In May-June 2014 the “Maidan of Foreign Affairs” Foundation was the first in Ukraine to formulate the basic principles of the Crimea Regain Strategy (1,2,3,4,5). Those principles have been publicized many times and commented on in Ukrainian and foreign media and social networks. In November-December 2014 they were published and presented in the book A Strategy for Regaining Crimea. Some conclusions concerning the initial period of the Crimea occupation, from February to December 2014, were published in a report presented in Washington on March 6, 2015 . The first version of “The Strategy for Regaining the Crimea” (henceforth referred to as 'Strategy') was formulated on the assumption that it would be used by top-level agencies in the national government of Ukraine; however, these expectations were not fulfilled, or else they were only partially realized and to a very small degree.

1. The Situation in the Annexed Crimea
and the De-Occupation Strategy
The Annual Report
Part 1
Kyiv, December, 2015

2. 2

3. In May-June 2014 the “Maidan of Foreign Affairs” Foundation was the first in
Ukraine to formulate the basic principles of the Crimea Regain Strategy (1,2,3,4,5).
Those principles have been publicized many times and commented on in Ukrainian
and foreign media and social networks. In November-December 2014 they were
published and presented in the book A Strategy for Regaining Crimea (6).
Some conclusions concerning the initial period of the Crimea occupation, from
February to December 2014, were published in a report presented in Washington on
March 6, 2015 (7).
The first version of “The Strategy for Regaining the Crimea” (henceforth referred to
as 'Strategy') was formulated on the assumption that it would be used by top-level
agencies in the national government of Ukraine; however, these expectations were
not fulfilled, or else they were only partially realized and to a very small degree.
The main concepts of the Strategy:
1. An economic blockade of the activities of the Russian Federation in the Crimea,
in order to make the annexation of Crimea as expensive as possible, affecting:
• sea, air and land transportation with the Crimea;
• cruises and in-coming tourism;
• delivery of goods from Ukraine and foreign countries to the Crimea;
• delivery of goods from the Crimea to destinations outside the peninsula;
• investments in the Crimea from the outside.
Ukrainian businesses working in the occupied Crimea.
2. A legal blockade of the Russian Federation in order to compensate for the losses
suffered by Ukraine, by foreign countries and by their citizens after the annexation of
the Crimea.
3. Opposition to any expansion of the Russian Federation in the Black Sea region.
The expansion of the international Organization for Democracy and Economic
Development GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) into GUAM "+"
(+ Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria).
4. The reinforcement of the military presence of NATO in the Black Sea; the
relocation of NATO naval forces to the Rumanian port Constan a on a rotation basis;ț
the introduction of new international military exercises of the air forces, air defense
forces, the ballistic missile defense forces, and forces for special operations in the
Black Sea region.
3

4. 5. Personal sanctions against Crimean collaborators – citizens of Ukraine who
violated their oaths as public servants. Revocation of all commitments of Ukraine to
them in the form of pension support, or the issuing of foreign passports; the
confiscation of their assets, etc.
6. Support for pro-Ukrainian citizens who leave the Crimea to continue their
education, to work, or to conduct business; the protection of the civil rights and
personal assistance for those who cannot leave the peninsula; the provision of links
with the homeland.
7. The reconstitution of the Crimea AR Council of Ministers and the entire system of
autonomous executive authority in unoccupied territory elsewhere in Ukraine. The
creation of a Crimea Committee in the Parliament of Ukraine. The realization and
implementation of economic programs with the participation of emigrants from the
Crimea; creation of special economic zones (SEZ) and technological parks on the
territory of five districts of Kherson oblast/province, adjacent to the Crimea.
8. The Enshrinement in the Constitution of Ukraine, of the status of the Crimea
as the autonomous national territory of the Crimean Tatar people.
Some of the steps have been taken (see page 6)
An updated version of the Strategy presented in this report is not so much for the
leaders of Ukraine as it is for members of society and for partners of Ukraine,
international organizations and members of the Ukrainian diaspora.
The motives for changing the target groups are the following:
The highest-level political leaders of Ukraine have been neglecting not only the
development and implementation of the “Crimean Strategy” on the national level, but
have refused to even discuss it.
Moreover, high-level leaders of Ukraine, constantly declaring their devotion to and
their belief in the reacquisition of the Crimea, after adopting a reasonably satisfactory
Act “About the Occupied Territories of the Crimea and Sevastopol” (8) later passed a
number of Acts that ran counter to the task of the reacquisition.
The so-called “Special Economic Zone Act” that regulates activity on the territory of
the occupied Crimea became the most resonant one (9). It created a favorable
environment for trade with the occupying forces and for the illegal trafficking of
Ukrainian goods through the occupied Crimea to Russia. On the basis of it, other
legal acts were adopted which discriminated against Ukrainian patriots who had left
or were wishing to leave the occupied territory, having been turned into
“nonresidents” in their native country. Simultaneously it put all the Ukrainians living
4

5. in the occupied Crimea on the same footing as foreigners. It has not been repealed yet
in spite of the multiple promises given by the President of Ukraine under pressure
from the civilian activists of the Crimea and the leader of the Crimean Tartars.
However, some of the steps suggested in 2014 were carried out; this happened as a
result of:
a) voluntary work by members of the civil society, with the involvement of the
Ukrainian and foreign media:
 the naval blockade of the Crimea, and the cessation of regular passenger
transport between Sevastopol, Yalta and Istanbul;
 the cancellation of the regular flight between Simferopol and Istanbul;
 the blockade by civilians of overland goods transport and electrical power
delivery to the Crimea;
 the adoption of the Act “About the Protection of Human Rights of Internally
Displaced People” (10).
b) the actions of partner countries and international organizations, and their
recommendations to the leaders of Ukraine:
 the sanctions of the USA, EU countries, Commonwealth countries and others
opposed to the Russian Federation;
 the sanctions of Ukraine against the Russian Federation;
c) the pressure from the civil society on the government agencies of Ukraine, and the
activity of the leaders who support the Strategy.
 the cutoff of water delivery to the Crimea via the Northern-Crimean canal;
 the closure of the rail connection with the Crimea;
 the prohibition of flights to Ukraine by companies from the Russian Federation
which fly to the Crimea;
 the creation of the Public Prosecutor's Office of the AR of the Crimea;
 indictments against the Crimean collaborators and the sequestration of their
property;
 the stopping of several ships.
Current high-level political leaders in Ukraine are afraid to deal with the reacquisition
of the Crimea, leaving it for “future generations”. That is the reason why a civil
society is obliged to intensify its activity on the international level, placing emphasis
5

6. on cooperation with partner countries, but not ceasing to put pressure on Ukrainian
government authorities.
Taking into consideration the global consequences of the annexation of the Crimea
and the subsequent developments in Ukraine and in the region of the Black and
Mediterranean Seas, it is possible to work out solutions to the Crimean problem only
in the broader international context.
During this period since the annexation of the Crimea a new understanding of
its significance has taken shape. "The world became a different place after the
events in the Crimea, and the changes are increasing very quickly.
President of the United States Barack Obama spoke about this in his speech at the
United Nations General Assembly (11):
“We see some major powers assert themselves in ways that contravene international
law. We see an erosion of the democratic principles and human rights that are
fundamental to this institution’s mission; information is strictly controlled, the
space for civil society restricted. We’re told that such retrenchment is required to
beat back disorder; that it’s the only way to stamp out terrorism, or prevent foreign
meddling…
… Consider Russia’s annexation of Crimea and further aggression in eastern
Ukraine. America has few economic interests in Ukraine. We recognize the
deep and complex history between Russia and Ukraine. But we cannot stand
by when the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation is flagrantly
violated. If that happens without consequence in Ukraine, it could happen to
any nation gathered here today. That’s the basis of the sanctions that the
United States and our partners impose on Russia.”
The annexation of the Crimea led to dramatic and fatal consequences for
Russian internal and external policies. The annexation of the Crimea became a
decisive point and Russia, having passed it, changed from an authoritarian state
into a neo-totalitarian one (12).
8. One of the peculiar features of this neototalitarism, in the the opinion of its
few researchers, is the total control of the ruling regime over the life of society,
yet under in which the population has unlimited access to media means and
communication of the 21st century.
Life in the annexed Crimea today is a picture of what Russia will be in the very
near future.
6

7. It has become obvious that the aggression against Georgia in 2008, the de facto
annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the creation of an enclave in
Transdniester controlled by Russian military forces, the annexation of the Crimea, the
attempt to detach Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk
provinces from Ukraine (the “Novorossiya Project”) using the Crimean model, and
the military intervention of the Russian Federation in Syria are interconnected
constituent parts of a single process.
In the context of the facts mentioned above, the idea of some members of the EU to
make a distinction between “sanctions for the Crimea” and “sanctions for Donbass”
looks questionable. It is necessary to convince the partners of Ukraine of keeping
the linkage of the preservation of sanctions and the pressure for tougher
sanctions against Russia, until Ukraine has fully regained its territorial integrity,
including the Crimean peninsula.
Russia’s entry into the war as an ally of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, and
the ballistic missile attack on Syria from the Caspian Sea through the territories of the
two states, may make this task easier, although it is likely that the inertia of the
prosperous European development during the years after the collapse of the USSR,
with the exception of the crisis in the Balkans, will have an impact for some time.
This manifests itself in attempts to “pacify the aggressor”, which are very reminiscent
of the years prior to the beginning of WWII. Moreover, in the remarks of some
European leaders it is possible to trace not only the idea of “pacification”, but a
tendency to sacrifice values and principles for the sake of the electoral or economic
expediency.
The civilized world did not learn its lesson from the unexpected Russian attack on
Georgia in August 2008. Nobody anticipated that Russia would dare to destroy the
“peace of Yalta”, or that in February-March 2014 it would annex the Crimea; that ten
active-duty battalions from the Russian Federation would invade Donbass in August
2014; that Russia would enter the war in Syria with aerial bombing, or that even more
than that, it would fire long-range 'Caliber-NK' (13) cruise missiles from the Caspian
Sea on October 7 and November 20, 2015.
This presented expert organizations in Ukraine and its partner countries with a
serious challenge. It was necessary to shift from an analysis of events that had already
happened to arrive at a prediction of the probable future moves of the Russian
Federation.
An overall view of the events of 2014-15 which began with the occupation and
annexation of the Crimea suggests that revanche on a global scale was the goal of
7

8. Putin's regime, in response to the historic defeat of the Soviet empire. Putin is
forming his own—anti-Western—world, which he calls (among other things) EEU,
or SCO. He has decided that a different set of basic values will prevail in his world.
This being the case, modern Russia, along with entities like ISIS, has become a new
global threat to the civilized world in the 21st century.
The annexation of the Crimea is also a symbolic challenge on Putin’s part to the
leaders of the USA and Great Britain. He threw down this challenge to two countries
out of the Big Three of the World War II era—the USA and the UK—a few months
before the 70th anniversary of the Crimean Conference which laid the foundations of
the postwar world. In annexing the Crimea, he in a very demonstrative manner
destroyed what had been known for 70 years as the 'world of Yalta'.
Another aspect of the annexation's challenge, thrown down before the USA and the
UK, was that it coincided with the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the
date when they along with Russia signed the Budapest Memorandum which was to
guarantee the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
The annexation of the Crimea, the attempts to create "Novorossia" on the territory of
six to eight of Ukraine’s regions, and the direct aggression in Donbass revealed that
Putin's Russia is a world leader in the scientific development and practical application
of the principles of modern hybrid or diffuse war, which leaves even NATO
somewhat at a loss in terms of responding adequately.
The new principles of modern warfare, successfully applied during the aggression in
Ukraine, were presented by the chief of General Staff Colonel-General Gerasimov in
the report "Main areas in the development of forms and methods of using the Armed
Forces, and the crucial tasks of military science for improving them " at a general
meeting of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation on January
26, 2013 (14).
"In the 21st century a tendency to erase the differences between the state of war and
peace can be traced. Wars are no longer declared, and when they begin, they do not
follow a predictable pattern.
... Within a matter of months or even days, a prosperous country can turn into an
arena of fierce armed struggle, may become a victim of foreign intervention, or it
may be plunged into chaos, humanitarian disaster and civil war. In terms of the toll of
victims and destruction, as well as the devastating social, economic and political
consequences, conflicts of this new type have consequences that are comparable with
those of a real war.
In addition, the "rules of war" have changed substantially. The role of non-military
methods to achieve political and strategic objectives has increased, and in some cases
8

9. they have exceeded the force of armaments in terms of their effectiveness.
... The focus of the methods of warfare is shifting towards the extensive use of
political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures,
implemented with the involvement of population sectors with the potential to engage
in protests. This is complemented by 'military' measures of a hidden nature, including
the implementation of measures of information warfare and the special operations
effect of forces. Often under the guise of peacekeeping activity and crisis
management, those involved only turn to overt force at a later stage, basically to
achieve ultimate success in the conflict.
... Asymmetrical actions which make it possible to neutralize an enemy's superiority
in a military conflict have obtained a wide circulation. They include the use of special
operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanent front throughout the
adversary nation, as well as by means of the manipulation of disseminated
information, the forms and methods of which are constantly being improved.
Another challenge to the world posed by Putin's Russia in 2014-15 is that by
intervening in the Syrian crisis, it joined two regional "arcs of conflict" – the
Mediterranean and the Black Sea – into one "front line" from Tunisia to the Donbass.
The Russian Federation has created the largest military grouping in the Southern
Military District. It includes not only the army and air force, but the intensively
regenerated Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla. Military bases in the annexed
Crimea, in non-recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in the Rostov region, and in
Krasnodar and the North Caucasus are used to carry out real military operations and
to train not only the military but also the combatants who seized the Crimea and
fought in Donbas.
In September and October 2015, realizing the complexity of supplying a base in Syria
by sea, the Russian Federation acquired at least eight civilian bulk carriers, including
them as military vessels under its flag in the 205th detachment of the 9th brigade of
the Black Sea Fleet auxiliary vessels. A separate Black Sea Fleet brigade of marines
was redeployed to guard the base.
In 2015, two of the six new missile frigates (with one more to come in 2016) will join
the Black Sea Fleet; in November 2015, two missile corvettes (of a total of six which
are projected), similar to those which carried out the rocket attack of Syria from the
Caspian Sea on October 7, 2015 already arrived. By the end of 2015 the Black Sea
Fleet will also have two new submarines (of which there will be a total of six). All
these vessels are equipped with "Calibre" cruise missiles, which can carry a nuclear
9

10. warhead with a range of at least 1,500 km (or even up to 2600 km, according to some
sources).
The air base in Gvardeiskiy (near Simferopol) will receive a naval missile-carrying
aviation regiment (NMAR) in 2016, armed with long-range Tu-22M3 bombers.
On November 16, 2015 a new submarine of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet
"Rostov-on-Don" made a rocket attack on Syria from the Mediterranean Sea using
"Caliber" cruise missiles (15). It should be noted that this submarine made its first
passage from its construction and testing site (in the Baltic Sea) to its site of
permanent deployment in the Black Sea.
Thus, Russia is using the Black Sea Fleet, based in the occupied Crimea, in the
Syrian war. This means that the annexed Crimea has now been drawn directly into
the Syrian crisis.
In this context, Russia's risk of reactivating the conflicts in the South Caucasus
(Georgia, Nagorny-Karabakh) to block new energy-source transit projects to
Europe from the Caspian Sea and Turkmenistan via Turkey has substantially
increased.
One of the most risky is the Moldovan direction. This is caused by the isolation
of Trans-Dniester, and by the fact that pro-Russian forces play an important role
in the civilian protests in Moldova.
The Occupation and Annexation of the Crimea: What was it?
The occupation and the subsequent annexation of the Crimea is not the result of
socio-political processes in the Crimea. It was the result of a combined special
operation of the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian
Federation Armed Forces, the Federal Security Service, the Russian Federation
Black Sea Fleet, the Marines, the Air Force and the airborne forces of the
Russian Federation. Assertions that the annexation of the Crimea was allegedly
the result of the long-standing aspiration of the majority of the Crimean
population toward Russia are untenable.
According to an analysis of information from various sources, we are able to
conclude that Russian Defense Intelligence, with the support of the Federal
Security Service, played a leading role in this special operation, and its direct
head was a professional military intelligence officer, Vice Admiral Oleg
Belaventsev.
Immediately after the annexation on March 21, 2014, he was appointed
Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian President in the so-called "Crimean
Federal District." In April 2014 by a secret edict of the Russian Federation President
10

11. he was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation for his success in the
occupation of the Crimea.
Chronology of the annexation
On February 20, as Vladislav Surkov, an aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin,
visited Crimea, social networks reported that a column of armored fighting vehicles
was seen leaving the Kazachya Bay, where the Marine Brigade of Russia’s Black Sea
fleet was based, and was headed toward Sevastopol. The following day Russian
authorities said the move was intended to enhance protection of the fleet in light of
the difficult political situation in Ukraine. Supposedly, the marines were to step up
the protection of the Black Sea fleet military units in other parts of Crimea.
On February 23, the rally in Sevastopol illegally “elected” a so-called “People’s
Mayor” and on February 24, Russian armored vehicles blocked all entrances to
Sevastopol.
On the same day the decision was made to set up the so-called "self-defense" groups
(see below, "the Crimean self-defense force").
Russian military personnel in uniforms without any rank insignia, together with
"the Crimean self-defense force" were in operation during the first two weeks. They
were called "the men in green". In early 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin
admitted in a number of interviews and films about the so-called "Crimean Spring"
that the "men in green" were soldiers of the Russian Federation.
Sevastopol represented the beginning of the Crimean occupation, as according to an
agreement with Ukraine, the headquarters of the Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, a member
of the Russian Navy and the Armed Forces of Russia, were based there.
On February 25, a Russian Black Sea fleet squadron that had just returned from the
Sochi Olympics transported eleven thousand soldiers with assault weapons from
Novorossiysk. In Sevastopol, Russian Black Sea fleet servicemen submitted lists of
their family members in the event of evacuation. The Marine Brigade was put on high
alert. Two military vehicles with Russian license plates and carrying special forces
entered Yalta and settled in the Black Sea fleet’s resort hotel.
On February 26, 2014, several hours after the occupation of Crimeaby Russian forces
began, several thousand supporters of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis gathered in order to
prevent legislators from passing separatist bills. They were opposed by several
thousand supporters of the Russkoe Edinstvo (Russian Unity) party. The clashes
11

12. resulted in the deaths of two people. The Investigative Committee of Russia has
opened an investigation.
On February 26, 2014, Sergei Shoigu, Minister of Defense in the Russian Federation,
said that the Russian Ministry of Defense would take measures to ensure the safety of
the Black Sea Fleet installations in the Crimea.
On the same day, at the order of the President of the Russian Federation, a surprise
combat readiness check of the Western Military District, the 2nd Army of the Central
Military District and Airborne Troops was announced. About 150,000 military
personnel, 90 aircraft, more than 120 helicopters, 880 tanks, more than 1,200 pieces
of military equipment, and up to 80 ships were involved in the exercise.
On the night of February 26, a reconnaissance and sabotage group of Russia’s
airborne special forces arrived from Sevastopol in uniforms without insignia and
seized the buildings of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of Crimea
in Simferopol. They raised Russian flags and erected barricades in front of the
buildings.
According to the group "Information Opposition", the seizure of the Supreme
Council building of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea on February, 27 2014 was
carried out by military personnel of the 45th separate special operations regiment of
the Airborne Regiment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. And in April 2014,
the military personnel of this Russian unit took an active part in extremist actions in
the east of Ukraine, being the "explosively formed penetrator" and the main
participants in seizing the local government, the buildings and the security forces.
One example was the seizure of the administrative buildings in Slavyansk (Donetsk
region), which was performed by servicemen of the 45th separate special operations
regiment. (16)
On February, 27 2014, with military personnel present, a session of the Crimean
parliament was held in which the government of the Crimea was dismissed. In
violation of the law of Ukraine, Sergei Aksenov, leader of the "Russian Unity" party
was appointed President of the Council of Ministers of the Crimea. On the same day
a portion of the deputies of the Crimean parliament adopted a resolution on the
organization and conducting of a republican referendum on the status of the Crimea
to take place on May 25. This decision was also taken in violation of the laws of
Ukraine, which make no provision for local referenda on the issues of the territorial
integrity of the state.
12

13. On the morning of February 27, the Russian military set up checkpoints on the
Isthmus of Perekop and the Chonhar peninsula, which connect Crimea and mainland
Ukraine. The Cossacks, who had arrived in advance, guarded them together with the
Russian military.
Besides them, members of “Berkut”, the Crimean special unit of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Ukraine, appeared at the checkpoints. They participated in the
bloodshed on Maidan in Kyiv on February 18-20, 2014, then due to the civilian
casualties the unit was disbanded and its members returned to the Crimea.
On February 27 2014 the official site of Ministry of Defense of Russia announced
(17) that military units and bodies of Western and Central Commands of Russian
Federation had initiated a large-scale relocation to designated areas, but the areas
were not named in the announcement. On that occasion it was announced that
“officers of the General Staff of Armed Forces of Russian Federation will inform the
commanders of the military units about the regions and the task to fulfill after
unsealing the corresponding packages”.
On February 28, special military forces of the Russian Federation without insignia
captured the Simferopol and Belbek (Sevastopol) airports. Eleven Russian MI-24
combat helicopters entered Crimean air space from Russia, and eight Russian IL-76
military-transport aircrafts landed on the Gvardeyskoye airfield in Simferopol. It was
announced that planes would land every fifteen minutes without the consent or
participation of the State Border Service of Ukraine. Several dozen Russian-made
armored vehicles, among which observers noticed Tigers (Tigr), and other types of
equipment and weapons not previously seen at the units of the Russian fleet in
Crimea, headed from Sevastopol and Gvardeyskoye in the direction of Simferopol.
Unidentified armed men surrounded the State Border Service of Ukraine’s Balaklava
unit.
On March 1, 2014 Sergei Aksionov arbitrarily subdued the Crimean security agencies
and appealed to President of Russia for help. Aksionov declared that the referendum
on the status of Crimea will be held not on March 25, but on March 30.
On the same day President of Russia asked Federation Council of the Russian
Federation for permission to use Russian troops “until socio-political situation in
Ukraine is stabilised”. Federation Council granted the request.
On the same day a group of armed men seized House of Trade Unions in Simferopol,
and in Dzhankoy the former military airport was captured by Russian troops.
13

14. On March 1, two large landing ships of the Baltic Fleet, Kaliningrad and Minsk,
arrived in Sevastopol harbor from Novorossiysk (Russia) with paratroopers and
equipment on board.
On March 2, two large landing ships, Russian Northern Fleet’s Olenegorsky Gornyak
and Russian Baltic Fleet’s Georgiy Pobedonosets, arrived in Sevastopol harbor from
Novorossiysk with more paratroopers and equipment.
On March 2014 armed men seized Permanent Mission of President of Ukraine in
Crimea, and in Feodosia Russian troopers and kazaki ordered the Marine battalion of
the Navy of Ukraine to lay down arms and blocked the military unit of the Ukrainian
coastal defense in the village of Perevalnoye. Moreover, the so-called “men in green”
blocked the Ukrainian Marine battalion in Kerch and seized the headquarters of
Azov-Black Sea regional administration and Simferopol Border Detachment of
Border Guard Service of Ukraine.
On March 3, the Russian military began a blockade of all Ukrainian military units
and bases in Crimea that continued through March 25.
The commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Alexander Vitko, ordered
the Ukrainian military to surrender by 5 a.m. on March 26 or face attacks on all units
and bases in Crimea. This ultimatum was delivered to all Ukrainian military
personnel by Russian soldiers.
A Russian Black Sea fleet missile boat blocked several exits from Sevastopol bays
into the open sea for Ukrainian Boarder Service vessels, including the Balaklava Bay
exit.
The Moskva missile cruiser, missile boat Squall, and two other Russian missile boats
blocked the Donuzlav Ukrainian naval base north of Yevpatoriia.
On March 3 2014 the headquarters of the Navy of Ukraine and some Ukrainian
military units in Sevastopol were attacked, as a result two officers of Sevastopol
Tactical Air Force brigade of Armed Forces of Ukraine were injured at Belbek
airport.
On the same day Russian soldiers blocked Ukrainian military unit № 2904 in
Bakhchisaray, and the ships of Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation blocked
Ukrainian corvette “Ternopol” and command and control ship “Slavutych” in the
Sevastopol Bay. The RF Black Sea Fleet representative demanded from the command
of military unit in Belbek to come over to the side of the Crimean authorities, but the
military men of Ukraine stayed faithful to the oath.
14

15. On March 4, at a press conference, Putin claimed local self-defense forces and not
Russian troops were blockading Ukrainian army facilities.
On March 5, Russian officials continued to deny the presence of Russian servicemen
in Crimea, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.
On March 5 2014 eight units of the State Border Service of Ukraine were blocked by
Russian Federation soldiers. In addition some equipment belonging to the anti-
aircraft missile regiment in Sevastopol were destroyed. On the same day OSCE
military observers were not allowed to pass through the checkpoints at the Crimean
border. This observer mission included representatives of 15 OSCE countries. In
Simferopol the “Crimean Self-Defense Force (Samooborona)” blocked the free
movement of Duniyu Miyativich, the OSCE representative for the issues of freedom
of speech, who was holding a meeting with social activists and editors of the Crimean
media.
On March 6, 2014 Russian soldiers blocked access to the sea for the ships of the
southern naval base of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by sinking the decommissioned
frigate Ochakov and the tugboat Shakhtior at the access point to Lake Donuzlav. On
the same day two other units of the Border Guard Service of Ukraine were blocked
by Russian soldiers.
On March 6, 2014 an extraordinary meeting of the Crimean Parliament was held in
the building of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which
was still guarded by the so-called “men in green”. At this meeting a resolution to hold
a referendum on March 16 (i.e. in 9 days) was adopted. Moreover, a resolution on
Crimea's membership in the Russian Federation as a constituent entity within the
Russian Federation was adopted. The Sevastopol city council adopted the identical
resolution on Sevastopol's membership in the Russian Federation as a constituent
entity within the Russian Federation in an extraordinary meeting.
On March 7, before the Russian military in Sevastopol began its assault on the
Ukrainian Air Force’s Crimea task group command, Cossacks rammed the gates of
the base with heavy trucks.
On March 8, one hundred so-called “self-defense” troops equipped with automatic
weapons, bulletproof vests, and portable radios arrived in three buses to the military
registration and enlistment office in Simferopol and stationed machine-gunners on all
the floors. This “self-defense” unit was led by a retired general who identified
himself as an adviser to the Crimean government.
On March 8, 2014 Russian soldiers captured the Ukrainian border checkpoint of
Shcholkine on the Cape of Kazantyp.
15

16. On March 9, 2014 Russian military personnel captured the Ukrainian frontier point in
the village of Chornomorske and a convoy of dozens of unmarked military vehicles
transporting Russian military personnel came to Simferopol.
During the night of March 10, 2014 Russian soldiers captured the missile unit in
Chornomorske and the military unit in Bakhchisaray.
On March 13, 2014 Russian troops and members of the “Crimean Self-Defense Force
(Samooborona)” blocked the premises of the armory in Inkerman (Sevastopol).
During the night of March 14, 2014 the Unit of the Foreign Intelligence Service of
Ukraine in Alushta was attacked. On the same day a convoy of Russian Federation
military equipment, which was observed to include large-calibre artillery, set off from
Kerch deep into the peninsula.
On March 15, 2014 the units of the Border Guard Service of Ukraine in the villages
of Massandra and Gurzuf (Yalta) were captured. On the same day a four-unit
antiaircraft missile battery was transported via the Kerch ferry.
Thus, the main military objectives and administrative buildings in the Crimea had
been captured by the Russian soldiers and the local paramilitary organization
“Crimean Self-defense (Samooborona)”, controlled by Aksionov, by March 16 (the
day the referendum was announced) and the number of the Russian soldiers and the
quantity of military equipment had increased considerably.
The Referendum
Before Crimea’s annexation by the Russian Federation in March 2014, the human
rights situation in Crimea differed little from that in the rest of Ukraine. For the most
part, residents of the peninsula enjoyed freedom of speech and assembly and had an
active civil society. Numerous independent print, broadcast, and online media outlets
operated. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots groups
regularlyorganized assemblies, rallies, and pickets on political, social, and
environmental issues. Protests against corruption or illegal construction were
commonplace, and Crimean Tatar organizations were particularly active.
Throughout the EuroMaidan period of mass protests from November 2013 to
February 2014, this situation did not materially change. (18)
To understand this crackdown it is important to recognize that, contrary to the
Russian narrative, the annexation of the region was not the result of natural
sociopolitical processes, nor did it grow from the aspirations of the Crimean
population. In fact, residents of Crimea have actually grown more “Ukrainian” in
their outlook in recent years.
16

17. According to a 2011 survey by the Razumkov Center (19), an independent policy
institute in Kyiv, 71.3 percent of respondents said they considered Ukraine their
homeland—up from 39.3 percent in a 2008 poll. Among ethnic Russian residents,
66.8 percent viewed Ukraine as their homeland; among ethnic Ukrainians and
Crimean Tatars, that figure was above 80 percent. Only 18.6 percent of respondents
said they did not think of Ukraine as their homeland, while 10 percent said they could
not answer the question.
Compare: in 2008 only 39.3% of respondents in the Crimea considered Ukraine to be
their motherland, 33.3% considered Ukraine not to be their motherland, and 27.4%
were undecided.
Thus the social basis for separatism in the Crimea was steadily shrinking in the early
2000s and by 2012 it was at about 30% (compared to approximately 60% in 2009).
The sociological data given coincide with the information about the actual number of
participants in the “referendum” on the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian
Federation (32.4%), as given by M. Dzhemilev, the leader of the Crimean Tatars.
In preparing to annex the peninsula, Russian state media launched a campaign to
counter Ukrainian sentiments and inflame fears of impending repression by
“Ukrainian fascists” among Crimea’s ethnic Russian population. This echoed similar
rhetoric used by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions
toward the EuroMaidan movement.
This referendum was held under occupation conditions marked by the presence of
Russian military troops, including Cossacks, and “self-defense” units sealing off
border crossings, airfields, and military bases, and guarding polling stations and
election commission offices.
According to the results of the so-called referendum on March 16 2014, held at
gunpoint and without observers, allegedly 96.77% of the participants (with an
attendance rate at 83.1%) voted for the Crimea's annexation by Russia. In Sevastopol,
traditionally famous for its pro-Russian views, 95.6% of the participants voted for the
Crimea to be annexed by Russia (with an attendance of 83.1% attendance), which is
lower than in the Crimea as a whole! This is just one more item of circumstantial
evidence that the results of the referendum were falsified. Note: there are about 1.6
million voters in the Crimea, and 0.3 million in Sevastopol. The population of the
Crimea is 2 million people; Sevastopol has 0.4 million residents.
The Changeover of Power and the Displacement of People
17

18. The issue of human rights in Crimea, the region with the military base, is dealt with
by Russia exclusively with a view to creating a loyal population, optimal in terms of
the cost of maintenance, and which is not capable of social protest or any other
uncontrolled forms of political activity.
It’s essential to understand that a population of 2.4 million in the Crimea is
economically unprofitable for the military base. For that reason, we predicted in the
middle of 2014 that the Russian Federation would encourage the migration of a
considerable number of people from Crimea to different regions of Russia, at the
same time populating the occupied Crimea with their citizens and replacing the
Crimean state employees, in spite of their loyalty.
Since the first days of the annexation in March 2014, the Russian government has
sent Russians to form its military, repressive, and managerial apparatus in Crimea.
Sevastopol in particular has seen an influx of military forces, law enforcement
officers, and regulatory agency officials and inspectors. (20)
In the year since the occupation began, Russia has removed Crimean professionals
from strategically important posts throughout the peninsula. Major law enforcement
officials, such as judges, prosecutors, investigators, police, and members of the
security services, were steadily being replaced by personnel imported from different
regions of Russia.
A partial sample shows the systematic nature of these replacements:
• March 25: After signing the treaty annexing Crimea, Russian President Vladimir
Putin appoints Russian navy Vice Admiral Oleg Belaventsev as his official
representative to the new Crimean Federal District.
• April 16: The port city of Feodosiia is assigned a new prosecutor from the
Krasnoyarsk region of Russia.
• April 22: One hundred fifty employees from various Russian regions are detailed to
the new investigative offices of Crimea and Sevastopol.
• April 25: A prosecutor from Orsk in the Orenburg region of Russia is appointed to a
similar post in the Crimean city of Alushta.
• May 16: A new head of the Crimean gas-producing company Chernomorneftegaz, a
subsidiary of Ukrainian state energy company Naftogaz, is appointed from the
Krasnodar region.
• May 18: Yevpatoriia in western Crimea gets a prosecutor from Russia’s Sverdlovsk.
18

19. • May 31: The Crimea and Sevastopol traffic police forces receive new management
from the Russian Federation.
• July 28: Three regions of Crimea are assigned new prosecutors from the Russian
Federation.
• August 25: Seventy-three staff members of thirteen territorial bodies of the Russian
Federal Penitentiary Service arrive in Crimea for placements.
The numerous Russian bureaucrats, officers, mercenaries, and soldiers on short-term
assignments, along with their families, made up the first large wave of the peninsula’s
new population. This group constituted the first wave of people initially sent to, in
Moscow’s historically revisionist lingo, “resettle” Crimea.
As a result, the population of Sevastopol has climbed steadily. (22) On January 1,
2014, the city was home to 384,000 people. (23) By August 1, 2015, the population
had reached nearly 410,000, a 6.8 percent increase. (24) By August 2015, over
twenty thousand residents of Russia had moved to Crimea in that year alone, the
majority settling in Sevastopol, the location of the Russian Black Sea fleet.
Soldiers make up a large part of this new migration to Sevastopol, and along with
major infrastructure projects to support this militarization—including a bridge over
the Kerch Strait to connect Crimea to Russia, and the installation of electrical wires
across Kerch Bay—officials in Crimea have been building homes for troops at a rapid
pace.
In August 2015, fifty apartment buildings were completed, making 2,109 new
housing units available for the families of those serving in the Russian Black Sea
Fleet. To support the families of the arriving servicemen, the construction of a
kindergarten and a school is scheduled to begin, for 260 and 600 children,
respectively, by the end of 2015. (25) Even after these apartments are filled, two
thousand more will be needed to house those serving in the fleet. (26)
By 2020, seventeen thousand apartments will be built for the military in Sevastopol
in addition to five thousand apartments in other Crimean cities and towns. (26)
Indeed, the expansion of the Black Sea Fleet, together with additional new military
units on the peninsula, has produced a massive shortage of housing: the number of
servicemen waiting for housing in Crimea exceeds three thousand.
In addition, construction of compounds for new coast guard units in the Simferopol
area continues. Six bases for soldiers have already been built, and construction plans
for family-style dorms, a kindergarten, and a new school for the soldiers’ children
have already been approved. Completion is planned for 2016. (27)
19

20. Territorial Agency of the Federal Statistics Service for the Republic of Crimea, “The
Demographic Situation in the Republic of Crimea, JanuaryJune 2015” (28)
By October 2014, it had shrunk by nearly 4 percent to 1,891,500. (29)
But the population decline has swiftly reversed. By June 1, 2015, 1,901,300 people
were living in Crimea. In the first half of 2015, 41 percent of migrants came from
Russia, amounting to almost 8,500 people, compared with 922 during the same
period in 2014. Also in the first half of 2015, 11,396 people left Crimea to live in
Russia, compared with 386 people for the same time period in 2014. The Crimean
population has continued to grow, despite the fact that there are three to four
thousand more deaths than births there annually.
According to the official statistics of the Russian Federation regarding the annexation
of the Crimea, including 2014 and first five months of 2015, 63,068 people came to
the peninsula (21,991 of them to Sevastopol) and 25,691 people left the Crimea. (30)
Thus the trends mentioned above are not only being maintained but are growing.
Information on real estate sales confirms the process of Crimea’s “new resettlement.”
In August 2015, the State Committee on Registration of Crimea (Goskomregistr)
reported that Russian citizens had purchased more than ten thousand apartments,
seven thousand land parcels for individual development, and seven thousand homes.
(31)
Goskomregistr itself serves as a good example of a broader, albeit difficult to track,
pattern in which Russian bureaucrats are populating Crimea’s government agencies
and ministries. Three of its four deputy directors are from Russia: one is from
Novorossiysk, another from Moscow, and a third from Krasnodar. (32) Of
Goskomregistr’s 433 employees, approximately 150 come from Russia, and there are
plans to increase their numbers to 250.(33)
It makes it possible to evaluate the scope of the “new populating” of the Crimea with
Russian officials: the Crimean government consists of 19 ministries, 8 state
committees, 14 departments (not including the Territorial Departments of the Federal
Security Service, the Border Guard Service, the police, the Office of the Public
Prosecutor, the Investigative Committee, and the customs and tax service, in which
the number of officials from Russia is much bigger than in the Crimean government).
According to “Maidan of Foreign Affairs” experts, who rely on the analysis of public
information as well as insider information, the percentage of the officials sent from
the Russian Federation to staff the departments of Russian Federation federal
agencies in the Crimea reaches 70%; in local agencies it is 50%.
Citizenship
20

21. The main strategy for displacing and demoralizing so-called 'disloyal people' was the
practice of mass and systematic “compulsion to adopt Russian citizenship”, which
violated all fundamental human rights.
This was implemented from the very first day of annexation. Its aim is to create
unbearable living conditions in the Crimea for those who don’t want to exchange
their Ukrainian citizenship for that of Russia. They have to quit their job, leave their
families, homes and property, and leave the territory of the Crimea.
On March 18, all citizens of Ukraine legally residing on the territory of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol were automatically declared
citizens of Russia. Those who wished to keep their Ukrainian citizenship had one
month to inform the Russian occupation authorities.
This procedure violated all norms of international law related to citizenship.
Moreover, it was purposely complicated. In all of Crimea, an area of 10,000 square
miles, only four offices — in Sevastopol, Bakhchysarai, Simferopol, and Bilohirsk —
were designated to receive the paperwork for those wishing to retain Ukrainian
citizenship. Applications by mail or proxy were not accepted.
Some people had to travel as far as 150 miles to get to the nearest office. (Due to
enormous lines, three additional offices, in Alushta, Yalta, and Kerch, were opened
on April 12, five days before the deadline.)
Those who rejected Russian citizenship, or have not yet received their Russian
passports, are required to obtain a residence permit. In a territory with a population of
2.4 million, the issuance of residence permits is limited to 5,000 per year. (34)
People not granted residence permits are considered foreign nationals with no right to
be on the “territory of the Russian Federation” for more than 180 days per year.
Natives of Crimea with family, jobs, and property in the region will have to regularly
travel outside the peninsula for long periods of time, without guarantees that they will
be allowed back in. (35)
In response, Ukraine’s parliament passed a law on April 15 suspending the country’s
dual citizenship prohibition for Crimeans who had Russian citizenship forced upon
them.
In a tit-for-tat measure, Russia’s Duma then passed legislation on May 28 setting
criminal penalties for Russian citizens who hold dual nationality but have not
disclosed that fact to the Russian authorities. Penalties include fines of up to 200,000
rubles (about $5,200) and up to 400 hours of community service. The law comes into
force on January 2016. (36)
21

22. Public servants in Crimea, such as judges, police officers, and government officials,
are required by the Russian Federation to turn in their Ukrainian passports.10
According to numerous personal accounts from Crimean residents, all employees of
state institutions, including hospitals and schools, are unofficially required to do the
same. (37)
The authorities of occupied Crimea declared that Ukrainian passports would only be
permitted until January 1, 2015, after which citizens with Ukrainian passports
residing in Crimea would be considered aliens.
By effectively coercing Crimeans into getting Russian citizenship, the Kremlin
indirectly restricts Crimeans’ freedom of movement to the territory of the Russian
Federation.
Ukrainian law does not recognize documents issued by the occupation authorities;
therefore, holders of Russian passports issued in Crimea will not be able to use them
to enter other parts of Ukraine.
And because Ukraine has notified other states that it considers such passports illegal,
Crimeans will likely encounter problems when traveling abroad, especially in
countries that require visas.
This will also affect those who were under eighteen years of age on March 18, 2014,
and had not yet been required to obtain a passport for foreign travel.(38)
RESTRICTING COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA: AN “INFORMATION
GHETTO”
Russia is working to turn the Crimean peninsula into an information ghetto, where
citizens are denied the opportunity to receive news and communication from the rest
of Ukraine. On the heels of the annexation treaty, Russia took steps to replace
Ukrainian Internet service providers on the peninsula. Access to Ukrainian television
and independent media has been virtually eliminated, and major Ukrainian mobile
phone services have been disconnected, with occupation authorities openly touting a
new Russian provider.
Crimean media outlets were forced to re-register in accordance with Russian law,
and, as a result, independent media essentially ceased to exist on the peninsula.
Online publications were particularly affected; under Ukrainian law they were not
required to register with state authorities, but under Russian law both online and print
outlets must do so.
Today, challenging Crimea’s status as part of Russia or supporting its return to
Ukraine—in the media, on social networks, or in a public place—is a prosecutable
22

23. offense. The law also carries a potential three-year prison term and fines of up to
three hundred thousand rubles or two years of the convicted person’s wages. Harsher
penalties, including up to five years in prison, are reserved for making such calls
“with the use of media, including information and telecommunications networks,
including Internet.”
An amendment to Russia’s criminal code was passed in the Russian Federation on
December 25, 2013, before the Crimean annexation. The law took effect in the
territory of the Russian Federation on May 9, 2014, which at that point included the
Crimean peninsula, and made it illegal to publicly call for “actions aimed at violating
the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.” Public calls to action are defined
as oral or written suggestions or requests to act addressed to a particular person or
persons, or to the general public. Neither the context in which those calls are made
nor whether they generate actual action matters from the perspective of the law.
As with Russian laws on “instigating extremism,” determining what constitutes such
a call and the intent of the speaker or writer is up to law-enforcement bodies.
Lawyers, therefore, recommend that Crimeans choose words carefully and even
watch their intonation when addressing topics related to Crimea, Ukraine, and Russia
in public—be it online, in a store, or on public transport— to avoid their comments
being interpreted as a “call” or “appeal.”
In ways that mirror Russian President Vladimir Putin’s moves early in his rule to
bring domestic media to heel, the Kremlin has sought to consolidate its hold on
Crimea by muzzling troublesome media outlets. Therefore, the 2015 witnessed a
comprehensive “mopping up” operation against a few stalwart individuals and
organizations.
Two leading Crimean Tatar media outlets, the Crimean news agency (QHA) and the
ATR TV station, were ultimately forced to decamp to Kyiv after Russian authorities
denied them registration. Prior to this denial, the authorities had searched the offices
of ATR and seized materials, while QHA’s Editor in Chief had been repeatedly
interrogated. (96)
Several other popular Crimean Tatar media outlets, the Lale children’s TV channel,
and the Meydan and Lider radio stations, were also denied registration and
consequently forced to shut down. (39)
Additionally, nearly all residents of Crimea whom the author of this report met, as
well as other experts, expressed fear that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)
continues to monitor Crimean citizens’ social media activities.
These fears were confirmed on April 20, 2015, when Emir-Usein Kuku, a
representative of the nongovernmental Contact Group for Human Rights, was
23

24. arrested on his way to work in Yalta. Authorities searched his home, seized electronic
devices and books, and took Kuku to be interrogated by the FSB, presumably at a law
enforcement location in Yalta. Kuku was accused of violating Article 282 of the
Legal Code of the Russian Federation, “Incitement of Hatred or Enmity, as Well as
Abasement of Human Dignity,” citing posts on Kuku’s Facebook page from 2013 as
the pretext for this harassment. (40)
According to inside information from the administration of the Federal Security
Service dealing with the Crimea and Sevastopol, a separate subdivision was created
and approximately 30 officers use special software to constantly trace the “likes” and
“reposts” of Crimea residents using social networks. Moreover, all the functioning
media are under the tight control of the Federal Security Service, and are totally pro-
Russian.
The creation of a “digital information ghetto” in the Crimea is having significant
consequences:
 with every day that passes, elsewhere in Ukraine as well as in the outside
world, it is becoming more and more difficult to have any idea about what is
currently happening in the Crimea; information which may be somewhere near
the truth must be obtained through painstaking analysis and comparison of
discoverable facts;
 even a solidly pro-Ukrainian inhabitant of the Crimea, confined within this
“informational ghetto”, has no opportunity to access sources of information
other than those planned by the media, created by Russian specialists in
psychological warfare. Through this, the individual risks losing an objective
grasp of reality and of key issues). Prolonged exposure to propaganda of that
kind warps the psyche, and can lead to a “zombie” effect;
 as a result, the longer the occupation of the Crimea lasts, the fewer solidly pro-
Ukrainian citizens live in the Crimea. Young people, and especially
schoolchildren, are particularly subject to various risks due to this.
Before annexation, mobile users in Crimea were mainly served by the three largest
Ukrainian operators: MTS Ukraine (57 percent), Kyivstar (21 percent), and Astelit
(16 percent). (41)
In early August, connection in Crimea to both MTS Ukraine and Kyivstar was
stopped. Both companies said they were not responsible for the disruption of service.
On August 4, Russian operator K-Telekom announced the launch of service on the
peninsula to replace MTS Ukraine. Kyivstar’s press office said that on August 11,
24

25. unidentified armed men entered the company’s Simferopol office and began
installing alternative equipment. Its service remains disabled in Crimea.
On August 8, the Ukrainian firm began roaming service in Crimea, using K-
Telecom’s network, making it much more expensive to use MTS Ukraine in the
region. (42)
The de facto authorities say these mobile operators have been kicked out because
Ukrainian legislation supposedly prohibits them from paying for property leases,
electricity, and equipment maintenance in Russian rubles. (43)
As of August 25, Ukrainian fixed-line operators had also been shut down in
Sevastopol and their customers switched to Rostelecom.
On August 4, Russian operator K-Telekom announced the launch of service on the
peninsula to replace MTS Ukraine.
Mobile telephone links
In 2015 the majority of Crimean mobile telephone subscribers, using numbers from
the Russian operator “K-Telekom” (WIN mobile), have been unable to use roaming
to make a connection to Ukrainian mobile networks. The only subscribers who are
able to do so are those with sim-cards issued by Russian mobile operators in regions
of the Russian Federation outside occupied Crimea. Sim-cards which are issued in
Crimea make no provision for calling to mobile numbers belonging to Ukrainian
service providers. The price of a one-minute roaming call from Ukraine to the Crimea
or vice versa is approximately two U.S. dollars per minute. By comparison, the cost
of roaming calls between Ukraine and the Russian Federation is approximately $1.30
per minute.
Persecution of those who criticize the annexation and are qualified as “disloyal”
groups
From the first days of the occupation, the Russian Federation organized a large-scale
campaign of physical harassment and criminal prosecution of potentially disloyal
groups and anyone who opposed the annexation of Crimea.
At first, these actions were carried out largely by the so-called “self-defense” forces,
but they have since evolved into a systematic campaign conducted in concert with
police and the FSB.
25

26. The chief targets can be divided roughly into three groups (with some overlap):
• ethnic Ukrainians and other ethnic, religious, or national groups viewed as favoring
Ukraine’s position in the conflict, including members of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate; Catholics; Jews; and immigrants from Poland,
Belarus, and the Baltic states
• the Crimean Tatar community, particularly officials of its self-governing body, the
Mejlis, and other Muslim organizations, including the Spiritual Administration of
Crimea Muslims and groups designated as extremist by Russia but not by Ukraine
• journalists, civil society activists, and members of NGOs existing prior to the
occupation
Ukrainians
In the Crimea the term “Ukrainians” does not only designate an ethnic group—it is
used to denote all Crimean residents of various nationalities who take a pro-
Ukrainian position. This group thus has not only an ethnic component but a political
one as well, and those who are part of it face discrimination in the exercise of their
right of free assembly, their freedom to express their opinions, their freedom of
religion (in the case of Orthodox Christians of the Kyiv Patriarch and Ukrainian
Greek Catholics), their right of personal inviolability, and their right to use their
native language.
In April and May 2014, Crimean departments of education announced that Ukrainian
language and literature would be studied only as an elective. (44)
At the same time, the number of Russian language and literature lessons doubled;
Russian history and geography lessons also increased. This, and the general anti-
Ukrainian political climate, dissuaded most parents and students from electing to take
Ukrainian classes.
On October 9, the de facto Crimean Minister of Education, Science, and Youth,
Nataliya Goncharova, said that the demand for Ukrainian instruction in Crimea was
rapidly declining. (45)
Consequently, there is no longer a single one of the six hundred schools in Crimea
offering instruction fully in Ukrainian, and only twenty have separate Ukrainian
classes.
This has led to massive job losses among teachers of Ukrainian, who now have to
choose another source of income or retrain at their own expense. (46)
26

27. In addition, high school students planning to take the External Independent
Evaluation (the Ukrainian equivalent to the United States’ Scholastic Aptitude Test)
in order to enter universities in Ukraine are thus deprived of an opportunity to study
in accordance with the Ukrainian curriculum.
Crimean Tatars
The fact that the Crimean Tatars receive attention of a particularly repressive kind
from the Russian authorities is not just by chance. In the opinion of the “Maidan of
Foreign Affairs” experts, there are two reasons for this.
First of all, the occupying power has not been able to persuade the Tatars to
cooperate with them, although they have made very strenuous attempts to achieve
this since the first days of the Crimean occupation.
Secondly, the Russian government considers the Crimean Tatar community the
primary organized opposition group to the Kremlin’s occupation and annexation of
Crimea.
Thirdly, Russia is concerned that Ukraine’s recognition of the Crimean Tatars as the
native people of Crimea and, further, its acknowledgment that Crimea is this ethnic
group’s national territory, may complicate Moscow’s assertion of Crimea’s
historically Russian roots.
The Tatars of Crimea have endured especially harsh treatment since the annexation.
Although there are no recent official statistics, it is estimated the Tatars number at
approximately three hundred thousand.(54) For their refusal to recognize the
authority of the de facto government, Tatar leaders have been exiled or banned from
public life, their public commemorations prohibited, and their media muzzled.
One of the earliest signs that Tatars would receive brutal treatment came on March
15, when the body of Reshat Ametov, a Crimean Tatar activist, was found roughly
two weeks after he attended a peaceful protest in front of the occupied Crimean
parliament. (55) Witnesses reported seeing men in military uniforms leading Ametov
away from the protest. His relatives later told Human Rights Watch that police had
classified his death as violent.(56) Prosecutors have released no information on the
progress of the investigation into his death.
On April 8, a monument to the renowned twentieth-century Crimean Tatar
choreographer Akim Dzhemilev was demolished in the village of Malorechenske. In
the same village, a red swastika was painted on the windows of a school whose
headmaster is a Crimean Tatar. (57)
27

28. On April 21, members of “self-defense” units arrived at the office of the Crimean
Tatar Mejlis in Simferopol and removed a Ukrainian flag that had been raised on the
building two days earlier. A similar event played out in mid-September, followed by
a Russian security service search of a Mejlis member’s home and a raid on the Mejlis
and a Tatar newspaper. (58) In the following days, the Tatars were evicted outright
from the Mejlis building. (59)
In late April, the press secretary to Mustafa Dzhemilev, a Crimean Tatar and Soviet-
era dissident who formerly led the Mejlis, said he and another Tatar leader had been
banned from broadcasts of the Crimea State TV and Radio network. (60) Two weeks
later, Dzhemilev was barred from the territory of Russia and Crimea, although
Russian authorities denied it at the time. He was returning to Crimea through the
Turetskiy Val checkpoint in Armiansk, northern Crimea, and was blocked by Russian
special forces and Crimean “self-defense” forces. In response, Tatars broke through
the security line at the checkpoint to meet Dzhemilev. For that, the prosecutor of
Crimea, Natalya Poklonskaya, ordered the Russian Investigative Committee and the
FSB to investigate the protesters on charges of mass rioting, using force against
officials, and illegally crossing the state border. (61) Poklonskaya also threatened to
dissolve the Mejlis because of “extremist” actions by Tatars. (62) The prosecutor’s
office refused to provide Tatar leaders with a copy of the warning, which would have
allowed them to appeal it.
In June, Dzhemilev’s son, Khaiser, was taken into custody and charged with murder
in connection with the May 2013 shooting of a security guard who worked for his
family. Khaiser Dzhemilev’s case was being reviewed for a possible downgrade from
murder to manslaughter when Crimea was annexed. The de facto authorities now say
he is subject to Russian justice. At a July 16 press conference, Dzhemilev and his
lawyer said that the European Court of Human Rights had ordered his son’s release,
but in late September he reported that his son had been transferred to a prison in
Russia’s Krasnodar region. (63)
On May 15, FSB officers raided the home of Ali Khamzin, head of the Mejlis’
Foreign Relations Department, on allegations that they had found Khamzin’s
business card in the possession of members of Pravyi Sektor, a Ukrainian political
group demonized by the Russian authorities. As Khamzin was in Kyiv at the time, his
son, who also lived in the house, was summoned by the FSB the following day. (64)
In the days leading up to May 18, the annual day of remembrance for Tatars who
were expelled from Crimea in 1944, the de facto authorities sought to preempt
opportunities for public gatherings. On May 16, Sergey Aksyonov, Crimea’s de facto
Prime Minister, issued a decree prohibiting mass events until June 6. In mid-June, the
28

29. Simferopol City Council denied a request by Tatar officials to hold their annual Flag
Day celebrations on June 26 in a city center park that had hosted the event in
previous years. The council refused, saying that a “mass gathering in an area not
intended to accommodate the expected number of the event participants can create
conditions for violating the public order and the rights and lawful interests of other
citizens.” (65)
On June 24, masked men unlawfully entered the house of Eider Osmanov, the Deputy
Director of a madrassa in the Simferopol village of Kolchugino, while he was at
home with his wife and two young children.(66) Later that day, a group of masked
men invaded the school itself when students were present, according to Eider
Adzhimambetov, Press Secretary of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of
Crimea and Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis. The invaders searched the school and
took the Deputy Director with them. He was released several hours later without any
charges.
On July 5, Mejlis Chairman Refat Chubarov was banned from Crimea and Russia for
five years on the grounds that he and the Mejlis had engaged in extremist activity.
Chubarov had been traveling back to Crimea from a neighboring part of Ukraine
when he was stopped at a checkpoint and barred from entering the peninsula. (67)
Therefore, in 2015 the Russian government effectively paralyzed the Tatar’s
congress, the Qurultay, along with their executive agency, the Mejlis; liquidated
independent Crimean Tatar media; created parallel collaborationist structures; sought
to marginalize Islamic activity in Crimea; and intimidated the Crimean Tatar ethnic
group by repressing its strongest leaders and activists.
On January 29, 2015, the deputy head of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, Akhtem Chiygoz,
was arrested as part of the investigation into the so-called “incident of February 26,
2014.” On that date, thousands of Crimean Tatars gathered outside the then Crimean
Parliament to show their support for Ukraine. The demonstrators clashed with pro-
Russian forces. For his involvement in organizing the rally, Chiygoz remains in jail.
(68) For the same incident, Ali Asonov, a father of four, has been locked up since
April 15, 2015. (69) Additionally along with Dzhemilev, Mejlis Chairman Refat
Chubarov, former Soviet dissident Sinaver Kadyrov, and the Coordinator General of
the QHA information agency and Turkish citizen Ismet Yuksel have all been banned
from entering Crimea for five years. (70)
The work of the Crimea Foundation charity, formerly led by Dzhemilev, has come to
a standstill; its property was confiscated in April 2015, including the building in
Simferopol where the Mejlis met. (71)
29

30. In April 2015, an unofficial Turkish monitoring group formed at the behest of the
Turkish government visited Crimea to study the human rights situation.
Representatives of Crimean authorities strove to circumscribe the experts’ work,
monitoring them continuously and preventing their speaking to Crimean residents.
(72)
Among the many human rights violations of Crimean Tatars and others identified by
the monitors were infringement of freedom of speech, due process, property rights,
coercion to assume Russian citizenship, and restricted access to media and education
in their native languages. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gave the
monitors’ report to Putin at a meeting in Baku on June 13, 2015. (73)
Still, Russian law enforcement did not allow six members of the Mejlis to leave
Crimea and attend the World Conference of Crimean Tatars in Ankara, which took
place from August 1 to August 3, 2015, summoning them on these days for
interrogation about the “incident of February 26.”
Religious Groups
Members and leaders of Ukraine’s indigenous religious groups, who stood with
EuroMaidan protesters against Yanukovych’s presidency and have spoken out against
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, have been intimidated and harassed by the authorities
or unknown attackers. (47)
Shortly after expressing support for besieged Ukrainian military units in February and
March, members of Crimea’s five parishes of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church
(UGCC) began receiving threats that they would be prosecuted and their parishes
eliminated.
In March, three of its priests—from Sevastopol, Yalta, and Yevpatoriia—were
kidnapped and later released. One of them, Mykolai Kwich, said he was questioned
by members of the Crimean “self-defense” force and Russian intelligence officers
and charged with extremism. (48)
The priests refused to talk about any further details of their detention or release. Later
in the spring, the three priests left Crimea, but they returned to their parishes in late
August. On September 2, the priest from Yevpatoriia, Bohdan Kostetsky, and twelve
parishioners were detained on the way to Yalta, placed in a basement, interrogated,
and released the following day without charge. These actions were likely acts of
intimidation related to the pro-Ukrainian and pro-Maidan position of the Greek
Catholic Church in Ukraine. The Greek Catholic priests remaining in the peninsula
await clarification of the church’s legal status.
30

31. Parishioners and the priest of St. Clement of Rome, a Ukrainian Orthodox church in
Sevastopol that sits on the grounds of a Ukrainian Naval Academy facility, have been
barred from using the building. (49)
On July 1, a group of armed men in Russian Cossack dress broke into a Ukrainian
Orthodox church in Perevalnoye village, in the Simferopol district, and destroyed
religious relics. During the attack, a pregnant parishioner and a priest’s daughter who
suffers from cerebral palsy were hurt, and the priest’s car was broken into.
Archbishop Klyment of Simferopol and Crimea reported that the police took the
invaders’ side and refused to register a complaint. (50)
The pastor of the Salvation Army’s Crimean branch, Ruslan Zuyev, who had reported
on the pressure applied to representatives of Protestant religious groups in Crimea,
was forced to leave Crimea with his family in June. He had been repeatedly
summoned by the FSB for airing “pro-Ukrainian” views.(50)
In early March, Rabbi Mikhail Kapustin of the Communities of Reform Judaism of
Simferopol and Ukraine fled Crimea with his family. Kapustin had denounced
Russian aggression in Crimea. In late February, someone painted a swastika and anti-
Semitic graffiti on his Ner Tamid synagogue. (51)
In April, vandals defaced Sevastopol’s monument to the 4,200 Jews, including
Crymchaks (a small and separate indigenous group of Tatar-speaking Crimean Jews),
who were murdered by the Nazi occupiers on July 12, 1942. (52)
On June 13, the façade of the Chukurcha Jami mosque in Simferopol was damaged
when someone threw a Molotov cocktail at it. A surveillance camera recorded the
attack, but a perpetrator has yet to be identified or arrested. In addition, the fence next
to the mosque was painted with a black swastika and the arson date. (53)
Journalists and Political Activists
The list of abuses against journalists and activists since the Russian takeover of
Crimea could comprise an entire report in itself. However, this abridged version
highlights the severity of the current situation. The tone was set in early March, when
armed men cut Ukrainian radio and television signals and Russian hannels took over
the airwaves. (74) Since then, journalists have been subject to an ongoing campaign
of harassment, violence, and threats.
On March 1, several members of the Crimean “selfdefense” forces entered the
editorial office of the Center for Investigative Journalism in Simferopol. (75)
According to center director Valentina Samar, the paramilitaries demanded to see the
organization’s media registration documents and office lease agreement. Samar said
31

32. that shortly afterward the Federation of Crimean Trade Unions, which owns the
building, asked the center to vacate the premises by the end of the month. (76)
On May 17, FSB officers detained and interrogated Waclav Radziwinowicz, a
Moscowbased reporter for the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, for several hours.
Various reports say he was accused of misrepresenting his identity or crossing the
border illegally. (77) Nikolai Semena, a Crimea-based reporter for the Ukrainian
newspaper Dien and photographer Lenyara Abibulayeva were also detained.
Those attempting to cover the cancellation of the commemoration of the Tatar
deportation, and reporters in the Tatar community itself, have been especially visible
targets. On the eve of the Tatar deportation anniversary, a photographer from the
Crimean Telegraph newspaper was detained by “selfdefense” forces while recording
a story about the maneuvers of police special units. (78)
On May 18, the deportation anniversary, “self-defense” forces detained Crimean
Tatar journalist Osman Pashayev and Turkish cameraman Cengiz Kizgin for several
hours at the paramilitary group’s headquarters in Simferopol. Pashayev stated on his
Facebook page after their release that the two journalists were threatened with
physical violence and subjected to psychological abuse. (79) They were also robbed
of equipment and personal belongings valued at seventy thousand hryvnya
(approximately six thousand dollars at the time). Afterward, they were transferred to
police custody and interrogated with no attorney present.
On the same day, a journalist for Russia’s Dozhd TV was shooting a video in the
central square of Simferopol when “self-defense” forces told him to delete the
footage. He complied but still was brought to the “self-defense” office, where his
equipment was damaged. (80)
On June 2, “self-defense” forces detained journalist Sergei Mokrushin and producer
Vladlen Melnikov of the Center for Investigative Journalism for making
“inappropriate remarks” about top Russian officials. (81) They were handcuffed and
taken to the headquarters of the “self-defense” forces, where their telephones and
social media accounts were inspected. Both men say they were beaten and Mokrushin
appeared to have bruising around the ribcage and possibly broken ribs. (82)
On June 3, the Editor-in-Chief of the Crimean Tatar newspaper Avdet, Shevket
Kaybullaev, was summoned to the Prosecutor’s Office of Simferopol, where he
received notice that the newspaper was being investigated for extremist activity
because it referred to “Russia’s annexation of Crimea” and to Crimea as an “occupied
territory.” (83)
32

33. Two days later, a founder of the Events of Crimea website, Ruslan Yugosh, reported
on attempts by Crimean police to put pressure on him by interrogating his seventy-
three-year-old mother. According to Yugosh, representatives of the police came to his
house and summoned his mother to testify in the district police station; no summons
papers were served. (84)
On June 22, Sevastopol occupation police detained reporter Tatiana Kozyreva and
cameraman Karen Arzumanyan of independent Ukrainian channel Hromadske TV,
who were broadcasting from a rally at a city square. (85)
Andrey Schekun, a EuroMaidan activist and representative of the education and
culture center Ukrainian House, (87) fled to Kyiv with his family after being
abducted by “self-defense” forces on March 9, tortured, and eventually released on
March 20. His apartment in Bakhchysarai, Crimea, was sealed by unidentified men
on June 7. (88)
On May 10 (by some accounts, May 11) Crimea-born filmmaker Oleg Sentsov was
detained by the FSB. Sentsov had participated in the AutoMaidan protests and helped
bring food and supplies to Ukrainian soldiers trapped in Crimean bases during the
early days of Russia’s occupation. He was charged with plotting to destroy key
infrastructure in Simferopol, Yalta, and Sevastopol. (89)
Along with Sentsov, activists Gennady Afanasiev, Alexei Chirnii, and Alexander
Kolchenko were also detained. The FSB claims they belong to Pravyi Sektor, but that
organization and the detainees both denied their membership. On June 4, Sentsov’s
lawyer, Dmitry Dinse, said his client had been tortured in an attempt to coerce him
into confessing. Dinse has filed a complaint with Russia’s Investigative Committee.
Sentsov and Kolchenko’s requests to see the Ukrainian Consul were denied. (90) A
court has ordered Sentsov and his co-defendants to be held in pretrial detention until
mid-January.
The fate of Vasyl Chernysh, a resident of Sevastopol and an AutoMaidan activist
who was reported missing on March 15, the eve of the Crimean referendum, remains
unknown. His family fears he is no longer alive. (92)
The Prosecutor’s Office and law enforcement agencies of Crimea have not provided
information on the progress of investigations into the late-May disappearances of
three other activists: Leonid Korzh, a member of Ukrainian House, reported missing
on May 22; Timur Shaimardanov, reported missing on May 26; and Seiran
Zinedinov, kidnapped on May 30. All were active in the movement for Ukraine’s
territorial integrity and provided aid to Ukrainian military units trapped by the initial
Russian takeover in February and March. (93)
33

34. On June 29, houses in Simferopol were pasted with leaflets calling on residents to
inform the Crimean Department of the FSB—anonymously, if necessary— of people
who were “against the return of Crimea to the Russian Federation or participated in
the regional Maidan.” (94)
In 2015, Russian law enforcement took over from the Crimean “self-defense” groups
—the Russian-sponsored paramilitary groups constituting the guerrilla forces of the
annexation—in pursuing opponents of the occupation. Their tactics include imposing
harsh sentences for fabricated incidents in order to make an example of particular
individuals.
This has opened the door to arbitrary arrest, search, and legal repercussions against
thousands of people for “extremism and terrorism,” and “incitement against the
territorial integrity of Russia.” In “the affair of May 3, 2014,” (95) and “the affair of
February 26, 2014” (96) for example, Crimean Tatars attempted to break through a
police cordon at a checkpoint in order to allow one of their leaders, Mustafa
Dzhemilev, back on to the peninsula after Russian officials banned him from
entering. Many who took part in this and related protests faced fines and criminal
charges.
Especially noteworthy is the international attention received by the prosecution of
film director Oleg Sentsov, or, as it is known in Russia, “the Crimean terrorist
incident.” (97)
It is important to note that all the young people sentenced in the fabricated incident
were born, raised, educated, and working in Simferopol, the capital of Crimean
autonomy and a city that has traditionally been considered Crimea’s most pro-
Russian. However, having come of age in a Crimea that was part of an independent
Ukraine, they supported the Euromaidan movement in Kyiv and the Ukrainian
soldiers in Crimea besieged by Russian forces during the annexation. (98)
Similarly, an FSB investigation concluded that the Karman art center—a unique
amateur theater and a center of contemporary culture, art, and education included on
official tourism lists of “Things to See in Simferopol”— functioned as a terrorist
meeting place. The center’s founder and Director, Galina Dzhikaeva, managed to
escape to mainland Ukraine after Russian authorities threatened her with arrest.
The Russian authorities have also prosecuted individuals for actions that took place
before Russia annexed Crimea, such as when clashes broke out outside the regional
parliament on February 26, 2014, between Crimean Tatars and supporters of Russia’s
occupation.23 In another retroactive prosecution—for an alleged offense not
committed in Crimea—Maidan activist Aleksandr Kostenko was detained in
Simferopol on February 5, 2015 for allegedly throwing a rock at an employee of the
Crimean Interior Ministry in Kyiv nearly a year earlier, during the EuroMaidan
34

35. events. The matter was taken up by Crimea’s new Russian appointed prosecutor,
Natalya Poklonskaya, and on May 15, 2015, a court found Kostenko guilty of
harming a police officer and possessing parts of a firearm. He was sentenced to four
years and two months in prison, reduced on appeal to three years, eleven months. (99)
The Russian FSB does not stop its pursuit of dissenters within the borders of Crimea,
but also targets citizens of Ukraine who left Crimea as early as spring 2014. Thus, on
March 10, 2015, five days after the publication of Human Rights Abuses in Russian-
Occupied Crimea, the Russian FSB office for Crimea and Sevastopol charged its
author, who now lives in Kyiv, with violation of Part 2, Article 280.1 of the Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation, accusing him of public incitement to destroy
Russia’s territorial integrity. (100) In April 2015, Russian security agents began
searching the home of and interrogating former employees of the
www.blackseanews.net website, of which the author is a co-founder and Editor in
Chief. At the time of writing this report, the investigation was still underway.
Likewise, Aleksandr Liev, a former Crimean Tourism Minister who fled to Kyiv after
the annexation, said he was “repeatedly warned” by individuals from Russia “to talk
less about the topic of returning Crimea, as I might face physical repercussions if
anyone pulled any shady business. Everyone who brings up this topic is being
monitored. For this reason the FSB will severely punish those who ‘bark.’ I was
threatened explicitly and implicitly.” (101)
On August 19, 2015, Putin held a meeting in Sevastopol focused on instilling law,
order, and state legitimacy in the Crimean Federal District. He warned publicly that
“external forces” were trying to destabilize Crimea:
Some capitals speak openly on this subject, speaking about the need to conduct
subversive activities. Structures are being created in parallel, cadres are being
recruited and trained to carry out diversions and acts of sabotage, and to
conduct radical propaganda. . . . Federal as well as the local authorities must
take all these risks into account and respond accordingly. Nothing should be
exaggerated here, nor should anything be fomented; but we must keep
everything in mind and be prepared to respond accordingly and react quickly.”
(102)
Several days later, on August 24, 2015, Ukrainian Independence Day, police in
Crimea arrested several people who came individually to lay flowers at the Taras
Shevchenko monument in Simferopol honoring the giant of the Ukrainian language
and literature, and those who posted photos taken that day with a Ukrainian flag in
Kerch. The monument to Shevchenko was erected shortly after Ukraine gained its
independence from the Soviet Union and, as one scholar put it in 2005, “remains the
only clear symbol of Ukrainianization” in an otherwise Russified city. (103)
35

36. Russian authorities have also expelled the Crimean Human Rights Field Mission, the
only human rights group working on the peninsula and publishing monthly reports.
Its ouster came after it appeared on a list of potentially “undesirable” organizations
that was unanimously approved by the Russian Federation Council on June 8, 2015.
(104)
With these actions, the Russian government is seeking to scare supporters of Ukraine
in Crimea and beyond its borders. The majority of Crimean residents accustomed to
freedom of speech find themselves forced to flee to other regions of Ukraine.
On the basis of information provided by various Ukrainian government ministries,
approximately 21,000 Crimean inhabitants have moved to the Ukrainian mainland
(105). Experts on Crimea, including two who are among the authors of this report,
indicate that Crimean Tatar leaders believe the number of Crimean emigrants to be at
least twice that high.
This is confirmed indirectly by statistical data. As of January 1, 2014 the total
population of Crimea (excluding Sevastopol) was 1,967,200. According to the census
held in October 2014, the population had dropped to 75,700. (106) This includes the
actual number of residents who left the Crimea because of its annexation, and this
process is still continuing.
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Since the annexation, property rights in Crimea have been violated on a massive
scale. All Ukrainian state property on the peninsula is now being expropriated under
the rubric of “nationalization” by the Republic of Crimea. Private companies have
also been effectively confiscated through hostile takeovers and forced management
changes carried out by “selfdefense” forces.
Crimean authorities decreed on July 30 that all lease contracts on property dated
before the annexation could be terminated prematurely and unilaterally. So far, four
hundred public companies have been “nationalized” and the list is constantly
growing. It includes all seaports, airports, railroads, wineries, grain elevators,
agricultural enterprises, water and energy supply infrastructures, and some two
hundred health resorts. The famous Nikitskyi Botanical Gardens, the Artek
Children’s Center, the oil and gas company Chernomorneftegaz, and the More
shipyard have also been seized. (107)
36

37. The expropriation is not limited to Ukrainian state property. Many “nationalized”
entities also include trade unions, higher education institutions, the Academy of
Sciences, and civic organizations.
Private companies are not officially expropriated, but are instead subject to hostile
takeovers and smear campaigns from the region’s de facto authorities. For instance,
officials may spread false information that a private enterprise is bankrupt or faulty
before seizing it. (108) This has been especially true of property belonging to
Ukrainian businessmen who oppose the Russian takeover. In one August 24 incident,
“selfdefense” henchmen blocked managers of the large Zaliv shipyard in Kerch from
entering—supposedly at the request of the workers. The plant belongs to Ukrainian
billionaire Konstiantyn Zhevago, a member of parliament who supports the
democratic changes in the country. (109)
Russian authorities avoid taking part in these “nationalizations” directly, instead
deeming property taken from the Ukrainian government to have been transferred to
the Republic of Crimea. Similarly, Russia’s largest state-owned monopolies have not
taken direct control of the expropriated enterprises in Crimea, fearing international
sanctions. Instead, the occupation authorities created de facto government enterprises
to assume control.
The concentration of a vast number of enterprises in the hands of the “Crimean
authorities” has worrying economic implications. The authorities of autonomous
Crimea have never run so many state businesses at once and have no pool of top state
managers to draw from, because Russian personnel has been limited largely to
military, law enforcement, and security agencies. This creates a serious management
problem that will likely lead to a severe economic crisis in Crimea. The danger is
compounded by the inability to attract private foreign investment to occupied Crimea.
The expropriated businesses in Crimea have lost old markets and contracts and are in
the process of switching to Russian legislation. They are kept afloat only by Russian
bank loans that are allocated mostly for salaries.
Russia’s approach to economic development in the occupied territory has been
opportunistic and chaotic. Plans for the funding and construction of a bridge over the
Kerch Strait change every few weeks. There is also a kaleidoscope of ideas on how to
supply the peninsula with water, ranging from building desalinization plants to
bringing it by tankers, to laying an underwater pipe network across the strait. Russia
will likely have to continue heavily subsidizing Crimea just to keep pensions and
public employees’ salaries at levels promised before the referendum. To do so,
Moscow is already using national retirement savings funds, as well as the budget
reserves of some regions of Russia, which increasingly fuels local irritation. (110)
37

38. One need not be a dissenter or activist to fall afoul of the new authorities in Crimea.
Simply owning a valuable piece of property has been enough to incur trouble from
the Russian authorities.
In 2014, the Crimean occupying regime passed an act “nationalizing” at least four
hundred properties in Crimea owned by the Ukrainian state, without due process or
payment for the property. Exact government figures have not been published because
the documents detailing Ukrainian state property in Crimea have been lost since the
annexation. (111)
This year, the “nationalization” of Ukrainian commercial property was launched.
Experts at the Maidan of Foreign Affairs generally accept prominent Ukrainian
attorney Georgiy Logvinskiy’s estimate that about four thousand state, private
enterprise, and social enterprise organizations have been seized for use by the
Russian regime. (112)
The owners have received no compensation, rather authorities cited the corporations’
“strategic significance” or “unauthorized activities” as a pretext for expropriation in
2014. (113)
In 2015, missing the March 1 deadline to re-register corporations in accordance with
Russian legislation, which was imposed after the annexation, was used as a reason to
seize properties.
Initially expropriated properties became, for appearances’ sake, the property of the
Republic of Crimea. However, toward the end of 2014 property stolen from the
Ukrainian government and Ukrainian citizens was gradually handed over to the
Administrative Department of the President of the Russian Federation. A partial list
of such properties includes the Crimean nature reserve in Alushta, the “Swan Islands”
nature reserves (Lebyazhi ostrova), the historic Yusupov and Golitsyn palaces, four
state residences, the Massandra winery along with eight of its branches, several
public and private retreat centers, and state children’s centers. (114)
All these properties are located in unique nature areas; encompass several tens,
hundreds, or thousands of hectares; and would fetch tens or hundreds of millions of
dollars on the market.
The Russian occupiers’ next phase of “appropriating Crimea” will likely be the sale
of the expropriated Crimean property.
* * *
Conclusions. The Main Points of the Strategy for Regaining Crimea in 2016
38

39. By the end of 2015 the 'transition period' was past in annexed Crimea, and the
region's total subjugation by the occupying country began, as part of its move to
achieve its geopolitical goals. (115)
The neo-totalitarian regime in Crimea is a much more relentless model than that of
the Russian Federation. In this sense, "the Crimean mode" is an experiment which
will be applied in the near future throughout Russia in terms of human rights and
domestic policy.
The importance of this experiment for the Russian Federation lies in the fact that this
neo-totalitarian pattern is being tested in a territory whose population lived for nearly
a quarter century under democratic circumstances, with unlimited freedom of speech
and opinion. The experiment produced an encouraging result for the Putin regime:
whereas democratic institutions in the Russian Federation crumpled slowly and
gradually over a twelve-to-fifteen-year period, in the Crimea it was done within a
year, and in a much stronger form.
It should be noted that in the Crimea, there once was a considerable amount of social
activism in a number of spheres: the campaign for the preservation of forests and
reserves and against construction development in parks; the struggle of small
businesses to maintain their rights while contending with corrupt officials; and the
battle of the Crimean Tatars to protect their rights. This activism often took the form
of rallies, picketing, marches, or petitions. With the arrival of the occupying forces
the attempts of the civil society to resort to their habitual “Ukrainian methods” were
firmly suppressed by the Federal Security Service and are not seen any more.
Harsh methods of suppressing civic activism, tested in occupied Crimea, are likely to
be widely used in Russia as means of mobilizing a totalitarian society, building
support for Russian militarism and expansionism, and using totalitarian power to
achieve the appearance of unity in the populace.
In 2015 there were many new developments in Russian-occupied Crimea. The
patterns that had been established during the initial period were in a general sense
maintained and reinforced, moving to a new level.
The main economic processes in the Crimea are occurring in spheres connected with
the principal objective of the annexation – the militarization of the Crimea. It
primarily involved the accelerated development of the military infrastructure and of
what could be termed the dual-function infrastructure:
 the construction of a bridge across Kerch Bay;
39

40.  the laying of an electrical cable across Kerch Bay (“energy bridge”);
 an increase in the capacity of the Kerch shuttle ferry;
 the construction of garrisons and housing for military personnel;
 the conversion of Crimean industrial enterprises on the basis of military orders,
etc.
In 2015, expanding the military base at an accelerated pace, the Russian Federation is
continuing to develop “technologies” in the Crimea which are beyond the limits set
within international law in general and international understandings relating to human
rights in particular. They are all aimed towards the formation of loyal population
groups and a favourable environment in the region where the military base is situated.
These processes were all at a stage of rapid development in 2014; now they have
become a part of life in the Crimea.
The Main Parts of the Strategy for 2016:
The list presented below does not supersede the opening statements of the Strategy,
but rather supplements them and develops them further.
1. The Strategy for the reacquisition of Crimea within a new conceptual
framework must be part of an as-yet-unestablished strategy to restrain Russian
expansion in the world. Crimea constitutes the first annexation in Europe since
World War II—one which has demolished the whole structure of global
security which was created after the war.
2. The international sanctions imposed on Russia by the civilized world in
response to the annexation of Crimea must never be separated from the
sanctions for “the aggression in eastern Ukraine”. Without the successful
annexation of the Crimea, there would not have been an attempt to dismember
Ukraine—the attempt which was halted in Donbas and other southeastern
regions of Ukraine by Ukrainians.
3. The sanctions against the Russian Federation which are directly connected with
the Crimea must be extended, making them more address-specific, sector-
specific and project-specific—they must be explicitly linked with projects
which are set to be implemented on the territory of the annexed Crimea:
40

41.  to include the seaports of Yevpatoria, Yalta and Feodosia on the EU sanction
lists; and to forbid the sale of ferries for the Kerch shuttle ferry service by
entrepreneurs from civilized countries;
 to provide for sanctions against companies which are involved in the
construction of the traffic bridge and the 'energy bridge' across Kerch Bay; or
in the delivery of ships, floating cranes and equipment for the power plant
which are being designed, or for those which are being constructed in Crimea;
and in the development of offshore oil and gas extraction facilities;
 to exclude the possibility of investing, purchasing and delivery or other forms
of cooperation with Ukrainian enterprises which have been expropriated by the
occupiers on the territory of Crimea.
 to include on the sanction lists those enterprises and organizations in the
Russian Federation which took over the management of enterprises in Crimea
that were the state property of Ukraine, including the Management of Affairs
Office of the President and the Government of the Russian Federation; the
Ministry of Internal Affairs; the Federal Security Service; the Ministry of
Defense; the Central Bank; and other Ministries and State Corporations of the
Russian Federation.
The effectiveness of the sanctions linked with the Crimea is confirmed by the
following facts. Before the annexation, the amount of tax revenue collected within
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was sufficient to cover the budget expenses
(about 40% of which were transferred to the budget of Ukraine and then returned in
the form of subsidies). In 2014-2015 occupied Crimea on its own only provided
revenues equivalent to 25% of budgetary expenditures, and 75% were transferred
from the budget of the Russian Federation. In 2016 the subsidies from the Russian
Federation will constitute approximately 80%.
4. In view of the sharp increase in the Russian Federation's naval capacity in the
Black Sea, it will be necessary to solve the problem of reinforcing the navies of
Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria, by means of a transfer to those countries of
warships from major naval powers such as those of NATO, based on the
principle of the Lend-Lease.
5. In order to provide genuine support for supporters of Ukraine who wish to
leave occupied Crimea so that they may continue their studies, their work or
their business activities, it will be necessary to create an international grant
program, from which resources could be directed towards the studies/training
of Crimean young people; towards support for possible evacuations of
businesses; and towards the creation of new employment positions.
41

42. Links
1 July 7, 2014. Andriy Klymenko (video): We must appeal to the International Court
of Justice and demand compensation for the losses incurred due to the annexation of
the Crimea. - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aw22ChqjCrE
2 July 10, 2014. Andrey Klymenko. “A blacklist and a sea blockade are just a small
portion of the strategy for recovering the Crimea. -
http://www.blackseanews.net/read/83504
42