A few years old, but the principles remain the same today. This slide show discusses the various decision processes used by pilots during the course of a flight.
A Review of the Literature Pertaining to Decision Making in Aviation
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A Review of the LiteratureA Review of the Literature
Pertaining to Decision Making inPertaining to Decision Making in
AviationAviation
By Robert BaronBy Robert Baron
The Aviation Consulting GroupThe Aviation Consulting Group
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This presentation is set up as aThis presentation is set up as a ““simplesimple
conversational outline.conversational outline.”” Complete details andComplete details and
results of relevant research and studies areresults of relevant research and studies are
expanded on in the full paper. A full referenceexpanded on in the full paper. A full reference
list will also be found in the full paper.list will also be found in the full paper.
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Case 1Case 1
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Injuries: 6 FatalInjuries: 6 Fatal
The pilot's improper decision to continue VFRThe pilot's improper decision to continue VFR
flight into IMC conditions and his failure toflight into IMC conditions and his failure to
maintain terrain clearance, which resulted inmaintain terrain clearance, which resulted in
controlled flight into terrain. Factors were night,controlled flight into terrain. Factors were night,
snow and a low ceiling.snow and a low ceiling. (NTSB Accident(NTSB Accident
Identification # NYC04FA092, 2004).Identification # NYC04FA092, 2004).
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Case 2Case 2
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Injuries: 3 FatalInjuries: 3 Fatal
The pilot's failure to maintain aircraft controlThe pilot's failure to maintain aircraft control
during the missed approach. Factors to theduring the missed approach. Factors to the
accident were; the pilot's improper decision toaccident were; the pilot's improper decision to
attempt the approach in weather conditionsattempt the approach in weather conditions
below the approach/landing minimums, thebelow the approach/landing minimums, the
weather, the pilot's lack of multiengineweather, the pilot's lack of multiengine
instrument experience, and spatial disorientationinstrument experience, and spatial disorientation
by the pilot.by the pilot. (NTSB Accident Identification #(NTSB Accident Identification #
CHI00FA080, 2001).CHI00FA080, 2001).
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Between 50% and 75% percent of GA accidentsBetween 50% and 75% percent of GA accidents
are caused by faulty decisionsare caused by faulty decisions
This statistic does not appear to be improvingThis statistic does not appear to be improving
WeatherWeather--related decisions are still the mostrelated decisions are still the most
problematicproblematic
Specifically, continued VFR flight into IMCSpecifically, continued VFR flight into IMC
conditions by nonconditions by non--instrument rated pilotsinstrument rated pilots
Other weather related problems include scudOther weather related problems include scud
running,running, ““duck unders,duck unders,”” and improper fueland improper fuel
planning.planning.
BasicsBasics
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FAA Guidance
Can be found in Advisory
Circular 6060--22 (Aeronautical22 (Aeronautical
Decision Making), 1991Decision Making), 1991
Includes information on theIncludes information on the
Five Hazardous Attitudes andFive Hazardous Attitudes and
DECIDE models.DECIDE models.
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The Five Hazardous Attitudes
1.1. AntiauthorityAntiauthority
2.2. ImpulsivityImpulsivity
3.3. InvulnerabilityInvulnerability
4.4. MachoMacho
5.5. Resignation.Resignation.
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The DECIDE Model
DD-- DetectDetect
EE-- EstimateEstimate
CC-- ChooseChoose
II-- IdentifyIdentify
DD-- DoDo
EE-- EvaluateEvaluate
* This is an iterative process.* This is an iterative process.
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Judgment
JudgmentJudgment cancan be taughtbe taught
Studies have shown positive effects inStudies have shown positive effects in
pilot judgment trainingpilot judgment training
Cognitive judgment is analogous to aCognitive judgment is analogous to a
computer system.computer system.
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Judgment
Another, more inAnother, more in--depth model, depicts adepth model, depicts a
two system process (Kahneman, 2002).two system process (Kahneman, 2002).
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Decisions
Decisions relating to weather are theDecisions relating to weather are the
most problematicmost problematic
Some factors that contribute to flawedSome factors that contribute to flawed
decisions are:decisions are:
Framing effects (prospect theory; gains andFraming effects (prospect theory; gains and
losses)losses)
Hindsight biasHindsight bias
HeuristicsHeuristics
SatisficingSatisficing
Cognitive dissonance.Cognitive dissonance.
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Framing Effects
Decisions may be framed asDecisions may be framed as ““gains orgains or
losseslosses””
When situations are viewed in terms ofWhen situations are viewed in terms of
gains, people are risk averse, but whengains, people are risk averse, but when
situations are viewed in terms of losses,situations are viewed in terms of losses,
people are risk seeking.people are risk seeking.
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Hindsight Bias
YouYou’’ve heard ofve heard of ““20/20 hindsight?20/20 hindsight?””
Hindsight bias is the tendency to viewHindsight bias is the tendency to view
what has already happened as relativelywhat has already happened as relatively
inevitable and obviousinevitable and obvious——without realizingwithout realizing
that retrospective knowledge of thethat retrospective knowledge of the
outcome is influencing one's judgmentsoutcome is influencing one's judgments
(Plous,1993).(Plous,1993).
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Heuristics
What the heck is a heuristic?What the heck is a heuristic?
Heuristics can be thought of as sets ofHeuristics can be thought of as sets of
empirical rules or strategies that operate,empirical rules or strategies that operate,
in effect, like a rule of thumb (Solso,in effect, like a rule of thumb (Solso,
2001)2001)
Can be great for simple problemCan be great for simple problem--solvingsolving
but can create flawed decisions for morebut can create flawed decisions for more
novel situations.novel situations.
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Satisficing
A behavior which attempts to achieveA behavior which attempts to achieve
at least some minimum level of aat least some minimum level of a
particular variable, but which does notparticular variable, but which does not
strive to achieve its maximum possiblestrive to achieve its maximum possible
value (Simon, 1957)value (Simon, 1957)
Related to this isRelated to this is bounded rationalitybounded rationality,,
where people are emotional orwhere people are emotional or
irrational in parts of their decisions.irrational in parts of their decisions.
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Cognitive Dissonance
A pair of cognitions that can be eitherA pair of cognitions that can be either
consonant or dissonant (Festinger, 1957)consonant or dissonant (Festinger, 1957)
Can be viewed as aCan be viewed as a ““mental tug of warmental tug of war””
Arriving at your destination airport, asArriving at your destination airport, as
planned, no matter what, + illegallyplanned, no matter what, + illegally
descending below DH on the approach =descending below DH on the approach =
cognitive dissonancecognitive dissonance
Pressure can exacerbate dissonance.Pressure can exacerbate dissonance.
17. “Jet Crashes Before Picking up Elder Bush”
11-22-2004
A private jet that was en route to Houston to pick
up former US President Bush clipped a light pole
and crashed Monday as it approached Hobby
Airport in thick fog, killing all three people aboard.
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Breaking Research on
Weather Decisions…
A new study just released by the NTSBA new study just released by the NTSB
(2005) found the following(2005) found the following……
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Breaking Research on
Weather Decisions…
Pilots who start flying earlier in life are at lower
risk of being involved in a weather related
general aviation accident than those who start
flying when they are older, and age at first
certificate is a better predictor of future
accident involvement than age at time of flight.
The observed connection between age and
accident risk in this study is not likely due to
physical aging issues, but to other factors
associated with the age at which a person
starts flight training.
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Breaking Research on
Weather Decisions…
Periodic training and evaluation may be
necessary to ensure that pilots maintain
weather-related knowledge and skills.
Knowledge and practical test failures are both
associated with a higher risk of a pilot being
involved in a weather-related general aviation
accident.
A pilot can incorrectly answer all questions
relating to weather on an airman knowledge
test and still receive a passing score on the
test.
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Breaking Research on
Weather Decisions…
A history of accident or incident involvement is
associated with a higher risk of being involved
in a future weather-related general aviation
accident.
General aviation pilots routinely consult
alternative sources of aviation weather to
obtain information that is not currently
available from a standard weather briefing.
The full NTSB report is available at:
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2005/SS0501.pdf
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Aftermath of a
Fatal Decision
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Another Fatal
Decision
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Surely, there must be a few
questions…
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Thank you for your
time!