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Competition and Public Procurement
Bid rigging in the construction sector in South Africa
Global Forum on Competition
OECD, 7 – 8 December 2017
Hardin Ratshisusu, Deputy Commissioner
Competition Commission South Africa
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
Outline
• Background
• Importance of public procurement
• Institutions: competition regulation
• Some key attributes for agency effectiveness
• Competition regulation and public procurement: stakeholder management
• Enforcement experience in bid rigging
• Evolution of Commission’s strategy
• Increased focus on enforcement
• The Construction case in brief
• Value of projects rigged and outcomes
• Advocacy
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
Importance of public procurement
• The role of government is to, inter alia, provide public goods and
services and purchase goods, services and capital assets.
• Public procurement is a critical component of delivering broader
government / public policy objectives.
• Public procurement accounted for 12% of GDP and 29% of general
government expenditure in OECD countries, amounting to EUR 4.2
trillion in 2013 (OECD, 2016).
• In South Africa, public procurement over the next three years will
amount to R1.5 trillion across all spheres of government (National
Treasury, 2016).
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
Institutions: competition
regulation
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
Some key attributes for agency
effectiveness
• Focus on an evidence-based enforcement and advocacy regime.
• Strategic case selection and prioritization.
• Prioritization framework that responds to socio-economic challenges
and public policy objectives:
– Focus on markets susceptible to anticompetitive conduct such those in public
procurement;
– Focus on advocacy, not as an adjunct but a central feature to the authority’s
enforcement instruments; and
– Focus on cases with the greatest impact.
• Credible enforcement and advocacy is critical for agency
effectiveness.
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
Competition regulation and public
procurement: stakeholder management
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
Competition
Authority
Government
Sector
Regulators
Consumers
Non-
governmental
agencies
Business
and Trade
associations
Parliament
Evolution of Commission’s strategy
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
1998 – 2005 2006 – 2009 2010 – 2014 2015 – 2020
 Competition Act passed
in 1998
 Institutions established
in September 1999
 Focus was on building
the institutions therefore
no specific strategic
goals
 Enforcement on merger
control (by design, a
significant number of
notifications received as
filling was mandatory)
 Align structure and
work processes to
strategic priorities
 Commission as a
centre of information,
knowledge and
expertise
 Enactment of leniency
policy
 Developed approach
and methodology to
prioritization of
sectors and case
selection
 Initiation of first bid
rigging cases in
construction,
infrastructure and
intermediate
industrial input
product markets
 Advocacy and
communication
 Achieve demonstrable
competitive outcomes in the
economy through
prioritisation of sectors and
selection of cases
 Increase competitive
environment for economic
activity through strategic
partnerships, engagement,
dialogue and advocacy
 High performance agency
 Heightened enforcement,
mostly against cartels and
abuse of dominance
 Increased settlement of
cases
 Effective enforcement &
merger regulation
 Strategic collaboration &
advocacy
 High performance
agency
 Heightened
enforcement, mostly
against cartels and
abuse of dominance
 Increased litigation
Increased focus on enforcement
• Since 2006, the Commission has stepped up its enforcement
activities, with a specific focus on detecting and prosecuting cartels.
• The Commission embarked on strategic planning and implementation
in 2006.
• A consistent feature of the strategic planning was the adoption and
implementation of a sector prioritisation and case selection strategy.
• This was key in enabling the Commission to strategically select cases
and appropriately channel its resources.
• An important aspect of the prioritization framework has been the
broader government agenda, particularly on infrastructure
development and product markets with a greater social impact.
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
Increased focus on enforcement
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
The Construction case in brief
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
2009
• 2009: Commission initiated complaints into alleged prohibited practices of bid-rigging and general
collusion in the construction sector.
• Commission received multiple applications for leniency in terms of its CLP and concluded bid
rigging and collusion was widespread.
• +/-150 marker applications and 65 CLP applications.
2011
• Commission launched Fast Track Settlement Process inviting construction firms to voluntarily
disclose rigged projects.
• Bid-rigging of 298 contracts to the value of R111.9 billion uncovered.
• Administrative penalties to the tune of R1.46 billion imposed.
• 15 firms reached settlements with the Commission.
2014
• Several of the implicated firms were not willing to settle under Phase I of the Fast Track Settlement
programme.
• As of August 2016: 10 additional firms settled (13 or 23) projects; 11 firms (19 projects) referred to
the Competition Tribunal, remaining cases in litigation.
• 2016: Major construction firms settled with government to pay R1.5 billion in lieu of damages.
• Other damages claims still ongoing.
Value of projects rigged and
outcomes
• Tenders rigged worth circa USD 3.7 billion:
• Public sector projects worth circa USD 2.2 billion; and
• The private sector projects worth circa USD 1.5 billion.
• Construction firms collectively paid over USD 127 Million in fines.
• The Competition Tribunal issued over 250 section 65 certificates for civil
damages:
• 179 to the public sector; and
• 82 to the private sector.
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
The cover pricing scheme
“I will give you a snapshot of how I understand this all to have worked between the companies from
my experience through the process. The main practice appears to have been what is called “cover-
pricing”. A strong management system was clearly in place, including succession planning because
when one person was promoted or left the company he would bring his successor to a meeting
(according to evidence submitted, these meetings usually occurred at 5 star hotels), introduce the
new person and do a formal hand-over. Some of the younger people knew that if they wanted to get
ahead in their companies this was “the way it is done”. The tenders were then allocated as follows:
the firm not wanting the business gives a “cover price” to a competitor who then wins the award on
submitting a lower price than the “cover price”. In some cases, the firm submitting the “cover price”
will be compensated through a ‘losers’ fee.”
Roger Jardine, ex-CEO: Aveng Grinaker-LTA
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
Advocacy programme
• Following the 2nd phase of the Fast Track Settlement Programme, the
Commission engaged in a targeted advocacy programme including:
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
Government (National
and Local)
Agencies of
government
Sector Regulator
Main focus and outcomes
• Impact of bid rigging on the State's financial resources.
• Required advocacy interventions:
– training of procurement officials; and
– drafting and introduction of the Certificate of Independent Bid Determination in public
procurement.
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
Certificate of Independent Bid Determination
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
Final Remarks
• Uncovering of bid rigging cases in 2009 further raised the profile of the
Commission.
• Government adopted the Certificate of Independent Bid Determination for all
public procurement in July 2010.
• Leniency policy contributed to the uncovering of bid rigging cases.
• More cases, particularly involving small firms, continue to be uncovered,
mainly lodged by government and municipalities.
• Collaboration with other stakeholders, more importantly government and
sector regulators, has been crucial.
competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
Thank you
Tel: +27 (0)12 394 3200
Fax: +27 (0)12 394 0166
Email: hardinr@compcom.co.za
Follow us on Twitter @CompComSA or me
@hardinratshi

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Small and developing competition agencies – Competition Commission South Africa – December 2017 OECD discussion

  • 1. Competition and Public Procurement Bid rigging in the construction sector in South Africa Global Forum on Competition OECD, 7 – 8 December 2017 Hardin Ratshisusu, Deputy Commissioner Competition Commission South Africa competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
  • 2. Outline • Background • Importance of public procurement • Institutions: competition regulation • Some key attributes for agency effectiveness • Competition regulation and public procurement: stakeholder management • Enforcement experience in bid rigging • Evolution of Commission’s strategy • Increased focus on enforcement • The Construction case in brief • Value of projects rigged and outcomes • Advocacy competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
  • 3. Importance of public procurement • The role of government is to, inter alia, provide public goods and services and purchase goods, services and capital assets. • Public procurement is a critical component of delivering broader government / public policy objectives. • Public procurement accounted for 12% of GDP and 29% of general government expenditure in OECD countries, amounting to EUR 4.2 trillion in 2013 (OECD, 2016). • In South Africa, public procurement over the next three years will amount to R1.5 trillion across all spheres of government (National Treasury, 2016). competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
  • 5. Some key attributes for agency effectiveness • Focus on an evidence-based enforcement and advocacy regime. • Strategic case selection and prioritization. • Prioritization framework that responds to socio-economic challenges and public policy objectives: – Focus on markets susceptible to anticompetitive conduct such those in public procurement; – Focus on advocacy, not as an adjunct but a central feature to the authority’s enforcement instruments; and – Focus on cases with the greatest impact. • Credible enforcement and advocacy is critical for agency effectiveness. competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
  • 6. Competition regulation and public procurement: stakeholder management competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy Competition Authority Government Sector Regulators Consumers Non- governmental agencies Business and Trade associations Parliament
  • 7. Evolution of Commission’s strategy competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy 1998 – 2005 2006 – 2009 2010 – 2014 2015 – 2020  Competition Act passed in 1998  Institutions established in September 1999  Focus was on building the institutions therefore no specific strategic goals  Enforcement on merger control (by design, a significant number of notifications received as filling was mandatory)  Align structure and work processes to strategic priorities  Commission as a centre of information, knowledge and expertise  Enactment of leniency policy  Developed approach and methodology to prioritization of sectors and case selection  Initiation of first bid rigging cases in construction, infrastructure and intermediate industrial input product markets  Advocacy and communication  Achieve demonstrable competitive outcomes in the economy through prioritisation of sectors and selection of cases  Increase competitive environment for economic activity through strategic partnerships, engagement, dialogue and advocacy  High performance agency  Heightened enforcement, mostly against cartels and abuse of dominance  Increased settlement of cases  Effective enforcement & merger regulation  Strategic collaboration & advocacy  High performance agency  Heightened enforcement, mostly against cartels and abuse of dominance  Increased litigation
  • 8. Increased focus on enforcement • Since 2006, the Commission has stepped up its enforcement activities, with a specific focus on detecting and prosecuting cartels. • The Commission embarked on strategic planning and implementation in 2006. • A consistent feature of the strategic planning was the adoption and implementation of a sector prioritisation and case selection strategy. • This was key in enabling the Commission to strategically select cases and appropriately channel its resources. • An important aspect of the prioritization framework has been the broader government agenda, particularly on infrastructure development and product markets with a greater social impact. competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
  • 9. Increased focus on enforcement competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
  • 10. The Construction case in brief competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy 2009 • 2009: Commission initiated complaints into alleged prohibited practices of bid-rigging and general collusion in the construction sector. • Commission received multiple applications for leniency in terms of its CLP and concluded bid rigging and collusion was widespread. • +/-150 marker applications and 65 CLP applications. 2011 • Commission launched Fast Track Settlement Process inviting construction firms to voluntarily disclose rigged projects. • Bid-rigging of 298 contracts to the value of R111.9 billion uncovered. • Administrative penalties to the tune of R1.46 billion imposed. • 15 firms reached settlements with the Commission. 2014 • Several of the implicated firms were not willing to settle under Phase I of the Fast Track Settlement programme. • As of August 2016: 10 additional firms settled (13 or 23) projects; 11 firms (19 projects) referred to the Competition Tribunal, remaining cases in litigation. • 2016: Major construction firms settled with government to pay R1.5 billion in lieu of damages. • Other damages claims still ongoing.
  • 11. Value of projects rigged and outcomes • Tenders rigged worth circa USD 3.7 billion: • Public sector projects worth circa USD 2.2 billion; and • The private sector projects worth circa USD 1.5 billion. • Construction firms collectively paid over USD 127 Million in fines. • The Competition Tribunal issued over 250 section 65 certificates for civil damages: • 179 to the public sector; and • 82 to the private sector. competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
  • 12. The cover pricing scheme “I will give you a snapshot of how I understand this all to have worked between the companies from my experience through the process. The main practice appears to have been what is called “cover- pricing”. A strong management system was clearly in place, including succession planning because when one person was promoted or left the company he would bring his successor to a meeting (according to evidence submitted, these meetings usually occurred at 5 star hotels), introduce the new person and do a formal hand-over. Some of the younger people knew that if they wanted to get ahead in their companies this was “the way it is done”. The tenders were then allocated as follows: the firm not wanting the business gives a “cover price” to a competitor who then wins the award on submitting a lower price than the “cover price”. In some cases, the firm submitting the “cover price” will be compensated through a ‘losers’ fee.” Roger Jardine, ex-CEO: Aveng Grinaker-LTA competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
  • 13. Advocacy programme • Following the 2nd phase of the Fast Track Settlement Programme, the Commission engaged in a targeted advocacy programme including: competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy Government (National and Local) Agencies of government Sector Regulator
  • 14. Main focus and outcomes • Impact of bid rigging on the State's financial resources. • Required advocacy interventions: – training of procurement officials; and – drafting and introduction of the Certificate of Independent Bid Determination in public procurement. competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
  • 15. Certificate of Independent Bid Determination competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
  • 16. Final Remarks • Uncovering of bid rigging cases in 2009 further raised the profile of the Commission. • Government adopted the Certificate of Independent Bid Determination for all public procurement in July 2010. • Leniency policy contributed to the uncovering of bid rigging cases. • More cases, particularly involving small firms, continue to be uncovered, mainly lodged by government and municipalities. • Collaboration with other stakeholders, more importantly government and sector regulators, has been crucial. competition regulation for a growing and inclusive economy
  • 17. Thank you Tel: +27 (0)12 394 3200 Fax: +27 (0)12 394 0166 Email: hardinr@compcom.co.za Follow us on Twitter @CompComSA or me @hardinratshi