions need to be cut from several sources – not just power generation Four ways to cut: • demand • efficiency • lower-carbon technologies • non-energy emissions
- 26. Ghana capacity as carbon sink 1996, Ghana a net GHG sink but… 1996, not 2009 12,388 12,267 12,673 14,004 13,999 14,265 14,878 10,000 10,500 11,000 11,500 12,000 12,500 13,000 13,500 14,000 14,500 15,000 CO2EQUIVALENTEMISSIONS(Gg) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 YEAR Without LUCF -20,417 -21,191 -15,585 -8,806 -5,411 -5,971 -4,082 -26,000 -21,000 -16,000 -11,000 -6,000 -1,000 NETCO2EQUIVALENT EMISSIONS(Gg) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 YEAR Net, with Land Use Change & Forestry (LUCF)
- 27. Development & adaptation: a continuum Vulnerability Impacts Focus Addressing drivers of vulnerability Building response capacity Climate risk management Confronting climate change Development assistance UNFCCC International funding Uncertainty, lack of awareness Risk Knowledge of climate change Approach Discrete adaptationClimate resilient development
- 28. Major UNFCCC provisions Chief objective Art. 2: • stabilize greenhouse gas emissions • prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system Principles – Art. 3(1): • Equity; ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and capbilities’ – Art. 3(3) • Precautionary principle – Art. 3(4) • Sustainable development
Hinweis der Redaktion
- Lord Stern: The South should frame the conditionality for successful talks: 80% reduction by 2050 under 1990 levels Sharing climate-friendly technologies Sharing revenues from carbon trading Financing global adaptation
- Tradition of framework deals Obama: not enough time Problem will be the new Marrakesh accords Politics flows where the interests are Adaptation will remain an issue, but development agencies have to be prepared to close the gap (not only WB) targets of developing countries: maybe as suggested by BASIC project: leading DCs could provide regular information on their emission cuts (first step to binding commitments?)
- What vertical linkages are required to address climate change, from global to household and individual levels? Which links are key?
- What horizontal linkages are required? How can different stakeholders engage?
- Who Does What? While parties to the UNFCCC & Protocol accept mainstream scientists’ findings on the need for significant & urgent action, it is clear that some fundamental differences persist on the critical question: who should do what? The UNFCCC enshrines the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, & all parties agree that Annex I countries should take the lead. But what does this actually mean? How much of a lead must Annex I countries take? Must they take on national emissions targets? If so, how ambitious should those targets be? & what should developing countries do? Responsibilities may be different, but should not all countries contribute to the solution, especially given that most future emissions growth will occur in major emitters from the South? These issues are complex & highly sensitive. Developing a framework that delivers the massive changes in emissions levels in a form agreeable to almost 200 countries is a daunting task. Key Topics in the “Who Does What” Debate Within this core question, various specific debates & fault lines have emerged. These will need to be resolved in Copenhagen if an agreement is to be reached. Four key debates relate to: (CLICK) a) the legal form of a future agreement; b) the level of Annex I targets; c) what sort of actions developing countries should take on; & d) the rules governing targets & actions – including the use of market-based mechanisms, forestry, land use, & so on.
- Structure of talk – no need to elaborate.
- Umbrella Group = loose coalition of non-EU developed countries, which “metamorphosed from the longer-standing JUSSCANNZ group” (Yamin and Depledge 2004: 45). The name JUSSCANNZ is based on the initial letters of its members Japan, United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand. The difference between the Umbrella Group and JUSSCANNZ is that the former excludes Switzerland, whose position on flexibility mechanisms is much closer to that of the EU, while including Russia and Ukraine who both share the other members’ support for unrestricted emissions trading (Yamin and Depledge 2004: 46). While the EU has acted as a leader among industrialized countries, pushing for the further development of the UN climate regime, the Umbrella Group has mostly played the role of a laggard (Oberthür and Ott 1999: 13ff., 65ff.). Developing countries on the other hand, have largely supported the evolution of the regime, while being reluctant to commit to binding quantitative emissions reductions. They have nonetheless agreed to general commitments under Articles 4(1), 5 and 6 of the convention, which apply to all Parties (Bodansky 2001: 205) None of these three groups should be seen as a coherent block: since climate negotiations have been covering a large number of different concerns, internal differences have become more or less visible in sub-groups or changing alliances (cf. Grubb, Vrolijk and Brack 1999: 27ff.; Schröder 2001). T The remarkable unity of the Group of 77 notwithstanding (Biermann 1998: 35ff., 2005: 274f.), developed countries have also grouped together in smaller alliances during climate negotiations, most notably the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), least developed countries (LDCs), the African Group, and members of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Carter 2001: 236f.; Ott 1997: 207f.; Yamin and Depledge 2004: 34ff EU:Eastern European countries have formed or participated in a series of different groups. By the same token, old and new EU members have been at odds about common climate strategies, for example, relative to reference years for the calculations of emission reduction targets Equally, members of the Umbrella Group have not always pursued a coherent strategy; for instance, apart from the U.S., all members of the Umbrella Group have meanwhile ratified the Kyoto Protocol. What is more, cross-cutting to these various coalitions, there is also an official distinction among country groups. Following established practice in the UN, the climate regime recognizes five UN regions - that is, Africa (also covering the Pacific); Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; Central and Eastern Europe; and Western Europe and Others. “The regional group system is only of limited relevance to the substantive interests of Parties in climate change politics. […] [T]he system has, however proved remarkably resilient in the regime, as indeed it has throughout the UN system” (Yamin and Depledge 2004: 33). For instance, the system was used as a basis for electing the members of most of the specialized bodies of the climate regime like the Compliance Committee.
- High degree of institutional openness; Conditions for observership: non-profit tax exempt status; expertise on climate change - 5 types of constituencies established over the years Most influential: ENGOs and BINGOs Privileges Access to conferene venue Presence during meetings Interventios during debate Side-events Face-to-face lobbying Display and circulation of material
- IMPORTANT: First time distinguishing between ICs and DCs (not Annex I countries) 25-40% by 2020; IPCC EU & Obama: 80% by 2050 (ratification?; Byrd-Hagel 1997; condemning exemption for DCs); Obama wants to push trhough federal legislation this year EU: 20%-30% by 2020; (IPCC) DCs: some form of action; also MRV ICs: 15-30% below BAU by 2020 Russia: voluntary commitments Scholars: differentiation DCs: against binding targets and voluntary commitments Leading DCs against differentiation Scholars: global 50% by 2050 leaves us with 50% chance to overshoot 2°C goal Big topic: REDD: Accountable for 20% of global emissions Bringing in commitments through the back-door Problem: how to pay? Creating tradable credits (might flood the market) ETS revenues (already other ideas) Leakage, additionality and permanence Pervertive incentives (what about biodiv) Methodology: reference emission levels; changes in forest cover, carbon stocks; participation of indigenous people; good practice guidance for LULUCF ICs: pushing for it (Norway, Germany) DCs: like to stress conservation, forest management ENGOs: no payments for hot air; Emissions trading: EU: all OECD countries until 2015; China and other NICs until 2020 (ICAP) US: plans national cap-and-trade system What about carbon taxes? Aviation and shipping: EU: 2020 below 2005 levels; 2050 below 1980 levels US: skeptical; trade war? OPEC: reluctant Sectoral approaches: Technology: second way to bring in commitments through the back door
- Assessments: going away from impacts-based assessments; focus on vulnerability; social conditions; hence: development issue Mainstreaming / integration: in order to avoid mere focus on impacts Economic diversification: OPEC issue Funding: Taking pledged amounts together for existing multilateral funding initatives (AF, SCCF, LDCF, SPA): roughly US$ 500 m. Adaptation Fund: not in a position to receive proposals; definition of operational policies and guidelines still missing; (DCs want legal capacity; independent fund) Estimates: UNFCCC mentioned an amount of 28-67 billion US$ by 2030. The World Bank (2006) mentioned 9-41 billion US$ per year, and Oxfam even estimated an amount of 50 billion dollar per year (Oxfam 2007). Even higher when taking into account damage costs; but so far not considered in negotiations; would be too much! Problem: additionality; mainstreaming EU: additional 175 m euros per year into adaptation funding; half of this going to DCs Private funding: insurances (problem: uncertainties; avoiding exploitation of the poor); solutions: bundling into lending agreements; index-based insurances Scholars: air travel levy Current situation: Poznan; no agreement on further resources, against backdrop of financial crisis; and duplication of debates (6 bodies for 90 items); new US administration
- Tech-Trans Poznan stratetic programme; but no accord on funding so far Adaptation? ICs: IPR standards help; want removal of trade barriers from developing countries Against acquisition fund under the convention Focus on funding: research and development DCs: relaxation of IPR standards; against dual-use goods; Want Tech-dev. And trans Board Want clear indicators to monitor and assess tech-trans Biofuels EU: sustainability criteria Brazil: rather skeptical CDM Smaller DCs: lower transaction costs; preferential treatment of LDCs, SIDS; methodology to calculate GHG reductions from small-scale projects Larger DCs: acceleration of project registrations; SD-PAMs OPEC: against preferential treatment; ICs: EU supportive of simplifying CDM procedures for LDCs, etc. Problem: several suggestions from scholars and ENGOs to avoid leakage: policy CDM; sectoral CDM; but not playing major role in negotiations Methodology issues: project boundaries, leakage New technologies for fossil fuels: CCS Funding: DCs: want acquisition fund to buy out IPRs Private funding will become more important: but what about adaptation?
- DCs Want a new financial architecture Want increased GEF-funding for capacity building Leading DCs: Mexican proposal for multinational fund; DCs should draw from fund according to extent of their contributions; China: 0.5% GDP fiscal commitment of developed countries for A&M Other DCs: not fair, equitable ICs Want to build on existing institutions Existing framework is sufficient; no need for monitoring indicators EU: generate 1/3 of investment through emissions trading Scholars (Benito Müller): criteria Additionality Predictability (not subject to domestic revenue problems) Apporporiateness (neither loans nor grants) Adequacy (scale of funding) Equity = historic responsibilities and capaicties North would have to provide up to 85% of global adaptation costs Stern: every year of inactio means loss of 5-20% of global GDP; EU should provide 35 billion euros for developing countries
- A summary of recent evidence of the commitment to warming for different stabilisation levels. This new evidence allows us to apply probabilities to projections of future climate change Ends of range – lowest probability; near centre of range – highest probability The red bars indicate range (90% confidence) based on two studies – IPCC Third Assessment Report (2001) and Hadley Centre (2004). IPCC because internationally agreed. Hadley because more recent, more sophisticated on probabilities and central of recent studies. The grey bars cover the range of eleven recent studies. Detail and sources: The lower bound is the 5th percentile from a study based on the IPCC Third Assessment Report (Wigley and Raper 2001). The upper bound is the 95th percentile is from a recent study by the Hadley Centre that explores the uncertainty in climate models (Murphy et al. 2004). The grey lines indicate the results over 11 recent studies (from Meinshausen (2006)) – 5% point from lowest, and 95% from highest. [newer studies are still emerging and give results within this range] Now at 430ppm and rising 2.5ppm per year [rate varies significantly year to year, 2004 it was 2.2ppm/yr, average 2.3ppm per year 1980-2004]
- GLOBAL Emissions arise from a very wide range of economic activities so a variety of solutions will be needed to bring about the reductions highlighted in the previous slide. Economics of cost dictate that reducing emissions wherever cheapest across sectors and regions will reduce the cost of any given target which will involve reducing emissions through all four of the routes identified in this slide. In the power sector, very many technologies that can reduce emissions. In non-energy emissions, reducing deforestation would make an immediate impact likely to be cost effective by agriculture may be more problematic. All countries around the world must be involved in action. In the long-run stabilisation, annual emissions must be 80-90% below current levels – equivalent of decarbonising everything except agriculture
- Not about avoiding greenhouse effect as such, but anthropogenic effect Six gases: CO2, methane, nitrous oxide (N2O) and three groups of fluorinated gases: HFCs, PFCs and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)