SAIEE presentation - Power System Resilience - Why should we CARE as energy utilities to prepare for an extreme incident or threat?

C4.47 – Power System Resilience Working Group
Power System Resilience
SAIEE - LOAD RESEARCH CHAPTER
Why should we CARE as energy utilities to
prepare for an extreme incident or threat?
Malcolm Van Harte
21 April 20

Malcolm Van Harte (B Tech, M Sc Elec Eng, MSAIEE), Head Centre of
Excellence (Control, SCADA, DSO, Netw Ops) at Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd.
• He has also been recently appointed in an acting role as the new Senior
Manager for Distribution SMART Grid. Previously Middle Manager Power
in System Resilience within Eskom, and has worked in Network Planning,
the Regional and National Control Centres, and Network Optimisation.
Currently he is leading the establishment of Distribution System Operator
and Market Operator.
• Malcolm has lead and participated in numerous strategy projects to create
a step change of new resilience capabilities within Eskom, namely, disaster
management, business continuity, organisational resilience, and enterprise
risk management. Furthermore, he participated in research activities and
the development of national standards related to reliability, network
planning, life cycle costing principles, and a reliability assessment tool.
• Malcolm has chaired numerous working and study committee groups
steering initiatives for the National Blackout, Provincial Transmission Risk
Workshops, Network Planning Study Committee, Network Performance,
and Quality of Supply to improve reliability and quality of supply of
electricity infrastructure.
• Malcolm has authored Eskom guidelines and published a number of
national and international papers (30 papers). He is currently the CIGRE
chair for Power System Resilience (C4.47 – PSR WG).

Agenda
1. What is Power System Resilience?
2. What are the principles?
3. Why is it important to network planners?
4. How does one go about it?

Problem statement in Context

5
New York was severely affected by
Hurricane Sandy in 2012
Hoboken - New Jersey
Madison St – 12th St

Catastrophe count graph from 1980-2010
Source: Munich RE
In 2008, Hurricane Ike, the
third most costly U.S.
hurricane, cost private
insurers nearly $16 billion.

Solar Storm - Probability distribution against aa index
High Impact Low Probability (HILP)
Source: Klerk, P. De, & Gaunt, T. (n.d.). Geomagnetic effects on the Main Transmission System, 31 March 2011

8
No SILVER Bullet
NATURAL
SPACE
TERRORIST
CYBER
Critical
Infrastructure

Think Resilience
BBC News 23 Oct 12 06:46 – Italy quake scientists convicted …”Six Italian scientists and an
ex-government official have been sentenced to six years in prison over the 2009 deadly
earthquake in L’Aquila.”…
“…killed 309 people…”

Power System Resilience Working
Group

Task Team 2 within WG Structure
WG Chair:
Mr Malcolm Van Harte
Task Team 1:
Mr Malcolm Van Hare
Literature Study &
International Survey
Definition
Task Team 2:
Dr Mathaios Panteli
Methods
Metrics
Planning
Task Team 3:
Dr Milorad Papic
Interdependencies
Regulatory and Policy
frameworks
Technical Coordinator:
Dr Mathaios Panteli
Technical Secretary:
Vacant

Power System Resilience WG - SCOPE
What are current efforts being conducted to protect critical infrastructures?
Definition of power system resilience in electricity sector
What is the appropriate approach and methodology to be followed for analysing power
systems resilience?
What metrics should be used to quantify the resilience performance of a power grid in
the face of a disaster?
How do we decide on and plan investment portfolios for boosting resilience?
How should we define and model the interdependencies between critical infrastructures?
Policy and regulatory framework to create the environment to encourage the adoption of
prudent decision making?

What is Power System Resilience?

CIGRE C4.47 – Power System Resilience WG
• The concept of resilience is of growing importance in the engineering,
business, and natural science disciplines.
• It has led to interesting debates and attempts to define its role and scope
in these different fraternities.
• A newly established working group should explore how a number of
resilience conceptual models and case studies are utilised to demonstrate
the application of resilience thinking in the electrical sector.
– This requires the demonstration of the conceptual difference between traditional
reliability engineering and resilience engineering techniques.
– The resilience models may suggest that building a resilient power system would
require a range of strategies to enhance the organisational and engineering
capabilities in order to safeguard the system and react to these extreme
conditions.
– New resilience-oriented metrics that go beyond the traditional reliability ones
need to be developed, which would enable the impact quantification of these
extreme events and the development of risk-based resilience and adaptation
strategies, accounting for the interdependencies among critical infrastructures.
• Governments world wide has elevated the requirements to enhance the
ability of critical infrastructures to absorb, prevent, and/or respond
appropriately to the disruption of essential services

Risk -- “a situation involving
exposure to danger [threat].”
Security -- “the state of being
free from danger or threat.”
Resilience -- “the capacity to recover
quickly from difficulties.”
Definitions by Oxford Dictionary
Slide by: USA Army Corps

Resiliency definition?
First thoughts
A resilient system does not necessarily experience
interruptions less frequently, but the duration of those
interruptions is shorter, and/or the impact is less severe
• A reliable system does not fail
• A resilient system adapts to failure to avoid impact
Slide by: Denmark WG members

17
Reliability Concepts
Reliability
Adequacy
Voltage Ampere kA
Steady
QOS
Security
Dynamic Frequency Voltage
Transient
Stability

18
High Impact and Low Probability
NATURAL
SPACE
TERRORIST
CYBER
Critical
Infrastructure

Reliability vs Resilience
Criteria Reliability Resilience
Focus High probability and Low impact Low probability and High impact
Thinking Complicated Complex (Multi –faceted)
Causality
Originate from causes that can
be individually distinguished
System result from networks of
multiple interacting causes
Aspects Security and Adequacy
Reliability, Resistance, Redundancy,
Response and Recovery
Paradigm Reductionism Sub – problem
Regulatory
framework
Incentive-based regulation CIP 014 (Prescribed *)
Metric Customer, Load & Energy indices Disaster Risk + more (Hazard)
Characterised Specified General

Resilience is a multi-faceted concept
Source: Alexander, D. E. (2013). Resilience and disaster risk reduction : an etymological journey. In National Hazards Earth System Science
Summary of the position of resilience studies in the sciences

Resilience Definitions – Disciplinary perspectives
Disciplines Definitions Key capabilities
Infrastructure
critical
Ref: NIAC
Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce the
magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The
effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise
depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt
to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive
event
•Ability to anticipate ?
•Ability to absorb ?
•Ability to adapt ?
•Ability to recover?
Economic
Ref: Hallegatte et al.
Economic resilience refers to the inherent & adaptive
responses to hazards that enable individuals and
communities to avoid some potential losses. It can
take place at the level of the firm, household, market,
or macro economy. In contrast to the pre-event
character of mitigation, economic resilience
emphasizes ingenuity and resourcefulness applied
during and after the event
•Ability to recover ?
•Resourcefulness ?
•Ability to adapt?
Resilience
engineering
Ref: Woods et al.
Resilience engineering is a paradigm for safety
management that focuses on how to help people cope
with complexity under pressure to achieve success. It is
the ability to create foresight – to anticipate the
changing shape of risk before failure and harm occur.
•Ability to be safe
•Anticipation of change
•Ability to cope with
complexity
•Operation under stress

Resilience “states”

Reference / Position Papers
• Congratulation to C4.47
WG
• TC accepted the position
and made reference paper
– published in the Future
Connections newsletter
– Global Insights newsletter
destined primarily for the
CEOs and senior level
management of companies

Part 1 – Power System Resilience definition

Part 2 – Power System Resilience definition
• Resilience is achieved through a set of key actionable
measures to be taken before, during and after extreme
events, such as:

What are the principles?

Resilience: a multi-faceted concept

Conceptual Discussion – Major Stress point
VS

Next debate
Power System
Resilience
Organisational Infrastructure Operational

Conceptual classification of Threats
Source: The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, “Enhancing the Resilience of the Nation’s Electricity System”, USA, July 2017

“FLEP” Resilience Metric System

Optimising the Trapezoid Area

Why is it important to network
planners?

Multi-phase Resilience Assessment Procedure

Fragility-based Probabilities of Failure

Reliability vs Resilience
Risk-based metrics
Focus on quantifying
the impact of HILP
events, and not of
expected, average
events

Resilience characteristics
After Linkov et al, Nature Climate Change 2014
Slide by: UK WG members

Resilience objectives / goals
Decision criteria for investment consideration:
Contain impact of the incident;
Coordinate the response and recovery of the
incident;
Compress the restoration time and
Check the different stages of resilience.

Power System Resilience Strategies
Source: UK Cabinet Office, “Keeping the Country Running: Natural Hazards and Infrastructure,” UK, 2011

Resilience state vs strategies adopted

Multidisciplinary Resilience Framework
Capacity to
rebound and
recover
Capacity
to
withstand
stress
Capability to
maintain desirable
Capability
to adapt
and
thrive
R
Resilience sweet spot
Source: Patricia H. Longstaff, Thomas G. Koslowskib and Will Geoghega, Translating resilience:
A framework to enhance communication and implementation

Resilience Matrix
Physical
Information
Cognitive
Social
PREPARE ABSORB RECOVER ADAPT
System Domains
Disruptive Event Stages
Scale
Home Neighborhood Town County Region State Country

Economic Analysis Framework – Optimisation
Models for Resilience thinking
Constraints
Objectives
Optimized
Natural
Space
Terrorist
Cyber
Inputs
Hazard analysis
Threat
Vulnerability
Consequence
CAPEX vs OPEX
Contain impact
Coordinate response
& recovery
Quicker restoration
time
Review lesson learnt
Institutional Arrangement
Resistance
Reliability
Redundancy
Response & Recovery
Output
Resilience strategy
options
Decision Criteria
Defined and applied
system and
Resilience metrics

How does one go about it?

Risk analysis attempt to answer three questions:
Risk
“Set of Triplets”
Source: Kaplan 1990
What can happen? Scenario
identification
1
If it does happen, what are
the consequences?
Evaluation of
damage caused
by that scenario
2How likely is it that it
will happen?
Probability of
scenario
3

Resilience Philosophy adopted
Adopted
Ref: M. A. Van Harte, M. Panteli, R. Koch, S. Mahomed, and A. Jordaan,
“Resiliency of critical infrastructure : Power system resilience
capabilities and assessment framework,” in DMISA, 2017, pp. 1–11.
Ref: M. A. Van Harte, M. Panteli, L. Pittorino, and R.
Koch, “Utilizing Advanced Resiliency Planning within
the Electrical Sector,” in CIGRE - C4, 2018, pp. 1–8.
Ref: M. Balchanos, Y. Li, and D. Mavris, “Towards a method
for assessing resilience of complex dynamical systems,”
Proc. - 2012 5th Int. Symp. Resilient Control Syst. ISRCS
2012, pp. 155–160, 2012.

Resilience decision-making framework
Define
Resilience
Threats
Data gathering
from historical
events
Hazard/threat
characterization
Impact
Quantification
Determine
acceptable levels
of resilience
Cost-Benefit
Analysis of
Resilience Strategies
Investment
decision-making

Resilience Decision-Making for Power Systems
TT2.1: Resilience
Quantification Metrics
TT2.2: Resilience Assessment
Methods
TT2.3: Resilience Planning and
Decision-making

What about risk metrics?
Need to adopt these risk-based metrics to get a better idea of
these HILP events and plan for mitigating their impact

Case Studies

Eskom Organisational Resilience
Time
ReadinessReduction Response Recovery
Shock
ReflectRecognise
R6
Co-ordinate
Check
Continuous Improvement
Compress
DisasterRisk
Rnormal
Ralert
1
Ralert
2
Ralert
3
ta te tr1 tr2 tr3
RΔ = Ralert
1- Ralert
3
t0
tr4
Resistance
Reliability
Resistance
Redundancy
Resistance
Reliability
Contain
Response &
Recovery
Recovery
Resilience
Strategies
Resistance
Redundancy

“The best highly reliable organisations know
that they have not experienced all of the
ways that their system can fail…
They also know that they have not deduced
all possible failure modes…
and have a deep appreciation for the
liabilities of overconfidence.”
Karl Weik & Kathleen Sutcliffe, “Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in an Age of Uncertainty”,
2nd Edition, San Francisco, John Wiley & Sons, 2007
Hoboken - New Jersey

54
Government / Public and Private partnership is
required - Resilience is an emerging topic, being in the
spotlight of system planners and regulators around the world
1
2
3
Modern Society reliance on critical
infrastructure - Cross-sector resilience: requires a whole
systems (“system of systems”) approach and coordination
World has experienced a number of extreme
incidents - Need to move towards a risk-averse decision-
making approach to provide protection against HILP events
Closing comments
Power System Resilience as an engineering
discipline is evolving and will assist in decision
making process
4
Resilient power system is not necessarily one
that is reliable and a reliable one is not
necessarily resilient5

Thank You – Any Questions

Case Studies 1 – Solar Storm

System GIC flows at (a) 45 and (b) 135 Geo-electric Field
Orientations
Source: Taylor, V. Singhvi1, A. Tarditi1, and M. . Van Harte, “Application of Geomagnetic

Solar Storm Resilience Strategies
Resistance Reliability Redundancy
Response and
Recovery
Infrastructure
Asset
 Power transformer is
designed with a 10 Adc
within 30 minutes
 New age protection relay
is most susceptible against
harmonic distortion
 Annual evaluation of the
GIC impact
 Investigate the neutral
blocking devices
 Built-in automatic shut
down on grid to prevent
cascading failure
 Newer Power Transformer
core design is moved from
5 to 3 limb design
 High Power transformer
withstands capability has
been selected
 Update the PSS/E models
to conduct GIC simulation
to assess the adequacy
and security constraint.
 Nuclear Power Station –
Single phase power
transformer has been
fitted with monitor
instruments
 Procure spare T&D
equipment
 Transmission networks
are planned and designed
with an (N-1)
deterministic philosophy
 Monitor the GIC and E
field at the grid ends
 Developed a response and
recovery plan
 Developed response
trigger level
 Employ two separate alert
stages for failure:
emergency
 Mutual assistance groups
and draw upon (MOU)
with Space Agency
People and
Procedure
 Emergency and
Contingency plans are
being developed
 Limit GPRS data transfer to
SCADA master (Fibre)
 Updated analytic models
with recent research
 Update Risk Assessment
 Impact on telecom. and
power system assessed

 Older relay are to be set
to reduce the sensitivity
to harmonic distortion
 Commercial procedure
has been initiated to
validate the transformer
design criteria
 Conduct protection
scheme response study
 Conduct international
review of SA
vulnerabilities and
resilience approach
adopted
 Nuclear Power Plant has
conduct beyond design
evaluation to understand
the vulnerabilities and
redial investment and
action plans has been
initiated
 Update the Solar Storm
response and recovery
standard operating
guidelines.
 Conduct regular training
of control centre staff.
 Solar Storm Website
 Conduct integrated
national exercise to test
the readiness.
 Review the National
Blackout response plans
(technical and company)

Case Studies 2 – Snow Storms

Introduction
• In recent years a number of extreme
snow incidents have occurred that
resulted in interruption of electricity
supply.
– Extreme snow incident in 2012
• The protection of critical infrastructure
against extreme incidents requires an
assessment framework to enhance
disaster preparedness to respond and to
prioritise investment decision making.
• Resiliency of critical infrastructure
requires:
– Defines power system resilience capabilities
and
– assessment framework for assessing
disaster scenarios in terms of the resilience
thinking.
Source: SANS 10280-1:2014
6
3 5
2
4
7
8
19
22
8
30
18
31
26
23
25
24,
36
28
27
11
9 10
12
13,38
39
21
1
15
14
35
3433
32
1617
20
Namibia
Port Nolloth
AtlanticOcean
Springbok
Vredendal
Brandvlei
Calvinia
Northern Cape
Saldanha
Cape Town
Worcester
Swellendam
Mosselbay
Cape Agulhas
Western Cape
Oudtshoorn Uitenhage
Cape St. Francis
Indian Ocean
Port Elizabeth
East London
Bisho
Queenstown
Eastern Cape
29,
37
De Aar
Victoria West
Port Shepstone
Lesotho
Durban
Ladysmith
Ulundi
KwaZulu-Natal
Kroonstad
Bethlehem
Bloemfontein
Free State
Botswana
Upington
Vryburg
Sishen
Kimberley
North West
Mmabatho
Johannesburg
Klerksdorp
Standerton
Gauteng
Pretoria
eMalahleni
Mpumalanga
Mozambique
Swazi-
land
Zimbabwe
Limpopo
Polokwane
Ice load risk area
Legend
Observed radial ice thickness
Light to moderate (up to 20 mm)
Moderate to heavy (20 mm to 40 mm)
Severe (exceeding 40 mm)
Drg.724ab
NOTE Effective radial ice thickness derived from wet snow
density of 0,5

Power System Resilience Assessment Framework
• No standardised framework for assessing
resilience levels and/or evaluating
investment decisions for the electricity
sector
• This sparked interest in researchers about
establishing a common approach to
adopting resilience in a power system
context:
– techniques for assessing resilience could include
using system engineering techniques
– metrics to quantify power system resilience and
relevant enhancement strategies
• Propose a power system resilience assessment
framework for making decisions

Step 1 - 3
• Holling et al. (1973) argue that resilience is a measure of the ability of systems
to endure shocks and maintain the relationships between different elements.
• Different systems are characterized by different scales and the processes
operating within one system may directly or indirectly affect another system.
• Improved understanding of the direct and indirect consequences and cost
elements.
1
• Hazard analysis is determined from historical data or scientific analysis of a hazard in the
study area, considering the following parameters:
i. Likelihood/probability/regularity = How probable is an event to occur in a given
space of time (season)?
ii. Frequency = How often does the hazard present itself in the given unit of
measurement?
iii. Duration = How long does an event take to occur?
iv. Magnitude/intensity = How severe are the hazards affecting the area of
interest/unit of measurement?
2
• Vulnerability analysis determines the exposure of the assets, systems, communities, and
the environment in the study area to the following vulnerability parameters:
i. Economic = describes how exposed and sensitive the economy is.
ii. Social = describes how exposed and sensitive is the social component of society
and its people.
iii. Environmental = describes how exposed and sensitive the environment is to the
particular hazard.
iv. Physical = describes how exposed and sensitive the critical infrastructure
3

Step 4 - 5
• Identifying the most vulnerable areas is the first step in
planning an effective disaster risk reduction programme.
• The UNDP’s disaster risk reduction (DRR) and suggest that
understanding the interaction of hazards, exposure,
vulnerability, and coping capabilities is crucial to effective
disaster risk assessment and investment decision-making.
4
5
Source: M.A Van Harte et al.

Resilience goals measured against resilience strategies
Decision criteria for investment consideration:
Contain impact of the incident;
Coordinate the response and recovery of the
incident;
Compress the restoration time and
Check the different stages of resilience.

Step 6 - 7
• The Hyogo framework suggests that engaging with multiple stakeholders is
required to establish, and form the foundation of, disaster risk reduction
efforts to ensure that the affected community is aware of hazards, risks, and
investment or operational decisions in terms of risk reduction.
• DM Act obligates organs of state to educate, and create awareness
programmes about the disaster scenarios for the affected communities.
6
• Operational and capital investment would consider the disaster risk profiling
and evaluate the cost-effectiveness of risk reduction projects in terms of the
resilience capability triangle (namely absorptive, adaptive, and restorative) for
risk reduction.
• The relationship between resilience capacities and the evaluation of disaster
risk reduction efforts and resilience enhancement strategies have to
demonstrate the prudence of the investment decision.
7

Case Studies 3 – UK wind storms
Source: M Panteli, S Wilkinson, R Dawson and P Mancarella, “Power System Resilience to Extreme Weather: Fragility
Modelling, Probabilistic Impact Assessment, and Adaptation Measures”, IEEE Transactions on Power System

Great Britain transmission network - Reducing
29-bus
Probability density function of regional wind
profiles with wmax=40m/s
An example of the hourly regional wind
profiles with wmax=40m/s

Impact of windstorms on GB transmission
network
Wind fragility curves of transmission lines and towers
A system model has been developed to assess the impact of
windstorms on the resilience of transmission networks. This includes
the fragility modelling of individual towers and lines and the
assessment of resilience to severe windstorms.

Evaluating the wind impact on the test network
Influence of wind on LOLF and EENS as a
function of wmax of each wind profile for the base
case
Generation and transmission lines that went
offline during windstorms with maximum
wind speeds of 40, 50 and 60m/s respectively

RAWEENS mapping for wmax = 40m/s

Time-dependent resilience indicators

Research questions

TT 1: Power System Resilience Definition
• Resilience characteristics and capabilities
– What characteristics and capabilities should a resilient infrastructure
have to withstand an extreme event?
• Resilience objectives and strategies
– What should be the decision criteria for investment decision-
making?
– Which is the optimum set of strategies for reinforcing resilience
(redundancy, robustness, resourcefulness, etc.)?
• Resilience domains
– Which domains should be considered in a cross-sector resilient
analysis (Physical, cyber, critical infrastructure interdependencies,
etc.)?
• Resilience decision-making
• How do we move beyond the traditional reliability investment decision-
making and planning towards a resilience-oriented one?

TT2.1: Resilience Quantification Metrics
• Characteristics of resilience metrics?
– Time-dependent
– Risk-based (CVaR/VaR), instead of average/expected (e.g.,
EENS)
• Go beyond infrastructure and “electrical” indices?
– E.g., social, environmental, …
• Differentiate between developed and developing
countries?
• Differentiate between rural and urban areas?

TT2.2: Resilience Assessment Methods
• Fragility assessment of power systems to external shocks
and stresses
– How is this affected by the condition, ageing of an asset, etc.
• Spatio-temporal, stochastic impact quantification
• Capable of handling the outage of multiple assets
(potentially in very short periods), going beyond N-1/N-2
security criteria and contingency analysis
• Dynamic Vs Static approaches
• Cascading analysis of events initiated by extreme events

TT2.3: Resilience planning
• Risk-averse planning based on optimization of risk
metrics (e.g., CVaR)
• How to cope with the challenge of performing a
traditional CBA for extreme, rare events?
• Go beyond reliability-driven investments (e.g., adding
more and more redundancy) towards adding embedded
flexibility to deal with unexpected, unforeseen events
• Role of regulatory and policy frameworks for enabling
this transition to resilience planning (link to TT3)

TT3: Regulatory Framework
• How do you define and measure resilience, and what do you define as resilience events,
for practical, regulatory, and “accounting” purposes?
• Operation
– How do you discriminate a “security” event from a “resilience” event?
– How can regulation facilitate a close to real time decision making framework for
relevant stakeholders (e.g., system operator)
– How do you ensure market transparency?
• Planning
– How do you discriminate “reliability (adequacy)” events from “resilience” events?
– How do you coherently measure them?
– How do you incorporate resilience into planning, and what is its relationship with
reliability-based planning?
– What is the most appropriate, implementable methodology for resilience-based cost
benefit analysis?
• How do you economically assess the impact of resilience events (as opposed to reliability)
• What is the most suitable governance for efficient decision making in operational and
planning for resilience events?

TT3: Regulatory Framework
• TT3 - Task 6: Interdependencies
– Given the increasing level of complexity and interactions among
sectors, it is critical to move towards a system of systems thinking
and engineering that captures multiple critical infrastructures and
their interdependencies. For example, we should evaluate how
multiple outages in a power system can cascade or escalate to
interdependent infrastructures, for example, water and gas.
• TT3 - Task 7: Regulatory Framework
– The PSR WG has to suggest a regulatory framework and the policy
required to encourage utilities to adopt appropriate operational and
investment decision-making to consider HILP events. The existing
standards provide the guidelines for the former type of event, but
less information and fewer guidelines are provided for the latter
type of event. These should thus be updated, or perhaps amended,
to serve as the baseline for developing networks with built-in
resilience and flexibility.

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