1. THE RESURRECTION OF
JAPANESE MILITARY CAPACITY
By Sara F. Smith
NOVEMBER 30, 2016
DR. JULIE LANE
University of North Carolina Wilmington

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Introduction
There are few sovereign states which limit their own military capacity as extremely as Japan.
Much of this is due to their American-written, post-war constitution. Article 9 of the Japanese
constitution reads as follows: (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice
and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the
aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will
never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized (The
Constitution of Japan, 1947). It would have been difficult for Japan to shrug this constraint
immediately given international pressure and the general weight of the document itself; however,
this does not explain why a country as economically strong and enveloped in international
institutions as modern Japan is, should not alter their laws or interpretation of the constitution to
allow for greater freedom in military action. This is especially true considering Japan is
geographically situated near two nondemocratic states which have both frequently made
threatening statements and actions towards the island nation.
It is thus easy to determine that Japan is now at a more understandable position to increase its
military capacity. It is doing just that right now. The Japanese government has been in the
process of passing legislation and taking strategic positions publically and privately to ensure
greater freedom in utilizing their military as well as increasing the power and size of the military.
There is no doubt that this is the stance the current leadership is taking. The question then
becomes thus: to what extent is Japan resurrecting its military capacity? The answer to such a
question ranges from merely tinkering with the idea of such a path, to aggressively taking action
year in and year out to ensure drastic increase in military capacity within a short period of time.

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The former is not worth the attention because of the powerful messages being sent out by Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe as well as members of the bureaucracy. This then leaves one with two
possible answers in a basic system of analysis. Japan could be a) extremely aggressive, or b)
making deliberate progress.
It must be noted that, in this context, the term “aggressive” does not refer to military
aggression itself. Rather, it refers to the pace and scope in which Japan is moving towards the
end result. One cannot assume that Japan is attempting to increase its military capacity simply
for offensive purposes or for bargaining power. National defense must be considered the key
motive for moving in such a direction. This is a reasonable assertion given the path the Ministry
of Defense has tread in the decades since Japan’s resuming of sovereignty post-war. The posture
of many key figures within the bureaucracy during this push for increased military capacity lends
to this assertion. For example, the Department Chairman of the 2014 Advisory Panel on
Reconstruction of the Legal Base for Security, Shinichi Kitaoka stated, “We cannot even help
our own citizens yet expect other militaries come to aid us. It’s ridiculous” (Kallender-Umezu,
2014). This plays into the intense Japanese culture of responsibility lending itself to positions
taken by government officials, which will be discussed later in the paper.
Given the choices between a deliberate progress towards increased military capacity and the
aggressive reach for it, the former is more consistent with the available evidence. While the
ruling faction in Japan and many key members of the bureaucracy and civil society favor an
intense push towards increased militarization and freedom in using the military, there is a
considerable number of “pacifists” who enjoy political power. These people oppose the current
trend and have slowed down critical legislation.

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Literature Review
There are relatively few major schools of thought on this topic. Much of the academic world
pays little mind to Japan’s military capacity or its alteration of strict non-aggression policies. The
notable difference in opinion is in whether or not Japan is progressing too quickly or not quickly
enough. Christopher Hughes, a Japan military expert and professor of international politics and
Japanese studies at the University of Warwick, maintains that Japan will certainly not be content
with the current policy initiatives because they, “will set precedents and set Japan on the way to
further expansion of military activities in the future” (Kallender-Umezu, 2014). This is likely
true and plays a part in the strains of thought on this topic. The intense anti-corruption movement
and frustration over inefficiencies in public works that brought about the historic win by the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) over the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2009 is still at play
today. The DPJ have successfully fulfilled many of their election promises and continue to poll
highly among Japanese voters. Given the intense support of resurrecting military capacity from
the DPJ, it is likely that Japan will continue down this path for as long as the DPJ stay in control
of the government.
Akira Kawasaki pinpoints the many ways Japan is at an important juncture concerning their
military capacity in the 2009 paper Japan’s Military Spending at a Crossroads. Kawasaki breaks
down the 2009 Japanese budget, focusing primarily on the allocations within the defense budget.
The author takes no clear stance on the issue, but brings forth data that clearly shows Japan’s
unwillingness to continue down the same path it has been heading down since 1955. This
includes sustaining the military budget at 1% of GDP even though the DPJ slashed the entire
federal budget by a large margin (Kawasaki, 2009). The author also delves into the large interest

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groups, primarily the business community, who have voiced strong opinions about probable
legislation concerning the subject. Kawasaki focuses on the Keidranren and their promotion of
the now-passed revision of the Three Principles of Arms Exports and the pursuance of space
technology. In this vane, Kawasaki breaks down the Ballistic Missile Defense expenditures,
showing a rise from Ұ110 billion in 2004 to its height of Ұ180 billion in 2007, and the
subsequent fall back down to Ұ110 billion in 2008 and 2009 after the economic recession of the
same time period. Kawasaki lays out the various categories of military-related spending and the
accompanying groups who push their respective agendas.
Some take the more opinionated stance that Japan is going in the right direction and should
continue to pursue this agenda of freeing itself to use its military in meaningful and impactful
ways. Those such as Grant Newsham, a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic
Studies, has claimed that “opponents [of the change] appear to be quite happy to have Americans
go slaughter whoever is threatening Japan… it’s faux pacifism” (Kallender-Umezu, 2014). This
is in reference to the key opposition group, the Buddhists. With pacifism being a central tenant to
their religion, the Buddhist faction has made attempts to stall the legislation needed to increase
lateral use of the military as well as halt the increase in military capacity. Of course, Newsham’s
western nationality needs to be taken into account along with his comments.
Research Design
Japan has constitutionally forbid itself from maintaining an offensive military since the
regaining of sovereignty in 1952; however, Japan has increasingly taken steps to work around
the ninth article of their constitution and increase its military capacity over the past few decades.

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But the question remains: To what extent is Japan preparing to resurrect its military capabilities
independent of domestic protection by American personnel? This can be a complicated answer
because the Japanese government has not necessarily been forthright with their hopeful
reanimation of a true military apparatus.
The analysis of materials will be undergone with the core assumption that Japan is, indeed,
working to bolster its military capabilities. This is in line with the theory of realism, given that
very few states do not have any working military and no other post-industrial state besides Japan
does not have an adequate military and completely relies on a foreign power for domestic
protection. In a realist point of view, Japan certainly has economic power. This, therefore, only
naturally translates into a desire for military power as well, even if the desire is for defensive
purposes.
It is expected that Japan is making deliberate progress towards increasing its military capacity
with the intent of participating in joint-defense programs and other defense-related actions.
Given that there is such a large scope of options to consider, the first step in this project will be
to break down the areas of discussion into three categories: general government actions, military
activity, and cultural motives. The first category of general government action consists of many
parts. To be discussed are: promotion of military-related technology in the private sector,
legislation concerning Japan’s strict non-aggression interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese
constitution, budgetary measures, etc. The areas of private business that the Japanese
government has taken interest in promoting will be included because the interplay between the
private sector and the public on matters of national importance is not new. The tight interlocking
of the public sector and the private sector has been the norm in Japan since its first serious
industrialization boom during the Tokugawa Era of the late nineteenth century (Meyer, 1993).

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One could even make the case that this weaving of interests and control has a history beyond the
Tokugawa and Heian Eras. To increase military capacity in a technology economy such as
Japan’s, it is prudent to guide and aid the private sector in developing the necessary military
technology to be sold to and used by the Japanese government and military. The pace and scope
of this undertaking is a clear signal as to the build-up strategy of the government.
The next piece is the legislation concerning Japan’s stance on even having or being able to
use their military. Japan was banned from manufacturing aircraft, military and civilian, for
decades after World War II. Its American-written constitution vaguely calls for no military
presence large and capable enough to wage war. In order to increase military capacity and make
it usable, anywhere from six to over a dozen laws need to be changed to make this action legal in
the state (Kawasaki, 2009). Its ability to formulate and pass legislation acts as key markers in
Japan’s militaristic progress.
Japan’s budgetary allocations is another insight into its military aspirations. In order for Japan
to increase its military capacity, it will need to spend more money. This does not necessarily
need to go directly to the military. Important budgetary allocations to be considered are those to
research and development firms dealing with aerospace technology, naval industries, technology
that can be used as direct weapons, and technology that can be useful in intelligence-gathering.
The 2008 global recession hit Japan particularly hard and it has been forced to find areas to cut
government expenditures to accommodate for the lack of revenue. Therefore, it will be
interesting to note budgetary shifts to areas related to military defense.
Other government actions will be considered as well. This included white papers, committee
statements and data releases, and statements from key leaders particularly Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe. The latter of the three is especially telling of the direction Japan will take and how quickly

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it will execute. Prime Minister Abe has made his intentions and feelings fairly clear to the
Japanese people and the world. With leadership this vocal about an international issue, it must be
included in the study.
The next piece of the study is actions by the military. This included increased recruiting efforts
and changes in recruitment practices in effort to combat any negative perception which would
prevent young Japanese individuals from joining the Self-Defense Force (SDF). To also be
included are alterations in large-scale training activities, particularly those in conjunction with
the United States. This is because, as Japan expands its capacity, its military leaders need to be
trained in technology and strategy. This will undoubtedly be done with the help of Japan’s
closest ally: the United States. Another key piece to this is the movements of American forces
within Japan. As Japan’s military grows, it will need more and more space in Japan’s military
centers, previously occupied mainly by the United States. Theoretically, as Japan’s capacity
grows, less Americans will need to be present on Japanese territory. It is expected that
Americans may be moved to other, less-secure locations in Southeast Asia in response; however,
the time frame may be larger than the scope of the study.
The last section of the study will be discussing the relevant cultural aspects in Japan that
would be expected to affect its progress towards increasing military capabilities. Japan is often
noted as a prideful nation and one that places emphasis on hard work and independence. This
conflicts with their current international position. Under the nonaggression interpretation of
Article 9, Japan cannot help defend its allies if it were attacked. However, if Japan was to be
attacked, their place in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) means that their allies
are obligated to help defend Japan. It also cannot send its military to save innocent civilians from
danger, even Japanese aid workers in foreign countries. This does not fall into step with their

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perceived cultural values. This study will attempt to use Japanese cultural norms to provide
additional context to the steps Japan is taking to increase its military capacity.
General Government Action
The Japanese government as a whole has moved toward increasing military capacity since the
2009 elections formed a coalition government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). This
election was the end of the reign of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who have held control
since 1955 (Kawasaki, 2009). Both Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and current Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe have overseen the shifting of perception regarding the military. This is easily seen in
the slashing of the government budget for 2010. To reduce government spending post-recession,
the DPJ cut Ұ3 trillion ($30 billion USD), mostly targeting “inefficient public works projects and
government corporations in collusive relationships with the bureaucracy” (Kawasaki, 2009). This
was done without touching the roughly Ұ4.8 trillion ($48 billion USD) allocated to military
expenditures1 (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2015). While most of the budgets towards
government agencies and programs fell in the wake of the 2008 recession, the military budget
stayed steady at about 1% of the gross domestic product (GDP). The prevailing sentiment has
been that “Japan’s military expenditures remain beyond criticism and serious revision”
(Kawasaki, 2009). This sort of defense of the military budget hints at the attempt at revitalizing
the military and the way the country is willing to use it.
1 This does not include the SACO-related budgetary allocations paid to the United States for domestic protection and
the subsequent costsin transportation and facilities associated with the American armed forces in the country.

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Technological advances is perhaps the quickest and easiest way for Japan to increase its
military capacity in a meaningful way. This is especially true given the very heart of Japan’s
private enterprise culture rests in the technology industry. Of course, most of this is personal or
corporate use technology, but most major corporations in Japan have a research and development
and/ or manufacturing branch for items which can be sold to the military. The largest roadblock
for military technology production was the Three Principles on Arms Exports banning any and
all defense-related technology or arms from being exported to “communist bloc countries,
countries subjected to ‘arms’ exports embargo under the United Nations Security Council’s
resolutions, and countries involved or likely to be involved in international conflicts (Japan's
Policies on the Control of Arms Exports, 2014). The wording of this 1967 policy essentially
prohibits the selling of arms to any other nation that does not meet the qualifications of a pacifist
nation. Since it is doubtful that pacifist nations would buy arms from Japan, the Japanese
government itself was the only patron of arms manufactured in the country. A 1976 policy
addition also declared that “direct oversees investment for the purposes of manufacturing ‘arms’
abroad and the participation in the overseas construction projects of military facilities” were also
banned (Japan's Policies on the Control of Arms Exports, 2014). This was a key point of
attempted reform for the many in the government.
Major reform of these policies was made in 2014 under Prime Minister Abe. The Cabinet
signed legislation relaxing the Three Principles to banning exports to, “countries involved in
conflicts” and any exports violating U.N resolutions along with the stipulation that “Japan will
allow arms exports only if they serve the purpose of contributing to international cooperation and
its security interests” (The Japan Times, 2014). This is essentially providing the government
leeway in determining when and to whom it is alright to export arms made in Japan. The new

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principles open up the market for widespread profit and innovation for Japanese manufacturers.
Allowing for increased innovation and international sales of arms is a step towards bettering the
Japanese military and increasing Japan’s effect on the international system, particularly in
situations where Japan’s allies are engaged in armed conflicts. This power would allow Japan to
successfully achieve many of the objectives the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal
Base for Security recommended Japan should accomplish such as rescuing aid workers, shooting
down missiles fired over Japan towards the United States, participating in U.N.-authorized
military actions and more (Kallender-Umezu, 2014). The revision of the Three Principles on
Arms Exports was just one of many major legislative actions aimed at increasing Japan’s
military capacity and providing the government leeway in using it.
Military action and the relationship with China
The military itself has taken actions independent of the executive and legislature which
exhibits a deliberate progress in increasing military capacity. Increased attention to recruitment
practices and results is one of the tactics used to accomplish an increased capacity. The Self
Defense Force had a full-time staff of 250,000 people as of March 2009 and, “in recent years, the
Ministry of Defense has been investing much more energy in recruiting SDF personnel”
(Kawasaki, 2009). The targets of these increased efforts are mainly high school students. In
particular, youth who have let home are extremely prevalent in the central Tokyo area of Shibuya
where the SDF established a jieikan (recruitment center) in 2008 (Kawasaki, 2009). Targeting
youth who have few options with the temptation of a steady career with the SDF is a clear signal
that the SDF is interested in expanding the number of personnel under its control. Many youths
are not interested in the SDF as a career path since the prevailing perception is that going to war

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is a distinct possibility in the SDF (Kawasaki, 2009). While war-waging goes against Article 9,
Japan’s involvement in logistical aid during the war in Afghanistan has led to the perception that
going to war is a distinct possibility if joining the Self-Defense Force.
This is especially true in a time where China has increased its aggressiveness in the South
China Sea. One of the most direct courses to understanding the relationship between China and
Japan’s militaries is to read the case from the Japanese perspective, the latter being the
reactionary actor in this case. Japan’s 2014 Defense White Paper clearly expresses Japan’s stance
on its neighbor. A 2014 article in Chinascope (Yin zhuo: Japan's defense white paper clearly
expresses that china is japan's top opponent., 2014) quotes Yin Zhuo, the director of the Navy
Expert Committee on Information Technology as stating that, “Japan’s Defense White Paper
clearly communicated to the outside world that China is Japan’s number one competitor and top
opponent.” The article continued by adding that “if future wars explode, China will be Japan’s
main combat objective,” (Yin zhuo: Japan's defense white paper clearly expresses that china is
japan's top opponent., 2014). The white paper clearly defines Japan’s reactionary stance to the
perceived Chinese threat to national security. This establishes the relationship between the two
countries’ military apparatuses.
An earlier article in Asian Survey document’s some of China’s strategic foreign policy
through the 1990s and early 2000s. Tamara Renee Shie states that, regardless of the warming of
relations with China worldwide in the early nineties, “they [China] showed a continual
willingness to use force to pursue territorial objectives” which, “exacerbated concern over a
growing ‘China Threat’, particularly in Southeast Asia,” (Shie, 2007). Shie continued to cite
cases such as the Spratly Islands incident in 1995, the Straight Crisis with Taiwan in 1995-96,
and China’s satellite tracking installation on South Tarawa Atoll in Kiribati.

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Japan has most definitely seen this aggression as possible predecessors to clear and
devastating attacks on Japan’s interests. Given that Japan is so responsive to actions by the
Chinese military, it is within reason to suspect that as China continues to push its interests in the
region, Japan will prepare militarily in case of future combat.
Cultural Motives
One cannot escape the question of why Japan would pursue an increased military capacity
with moderate leeway in which to use the military itself while maintaining the stance of refusing
to give itself complete freedom to grow and utilize it as much as other sovereign states.
Underpinning this entire push towards increased military capacity is Japan’s strict revulsion to
full-scale war based on Japanese aggression. World War II is still fresh in the Japanese psyche.
Like all major players in large wars, Japan committed numerous human rights violations. That
fact is not lost on the current population. Japan as a country simply does not want to be the “bad
guys” anymore. This is likely a key reason in the continued closeness and affiliation with the
United States after all these years.
It would otherwise be very reasonable for a more complicated or strained relationship
between the U.S. and Japan. The dropping of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki are
both events that are still strong in the social consciousness. The United States was the main
opponent to Japan during WWII and was the overseer of Japan’s reconstruction, forcing a
western constitution and democratic system a country with an honored tradition of being ruled by
emperors and the shogunate. Many of the concepts the U.S. pushed onto Japan in the post-war
period was contradictory to Japanese traditional values and ideas. It would only be natural that

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Japan today would still hold a great amount of animosity at their treatment by the U.S. decades
ago.
However this is clearly not the case. After the 2014 Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the
Legal Base for Security made its report public, Abe emotionally appealed to the Japanese people
by standing in front of an illustration depicted an unnamed aggressor (clearly China) attacking an
American vessel carrying both American and Japanese civilians, including children. Abe then
states, “We as the Japanese government can’t do a thing to help them. Do you really think that is
good?” (Kallender-Umezu, 2014). In fact, a key motive for many Japanese leaders in increasing
military capacity and leeway in use is for Japan to lift its own weight on the international scene.
No longer are these leaders willing to allow the United States and Japan’s other NATO allies to
shed blood in important combat arenas while Japan stays back and provides logistical support at
the most. Deputy Chairman Kitaoka pushed this point when stating that the Shuuhen Jitaiho
(laws relating to security in areas surrounding Japan) should be changed so that Japan can aid
American ships in the water should the situation arise (Kallender-Umezu, 2014). Japanese
leaders have provided clear evidence that helping its allies, particularly the United States, is a
major reason to overhaul the current constitutional interpretation of Article 9 and to increase
Japanese military capacity.
National pride is another major factor in Japan’s current trend. Deep in the Japanese
collective conscience is the sense of pride in hard work and independence. This can be seen in
the abnormal work hours many Japanese workers live with in order to achieve success. This has
gone to extremes in the cases of karoshi, which is a unique Japanese term for one who has died
from overwork (Martin, 2016). Even though karoshi are far and few between, the presence of a
specific term for this sort of person marks the intense pride in working hard. Japanese television

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and popular culture is filled with sentiments of never abandoning one’s friends and always
pushing oneself to the brink through long preparation, most notably in the well-funded industry
of Japanese animation and graphic novels. Given these cultural sentimentalities, the earlier
statement of the Department Chairman of the 2014 Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the
Legal Base for Security, Shinichi Kitaoka, makes sense. The cultural aspirations to try one’s best
and to stand with one’s allies directly conflicts with the strictly pacifist interpretation of the
constitution. The gap between the societal values and government policy is great and this sort of
gap leads to disassociation with the government. The most likely path in this situation is to alter
government policy to reflect society’s values. To do this, Japan must be willing to militarily aid
its allies and increase military capacity to provide protection to Japanese citizens who travel
abroad.
Given Japan’s primary motivation in increasing military capacity and leeway of use being to
aid allies and aid citizens abroad, it must be noted that Japan is not pressing for an outwardly
aggressive path. The motivations do not seem to include a military that will threaten other
countries or enter into combat situations needlessly. This is in itself a check to the progress of
increasing capacity. If the political elite in the country intended for a large, military ready to
enter combat any time Japanese interests are threatened, Japan would be making aggressive
progress rather than the deliberate advancements it has been making.
Conclusion
Japan has been steadily increasing its military capacity during the reforms of the last few
years. Positive views on the importance of a strong, flexible military have increased since the

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beginning of renewed Chinese aggression in the region during the 1990s. Many political elite in
Japan have pushed heavily to pass legislation allowing for greater latitude in using military force,
loosening the bans on arms exportations, and allowing for the blurring of lines between defense-
related scientific technology and other forms of scientific technology. These efforts have
resulted in some reforms, most notably Prime Minister Abe’s new Three Principles on Arms
Exportations allowing for far greater latitude in determining to whom Japanese manufactured
arms can be sold.
Efforts have been held in check by both opposition to the measures and those careful to not
resurrect Japanese military aggressiveness along with military capacity. Buddhists make up the
largest portion of strict opponents in Japan. The religion itself presses for complete pacifism;
however, this is not a feasible path in today’s current political order and Japan’s proximity to
aggressors such as China and to a lesser extent Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Pacifist sentimentalities
are battling against the deeply entrenched values on hard work and teamwork. While the United
States continues to risk American lives on behalf of Japanese citizens, it is unlikely that these
values will lose to the religious pacifism that provide the center for the opposition’s arguments.
Japan has begun to walk the path of increased military strength and flexibility in its use. This
will undoubtedly continue in policy reforms, recruitment tactics, armament research and
development, and increased training exercises between the American and Japanese military to
provide better support for an increased domestic military presence in the country. Japan will
continue its deliberate progress without emotionally charging its military to engage in needless
combat as it has done in the past for the sake of ideology and power. Modern Japan is one with a
progressing military power and one which values peace. The two are not opposing ideas as Japan
has certainly proved throughout the initial reformation process. Americans can look forward to

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the day in which Japan has enough lateral freedom in its military use to be able to aid its allies in
all pertinent situations.

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