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Mark Hayek – 201000569
PHIL 232 Final Paper
The Ontological Necessity of Simple Unity and Its Consequences
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This paper will trace the argument posed by Al-Kindi to prove the logical
necessity of the existence of a One True Being, of which all other beings are
predicated. This is done using the principle of non-contradiction, which is the central
methodology used throughout On First Philosophy. The focus of the paper will be on
chapter three of On First Philosophy, namely the part focused on two major themes:
the first is the relationship between unity and multiplicity, and the second is the
relation between real and metaphorical or accidental unity and multiplicity. Al-Kindi
does this in quite the opposite way I choose to present it, since he moves from what I
have designated as the second theme to the first, syllogistically. By moving from the
first to the second theme, I hope to make clearer the necessary causal relation between
multiplicity and unity, namely that there is no multiplicity without unity necessarily
preceding it. In other words, multiplicity is multiplicity of singular units, and
therefore there cannot be multiplicity without unity. Since Al-Kindi adopts the
Aristotelian notion of causes and the first uncaused cause, through this first theme of
multiplicity/unity we can derive the understanding of metaphorical existence of
multiplicity and unity in space-time. This leads to two fundamental issues with Al-
Kindi, and creationism based on Aristotelian premises. The first is how to establish
the necessary existence of multiplicity ontologically. In other words, if the One is
simple unity, what is the necessary premise for the existence of multiplicity? The
second issue, which necessarily derives from the first, is the burden of proof of the
ontic necessity of the existence of multiples. In broader terms, how can Al-Kindi
account for accidental existences having being (and knowing them), if the only true
knowledge is knowledge of the One? Heidegger, in Being and Time, most adequately
lays down the answer. If we introduce Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology,
coupled with the notion of being-in-the-world as a necessary aspect of Dasein, or
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being of oneself, in the multiplicity of space-time, we realize that the problem of
establishing a connection between the simple unity and what is contingently existent
as what is known as the world dissipates.
Al-Kindi poses the claim that the ultimate form of predication is the One. It is
the only predicate that is itself not subject to predication. He does so by focusing on
each of the two, multiplicity and unity, and rhetorically attempts to break the
necessary connection between them. Al-Kindi lays down a staggering amount of
arguments that ultimately lead to contradiction in the case of having multiplicity
without unity. Through the staggering amount of fourteen arguments, he shows both
the metaphysical and epistemological contradictions of having multiplicity without
unity. If to know something is to know its essence, and its essence is its participation,
or being, in one state, then we have already let unity back into the argument. If only
multiplicity is predicable, then it would be impossible to predicate any form of being,
since being is being something, and not many things at the same time. Again, if there
is only multiplicity, then we have eliminated the similar/dissimilar that is based on
unity, since to be similar is to have at least “one” thing in common. Also, if there is
only multiplicity, then nothing would be knowable; the epistemic dimension is wholly
removed since if it is all multiplicity then all would be in constant motion, not
physically but essentially. And if that is the case then I would take it a bit farther than
Al-Kindi and say that there is no essence. Taking the previous argument the other way
around, if there I only multiplicity then nothing would be changing, because change
implies one thing changing into another, and that is contradictory without unity, since
the thing changing must be a thing before it changes into something else, which is
also a unity in itself, or at least becomes so. The argument laid out by Al-Kindi
becomes stronger when he introduces the infinite regress of multiplicity without unity.
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When considering the infinite, divisibility is out of the question for to be divisible is
to be finite and measurable, and it would be to be divisible into parts and parts are
units thus necessitating the existence of unity.
Al-Kindi then moves to undermine the claim that unity can exist without
multiplicity, and sets up another lengthy list of contradictions that arise from this
premise. The main idea that Al-Kindi is implicitly stating is that, and this is precisely
how Heidegger will fit into this argument (but that will come later), that the existence
of multiplicity is self-evident. This is based on the notions of contrariety,
differentiation, multiple opinions and metaphysical claims, and what is similar to the
infinite argument that was posited for multiplicity without unity. To explicate:
contrariety can only exist if there is at least two things, thus multiplicity.
Differentiation carries the same presupposition, namely differentiation between, and
that is multiplicity. There is no need to further explain the notion of multiple opinions
– they are multiple. And the fourth notion of infinity is quite different than the one
give in multiplicity, since saying that there is only unity means that there are no parts,
there are no delimitations, there are no particulars, and thus nothing should exist. This
will also become clearer with Heidegger.
The main premise that allows the existence of metaphorical unity/multiplicity
is the Aristotelian metaphysics of causation. When applied to the understanding of the
unity/multiplicity present in genera, namely that they are one inasmuch as they have
the generic unity, but are multiple in their different accidental qualities, it necessarily
and logically follows that species and individuals retain this dual quality of unity and
multiplicity. The reason why, both ontically and ontologically, unity and multiplicity
are metaphorical in all worldly things is because they are not necessary in and of
themselves, but rather they are contingent upon the necessity of the One True One
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Being. What I mean by worldly is corporeal, but also all that we do not know which is
not the One. In other words, all things that we do know, or can know, are subject to
predication. They are demonstrable, subject to specification, and contain within them
accidental qualities. Al-Kindi logically assumes that nothing can be the cause of its
own essence, and therefore all things exist contingently. In other words, the
metaphorical unity, taking Al-Kindi’s example of a house, is both a unit – one house –
and multiple – made up of walls and such. The unity that we refer to in this example
is accidental, metaphorical, contingent upon the builder and the materials, the form of
the house and the use of it as a house. This is a very clear Aristotelian understanding
of beings as beings only because of external causes.
After we have established the necessity of both unity and multiplicity as being
mutually dependent, and also established the necessity of the dependence of
metaphorical unity and multiplicity on real unity and multiplicity, we must attend to
the complications mentioned in the introduction. To restate, if the One is simple unity,
what is the necessary premise for the existence of multiplicity, and what about the
ontic necessity of the existence of multiples? In order to do so, we must take
Heidegger’s helping hand. In Being and Time, one of the many issues that he
addresses is what both Kant and Descartes call the “scandal of philosophy” (195),
namely that “there is still no cogent proof for “the existence of things outside us”
(195). This is simply using different words to articulate the same problem faced by
Al-Kindi’s metaphyics, namely why is it necessary that things exist if the One is truly
and absolutely simple. This is, for me, a problem solved by the phenomenological
method employed by Heidegger.
Before understanding how Heidegger solves this problem, we must explicate
his notion of phenomenon: “Phenomenon – the self-showing in itself – means a
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distinctive way something can be encountered” (29). This is quite different from
appearance, namely ontic perception. What happens with Descartes and Kant, i.e.
what problems I stated, is that there is an ontic denial of the existence of the world
outside the self. The emphasis is placed thus on the self, and all else is discarded. But
the mistake that they make, is to completely disregard the notion of the ontological
necessity prior to ontic existence. This priority is not temporal, it is rather ontological
in itself. In other words, it is an intellectual, incorporeal priority. Primordially, there is
being. All of the confusion and commotion about proofs and reality of things outside
of myself lie in a study of exactly that which is outside myself. In other words we are
constantly confronted by the outside, and the choice of dealing with it, even one as
extreme as denying it completely, still entails an interaction with it. This is where
Heidegger introduces being-in-the-world as an a priori component of being.
Put very simply, it is impossible for being to be being in itself without the
world. He answers this question with a basis on the necessity of “being-in-the-world”
as “The Fundamental Constitution of Dasein” (53). Heidegger states: “The compound
expression ‘being-in-the-world’ indicates, in the very way we have coined it, that it
stands for a unified phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole. But
while being-in-the-world cannot be broken up into components that may be pieced
together, this does not prevent it from having a multiplicity of constitutive structural
factors. The phenomenal fact indicated by this expression actually gives us a threefold
perspective” (53). This “threefold perspective” focuses on the ontological
understanding of worldliness, the being of everyday inasmuch as it is constituted
unity, and the notion of being in – namely the understanding of what it means to be in
something or somewhere. Insofar as this argument is flushed out by Heidegger, it
includes the same structure that Al-Kindi adopts, that of necessary unity and
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multiplicity in all being. The question of “cogent proof” is thus completely
undermined by adding this premise of being-in-the-world. Heidegger reformulates it
by saying that it is a scandal only because Kant, Descartes, and others believe that
such a proof is even necessary (196).
Bibliography:
- Al-Kindi. On First Philosophy. Trans. Alfred L. Ivry. Albany: State
University of New York Press. 1974. Print.
- Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State
University of New York Press. 2010. Print.
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