1.
PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH
2nd Floor, CPDRI Room, Asian Institute of Tourism, University of the Philippines
Commonwealth Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City 1101 Philippines
Telephone +632 9946972 Fax: +632 4333870
www.pipvtr.com
TERRORISM
IN
ASIA
AND
THE
PHILIPPINES:
AN
ASSESSMENT
OF
THREATS
AND
RESPONSES
11
YEARS
AFTER
9/11
ROMMEL
C.
BANLAOI
Delivered
at
the
National
Conference
of
the
Philippine
Historical
Association
(PHA)
in
cooperation
with
the
National
Commission
for
Culture
and
the
Arts
and
the
Philippine
Historical
Commission
of
the
Philippines
held
at
the
University
of
Iloilo,
Iloilo
City
on
21
September
2012.
PLEASE
CHECK
AGAINST
DELIVERY.
It
is
really
my
deep
honor
to
speak
before
all
of
you
today,
particularly
before
members
of
the
Philippine
Historical
Association
(PHA),
the
National
Commission
for
Culture
and
the
Arts
(NCCA)
and
the
Philippine
Historical
Commission
of
the
Philippines
(PHCP).
Please
accept
my
sincerest
appreciation
for
the
privilege
to
deliver
my
talk
today.
Yesterday,
I
arrived
from
Bangkok
where
I
delivered
a
related
lecture
on
crime-­‐
terrorism-­‐insurgency
nexus
in
the
Philippines.
Some
portions
of
my
talk
today
is
culled
from
this
lecture,
while
bearing
in
mind
the
general
theme
of
this
conference.
As
a
Political
Science
scholar,
History
is
an
integral
part
of
my
academic
activities.
There
is
even
a
contested
perception
that
“History
is
past
politics”.
That
is
why
I
can
not
imagine
pursuing
political
studies
and
analyses
without
History.
In
the
area
of
terrorism
studies
and
research,
History
provides
the
proper
context
to
understand
the
evolution
and
the
current
nature
of
terrorist
threats
and
their
concomitant
counter-­‐measures.1
In
Asia,
History
shows
that
many
problems
associated
with
terrorism
predate
the
September
11,
2001
(9/11)
terrorist
attacks.2
However,
that
it
was
only
in
the
1Gérard
Chaliand
and
Arnaud
Blin,
eds.,
The
History
of
Terrorism:
From
Antiquity
to
Al
Qaeda
(California:
University
of
California
Press,
2007).
2For
an
excellent
reference
on
this
issue,
see
Andrew
TH
Tan,
ed.,
A
Handbook
of
Terrorism
and
Insurgency
in
Southeast
Asia
(London
and
Massachusetts:
Edward
Elgar
Publishing,
Inc.,
2007).
1

2. aftermath
of
9/11
when
terrorism
received
more
serious
scholarly
attentions
in
Asia.
In
the
Philippines,
however,
terrorism
research
and
studies
continue
to
receive
little
scholarly
attention.
Though
there
are
some
Filipino
social
science
scholars
touching
terrorism-­‐related
issues
in
peace
research
and
armed
conflict
studies,
terrorism
as
an
academic
field
in
the
Philippines
remains
nascent,
weak,
and
marginalized.
This
is
lamentable
considering
the
fact
that
terrorism
research
abroad
has
gone
up
since
9/11.
Even
among
Filipino
historians,
terrorism
research
has
not
been
given
enough
scholarly
attention.
To
my
knowledge,
our
institute
is
the
only
academic
research
organization
in
the
Philippines
that
treats
terrorism
as
a
centerpiece
of
scholarly
research.
Hoever,
our
institute
receives
little
funding
to
implement
fully
all
our
research
programs.
Due
to
funding
constraints,
related
research
organizations
relegate
terrorism
in
the
periphery
of
their
research
agenda.
There
is
a
need
to
conduct
more
scholarly
research
on
terrorism
because
history
shows
that
the
Philippines
has
been
a
victim
of
various
terrorist
attacks.
In
fact,
almost
all
non-­‐state
armed
groups
in
the
country
have
already
engaged
in
violent
acts
associated
with
terrorism.
This
encouraged
the
Philippine
government
to
pass
the
anti-­‐terrorism
law
in
2007,
which
is
called
the
Human
Security
Act
of
2007.
Though
9/11
maybe
considered
a
thing
of
the
past,
its
aftershocks
eleven
years
after
are
still
being
felt
in
Asia
and
more
so
in
the
Philippines.
Terrorism
remains
a
problem
in
Southeast
Asia,
South
Asia,
Central
Asia,
and
West
Asia
particularly
in
countries
like
Indonesia,
the
Philippines,
India,
Pakistan,
Afghanistan,
Iraq,
Iran,
Yemen,
Syria,
and
Egypt,
just
to
name
a
few.
In
July
2012,
the
Bureau
of
Counterterrorism
of
the
United
States
Department
of
State
published
the
Country
Reports
on
Terrorism
2011.3
This
report
laments
that
terrorism
remains
a
global
threat
requiring
global
counterterrorism
cooperation.
Though
Osama
bin
Laden
was
already
killed,
he
remained
an
iconic
leader
by
those
influenced
and
inspired
by
his
ideas
and
actions.
Though
already
weakened
as
a
result
of
various
counterterrorism
measures,
Al
Qaeda
remains
alive.
In
Asia,
there
are
still
individuals
who
are
influenced,
inspired
and
even
associated
with
Al
Qaeda.
In
Southeast
Asia,
Al-­‐Qaeda
linked,
influenced
and
inspired
organizations
continue
to
pose
a
threat
to
regional
security
eleven
years
after
9/11.
3US
State
Department,
Country
Reports
on
Terrorism
2011
(Washington
DC:
Bureau
of
Counterterrorism,
July
2012),
p.
181.
2

3. Indonesia
is
considered
to
be
the
epicenter
of
terrorist
threats
in
Southeast
Asia
because
of
Jemaah
Islamiya
(JI),
a
homegrown
violent
extremist
group.
Though
JI
already
disintegrated
as
result
of
the
killing
and
arrest
of
their
key
leaders,
it
continues
to
have
a
thousand
followers
in
Indonesia,
Malaysia
and
the
Philippines.
Because
JI
is
in
the
wanted
list
of
foreign
terrorist
organizations,
its
members
have,
in
fact,
formed
another
group
as
a
cover.
This
group
is
called
Jama'ah
Ansharut
Tauhid
(JAT)
led
by
no
less
than
the
JI
co-­‐founder,
Abu
Bakar
Bashir.4
The
U.S.
government
already
classified
JAT
as
a
foreign
terrorist
organization.
Like
JI,
JAT
has
followers
not
only
in
Indonesia
but
also
in
Malaysia,
the
Southern
Thailand,
and
even
the
Southern
Philippines.
Like
JI,
JAT
also
has
a
dream
of
establishing
an
Islamic
caliphate
in
Southeast
Asia
that
includes
the
Southern
Philippines.
The
U.S.
Department
of
State
claims
that
the
Philippines
remains
as
a
“terrorist
safe
haven”
in
its
Country
Reports
on
Terrorism.5
In
the
Philippines,
it
is
common
to
refer
to
the
Abu
Sayyaf
Group
(ASG)
when
talking
about
terrorist
threats.
There
is
a
debate
on
whether
the
ASG
is
a
rebel,
terrorist
or
a
mere
bandit
group.6
Some
carelessly
describe
the
ASG
as
the
Frankenstein
monster
of
the
Philippine
military.
The
media
interchangeably
describes
the
ASG
as
a
bandit
and
a
terrorist
group.
But
the
United
States
decisively
classifies
the
ASG
as
a
foreign
terrorist
organization.
In
my
continuing
study
of
the
ASG
for
more
than
15
years,
I
have
learned
that
the
ASG
has
evolved
into
a
non-­‐state
armed
group
with
multiple
personalities
involved
in
various
acts
of
violence.7
When
Abdurajak
Janjalani
formed
the
group
in
1989,
his
original
intention
was
to
bridge
the
divide
between
the
Moro
National
Liberation
Front
(MNLF)
of
Nur
4
International
Crisis
Group,
Indonesia:
The
Dark
Side
of
Jama’ah
Ansharut
Tauhid
(JAT)
(Asia
Briefing
Number
107,
6
July
2010).
5
Ibid.
6Soliman
M.
Santos,
Jr.
and
Octavio
A.
Dinampo.
“Abu
Sayyaf
Reloaded:
Rebels,
Agents,
Bandits,
Terrorists
(Case
Study)
in
Soliman
Santos,
et,
al.
Primed
and
Purposeful:
Armed
Groups
and
Human
Security
Efforts
in
the
Philippines
(Geneva:
Small
Arms
Survey,
2010),
pp.
115-­‐138.
7For
my
most
updated
publication
on
the
ASG,
see
Rommel
C.
Banlaoi,
Al-­Harakatul
Al-­Islamiyyah:
Essays
on
the
Abu
Sayyaf
Group,
3rd
edition
(Quezon
City:
Philippine
Institute
for
Peace,
Violence
and
Terrorism
Research,
2012).
3

4. Misuari
and
the
Moro
Islamic
Liberation
Front
(MILF)
of
the
late
Hashim
Salamat.
Thus,
Abdurajak
recruited
followers
from
the
MNLF
and
the
MILF.
But
when
he
died
in
1998,
the
ASG
rapidly
degenerated
into
a
bandit
group
engaged
in
kidnapping,
extortion
and
smuggling
activities
under
the
leadership
of
his
brother,
Khadaffy
Janjalani.
At
present,
the
ASG
has
adopted
a
cellular-­‐type
structure
led
by
commanders
in
their
respective
geographical
turfs.
With
many
commanders
at
the
helm
of
a
single
group,
the
ASG
has
already
evolved
into
a
highly
promiscuous
armed
group
linked
with
other
armed
groups
engaged
in
terrorism,
insurgency,
banditry
and
other
violent
acts.
It
has
also
become
a
very
resilient
armed
group
having
been
protected
by
some
corrupt
local
politicians
and
a
few
scalawags
in
uniform
who
benefit
from
ASG’s
violent
activities.8
Some
ASG
members
even
serve
as
private
armed
escorts
of
a
few
local
politicians
in
Sulu,
Basilan
and
Tawi-­‐Tawi,
particularly
during
elections.
Thus,
the
ASG
of
the
late
80’s
is
no
longer
the
ASG
of
today.
In
fact,
some
armed
men
who
claim
to
be
followers
of
the
ASG
are
also
claiming
to
be
followers
of
the
MNLF
and
the
MILF,
depending
on
the
situation.
Current
remnants
still
prefer
to
use
the
name,
ASG,
as
it
has
become
a
very
convenient
trademark
for
their
violent
activities.
Ustadj
Abdul
Rasul
Sayyaf,
the
real
person
whom
this
trademark
is
based,
is
very
displeased
to
see
his
name
being
used
in
the
Philippines
for
violent
purposes.
Since
the
global
war
on
terrorism
in
2001,
the
Philippine
government
has
already
put
to
justice
many
ASG
members
for
committing
various
crimes
associated
with
terrorism.
But
the
ASG
threat
persists
because
the
ASG
has
a
survival
instinct
that
is
also
shared
by
some
likeminded
groups
abroad.
ASG’s
staying
power
comes
from
the
continuous
supply
of
illiterate
and
out-­‐of-­‐
school
youth
in
Mindanao
joining
the
group
for
a
variety
of
reasons
from
personal,
economic,
social,
and
political.9
In
fact,
the
ASG’s
rank-­‐and-­‐file
is
composed
of
some
young
orphans
being
abused
by
old
commanders
to
mount
various
kidnap-­‐for-­‐
ransom
and
extortion
activities.
8Rommel
C.
Banlaoi,
“The
Sources
of
Abu
Sayyaf
Resilience
in
the
Southern
Philippines”.
CTC
Sentinel
(3
May
2010).
9Rommel
C.
Banlaoi,
“The
Pull
of
Terrorism:
A
Philippine
Case
Study”.
Youth
and
Terrorism:
A
Selection
of
Articles
(Kuala
Lumpur:
Southeast
Asian
Regional
Centre
for
Counter-­‐
Terrorism,
2011),
pp.
39-­‐50.
4

5.
The
Philippine
military
says
that
the
ASG
has
around
400-­‐armed
members
as
of
2010.10
Most
of
its
members
operate
mainly
in
Basilan,
Sulu,
Zamboaga
Sibugay
and
Tawi-­‐Tawi.
But
there
are
also
sightings
of
ASG
followers
in
Metro
Manila.
During
the
first
semester
of
2012,
the
Philippine
government
says
that
the
ASG
membership
has
declined
to
around
350.
My
independent
research
on
the
ASG,
however,
indicates
that
the
ASG
has
only
around
100
regular
followers
serving
six
major
commanders
lording
over
in
only
three
major
provinces
in
Mindanao:
Basilan,
Sulu
and
Tawi-­‐Tawi
(BASULTA).
In
Sulu,
which
is
the
epicenter
of
ASG
activities,
there
are
three
major
commanders:
Commander
Radullan
Sahiron,
Commander
Yassir
Igasan,
and
Commander
Hajan
Sawadjaan.
Sahiron
has
only
around
30
regular
armed
followers.
He
is
the
recognized
over-­‐all
operational
commander
of
the
ASG.
Igasan,
who
has
been
rumored
to
be
the
over-­‐all
Amir
of
the
ASG,
only
has
around
5
regular
armed
followers.
Sawadjaan
only
has
around
10
regular
armed
followers.
In
Basilan,
there
are
also
three
major
commanders:
Commander
Isnilon
Hapilon,
Commander
Khair
Mundos,
and
Commander
Puruji
Indama.
Hapinol
has
only
around
20
regular
armed
followers.
Mundos
has
only
around
15
regular
armed
followers
while
Indama
has
only
around
15
regular
armed
followers.
In
Tawi-­‐Tawi,
the
recognized
ASG
commander
in
the
area
is
Jul
Asman
Sawadjaan,
the
brother
of
Hajan
Sawadjaan.
He
is
believed
to
have
at
least
10
regular
armed
followers.
There
is
an
emerging
young
commander
of
the
ASG
by
the
name
of
Nadzmir
Alih.
He
is
an
adopted
son
of
ASG
founder,
Abdurajak
Janjalani.
In
his
mid-­‐30s,
Nadzmir
Alih
operates
in
Basilan
as
a
military
protégé
of
Isnilon
Hapilon
and
in
Sulu
as
spiritual
mentee
of
Yassir
Igasan.
Nadzmir
Allih
has
around
10
regular
armed
young
followers
associated
with
another
group
called
Anak
Ilo
or
orphaned
sons.
His
group
is
responsible
for
a
spate
of
“small-­‐to-­‐medium-­‐scale”
kidnap-­‐for-­‐ransom
activities
in
Sulu
and
Basilan.
Thus,
the
ASG
is
only
a
very
miniscule
armed
group.
But
the
ASG
threat
looms
large
because
it
wields
tremendous
strength
from
its
superb
ability
to
network
with
countless
armed
groups
in
Mindanao
engaged
in
various
criminal,
terrorist,
insurgent
and
even
partisan
political
activities.
10General
Headquarters
of
the
AFP,
Internal
Peace
and
Security
Plan,
Bayanihan
(Quezon
City:
Armed
Forces
of
the
Philippines
Headquarters,
2010),
p.
12.
5

6. While
a
few
ASG
commanders
still
embrace
an
Islamic
ideology
that
aims
to
promote
the
establishment
of
a
Islamic
State
in
Mindanao,
most
followers
have
become
violent
entrepreneurs
engaged
in
predatory
economic
activities
such
as
kidnapping,
extortion
and
smuggling
of
arms
and
drugs.
These
violent
entrepreneurs
have
skills
in
jungle
and
urban
warfare.
Worse,
they
have
the
ability
to
manufacture
improvised
explosive
devices
(IEDs)
that
they
use
for
criminal,
terrorist
and
insurgent
activities.
Based
on
our
independent
investigative
research
aided
by
seasoned
intelligence
officers,
we
discovered
that
almost
90%
of
the
funds
of
the
ASG
are
derived
from
illicit
activities,
mainly
from
kidnap-­‐for-­‐ransom
and
extortion.11
As
a
violent
group,
the
ASG
has
also
demonstrated
its
inherent
capability
to
conduct
acts
of
piracy
for
economic
reasons
and
maritime
terrorism
for
political
reasons.12
The
Philippine
government
has
declared
a
policy
of
crushing
the
ASG
through
combined
police
and
military
efforts.
But
it
recognizes
difficulties
in
doing
so
because
of
the
ASG’s
complex
links
with
other
armed
groups
like
the
lawless
elements
of
the
MILF,
rouge
factions
of
the
MNLF,
remnants
of
Jemaah
Islamiyah
(JI)
in
Mindanao
and
other
violent
groups
such
as
the
Al
Khobar
Group
(AKG),
the
Bangsamoro
Islamic
Freedom
Fighters
(BIFF)
and
even
the
New
People’s
Army
(NPA).
The
ASG’s
links
with
some
local
warlords,
government
militias,
and
local
communities
confound
the
already
convoluted
threat
it
poses
to
Philippine
internal
security.
In
other
words,
the
ASG
has
become
“complex
adaptive
system”
with
a
superb
survival
instinct.
This
instinct
to
survive
is
reinforced
by
their
complex
linkages
with
one
another
as
well
as
with
ordinary
organized
crimes
groups
and
partisan
armed
movements.
Underlying
issues
of
abject
poverty,
inefficient
governance,
ethnic
conflict,
clan
feuding
and
religious/ideological
intolerance,
among
others,
also
fuel
the
staying
power
of
the
ASG.
Most
importantly,
the
ASG
knows
how
to
learn
from
its
past
mistakes.
11Rodolfo
B.
Mendoza,
Jr.,
“The
Evolution
of
Terrorist
Financing
in
the
Philippines”
(Paper
presented
at
the
International
Conference
in
Countering
the
Financing
of
Terrorism
at
the
Sulu
Hotel,
Philippines,
7-­‐8
July
2008).
12Rommel
C.
Banlaoi.
“The
Abu
Sayyaf
Group:
Threat
of
Maritime
Piracy
and
Terrorism
in
Peter
Lehr
(ed),
Violence
at
Sea.
Piracy
in
the
Age
of
Global
Terrorism
(New
York:
Routledge,
2007),
pp.
121-­‐
138.
6

7. Based
on
the
documents
and
reading
materials
we
accessed
from
various
ASG
camps,
some
ASG
leaders
study
history,
particularly
the
history
of
Islam
in
Mindanao.
Let
me
conclude
my
talk
by
stressing
that
terrorism
continues
to
pose
a
serious
threat
to
Asia
and
the
Philippines
11
years
after
9/11.
Without
our
knowledge
of
History,
it
will
be
very
difficult
for
us
to
address
this
threat
now
and
in
the
future.
Thank
you
very
much
for
your
attention.
7