1. December 2013 Vol. 58, No. 3
Commercial Banking,
Collections & Bankruptcy Law
The newsletter of the Illinois State Bar Association’s Section on Commercial Banking, Collections & Bankruptcy Law
Illinois State Bar Association
Inside
Attorney fees provision
in invoice binding on
buyer (N.D. Illinois 2013). . . 1
Illinois business records:
Getting them in at trial. . . . . 1
Defendant bank not
liable for permitting
judgment debtor to
transfer over $700,000
from accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The aftermath of
Cypress Creek—How
newly-enacted HB 3636
affects commercial
mortgage lenders . . . . . . . . . 5
Upcoming CLE
programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Mentors needed for
ISBA Lawyer-to-Lawyer
Mentoring Program . . . . . . . 8
If you're getting
this newsletter
by postal mail
and would
prefer electronic
delivery, just
send an e-mail to
Ann Boucher at
aboucher@isba.org
I
t’s not unusual for complex litigation cases to
drag on for several years, resulting in astro-
nomical attorney fees and litigation costs to
the parties. When this happens, whether a liti-
gant can recover his attorney fees at the lawsuit’s
end assumes primary importance. On the issue
of recovering fees, Illinois applies the “American
Rule”: each side is responsible for its own fees
unless: (1) a contract contains ”prevailing party”
fee-shifting language; or (2) a statute provides
for fees. See, e.g. Estate of Downs v. Webster, 307
Ill.App.3d 625, 240 Ill.Dec. 309, 716 N.E.2d 1256
(1999). On this last point, several State and Fed-
eral statutes – particularly in consumer realm - al-
low a successful claimant to recover fees in addi-
tion to any money damage award.
Enter this fact pattern: a seller and buyer of
good enter into a written contract. The contract
is silent on attorney fees but the seller’s invoices
contain boiler-plate fee-shifting language (i.e.,
the invoices say that if buyer fails to pay invoice
within 30 days (usually), the seller can recover
unpaid invoice amount plus its attorney fees,
collection costs and interest (typically at 18%
annually)).Thebuyerthendefaultsandsellersues
for damages and includes in its damage claim,
the unpaid invoices, its attorney fees, interest at
18% and costs. The buyer defends on the basis
that the contract doesn’t provide for attorney
fees and therefore, the seller’s boilerplate fees
and interest language is not binding on the
buyer since those terms were never part of the
parties’underlying agreement.
I’ve been on both sides of this fact pattern
and have both won and lost on the issue.The dif-
fuse results illustrate the law’s inconsistency as
to whether an invoice’s attorney fees provision is
binding on the breaching party. And the higher
Attorney fees provision in invoice binding on
buyer (N.D. Illinois 2013)
By Paul B. Porvaznik
T
he specter of not being able to get a key
document into evidence at a breach of
contract trial elicits feelings of both panic
and embarrassment. I’ve learned from painful
experience to always have evidentiary founda-
tion and authenticity considerations at the fore-
front of my trial preparation plan. I’ve also found
that having a working knowledge of Illinois Su-
premeCourtRule236(SCR236),aswellasFeder-
al and Illinois Evidence Rules 803(6) and 902(11)
(hearsay exception and self-authentication rules
for business records, respectively) is essential to
preparing for and proving my client’s breach of
contract case at trial.
Three weeks ago, in Bank of America v. Land,
2013 IL App (5th) 120283, the Fifth District dis-
cussed the content and reach of the business
record exception to the hearsay rule in the con-
text of a mortgage foreclosure suit. The plaintiff
bank sued to foreclose a mortgage and later
Continued on page 2
Continued on page 2
Illinois business records: Getting them in at trial
By Paul B. Porvaznik

2. 2
Commercial Banking, Collections & Bankruptcy Law | December 2013, Vol. 58, No. 3
the dollar amount involved and the longer
the case drags on, the more critical the attor-
ney fees issue.
The Northern District recently weighed
in on the fee-shifting-language-in-invoice
question in VLM Food Trading International,
Inc. v. Illinois Trading Co., 2013 WL 816103
(N.D.Ill. 2013). The Court held that a seller of
frozen foods could recover both its unpaid
invoices and its attorney fees against a de-
fendant wholesaler even where the parties’
contract was silent on attorney fees, costs
and interest. The reason: the seller’s invoices
contained fee language and provided for an-
nual interest on unpaid sums at 18%.
VLM (seller) sued under the Federal Per-
ishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 USC
§499a et seq. (“PACA”), which allows a food
seller to impose a floating constructive trust
on goods sold to a buyer who fails to pay for
them. The plaintiff joined a state law breach
of contract claim with its Federal PACA claim.
In allowing the seller to recover its attor-
neys fees (despite the absence of contractual
fee-shifting language) after an evidentiary
merits hearing, the Court noted the follow-
ing: (a) seller submitted 18 invoices totalling
nearly $200K to buyer; and all invoices con-
tained attorney fees and interest language;
(b) the buyer’s bookkeeper admitted receiv-
ing the invoices and never objecting to the
form fees and interest language in the invoic-
es; and (c) plaintiff’s representative testified
that in the food wholesaling business, it was
customary for a seller like plaintiff to include
fee-shifting and interest provisions in its in-
voices. These facts were central to the court
denying buyer’s argument that the attorney
fee language in the invoices were material
changes to the contract under UCC 2-207.
First year Sales class/’battle of the
forms” nightmare, er um, I mean “flash-
back!!”:
UCC 2-207 (810 ILCS 5/2-207) provides
that additional contract terms are gener-
ally construed as counter-proposals but
between “merchants”, additional terms are
binding unless the terms materially alter the
contract’s substance. VLM, at *6. The VLM
Court equated the statute’s “materially alter”
language with an “unreasonable surprise” to
the other contracting party. Id.,JadaToys,Inc.
v. Chicago Import, 2009 WL 3055370 (N.D.Ill.
2009). The parties were clearly “merchants”
under UCC Article 2: they were both high-
volume food sellers and buyers. And since
defendant testified that it received, saw and
never objected to the invoices’fee language
and plaintiff testified that it was an industry
standard to include fee-shifting in product
invoices, the Court found no unreasonable
surprise to the breaching buyer. As a result,
the invoice’s attorney fees and interest lan-
guage did not work a material change to the
contract. VLM, at *6.
Take-aways: Major win for sellers; “red
alert”territory for buyers. For sellers, it opens
the door to claim fees even where a contract
is silent on fees and interest (usually, you can
only get 5% pre-judgment interest in Illinois).
So long as the invoice contains fees/inter-
est language and buyer doesn’t object, the
case supports a seller claiming these items
as additional damages. Goods buyers should
clearly be hypervigilant to boilerplate attor-
ney fees language in invoices and should
timely object to any responsibility for the
seller’s fees where the contract doesn’t con-
tain a fee-shifting clause.The other benefit to
sellers that I see from this case is it will pro-
vide added leverage in settlement negotia-
tions. Because now, and assuming a seller’s
invoices reference attorney fees, a seller will
be able to raise the specter of not only re-
covering unpaid invoices at trial but also its
fees. This will allow the seller to increase its
pre-trial settlement demand to include the
amount of fees and costs incurred up to the
demand date.
Note: one factual oddity of VLM is that it
was brought under the arcane PACA statute.
The Court did say that the underlying policies
of PACA (giving food sellers a lien on unpaid
products) provided additional support for its
attorney fees determination. So, how much of
an impact the Federal PACA statute had on the
court’srulingisunclear.So,theopenquestionis
if PACA didn’t apply, would the court still have
awarded fees? The answer is not crystal clear,
butitseemstobe“yes.”ButifIrepresentabuyer
in a state law breach of contract suit (where
no Federal statute is involved) who’s sued for
contract damages plus the seller’s attorney
feesbasedoninvoice(notcontract)language,I
would distinguish such a case from VLM on the
basis that the VLM Court considered the PACA
statute as an additional basis for its fee award
to the seller.
Attorney fees provision in invoice binding on buyer (N.D. Illinois 2013)
Continued from page 1
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3. 3
December 2013, Vol. 58, No. 3| Commercial Banking, Collections & Bankruptcy Law
moved for summary judgment. The bank
supported its summary judgment motion
with a bank officer’s affidavit who testified
that she reviewed the bank’s books and re-
cords of the mortgage holders, reviewed the
borrowers’paymenthistoryandalsocertified
a payment history attached to the affidavit.
Land, ¶ 5. The trial court granted the bank’s
motion awarding it money damages of over
$100,000 and a judgment of foreclosure.
Land, ¶ 6. Defendant appealed.
Result: Trial Court affirmed. The bank’s
supporting affidavit meets the requirements
of SCR 236.
Reasoning: The defendant’s chief argu-
ment on appeal was that the bank officer’s
supporting affidavit was inadmissible hear-
say since the underlying mortgage didn’t
originate with the plaintiff and because the
affidavit relied on a third party’s (another
mortgage company) loan records. The Court
rejected the argument and held that the af-
fidavit met the requirements of SCR 236,
which codifies the hearsay exception for
business records (a link to the Rule’s text fol-
lows this post).
SCR 236 provides that any record of a
monetary transaction is admissible as evi-
dence of that transaction if the record is
made in the regular course of business and
the business’ regular practice was to make a
record of a transaction at or near the time of
the transaction. The philosophical underpin-
ning of the rule is that business records exist
to aid in the proper transaction of business
and so records are “useless for that purpose
unless accurate.” Because of this, the motive
for accurate record-keeping is high while the
motive to falsify records is low. Land, ¶ 13;
Kimble v. Jorgenson Co., 358 Ill.App.3d 400
(2005). What’s more: lack of personal knowl-
edge by the maker may affect the evidence’s
weight, but not its admissibility. Land, ¶ 12; In
reEstateofWeiland, 338 Ill.App.3d 585 (2003).
And,“it makes no difference whether the re-
cords are those of a party or of a third person
authorized by the business to generate the
record on the business’s behalf.” A party can
establish the foundation of a business record
through a records custodian or other person
familiar with a business’s operations. Land, ¶
13.
Applying these rules, the Court found
that plaintiff satisfied SCR 236 requirements
where the affiant/bank officer testified (i)
that she was familiar with the bank’s busi-
ness records creation and maintenance prac-
tices, (ii) that the records pertaining to the
defendants were made at or near the time
of the occurrences giving rise to the records,
(iii) were made by individuals with personal
knowledge of the information contained
in the business record, and (iv) the records
were kept in the regular course of the bank’s
business. Land, ¶ 14; Also, see Healix Infusion
Therapy, Inc. v. HHI Infusion Services, 2011 WL
291160, *1 (N.D.Ill. 2011)(court admits busi-
ness records pursuant to FRE 803(6) where
e-mail submissions are signed by a records
custodian).
Take-aways: Illinois litigants now have a
slew of evidence rules – SCR 236, IRE 803(6),
IRE 902(11) - at their disposal that streamline
the process of getting business records into
evidence at trial and eliminate many of the
logistical and hearsay headaches that trial
practice formerly entailed. The cumulative
effect of the rules is that a party no longer
has to worry about issuing trial subpoenas
to unwilling or elusive witnesses. I’m curious
why there’s no discussion in this case of IRE
803(6) or 902(11) – the latter of which sim-
ply requires a records custodian to submit a
sworn statement with the records to be ad-
mitted at trial. Even so, the case cements the
importance of knowing the rules for busi-
ness record admissions at trial and on sum-
mary judgment. A key holding of Land is that
the business records relied on can be those
of a third party; as long as the witness can
testify to her familiarity with the records and
can establish that the third party records
were integral to the witness’s business. This
obviously obviates the need to subpoena a
third party to testify concerning the third-
party records. ■
__________
Links:
http://www.state.il.us/court/supremecourt/
rules/Art_II/ArtII.htm#236
http://www.state.il.us/court/supremecourt/
evidence/Evidence.htm
(recommended viewing: Rule 803(6), 902(11)
and 406 (habit evidence)
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Illinois business records: Getting them in at trial
Continued from page 1

4. 4
December 2013, Vol. 58, No. 3| Commercial Banking, Collections & Bankruptcy Law
C
ode Section 2-1402 and Supreme
Court Rule 277 work in tandem to
govern the mechanics and scope
of post-judgment or “supplementary” pro-
ceedings under Illinois law. One particularly
powerful creditor enforcement tool is the Ci-
tation to Discover Assets to a Third Party or
“third-party citation.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(a),
(b); SCR 277(a), (d). It allows a judgment
creditor (the party that obtains a money
judgment) to serve a citation on a third-par-
ty (usually a bank) that holds property of
the judgment debtor (whom the judgment
is entered against) and essentially lien or
freeze that property until the court orders
the property released. See 735 ILCS 5/2-
1402(f)(1).The third-party citation form used
in Cook County (see link below) prohibits the
citation respondent from allowing any trans-
fer or other disposition of debtor’s property
pending further order of court or termi-
nation of the citation. When a bank is the
third-party citation respondent, the creditor
serves the citation upon the bank (either by
personal service or certified mail) and upon
receipt of the citation, the bank must freeze
the debtor’s account until the court enters
an order dismissing the citation or releasing
the account.
What’s simultaneously enticing (to a
creditor) and sinister (to a debtor) about
third-party citation practice is that the credi-
tor doesn’t have to notify the debtor that
he’s issued and served a third-party citation
until 3 business days have passed. 735 ILCS
5/2-1402(b). This makes it next to impossible
for a debtor to deplete his bank account(s)
and hide funds – something which could
easily happen if he caught wind of a credi-
tor’s attempts to seize his accounts. My ex-
perience is that few things bring a business
debtor to its knees (and to the settlement
table) quicker than a creditor placing a hold
on the debtor’s bank accounts via a citation.
Allofasudden,thevitriolicdebtorwholoved
calling you and your creditor client unprint-
able names, is reduced to begging and now
wants to be your best friend. “I’m sorry!” I
didn’t mean it!” ”Please! I can explain!” I try not
to too gleefully watch the groveling display.
(smile emoticon).
Mendezv.RepublicBank,2013WL3821532
(7th Cir. 2013), a three-weeks old Seventh
Circuit case, examines whether a bank that
unfreezes the wrong bank accounts (and al-
lows a judgment debtor to transfer hundreds
of thousands of dollars) can be liable to the
judgment creditor for violating a citation’s
restraining provisions. While the court sym-
pathized with the plaintiff creditor—who
could have had its entire judgment satisfied,
and then some—the Court affirmed the trial
court’s finding that the bank was not liable to
the plaintiff.
Facts: plaintiff obtained a money judg-
ment of nearly $400,000 in an employment
discrimination case against the corporate
defendants and embarked on a multi-year
post-judgment “odyssey” to enforce the
judgment, issuing over 50 citations to vari-
ous banks where plaintiff believed defen-
dants had accounts. Defendant Republic
Bank alone froze 22 separate accounts based
on plaintiff’s citation blitz. After several of the
banks moved to quash various citations, the
district court judge entered an order requir-
ing that all bank accounts except for three (3)
specified accounts be unfrozen. Mendez, at *
2. In response, defendant bank released from
the citation two of the debtors’ accounts
which totalled over $700,000 – all of which
were dissipated by the debtors over a four-
month period. Id. at * 3.
After the case was transferred to another
judge and plaintiff found out that two of de-
fendants’ accounts were unfrozen, plaintiff
immediately moved to refreeze the accounts
and to hold the bank liable for allowing the
release of defendants’ funds in violation of
Code Section 2-1402(f)(1) – which provides
for a citation respondent’s liability where it
improperly releases funds subject to a cita-
tion lien. Id. at *3; 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(f)(1).The
District Judge, while originally siding with
plaintiff, reversed herself and found the bank
not liable. The reason: the prior judge’s order
requiring the bank to unfreeze accounts was
ambiguous “at best” and the bank’s actions
were a reasonable response to and interpre-
tation of that order. Mendez, at *4.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that
the prior judge’s order unfreezing certain ac-
counts was indeed poorly drafted and the
defendant bank followed the most reason-
able interpretation of the order. Id. at * 5.
While the Court acknowledged that under
Illinois law, a citation respondent can be li-
able for any transfer that violates a citation’s
restraining provisions (regardless of whether
there is intent or contempt), the bank’s ac-
tions were reasonable in light of the order’s
text: “All we can reasonably expect of third-
party citation respondents is that they fol-
low the most reasonable interpretation of a
court’s order.”Mendez, at * 11.
Take-away: In my experience, from a
creditor’s standpoint, attaching a corporate
debtor’s bank account via a third-party cita-
tion is often my only real chance of collecting
anything on a judgment. Any real estate is
usually mortgaged to the hilt, and the cor-
porate debtor often lacks sufficient accounts
receivable, inventory or personal property to
meaningfully make a dent in the judgment
amount. Plus the costs and bonding require-
ments entailed in levying on a debtor’s per-
sonal property (i.e., car, boat, jewelry, elec-
tronics,stocks,etc.)areoftencost-prohibitive.
Consequently, hyper-precision in drafting
citation orders is critical in post-judgment
enforcement proceedings. If the order is not
drafted by the parties (i.e. it’s prepared by the
court) and its text is unclear, it is incumbent
on a party to file a motion seeking clarifica-
tion of the order.The case also illustrates that
under Illinois supplementary proceedings
law, a creditor does not have to prove a cita-
tion respondent’s willful or spiteful conduct
to hold the respondent liable for wrongfully
transferring a debtor’s assets.
__________
Links:
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/fulltext.
asp?DocName=073500050K2-1402
http://www.state.il.us/court/supremecourt/
rules/Art_II/ArtII.htm#277
http://12.218.239.52/Forms/pdf_files/
CCM0124_EXAMPLE.pdf
Defendant bank not liable for permitting judgment debtor to
transfer over $700,000 from accounts
By Paul B. Porvaznik

5. 5
Commercial Banking, Collections & Bankruptcy Law | December 2013, Vol. 58, No. 3
O
n February 11, 2013, House Bill 3636
was signed into law by Governor
Quinn, immediately modifying the
Mechanics Lien Act in response to the Illinois
Supreme Court’s decision in LaSalle Bank Na-
tional Association v. Cypress Creek I, LP, 242
Ill. 2d 231 (2011). This article provides a real-
world example of exactly how these changes
to the Act affect a commercial real estate
foreclosure with post-mortgage mechanics
liens.
Under Cypress Creek, which HB 3636 es-
sentially reversed, the Foreclosing Lender
stood in the shoes of any and all contractors
who were paid, either from loan proceeds or
from the Borrower’s personal funds. Assume
there was a $9,000,000 mortgage loan, and
the Property was worth $8,000,000 when the
loan was made. Also assume that $1,000,000
from the loan paid for improvements,
but that the Borrower obtained another
$1,000,000 in improvements which were not
paid for, resulting in two mechanics liens for
$500,000 each. Finally, assume the Property
only sold for $5,000,000 at the foreclosure
sale.
If the Court agreed that the Property was
worth $8,000,000 before the improvements
were made, and that $2,000,000 in improve-
ments took place, then the Court created
“two funds”totaling $10,000,000.The Lender
was entitled to 100% of the $8,000,000 fund
attributable to the value of the Land before
the improvements. Under Cypress Creek,
the Lender was also entitled to 50% of the
$2,000,000 fund attributable to the improve-
ments, since the loan proceeds and the
owner paid for 50% of the improvements.
The other two lien claimants each were en-
titled to 25% of the fund attributable to the
improvements.
The $8,000,000 fund was 80% of the
total improved value of the land, and the
$2,000,000 fund was 20% of the total im-
proved value of the land. The Court would
applythis80/20ratiotothesaleprice,anddi-
vide the proceeds accordingly. Under Cypress
Creek, the land value fund would be 80% of
the sale proceeds, or $4,000,000, which the
Lender was entitled to. The improvements
fund would be 20% of the sale proceeds, or
$1,000,000, of which the Lender was entitled
to50%,or$500,000.Thelienclaimantswould
each receive 25% of the improvements fund,
or $250,000 each.
HB 3636 reversed the foregoing appor-
tionment formula. If we assumed the ex-
act same fact pattern, but applied HB 3636
instead of Cypress Creek, the Lender is not
entitled to any of the fund attributed to the
improvements.Worse, the two lien claimants
actually benefit from the improvements paid
for by the Lender or the owner.
In our hypothetical, the Lender still re-
covers the land value pegged at 80% of
the sale proceeds under HB 3636. However,
the Lender is not allowed to participate in
the improvements fund. Instead, the entire
$1,000,000 improvements fund is divided up
by all the mechanics lien claimants. If there
are only two lien claimants, each having im-
proved the land by $500,000, and if the total
improvements are $2,000,000, the lien claim-
ants will each be entitled to 50% of the im-
provements fund. Since the $5,000,000 sale
price left $1,000,000 in the improvements
fund, each lien claimant now recovers their
full $500,000. (Note that, in the unlikely case
where this new formula resulted in the lien
claimants recovering more than they actu-
ally were entitled to under their liens, which
is possible where an owner or lender funds
improvements and only minimal mechan-
ics liens are recorded in comparison, the re-
mainder of the improvements fund should
shift back to the Lender.)
Inourfactpattern,thenewlawonlyallows
the Lender to recover a total of $4,000,000.
But under Cypress Creek, the Lender would
have recovered $4,500,000.
In enacting HB 3636, the Legislature and
Governor Quinn decided to prioritize con-
tractors over lenders, even where lenders or
owners paid for some of the improvements.
Despite this change in the law, the Lender
might have one way to reduce its potential
losses. If a Lender settles a mechanics lien
claim during a foreclosure action, it should
insist on an assignment of that lien, not a re-
lease. This way, the Lender could attempt to
stand in the shoes of the settling lien claim-
ant as an assignee.
Unfortunately, the only way to prevent
the new law from adversely impacting a
Lender altogether would be to have a bor-
rower or escrow agent refuse to pay any
contractor unless they first filed a mechanics
lien, requested payment, and assigned the
lien to the Lender upon payment. This is not,
of course, a reasonably workable solution in
real-world situations, and could be deemed
an improper end-run around HB 3636. ■
__________
Tom Lombardo is the manager of the litigation
department at Ginsberg Jacobs LLC, focusing on
creditor’s rights, finance and real estate matters.
The aftermath of Cypress Creek—How newly-enacted HB 3636
affects commercial mortgage lenders
By Thomas M. Lombardo
It’s Campaign Season
for the 2014 Election
Run for ISBA Office—
Positions Available:
• 3rd VP
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leadership.
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6. 6
Commercial Banking, Collections & Bankruptcy Law | December 2013, Vol. 58, No. 3
Upcoming CLE programs
To register, go to www.isba.org/cle or call the ISBA registrar at 800-252-8908 or 217-525-1760.
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by the Illinois State Bar Association – Compli-
mentary to ISBA Members Only. 4:00 Eastern.
Thursday, 1/9/14- Live Studio Web-
cast—2014 Traffic Case Law & Legislative
Update-Changes which Affect Your Practice
& Clients. Presented by the ISBA Traffic Laws
& Courts Section. 12-1.
Thursday, 1/9/14- Teleseminar—2014
Nonprofit Law/Exempt Organizations Up-
date. Presented by the Illinois State Bar As-
sociation. 12-1.
Friday, 1/10/14-Teleseminar—Attorney
Ethics and Elder Abuse. Presented by the Il-
linois State Bar Association. 12-1.
Monday, 1/13-Friday, 1/17/13 - Chica-
go, ISBA Regional Office—40 Hour Media-
tion/Arbitration Training. Presented by the
Illinois State Bar Association. 8:30-5:45 daily.
Monday, 1/13/14- Teleseminar—2013
Americans With Disabilities Act Update (Live
replay from 10/22/13). Presented by the Illi-
nois State Bar Association. 12-1.
Tuesday, 1/14/14- Teleseminar—BYOD:
Bring Your Own Device to Work- Employ-
ment Law Issues in theWorkplace. Presented
by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.
Wednesday, 1/15/14- Webinar—Bool-
ean (Keyword) Searches on Fastcase. Pre-
sented by the Illinois State Bar Association –
Complimentary to ISBA Members Only. 4:00
Eastern.
Wednesday, 1/15/14- Teleseminar—
Planning with Family Limited Partner-
ships/Family LLCS, Part 1 (Live replay from
10/15/13). Presented by the Illinois State Bar
Association. 12-1.
Thursday, 1/16/14- Teleseminar—Plan-
ning with Family Limited Partnerships/Fam-
ily LLCS, Part 1 (Live replay from 10/15/13).
Presented by the Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion. 12-1.
Tuesday, 1/21/14- Teleseminar—Pierc-
ing the Entity Veil: Individual Liability for
Business Acts. Presented by the Illinois State
Bar Association. 12-1.
Wednesday, 1/22/14- Teleseminar—
Fixing Trusts: Techniques to Alter a Trust
When Circumstances Have Changed. Pre-
sented by the Illinois State Bar Association.
12-1.
Thursday, 1/23/14- Teleseminar—
Drafting Guaranties in Real Estate Transac-
tions. Presented by the Illinois State Bar As-
sociation. 12-1.
Tuesday, 1/28/14- Teleseminar—Buy-
outs in Closely Held Companies- Triggers,
Methods, Valuation & Finance. Presented by
the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.
Thursday, 1/30/14- Teleseminar—Es-
tate Planning for Personal Residences. Pre-
sented by the Illinois State Bar Association.
12-1.
Friday, 1/31/14-Teleseminar—Attorney
Ethics and Digital Communications. Present-
ed by the Illinois State Bar Association. 12-1.
February
Wednesday 2/5/14- Webinar—Intro-
duction to Fastcase Legal Research. Pre-
sented by the Illinois State Bar Association –
ComplimentarytoISBAMembersOnly.12:00
Eastern.
Thursday, 2/6/14- Teleseminar—Fund-
ing Unfunded Testamentary Trusts in Estate
Planning. Presented by the Illinois State Bar
Association. 12-1.
Friday, 2/7/14- Teleseminar—2014 Re-
taliation in Employment Law Update. Pre-
sented by the Illinois State Bar Association.
12-1.
Friday, 2/7/14- Webinar—Advanced
Tips to Fastcase Legal Research. Presented
by the Illinois State Bar Association – Compli-
mentary to ISBA Members Only. 12:00 East-
ern.
Friday, 2/7/14- Bloomington-Normal,
Marriott Hotel and Conference Center—
Hot Topics in Agricultural Law- 2014. Pre-
sented by the ISBA Agricultural Law Section.
All Day.
Friday, 2/7/14- Chicago, ISBA Regional
Office—2014 Federal Tax Conference. Pre-
sented by the ISBA Federal Taxation Section
All Day.
Monday, 2/10/14- Teleseminar—Treat-
ment of Trusts in Marital Separation (Live re-
play from 11/5/13). Presented by the Illinois
State Bar Association. 12-1.
Tuesday, 2/11/14- Teleseminar—Suc-
cessor Liability in Business Transaction: The
Risk of Selling Assets but Retaining Liability.
Presented by the Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion. 12-1.
Wednesday, 2/12/14- Teleseminar—
Small Commercial Leases: Negotiating and
DraftingIssues.PresentedbytheIllinoisState
Bar Association. 12-1.
Wednesday, 2/12/14- Webinar—Bool-
ean (Keyword) Searches on Fastcase. Pre-
sented by the Illinois State Bar Association –
ComplimentarytoISBAMembers Only.12:00
Eastern.
Wednesday,2/12/14-Chicago,ISBARe-
gional Office—Tort Law Back to Basics. Pre-
sented by the ISBATort Law Section. All Day.
Monday, 2/17/14- Chicago, ISBA Re-
gional Office—Advanced Workers’ Com-
pensation. Presented by the ISBA Workers’
Compensation Section. 9-4:30. ■

7. 7
December 2013, Vol. 58, No. 3| Commercial Banking, Collections & Bankruptcy Law
The new Guide to Illinois Statutes of Limitations and Repose is
here! It contains Illinois civil statutes of limitations and repose (with
amendments) enacted through September 15, 2013. The Guide con-
cisely brings together provisions otherwise scattered throughout the
Code of Civil Procedure and other chapters of the Illinois Compiled
Statutes. It also includes summaries of cases interpreting the statutes
that were decided and released on or before September 15, 2013.
Designed as a quick reference guide for practicing attorneys, it pro-
vides comprehensive coverage of the deadlines you can’t afford to
miss. The Guide includes a handy index organized by act, code, and
subject, and also includes a complete table of cases. Written by Hon.
Adrienne W. Albrecht and Hon. Gordon L. Lustfeldt.
Guide to Illinois STATUTES of LIMITATIONS and REPOSE
2013 Edition
Illinois has a history of
some pretty good lawyers.
We’re out to keep it that way.
Order the new guide at
www.isba.org/store/books/guidetoillinoisstatutesoflimitation
or by calling Janice at 800-252-8908
or by emailing Janice at jishmael@isba.org
GUIDE TO ILLINOIS STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND REPOSE
2013 EDITION
$35 Member/$50 Non-Member (includes tax and shipping)
Need it NOW?
Also available as one of ISBA’s FastBooks.
View or download a pdf immediately using
a major credit card at the URL below.
FastBook price:
Guide to Illinois
STATUTES of LIMITATIONS and
REPOSE - 2013 Edition
$32.50 Member/$47.50 Non-Member
A “MUST HAVE”
for civil
practitioners
Don’t Miss This Quick Reference Guide of Deadlines and Court Interpretations of Illinois Statutes!

8. Commercial Banking,
Collections & Bankruptcy Law
Illinois Bar Center
Springfield, Illinois 62701-1779
December 2013
Vol. 58 No. 3
Non-Profit Org.
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
Springfield, Ill.
Permit No. 820
Mentors needed for ISBA Lawyer-to-Lawyer Mentoring Program
By Peter L. Rotskoff
H
owmanyofyourememberthosefirst
few weeks of your first job when you
realized how little you actually knew
about practicing law? Some of us were lucky
enough to have a mentor who guided us
through those turbulent times. Those men-
tors provided practical training and advice
that we didn’t get in law school. They also
helped to guide us through difficult issues
and ethical dilemmas.
Today, many law schools are doing a bet-
terjobofteachingpracticalskills.Thenewlaw
school at Indiana Tech in Ft. Wayne, Indiana,
for example, has a strong emphasis on prac-
tice skills. The Dean, Peter Alexander, a mem-
ber of the ISBA Standing Committee on Legal
Education, Admission and Competence, has
helped to develop a curriculum that empha-
sizes clinical training and practical legal skills.
In addition, each student has a lawyer or
judge mentor throughout law school.
Despite these efforts, many new gradu-
ates need mentors, particularly those who
choose to go into solo practice. In 2011, the
Illinois Supreme Court’s Commission on Pro-
fessionalism launched the Lawyer-to-Lawyer
mentoring program. By the end of 2012, 61
sponsoring organizations (including the
ISBA) were involved and over 450 mentor-
new lawyer pairs had been established.
Additionally, Supreme Court Rule 795 was
amended to provide that mentors and men-
tees who complete the program receive 6
hours of CLE credit.
The ISBA’s mentoring program follows
the Lawyer-to-Lawyer template established
by the Commission on Professionalism. It is
a one-year plan that includes at least eight
face-to-face meetings and allows the men-
tor and mentee to choose discussion topics
from a broad range of issues including the
development of practical skills, time and law
office management issues, legal ethics and
professionalism.
Presently the number of mentees who
have signed up for the ISBA’s mentoring pro-
gram far exceeds the number of mentors.
Please consider making the commitment to
participate in the program as a mentor. Not
only will you be contributing to the profes-
sion, but a recent survey conducted by the
Commission on Professionalism showed that
over 90% of the mentors believed that the
experience benefitted them professionally
as well.
A mentor application is available on the
ISBA’s Web site at <http://www.isba.org/
mentoring>. A required orientation for men-
tors and mentees is scheduled for 12:00 p.m.,
January 29, 2014.
EDITOR’SNOTE:Forthepastfewyears,Rich-
ard Larson of Sycamore, who serves a Mem-
ber of the Commercial Banking, Collections,
and Bankruptcy Law Section Council, has also
served as its Mentoring Liaison. Mentoring is-
sues in commercial banking, collections, and
bankruptcylawcanbeaddressedtohimatlar-
law@frontier.com. ■
__________
Peter L. Rotskoff is Chief of Litigation and Pro-
fessional Education for the ARDC in Springfield. He
is a past Chair of the ISBA’s Standing Committee
on Mentoring.