This paper examines the history of the legislative veto as a separation of powers mechanism in the American government and its influence on American foreign policy making decisions in the Middle East. Its theoretical foundation lies in the tension between the legislative and executive branches, which must work together to make foreign policy as a result of the shared power given by the United States Constitution. As both the President, the head of the executive branch, and the members of Congress both rely on election from the American public and support from American interest groups, which use their monetary and informational support in exchange for policy support in Washington DC. The legislative veto, officially in practice from the 1930s to 1983, had a distinct impact on foreign policy because of its reversal of the legislative process, which enabled public interest groups to have a greater influence on foreign policy. Its impact can be easily seen on Foreign Policy in the Middle East because the legislative veto provision was included in the 1974 renewal of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). During the 9 year period until the legislative veto was ruled unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, five large arms sales to Middle Eastern countries illustrate the larger trend of public policy changing government policy making through the legislative veto. The five sales studied in this paper illustrate the influence of lobbying groups, particularly the American Israeli lobby as a general group, in being able to change foreign policy arrangements already negotiated by foreign policy actors in the US government and demonstrate that sales were altered, withdrawn, or resubmitted with amendments in favor of pro-Israeli policies.

1. ARMS SALES, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
An Examination of the Impact of the Legislative Veto on
American Foreign Policy in the Middle East from 1974 to 1983
Lydia A. Boyer
International Relations 395
May 7, 2010
Submitted to the Mount Holyoke College International Relations Committee
Primary Advisor: Sohail Hashmi Second Advisor: Jon Western Third Reader: Jeremy King

2. Abstract
This paper examines the history of the legislative veto as a separation of powers
mechanism in the American government and its influence on American foreign policy making
decisions in the Middle East. Its theoretical foundation lies in the tension between the legislative
and executive branches, which must work together to make foreign policy as a result of the
shared power given by the United States Constitution. As both the President, the head of the
executive branch, and the members of Congress both rely on election from the American public
and support from American interest groups, which use their monetary and informational support
in exchange for policy support in Washington DC. The legislative veto, officially in practice
from the 1930s to 1983, had a distinct impact on foreign policy because of its reversal of the
legislative process, which enabled public interest groups to have a greater influence on foreign
policy. Its impact can be easily seen on Foreign Policy in the Middle East because the legislative
veto provision was included in the 1974 renewal of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).
During the 9 year period until the legislative veto was ruled unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha,
five large arms sales to Middle Eastern countries illustrate the larger trend of public policy
changing government policy making through the legislative veto. The five sales studied in this
paper illustrate the influence of lobbying groups, particularly the American Israeli lobby as a
general group, in being able to change foreign policy arrangements already negotiated by foreign
policy actors in the US government and demonstrate that sales were altered, withdrawn, or
resubmitted with amendments in favor of pro-Israeli policies.

3. Table of Contents
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1
Chapter 1: The Legislative Veto ......................................................................................................4
Chapter 2: American Foreign Policy Making ................................................................................23
Chapter 3: Case Studies of American Arms Sales to the Middle East ..........................................44
Case Study #1 -1975: Sale of Hawk Missiles to Jordan ....................................................49
Case Study #2 - 1976: Sale of C-130 Hercules Transport Planes to Egypt .......................62
Case Study #3 - 1976: Package Sale to Iran, Saudi Arabia and others ..............................72
Case Study #4 - 1978: Package Sale to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia ............................87
Case Study #5 - 1981: Sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia .................................................104
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................117
Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................................120

4. Boyer 1
1
Introduction
The United States underwent significant changes during the twentieth century as it took a
prominent role in global affairs, but as the role of the country changed, its government had to
find a way to adapt to the new challenges. One of the adaptations that the government began
utilizing in the early 1930’s was known as the legislative veto and it allowed the American
government to reorganize how policy was made. The mechanism took a prominent role in both
foreign and domestic policies and changed the structure of government. As a result, other
changes took place in how the government made foreign policy, the greatest of which was a
more powerful executive branch. By the 1970’s Congress was fed up with the expansion of
executive powers that allowed the President to conduct foreign policy almost unilaterally, and
often against the will of the legislature. As a result, Congress began using the legislative veto as
a mechanism to take back control in many areas of foreign and domestic policy. In foreign
policy, this meant that Congress was attempting to regain its powers over trade, declaration of
war and committing of troops, and commitment of foreign aid.
The more active role that Congress took in the 1970’s and early 1980’s developed the
legislative veto process as a direct result of the increased use of the legislative veto on new laws
passed by Congress. The impact was not necessarily apparent by looking at a general survey of
the laws though because the legislative veto seemed to be used very infrequently. In American
foreign policy in the Middle East, however, the legislative veto made a very clear impression
because it opened up Congress to more lobbying efforts and gave special interest groups a
greater ability to push their agendas. The clearest example of this process can be seen in arms
sales between the U.S. and countries in the Middle East with the greatest rallying of lobbying
coming out around sales to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. By giving more power to

5. Boyer 2
2
Congress, the legislative veto provision would allow for a frenzy of activity by voters to rally
around an issue while it was under review on Capitol Hill with a resultant increase in
participation.
In order to demonstrate that there was a general increase in participation by lobbying
groups, and most notably in the case of Middle East arms sales, the Israeli lobby, this paper will
look at how the legislative veto works, the process of American foreign policy making and the
role of lobbies before looking at a series of arms sales from 1975 to 1981, which demonstrate the
increased participation by special interest groups. The two other main results of the legislative
veto from the same period were that Congress used it as a means to reassert its power and check
the President, even if the legislature did not wish to stop an activity, and it served as a
mechanism to allow for increased debate of the Cold War, which most likely perpetuated the
mentality of the Cold War through this period. While these two issues may overlap with the
increased participation by lobbying groups, they are not the focus and were sometimes used by
the public to push a point of view where the argument could be furthered by using either the need
for a stronger Congress or the Cold War mentality.
Overall, the conclusion that I have come to is that lobbying the United States government
to influence American foreign policy in the Middle East became more important during this
period than it had been before because of the changes in the American role in the region.
Throughout the period of 1975 to 1981, the United States was taking a more dominant role as the
major peacemaker and mediator between the Arabs and the Israelis and it brokered many of the
peace agreements. As a result, advocates for both the Arab and Israeli sides wanted to ensure that
their government understood what was at stake during the entire process and procuring arms for
the states they sympathized with became a fundamental part of their advocacy. While early on,

6. Boyer 3
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the American Jewish lobby was much more successful in asserting its influence, the rise of the
Arab lobby, especially with its connection to Arab oil, began to take a bigger role.
The issue, as will be seen from the case studies, is that the points of view lobbied for by
the interest groups do not always make the most sense based upon the conditions abroad and
while groups may be informed about specific foreign policy issues, they espouse a bias by
advocating for a certain position as though the issue existed in a vacuum. Congressmen, who are
not as educated on international issues, can be swayed by the presentation of information by
interest groups as facts rather than a single interpretation of events. The other challenge about
very active interest groups is if they have motivated donors and voters, elected officials will feel
pressure to vote in certain ways to ensure their self-interest in re-elections, which bureaucrats in
the executive department are not subjected to. The dilemma that emerges is one where wealthier
and more prominent groups are able to levy greater influence over Congress regardless of where
American interests actually are because they are able to impact elections through donations and
campaigning for or against an incumbent based upon their voting record on specific issues.
In sum, the legislative veto is a mechanism that allowed for greater participation by the
public in foreign policy formation in the Middle East and created a contained environment for
interest groups to lobby their issues. Foreign state leaders also took advantage of the ability to
lobby the U.S. government, but they were already able to do so through diplomatic channels; the
difference being that they began lobbying Congress during this period as well as the President
and executive departments. In the Middle East, arms sales demonstrates this increase in
participation despite that an arms sale was never vetoed. The active role of interest groups in the
U.S. that focuses on Middle East policy has thus persisted to this day.

7. Boyer 4
4
Chapter 1: The Legislative Veto
The legislative veto developed during the twentieth century to address the need of the
national government to widen its scope while retaining efficiency within both the legislative and
executive branches. The legislative veto, also called a congressional veto, developed throughout
the twentieth century in order to address these challenges in the federal government. Proponents
have held that it is a constitutional method of delegating power from Congress to the more
capable executive while retaining both the separation of powers and the ability for one branch to
perform a check on the others’ power. However, opponents argue that it violates basic
constitutional prescriptions for inter-branch interactions. In the case of arms sales, the veto
opened up the number of groups that could assert influence over the sales as well as acting as a
means for the executive and legislative branches to work together more efficiently. This section
will look first at the veto itself and then the development of the veto as it was attached to laws
relating to the foreign sale of arms.
The development of the legislative veto was a result of both branches working together to
develop a mechanism that would provide both branches of government with increased flexibility
and the ability to streamline as they fulfilled constitutional duties. Opponents and proponents
have existed in both parts of the government and at different times each branch seems to have
benefited more from the legislative veto. Generally, these laws allow the executive branch to
take actions that normally Congress is responsible for under the constitution while providing a
means for Congress to retain oversight on any decision made.
In order to understand how the legislative veto became a part of American foreign policy
making, the mechanism itself and its context needs to be understood. The constitutional power
given to Congress and the President overlaps in specific ways and the legislative veto sought to

8. Boyer 5
5
mediate these conflicting powers. This section is divided into three parts: an introduction to the
legislative veto and how it works; the history and development of the legislative veto from its
inception until its official death in the 1983 Supreme Court ruling and then a brief synopsis of
the key ways that the veto makes an appearance in American foreign policy and then how it
functioned in arms sales between 1974, when it first appeared, and 1983 when it was removed
from practice.
The Veto Mechanism
There are several different types of legislative vetoes that vary slightly from one another.
In order to understand the entire mechanism behind a legislative veto, these different definitions
of the scope of the veto in addition to the narrow and broad definitions must be spelled out. The
general definitions of the veto describe the most basic way that it works. James M. Lindsay
describes legislative vetoes as all “shar[ing] the same kind of basic quid pro quo: Congress
delegates authority to the President, but reserves the right to veto the President’s actions by
passing a simple (one-house) or concurrent (two-house) resolution, neither of which is subject to
a presidential veto”.1
This basic definition is expanded on by Louis Fisher who notes that
committee vetoes or “even a committee chair’s veto” as the actions that qualify as legislative
vetoes.2
In summary, the most basic definition of the legislative veto is that Congress may veto
the action of the executive in a specific context where the actions being taken stem from
delegated authority from Congress. However, each veto provision is slightly different because, as
Lindsay alludes to, they are all attached different onto specific laws, so the process for using a
legislative veto depends on how it was incorporated in a particular case.
1
Lindsay, James M, Congress and the Politics of Foreign Policy (The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore
and London): 1994, 105.
2
Fisher, Louis, The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive 4th
Ed. (Texas A&M Press: College
Station): 1998, 91. [Fisher 1998]

9. Boyer 6
6
As a result of the individual attachment of veto provisions, each veto functions differently
in practice. Fisher identifies them as working in one of two ways: congressional approval before
the action is taken or disapproval after the action is taken but within a certain period of time.3
Both of these mechanisms fall into what has been termed a “report and wait” provision, but they
are not all the same because some provisions require an explicit approval from Congress while
others give Congress a specific period of time during which they may disapprove of the actions.
If Congress does not disapprove, then the action continues as the executive branch intended.4
The general similarity between these approvals or disapprovals is that “these legislative actions
are not presented to the president for his signature or veto”.5
The veto developed for many reasons, but the most prominent was for Congress and the
President to compromise on how the executive branch could take more discretionary action
while still allowing Congress' monopoly legislating. In foreign policy, constitutional gaps
between the authority given to the legislature and the executive, as well as new demands on the
federal government abroad caused the legislative veto to become the tool that allowed executive
departments to fulfill specific needs while maintaining Congressional oversight. The rationale
was that the bureaucracies would be more efficient at the tasks because of their expertise.
The Development and End of the Legislative Veto
The legislative veto developed from the need to close gaps in policy making power
between Congress and the President. The twentieth century marked an expansion in the Federal
government, which caused the original design of the government to impede lawmaking and
3
Fisher, Louis. “A Political Context for Legislative Vetoes” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 93 No. 2 (Summer
1978), 241. [Fisher 1978]
4
Franklin, Daniel Paul. “Why the Legislative Veto Isn’t Dead” Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 16, No. 3,
Leadership and National Security Policy (Summer 1986), 492.
5
Fisher 1978, 241.

10. Boyer 7
7
implementation because the expanding legislative demands on Congress. By the 1930’s, “the
President wanted Congress to delegate additional authority to the White House; Congress wanted
to control that authority without having to pass another public law”.6
The legislative veto
emerged as the most efficient way to accomplish both of these goals; and as a result, Congress
was able to pass a single piece of legislation that delegated powers to the president, but the law
would contain a provision that allowed for Congress’ approval or disapproval of the actions that
the executive took with the new power. The first real example came in 1932 when Congress gave
President Hoover the opportunity to reorganize the executive branch by submitting a proposal to
Congress, which it could then have the option to veto.
The legislative veto was initially used very sparingly but over time, it became a more
frequent addition to statutes. The majority opinion in INS v. Chadha (1983), which ruled the veto
unconstitutional, highlighted the increase in frequency that the veto was being added into
legislation. The decisive opinion in the case states that:
Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional
veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes as follows: from
1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; from 1940-49, nineteen statutes;
between 1950-59, thirty-four statutes; and from 1960-69, forty-nine. From the
year 1970 through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such provisions were
included in eighty-nine laws.7
The increased use of the veto alerted both politicians and scholars to many issues that were
present in balancing powers that were divided between Congress and the President and prompted
the start of the debate of the veto's constitutionality. The arguments made were that the veto as a
6
Fisher 1998, 91.
7
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Chadha. 462 U. S. 919 (1983).

11. Boyer 8
8
provision in laws weakens one of the branches relative to the other or allows too great an
increase in power.
American history has demonstrated that there are periods of increased presidential power
and periods of increased congressional power. The 1970’s marked a period of Congressional
resurgence and a desire for the body to reassert itself against the growing power of the
president.8
The veto became more prominent during the 1970's as Congress attempted to reassert
its authority over the executive because Congress viewed the veto as an essential tool to
maintaining its authority. This point is illustrated by Jessica Korn, who writes that "[o]bservers
in the 1970's and 1980's who viewed the legislative veto as "by far" Congress' "most powerful
weapon" for reacting against the aggregation of foreign policy making power in the presidency."9
She continues to say that "[t]his conviction implied that Congress needed extra-constitutional
mechanisms to combat the rise of extra-constitutional presidential powers."10
She further notes
that Congress had been the more dominant branch during the nineteenth century, but declined
during the twentieth century. By the 1970’s, the veto had changed from a political idea that was
infrequently practiced and instead “it began to be touted as a necessary congressional control
tool”.11
As legislative vetoes became more frequently attached to legislation, both critics and
advocates began to submit their opinions about how it violated the constitution or was justified
as a constitutional interpretation, though it also seemed tied to the attempt by Congress to
reassert itself in creating foreign policy.
8
Grimmett, Richard F., “Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress,” Congressional Research Service
Reports and Issue Briefs, June 1, 1999, Online at: http://fpc.state.gov/6172.htm.
9
Korn, Jessica, The Powers of Separation: American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the Legislative Veto,
(Princeton University Press: Princeton): 1996, 7
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid., 41

12. Boyer 9
9
Opponents described the veto as a violation of the separation of powers because it
violates the “presentment clause” of the Constitution that appears in Article I Section 7. The
clause stipulates that:
every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House
of representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall
be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take
effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be re-passed
by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives.12
One-house vetoes further violate this principle because they allow action to be taken by a single
house, while the Constitution stipulates in Article I it says, “All legislative powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives”.13
Opponents of the legislative veto utilize a very strict interpretation of the
Constitution, which is rooted in the non-delegation principle that Congress is unable to give
away any of its legislative power. The non-delegation doctrine believes that the Constitution
delegated the power to Congress and that delegated powers cannot be further delegated.14
The
violation of bicameralism and the presentment clause were what brought down the legislative
veto, but not actually the strict interpretation that yielded the non-delegation principle.
Proponents have a different interpretation based in the U.S. Constitution and court
decisions. The general attitude is: first, that “the legislative veto is an essential means of
controlling the bureaucracy and maintaining representative government”; and second, that if
Congress were to delegate “lawmaking power to independent and executive agencies” it should
retain an ability to ensure that it approves of the actions being taken as a means of maintaining
12
U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 7.
13
INS v. Chadha.
14
Fisher 1998, 32.

13. Boyer 10
10
inter-branch oversight.15
Furthermore, in practice the non-delegation principle has not been
upheld by the Courts, which should allow the delegation of legislative power. The catch twenty-
two that emerges is that if Congress does delegate power to the executive by a majority vote (all
that is required to pass a new law), they would have to secure a two-thirds majority in order to
override the action taken by the executive with the delegated authority. Proponents of the veto
find it problematic that they may delegate power with a simple majority, but may only reassert
Congressional institutional power through a larger majority once they have delegated a task. If
delegating authority is constitutional, then proponents argue that there must also be a provision
that allows Congress to reclaim delegated powers.16
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion from INS v. Chadha illustrates how the
presentment clause is not violated: all three actors (the Senate, the House of Representatives and
the President) must approve of an action in order for it to take effect and the disagreement of any
of these actors would prevent it from becoming law. The Presentment Clause is not violated, but
rather the traditional order is changed because the President (or executive actor) introduces the
action and looks for Congressional approval. If one body of Congress disapproves, then the
action cannot occur. A one-house veto simply expedites the process because without both
houses, the action cannot pass. The second congressional body does not need to actually vote for
the action to have failed. Even though the order is changed, “the requirements of Article I are not
compromised by the congressional scheme.”17
The process is simplified in these cases, which is
where the argument that it creates a more efficient government is based.
The most compelling dimension of the argument by proponents of the veto is that it
creates a more efficient government. Justice White writes that “the history of the separation of
15
Fisher 1978, 241; INS v. Chadha Dissenting Opinion of Justice White.
16
Fisher 1978, 243-44.
17
INS v. Chadha Dissenting Opinion of Justice White

14. Boyer 11
11
powers doctrine is also a history of accommodation and practicality.” He continues to say that
“the Court, recognizing modern government must address a formidable agenda of complex
policy issues, countenances the delegation of extensive legislative authority to the executive and
independent agencies”. Historically, interpretations of the constitution have allowed for extra-
constitutional powers to be outlined and authorized if they contribute to efficiency and practical
functioning of the government in practice.
The debate over the legislative veto reveals the complexity of the federal government law
making process, especially in areas where the Constitution gave shared powers. The two
interpretations stem from an attempt to negotiate how to divide powers between the different
branches of the government because they are not specified. Gibson notes that “so many critical
functions are not specifically delegated in the constitution,” which causes confusion over whose
jurisdiction those actions are.18
These undesignated functions or new developments in federal
responsibilities are never explicitly addressed in the Constitution, but some would argue that they
can be extrapolated through the “elastic clause”, which is discussed in the next section.
The two main opinions that were given in INS v. Chadha attempt to reconcile these two
opinions about how and why the veto emerged and was struck down. In foreign policy
formation, there are many areas that overlap and emerge as being unclear about whether the
executive or legislative branch has the dominant power as delegated by the Constitution. As a
result, the veto seemed like an effective compromise because it maximized both governmental
efficiency while also adapting to changes in the needs of the federal government. As this paper
will discuss in further detail later on, the veto also made certain aspects of policy formation more
18
Gibson, Martha Liebler, Weapons of Influence: The Legislative Veto, American Foreign Policy and the Irony of
Reform, (Westview Press: Boulder): 1992, 9. [Gibson 1992]

15. Boyer 12
12
transparent and accessible to American citizens and foreign governments who could then lobby
the government more effectively.
The Legislative Veto and American Foreign Policy
The legislative veto acts as a constraint on foreign policy formation because foreign
policy construction is shared by the legislative and executive branches. This section will discuss
the Constitutional powers granted by the Constitution for foreign policy making and discuss the
legal developments within the United States and highlight the areas of contention in foreign
policy making where the legislative veto has been included in foreign policy provisions.
Congress’ powers from the Constitution for foreign policy making are in Article I Section
8. The Constitution gives explicit powers for Congress to: “regulate Commerce with foreign
nations”, “declare war, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and water”, and “To raise and support armies, but no Appropriation of Money
to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years”.19
This section also contains the “elastic
clause” or the “necessary and proper clause”, which provides Congress with the power “to make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Office thereof”.20
This clause allows for Congress to make laws or delegate
powers to any part of the government in order to ensure that the government continues to
function. It would allow for more power delegation if there are new demands on the government
or to assign new powers that the Constitution would not have accounted for. It also serves as the
19
U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 4, cl.11, cl. 12, cl. 13.
20
U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

16. Boyer 13
13
basis for Congress asserting its right to delegate in the legislative veto context, though
maintaining oversight is a less intuitive extrapolation.
The President is also given powers by the Constitution for conducting foreign policy. In
Article II Section 2, the Constitution says that “The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States”, “He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties”, he “shall appoint Ambassadors”, and then in Section 3,
it says “he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers” and that “he shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”21
The final part does not explicitly relate to foreign policy,
but it does mean that the executive branch must carry out the laws that Congress passes, which
includes foreign policy legislation. It also means that if a law has a legislative veto provision
attached to it, the executive branch must acknowledge and accept Congress’ check on the action.
Essentially, the President that signs legislation with a legislative veto accepts the condition and is
agreeing to abide by it. In foreign policy, this can be challenging if the President takes action that
the Congress then rejects because the executive has tied himself to a decision that has not
received official authorization.
The President appears to have fewer powers in the area of foreign policy according to the
Constitution than the Congress and the powers that are given to the executive seem to be joined
with oversight by the legislature. However, the executive maintains a larger implicit role because
the President must sign or veto all bills passed by Congress, including those relating to foreign
policy. The interactions have also developed because the “the constitutional roles of Congress
and the President, defined by experience, have changed during the course of the nation’s
history”.22
The practical implementation of the Constitution has resulted in an evolution of the
21
US Constitution, art. II, § 2 and art. II, § 3.
22
Gibson 1992, 10.

17. Boyer 14
14
balance of powers. For example, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright (1936), the Supreme Court
ruled that the President was the highest authority in foreign affairs, despite clearer constitutional
role given to Congress.23
The next section is going to focus more on the potential for conflict between branches in
foreign policy making and highlight the areas where the legislative veto is most likely to appear.
The areas where there is the greatest overlap in authority are in war powers, trade, foreign aid
and treaty and negotiation power, but the focus here will be mainly on trade, specifically arms
transfers.
Congress has jurisdiction over all trade powers while the President is given the authority
over negotiations and treaties. It is possible for there to be an overlap in negotiations and trade
because the executive may make trade promises as a part of negotiating. In the 1970’s the
executive was also given the power to negotiate trade agreements, which were then subject to
Congressional review, generally in the form of a legislative veto, in several laws including the
Trade Expansion Act of 1974 and the Arms Export Control Act (A.E.C.A.) of 1976.24
Conflicts
can then arise over who receives arms and in what quantity. In the Middle East, issues over trade,
especially arms transfers, are particularly salient because of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the
prominent role played by Arab oil-producing countries in American interests in the region. Arms
sales are particularly troubling for some because of the possibility that the transfers could disrupt
the regional balance of military power enough to cause another Arab-Israeli war or enable a pre-
emptive Arab attack on Israel that could lead to the destruction of the Jewish state.
23
Howell, William G., Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action,(Princeton University
Press: Princeton) 2003, 20.
24
Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1983, "Arms Sales, War Powers, Aid: Hill Weighs Foreign Policy Impact of
Ruling," July 2, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1266-67.

18. Boyer 15
15
Asymmetrical information between the branches makes it particularly difficult to reach
some compromises in foreign policy. In general, the executive has significantly more
information and Congress does not have the ability to obtain as much nuanced information about
every issue. Furthermore, if Congress attempts to review every action taken by the executive
branch, then Congress then becomes more open to pressures of special interest groups because
Congressional members do not have enough information themselves and are more likely to be
swayed by convincing arguments by interested groups who are able to provide easy
explanations.25
William G. Howell identifies this asymmetry in information between the
President and the rest of the federal government, especially in foreign affairs. Howell says that
“presidents, on a whole, have access to more information about public policy and its
implementation than any other branch of government. An enormous bureaucracy exists, in large
part, to advise the president on policy matters."26
This is obvious in foreign affairs, Howell
continues, because there is “a massive network of national security advisers, an entire
intelligence community and diplomats and ambassadors stationed all over the globe [who] report
more or less directly to the president."27
Much of the information that Congress and the general
public receive is what the executive branch chooses to release, which means that Congress
cannot have as complete of an idea about foreign policy making as the executive branch.
Furthermore, information that is potentially crucial for decision-making often remains classified;
details of arms transfers are usually not released to the entire Congress. As shown in the 1981
25
Fisher 1978, 250
26
Howell, 103.
27
Ibid.

19. Boyer 16
16
Airborne Warning and Control System (A.W.A.C.S) case study, however, the President may
choose to declassify certain information in order to make his case for the sale.28
Congress is also influenced by both its voters and interest groups. While neither pressure
is consistent across all issues or periods of time, it is clear that both have an influence. Gibson
writes that “it is very difficult without constituency pressure to convince a large enough number
of overburdened legislators to oppose the President successfully. Constituent pressure, then, is
critical to motivating individual legislators to oppose the executive on foreign policy."29
Furthermore, opposition from interest groups, especially those who contribute to congressional
campaigns regularly or have key constituents they are able to influence, have the same
opportunity to motivate congressional members. Gibson asserts that “public opinion pressure” on
Congress is crucial for mobilizing the legislators to oppose an executive action.30
Congressional
opposition to executive action can then cause Congress to threaten the use of a legislative veto to
change policy in favor of its own interests. Further discussion of how public interest groups can
exert pressure on Congress over foreign policy issues can be found in the next chapter.
As is evident, there is a large area of foreign policy making that has the potential to cause
disputes between Congress and the executive over whose power is being used. The argument
over the exercise of constitutional power is what gives way to the legislative veto.31
Gibson
simplifies the potential for a legislative veto to occur by looking at factors that she identifies as
contributing to motivation for Congress to act: institutional motives, electoral motives and
congressional will. She divides actions into five groups and identifies how intense the factors are
28
Congressional Quarterly Weekly. 1981, "First Notice Sent: Debate Over A.W.A.C.S. Sale Not Yet in Full Bloom
as Begin Visits Washington," September 12, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1757.
29
Gibson, Martha Liebler, “Managing Conflict: The Role of the Legislative Veto in American Foreign Policy,”
Polity ,Vol. 26 No. 3, (Spring 1994), 447. [Gibson 1994]
30
Gibson 1994, 448.
31
Ibid., 444.

20. Boyer 17
17
on Congress. The highest likelihood that Congress will exercise a legislative veto comes when
all three factors are high.32
In cases where Congress decided to include a legislative veto provision to foreign policy
legislation, it is because Congress believed that they will be giving up too much power if they do
not retain oversight authority. Justice White identifies twelve statutes that have provisions for
“congressional review” and a possible veto in the realm of foreign policy; even more than these
exist.33
Many of the provisions cited by Justice White have to do with trade, foreign assistance
and war powers, and several of them have a common thread: they have to do directly with hot
topics in Middle East foreign relations like foreign assistance, arms transfers and oil policies.34
During the period of time when the use of the legislative veto was increasing, Middle
East foreign policy from the United States revolved around how to get involved in the region and
whether to get more involved with both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Strategically, the
Middle East is important to the United States because of its oil reserves, which the U.S.
depended on domestically, as evident by the 1973 oil crisis when the O.P.E.C. embargoed oil,
and abroad to support U.S. military endeavors. Ideologically, the U.S. aligned itself with Israel
and committed itself to the idea of Israel’s existence on moral and value-based grounds. The
clear conflict of interest over strategic and ideological concerns meant that the U.S. had to
carefully balance its policy between the two in order to prevent domestic upheaval or another
violent outbreak in the Middle East.
Due to the ongoing conflict in the region, the question the U.S. has to ask itself about its
involvement is first, how should it get involved: militarily, financially or diplomatically? Then,
once it decides to get involved in a particular issue or in response to an emergency, it must make
32
Ibid., 447-49.
33
INS v. Chadha, Dissenting Opinion of Justice White.
34
INS v. Chadha, Dissenting Opinion of Justice White, Congressional Quarterly Weekly 1983, 1757.

21. Boyer 18
18
many decisions about how. The polarized nature of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict in the
Middle East also isolates American policy makers as being either for or against each side. The
legislative veto was used most when opposing interests in the region faced one another. Arms
sales provided a fertile ground for debate over regional foreign policy and a domestic means for
interest groups to try and affect outcomes.
Arms Sales and the Legislative Veto
The legislative veto did not begin affecting the oversight used by Congress on arms sales
until 1974, which was a direct result of a Congressional understanding that escalating transfers
could lead to more involvement in foreign countries, as had happened in Vietnam.35
The reason a
provision was added to address arms sales was because Congress did not feel that the executive
branch was adequately consulting the legislature on matters of foreign policy before the actions
were essentially completed.36
The intent of the veto provision in arms transfer legislation was
that Congress was trying to reassert itself in foreign policy, and the result was that its increased
engagement in the arms sale process opened it up to a politically charged issue that dealt directly
with foreign states and cleavages within the American public. This section is going to briefly
trace the development of the legislative veto in arms sale legislation and how it developed
between 1974 and 1983.
The foundation of the legislation for arms sales are rooted in the A.E.C.A. which is
updated periodically by Congress. In 1974, the A.E.C.A. that came into being was Public Law
93-559. The A.E.C.A. is linked to several other articles of legislation including many that relate
35
Franck, Thomas M. and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy By Congress, (Oxford University Press: New York
and Oxford): 1979, 98.
36
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy: Strengthening the
Legislative Side, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982. Committee Print 5. 37.

22. Boyer 19
19
to foreign assistance, but it provides the foundation for the reporting of military weapon sales as
well as the legislative veto in this particular case.37
The foundation for the veto in this case was
laid by including a reporting requirement and then a waiting period that the executive would
have to wait before proceeding during which Congress could debate the merits of the sale and, if
so motivated, block the sale by passing a concurrent resolution.
The first incarnation of the A.E.C.A. in 1974 included a specific amendment that allowed
for the legislative veto. In section 36(b) of the A.E.C.A., there is an explicit reporting
requirement for any sales of weapons greater than $25-million prior to being implemented by the
executive branch.38
Furthermore, in the earliest stages of the law, the framework laid out gave
Congress twenty days within which to assess and pass a concurrent resolution to veto the law. If
after the twenty day period both houses had failed to do so, then the transfer would proceed.39
The A.E.C.A. has seen several changes to the threshold for reporting a sale, the reporting
requirement in terms of when it needs to be implemented and how long the waiting period is
since the act first took hold.
The provision in the A.E.C.A. started out in 1974 as a part of the so-called Nelson-
Bingham Amendment. The act was a direct result of Congress' desire to become more pro-active
in determining what countries received weapons and determining if the decisions could cause the
United States to become militarily involved abroad like it was at the time in Vietnam.40
Prior to
1974, "the law merely required the Secretary of State to report 'significant' arms sales semi-
annually to Congress".41
The problem at this juncture was that it was unclear what "significant"
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid., p. 69.
39
Ibid.
40
Franck and Weisband, 98-99.
41
Ibid., 99. A footnote in Franck and Weisband's work here refers to the language of the law and points to The
Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2776, P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320, Sec. 36 as the source
of the language "significant". This is the same section that would be amended to contain the reporting requirement

23. Boyer 20
20
meant and how it could be systematically applied. Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-W.I.) and
Representative Jonathan Bingham (D-N.Y.) both introduced the amendment as a floor
amendment and were successful in having it attached to the bill because Congress had been
looking for a means of re-asserting some of its authority over the executive.42
The provision in
this case required that all of the sales over $25-million be reported, that the executive wait
twenty days and that Congress could disapprove by a concurrent resolution. It also stipulated that
the report to Congress must be made before the President could issue an official letter of offer for
the sale to a foreign state and it must include the terms of transfer as well as all of the weapons
involved.43
The early stages of the law lasted until nearly the end of the Ford Presidency when
Congress chose to revise certain dimensions of the law to favor Congressional oversight more.
The architecture of the law as drawn up in the Nelson-Bingham amendment continued in
its basic form with the required report before official action could be taken and disapproval only
by concurrent resolution. Minor changes were made in subsequent revisions, like increasing the
period for Congress to review the proposals from twenty to thirty days. The 1976 revisions
changed the threshold from $25-million to $7-million and also mandated that the Administration
provide more information to Congress to help assess the sales and alleviate the discrepancies in
information available to the two sides.44
Another modification was made by way of an unspoken
agreement that there would be a "pre-notification" twenty days before the letter was actually
submitted so that Congressional staff members can research and understand the issue fully before
the Congressmen must move to vote against a potential sale.45
A few more small modifications
were made in 1981 when the reporting requirement changed the minimum value of the sales that
threshold in 1974 and would continue to be the location of the legislative veto in future amended versions of the
A.E.C.A., which came out of the Foreign Military Sales Act.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid., 99.
44
Ibid., 103.
45
Ibid., 104.

24. Boyer 21
21
must be reported into two categories: individual sales and package sales. This modification
required that "individual weapon or military equipment sales" valued at $14-million or above
had to be reported while packaged sales of the same materials of $50-million or above were
required to be sent to Congress.46
The development and changes in the actual legislation for a legislative veto relating to
arms transfers were related to the context in which they were passed, but also to capture highly
controversial deals. For example, the initial $25-million cusp for reporting sales was proposed by
Senator Nelson because it was the cost of a single squadron of F-5E's, the sale of which would be
likely to raise controversy.47
As the conditions changed, so did the laws, but in the period
between 1974 and 1983, the congressional oversight on arms sales gave an increased amount of
power to interest groups who sought to influence the sale. The veto mechanism itself was what
opened the floodgates to a change in how policy making would work.
Conclusions about the Legislative Veto
The legislative veto emerged from the American tradition of interpreting the constitution
and its death revealed that the two traditional methods of interpreting the constitution are still
alive and well. The veto attempts to expedite the policy making process throughout the American
government as well as enable Congress to assert some of its Constitutionally delegated control
while being able to delegate authority to the more efficient executive. In foreign policy, it pitted
the executive and legislative branches against one another for influence.
The legislative veto, which makes it appearance most heavily during the 1970’s,
demonstrates that Congress and the President were attempting to compromise over foreign policy
46
Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1983, "Congress Loses Major Foreign Policy Tool," June 25, Washington, D.C.:
CQ Press, 1265.
47
Franck and Weisband, 99.

25. Boyer 22
22
powers and the laws with the legislative veto provisions were necessary for the division of labor
to be spread the most efficiently. The evolution of the executive branch as the primary
formulator of foreign policy led Congress to move to a secondary position and exercise oversight
powers. This was particularly true in Middle East policy: the executive began to implement all
the different levels of involvement, especially on military involvement and arms trades while
Congress seemed to retain its power of the purse over aid programs. Despite its short prevalence
at the forefront of foreign policy, the legislative veto influence Middle East policy because it
forced more interactions between the branches and altered the inter-branch dynamics, and
opened the door for lobbying and interest groups to impact the debate and, to a more limited
degree, policy outcomes.

26. Boyer 23
23
Chapter 2: American Foreign Policy Making
The mechanism of foreign policy making that were laid out in the American constitution
have developed to address the changing needs of the government. Scholars who have studied
Middle East policy have different understandings of what motivates policy makers and which
policy makers have more influence. According to Steven L. Spiegel, the most important factor in
making Middle East policy is the role of the President and the surrounding elite. In reality, the
model that stresses the “Presidential elite” most ignores many other key factors, especially the
public pressure on the federal government, in policy making. All of the approaches are important
because different policy decisions can be motivated by factors or executed by actors that other
models dismiss. What is illustrated by the experience of arms sales to Middle Eastern countries,
however, is that the pluralist model has the strongest sway because voter and interest group
participation in the legislative process became very effective. The effectiveness supports that the
public pressure on the government, especially from the Israeli lobby, was taken very seriously
and was a result of methodical and effective government petitioning.
This chapter is going to lay out the way that Americans make foreign policy by revising
the separation of powers in foreign policy and demonstrating how the branches of the
government must work together on policy formation. Second, it will discuss what the American
national interest is, how it guides foreign policy and what American interests are in the Middle
East. Finally, it will discuss why and how interest groups get involved in policy making in
Washington, and what tools they are able to use to influence policymaking. The material
presented in this chapter will serve as the basis for understanding the arms sale case studies
presented later.

27. Boyer 24
24
The Making of American Foreign Policy
The making of foreign policy is a bureaucratic process that involves both the executive
and the legislative branches of the U.S. government. The Constitution delegates power to each
branch of the government; in foreign policy the power is shared by the executive and legislative
branches in order to prevent the supremacy of one over another. The division of power between
the branches is straight forward, but has also been adapted to respond to the growing complexity
of foreign affairs. The making of foreign policy is divided into the constitutional powers and the
methods used to implement them.
As demonstrated by the explanation of power sharing in the previous chapter, the
branches of the American government share the responsibilities in foreign policy making. By
balancing the foreign policy making power between the executive and the legislative branches,
neither is able to make policy without working with the other. The parity between the executive
and the Congress means that the both branches must be privy to many parts of foreign policy
making. In order for Congress to make an arms transfer, they must send a bill to the President for
his signature. In the same vein, the President must get funding from Congress in order to
maintain the armies and be able to continue any missions that the military is sent on. As a result,
the government works in tandem to forge foreign policy. Both parts of the government rely on
one another, but have more command of specific dimensions of policy making. In general, the
dominant power oscillates between the Congress and the executive over history, which can
influence why specific policies are made are certain points in time.48
A result of the executive and legislative working relationships is that the two branches do
not always get along and have to forge compromises to make sure that foreign policy is approved
of by both. However, different methods are available to both parts of the government, which
48
Grimmett.

28. Boyer 25
25
changes how the branches interact. Richard F. Grimmett identifies twelve ways that foreign
policy is made within the two branches and highlights how the branches respond to actions taken
by the other. Grimmett’s analysis is useful for approaching each action by Congress or the
President and using it to identify inter-branch interactions that promote collaboration or are
possible areas of tension.
Table 2.1: Methods of Making Foreign Policy49
Executive Methods Legislative Methods
1. Responses to Foreign Events 1. Resolutions and Policy Statements
2. Proposals for Legislation 2. Legislative Directives
3. Negotiations of International Agreements 3. Legislative Pressure
4. Policy Statements 4. Legislative Restrictions/Funding Denials
5. Policy Implementation 5. Informal Advice
6. Independent Action 6. Congressional Oversight
Grimmett’s analysis demonstrates the policymaking power balance between the branches
and despite that the executive and legislative branches have been given the tasks of administrator
and legislator, respectively, they sometimes exchange roles in order to create policy. Foreign
policy creation rests in the tools that Congress and the President employ and how they react to
policies formed by the other. The division of labor in this case creates an environment within
which the branches of government must negotiate with one another; this kind of negotiation
process has led to the development of compromises, including the addition of legislative veto
provisions in foreign policy legislation.
The President and the executive branch, often acts as the initiator and the actor that
implements policy, but it can only do so with the agreement of Congress. Examining the six
main ways that Grimmett identifies that the executive formulates policy illustrates the
overlapping nature of foreign policy formation. In the case of the legislative veto and foreign
49
Ibid.

29. Boyer 26
26
policy in the Middle East the most relevant methods that the executive branch can use are
negotiating international agreements, making policy statements as overall policy guidelines and
determining how to implement policy.50
In this particular study one of the most important ways that the President and the rest of
the executive branch can make foreign policy is by negotiating international agreements.
International agreements are more complicated because there are conditions for whether they are
submitted to Congress as a whole, to a single body or neither at all. However, some are not
submitted to Congress at all. The conditions have to do with the agreement and what exactly the
goals are and which branch is seen to have had the power over the negotiations taking place. For
example, the Iranian Hostage Agreement of 1981 was not submitted to Congress for approval,
but other agreements require Congressional approval because they are negotiated by the
executive as a result of delegated power from Congress.
These treaties can also include foreign trade and military and economic assistance. While
the power of trade was given to Congress, often the executive branch does the actual negotiating
for practical reasons. In 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was engaged in a bout of
shuttle diplomacy and while he was in Jordan, King Hussein made it clear that the Hashemite
Kingdom felt vulnerable in the region with an army that was not equipped with modern
equipment likes its neighbors and that it wished to make the purchases necessary to ensure its
own security.51
After several months of studying the Jordanian Armed forces, the Department of
Defense was given permission by the White House to negotiate the arms sale agreement with
Jordan.52
The negotiation was under the auspices of an international agreement because it was a
50
Ibid.
51
Franck and Weisband, 100.
52
Ibid.

30. Boyer 27
27
part of the larger scheme of Middle East Policy, but as a result of the 1974 Nelson-Bingham
Amendment, the deal was subject to congressional review before it could proceed.
The executive branch has some latitude in interpreting policy and how that policy is
implemented on a daily basis. Often Congress will pass legislation or delegate authority to the
executive for foreign policy that will have certain criteria or objectives, but it is left up to the
parts of the executive following the policy how they implement it. For example, in the A.E.C.A.,
Congress only stipulated two provisions for arms sales: first, that Congress is notified of the sale,
and second, that a procedure exist for Congressional disapproval. The executive is then left to
interpret the rest of the Act because they are able to make the daily decisions about which states
to sell weapons to and what kind of arms are sold. One of the issues that has been cited with
arms sales that led to the legislative veto's inclusion in the legislation is that Congress is not
included in the early decision making process. Critiques of the executive branch by Congress
generally fall into this category: in the implementation of action in foreign policy, Congress is
not consulted until the action is essentially completed or if "they need something such as
authorization, appropriation or approval of a treaty."53
By essentially implementing policy
independently, the executive maintains its ability to influence policy formation as it sees fit.
Congress is also able to take actions that affect foreign policy; however, they seem to be
more limited than the executive despite broader powers from the Constitution. The first is that
Congress can issue legislative directives, which establish new programs, set objectives and
guidelines, authorize and direct the executive branch to undertake specific activities and can
earmark funding for specific projects.54
All legislative directives require a Presidential signature
or a two-thirds majority in Congress to override a Presidential veto in order to take effect as law
53
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy: Strengthening the
Legislative Side, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982. Committee Print 5. 37.
54
Grimmett.

31. Boyer 28
28
because they are creating new legislation. Congress is able to delegate authority to the executive
to make foreign policy through legislation as well as reassert control over specific endeavors,
especially through their funding allocations. This ability to delegate authority was used to give
the executive the power to submit arms sales under the A.E.C.A. of 1976.
More informal methods of foreign policy formation are used by Congress, such as
legislative pressure and informal advice. Legislative pressure often comes in the form of
Congress threatening to enact legislation to change the course that the executive branch is taking
in foreign policy formation.55
Informal advice can come in many forms, like legislative pressure,
and it seems to be the result of meetings between the executive and members of Congress where
there are no decisions being made, informal contacts between members of the two branches and
congressional letters.56
These informal practices can influence how the President and other parts
of the executive branch factor Congress into their foreign policy actions. It seems most likely
that pressure against policy emerges over controversial action or when the electorate is the most
involved.tillma
Finally, Congress uses oversight powers to exercise a check on executive power, which
means that many parts of the executive are subject to oversight from the committees that they are
under.57
Congressional committees conduct hearings and investigations to ensure that policies
are being properly carried out by the executive branch. The Department of State is overseen by
the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The
Armed Services Committees oversees the Department of Defense and the Intelligence
Committees oversee the Central Intelligence Agency and the rest of the intelligence community.
On a whole, Congress has reporting requirements for the executive so that they are not excluded
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.

32. Boyer 29
29
from international agreements. Most international negotiations and agreements have to be
submitted to Congress for approval, which enables Congress to retain oversight executive
negotiation.58
Congress has also attempted to expand their oversight capabilities by including reporting
requirements in legislation, like the Case Act of 1972, which “required presidents to report every
‘international agreement, other than a treaty’ to Congress within sixty days.”59
The Case Act was
expanded in 1977 and 1979 “that reduced the reporting period to twenty days and expanded the
scope of the act to include international agreements brokered by executive agencies and
departments.”60
The Case Act only required that the agreements be reported and did not provide
Congress with any authority to change the agreements. In cases where the reporting requirement
is followed by the ability for Congress to take action, a legislative veto emerges.
Since policy formation and implementation are both multi-branch functions, foreign
policy is not a simple equation that yields a particular output. Instead these factors contribute to
the dynamic outputs that depend on a myriad of surrounding conditions. The methods of making
foreign policy by the legislative and executive are the skeleton of the practice, but the rest of this
chapter will focus on where the other conditions and driving forces come from.
The American National Interest and the Middle East
Understanding American foreign policy can be challenging, especially in the Middle East
because of the number of competing American interests in the region. The foundation for
understanding American foreign policy is the national interest of the U.S. is and identifying the
general undercurrents that are constantly present in the national interest. This section is going to
58
Ibid.
59
Howell, 104.
60
Howell, 104.

33. Boyer 30
30
briefly discuss what factors contribute to the national interest, how it is defined in terms of
foreign policy and what American interests are in the Middle East.
The national interest is based on the overall interests of the state and serves as the
foundation for foreign policy decisions because it serves as an outline for what goals the
government wishes to pursue. Seth P. Tillman notes that “the term ‘national interest’ connotes a
selfish and unprincipled, or at least amoral, approach to the conduct of foreign
relations.”61
However, this view is a narrow understanding of national interest. Tillman expands
this notion by including “principled behavior, regard for the law, loyalty to friends and
commitments, ethical restraints, and ethical imperatives – as well as the seeking of geopolitical
and economic advantage.”62
Donald E. Nuechterlein also explains that the national interest is
made up of a series of basic interests: defense, economic, world order and ideological interests.
Every state weighs these interests and follows them based upon their individual priorities.63
The
ultimate national interest for the U.S. then comes from evaluating all of the basic interests
against American values and the global environment.
The basic foundations of American interests come from a realist point of view of the
world. The U.S., especially in terms of its Middle East interests, takes a strong realist stance
where it does act to maximize its power in terms of state-to-state relations. Especially during the
period that this paper is looking at between 1974 and 1983, the Cold War was still ongoing and
the U.S. was concerned with containing Soviet influence. It also assumes that all states act
rationally, seek out their own interests first and always to act to maximize their own power in
terms of other states. However, certain idealistic principles have also come into the American
61
Tillman, Seth P., The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles, (Indiana University Press:
Bloomington): 1982, 43.
62
Ibid.
63
Nuechterlein, Donald E., National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities, (Westview
Press: Boulder): 1978, 4-5.

34. Boyer 31
31
national interest, specifically helping to reduce and end conflict, especially in the Middle East
where conflict tends to break out regularly.
In the Middle East, the U.S. has had a clear set of interests since the end of the Second
World War when it became the hegemonic power in the region. Different scholars have
identified similar sets of interests, generally in the context of the Cold War and the status of the
U.S. as the hegemonic power in the region, which the U.S. follows to determine its Middle East
policy. Tillman asserts that the U.S. has four fundamental interests in the Middle East: “reliable
access, on reasonable terms, at tolerable prices, to the oil of the region, especially the Arabian
peninsula; the survival and security of the state of Israel; the avoidance of confrontation and
advancement of cooperation with the Soviet Union; and the fulfillment, so far as possible, of
certain principles, including the peaceful settlement of international disputes.”64
Cheryl A. Rubenberg identifies very similar U.S. interests in the Middle East: preventing
a shift in the global balance of power, ensuring the security and Western freedom of access to the
region’s oil supplies, assuring access to the region’s market for American goods, and securing
the environment for American investment opportunities.65
Rubenberg also explicitly specifies
that the U.S. sees Israel as a "strategic asset" in the region because it can act as a buffer against
Soviet influence, contrary to the argument that Israel actually makes the Arab states more
inclined to work with the Soviets because Israel is so closely tied to the United States.66
Janice J. Terry also attempts to tackle this subject and develops a slightly different set of
four main interests. She summarizes the four historical goals of American foreign policy in the
Middle East as securing the free flow of oil, improving relations with friendly
64
Tillman, 51.
65
Rubenberg, Cheryl A,. Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination, (University of Illinois
Press: Urbana and Chicago): 1986, 2.
66
Ibid.

35. Boyer 32
32
Arab/Turkish/Persian regimes, preventing the region from being a sphere of interest for other
states, and supporting the coexistence of the state of Israel.67
Yakub Halabi, like Terry, takes a
slightly different interpretation of similar interests. He identifies the U.S. dependence on oil as
crucial, especially the perception that the Americans could not fight another prolonged war
without Middle Eastern oil, and the shock of the 1973 oil embargo on the American economy,
which pushed the government to look for ways to bring the money Americans spent on oil back
into the American economy through trade.68
What Tillman, Rubenberg, Terry, and Halabi illustrate with their assessment of American
interests in the Middle East is that there are clear American interests in the region though they
are articulating same ideas in different frames. For example, Terry manages to combine the
economic interests in the region, like Rubenberg’s points about access to economic markets for
exports and environments for American investment opportunities, by highlighting the importance
of good relations with friendly governments. Overall, however, the American interests in the
region can be summarized as: protection of access to Middle Eastern oil; containment of Soviet
influence; protection of the state of Israel and its security; peaceful settlement of regional
disputes; and protection of U.S. access to the economic markets of the Middle East for exports
and investment opportunities. With the understanding that these are the American national
interests at stake in the region, it then follows that interest groups would seek to heighten those
that affect them most whether it be oil corporations wanting to see more favorable
circumstances, arm manufacturers wanting additional markets for their weapons or supporters of
67
Terry, Janice J., US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups, (Pluto
Press: London): 2005, 23.
68
Halabi, Yakbu., US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From Crises to Change, (Ashgate Publishing Company:
Burlington, VT): 2009, 6, 29, 63-65.

36. Boyer 33
33
Israel wishing to see additional foreign assistance to ensure that the state is able to defend itself
in a generally hostile region.
Why and How Interest Groups Influence Foreign Policy Making in Washington
American policy towards the Middle East has, for the majority of the twentieth century,
been very complicated and had so many factors contributing to it that it is almost impossible to
determine what single factor is the most important. Instead, it is easier to look at how actions
have shaped the outcome of policy, and attempt to understand each factor and its impact. The
role of interest groups and forces outside the American government attempting to influence both
the executive and legislative branches are well-documented over the years and provide a great
amount of information.69
As this paper is discussing, the activity of these public interest groups
seems to have increased with the success that they found working in the legislative veto
framework because they were able to identify specific target actions that the government was
taking and mobilize their cause. This section is going to discuss the formation of American
policy towards the Middle East and discuss how the public is able to influence the decisions
made by the government in formulating this policy.
Different scholars have taken different approaches to understanding how and why the
U.S. government forms its policy towards the Middle East. Steven L. Spiegel identifies the main
four that studies have pointed to as systems theory, bureaucratic and organizational theory, the
pluralist model and the presidential elite model.70
Each model can be supported and refuted by
examining different decisions at different points of time. What these models demonstrate,
however, is the major players and constraints on foreign policy formation: the systems theory
69
Terry, 1.
70
Spiegel, Steven L. The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy from Truman to
Reagan (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London): 1985, 383-393.

37. Boyer 34
34
focuses most heavily on the international system developing the framework that foreign policy
must respond to; the bureaucratic and organizational theories stresses that the policies come out
of the "permanent" members of the government; the pluralist model focuses on the effects of
interests groups, mainly pro-Israeli groups, on influencing Congress to make policy; and the
Presidential Elite model maintains that the President and his immediate advisers create policy.71
All of these models can be used effectively to describe circumstances, but none are sufficient for
explaining interest groups entirely and how they are able to exert pressure on the government or
influence policy changes. Even Spiegel's pluralist model is limited because it ignores interest
groups outside of the pro-Israeli lobby.
For the purposes of this paper, there is an underlying assumption that Congress does play
a role in Middle East policy despite its lack of presence in many analyses of American Middle
East policy. Since Congress does in fact play a role, it follows that interest groups who focus on
lobbying Congress would be able to influence outcomes, especially if they are given specific
opportunities like legislative veto procedures that can offer short campaigns against specific
policies. Spiegel also acknowledges, although by mistake, that these interest groups and lobbies
can play an important role; he says, “Domestic politics affects the timing and handling of
decisions more than their actual content. Presidents try to avoid antagonizing Israel’s supporters
in an election year, especially a Presidential year.”72
The backhanded acknowledgement of the
influence of any group to effect even just the “timing and handling” of a decision means that
they are influential enough in the process to begin with.
In order to discuss interest groups and how they are able to influence policy, one must
identify what their interests are before examining the means by which they attempt to pressure
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid., 386

38. Boyer 35
35
the government to adopt favorable policies. As the previous section discussed, there are specific
American interests in the Middle East, and there are groups that advocate positions that are
related to these interests (see table 2.1).
Table 2.2: Advocates of American National Interests in the Middle East
American National Interest in the
Middle East
Interest Groups Associated with Supporting
specific American Interests
1. Protection of access to Middle Eastern
oil
Oil companies, Arab governments
2. Containment of Soviet influence American government officials, pro-Israeli interest
groups
3. Protection of the state of Israel and its
security
Pro-Israeli interest groups, conservative American
Christians, Israeli government
4. Peaceful settlement of regional disputes American government officials, Arab
governments, Israeli government, pro-Israeli
interest groups, pro-Arab interest groups, oil
companies, multinational corporations, the
international community73
5. Protection of U.S. access to economic
markets and investment opportunities in the
region
Oil companies, multinational corporations,
American government officials, Arab governments
As Table 2.2 shows, there are numerous groups both inside of the United States and
outside of it that wish to see specific interests pursued and some even have multiple interests in
the region. Given the number of different groups that have interests in the region, it is difficult to
imagine all of their own interests aligning as well. For example, Arab governments and the
Israeli government both ask for very different criteria for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-
Israeli dispute, the most salient conflict in the region. As a result of these groups having their
own interests align with aspects of American interests, some of them decide to advocate their
positions to the American government in order to pressure the government to adopt policies that
73
International community here refers to the collective interests stated by a majority of states. The United Nations
General Assembly has dedicated time, energy and resources to working towards a solution of the Arab-Israeli
conflict since the international organization was founded. Formal statements made through General Assembly
resolutions call for a peaceful settlement of the disputes and a more permanent peace, which serves as the basis for
claiming that the international community at large has a vested interest in ending the regional conflict.

39. Boyer 36
36
the group feels coordinates more closely with their own. Furthermore, the American government
is attempting to make policy on a broad level that protects the interests of the American people.74
In order for interest groups to be successful, they have to organize themselves and utilize
the most effective means of pressuring the government in order to gain influence in policy
making. As the case studies will demonstrate, the legislative veto procedure opened the debate
for arms transfer in such a way that interests groups could gain a stronger voice in Congress. The
next few paragraphs will explain how interest groups are able to apply pressure to the
government in order to have their interests pursued more heavily.
To start with, Congress is the target of these groups, which is explained by David D.
Newsom in his book The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy. What Newsom argues is that the
public is very important to a government’s success therefore the “public dimension” of foreign
policy consists of the statements made by government officials and the spaces outside of
government where ideas develop and apply pressure on policies.75
The nexus of the public and
government comes together in Congress, because Congress provides the most opportunities to
reach legislators who can affect policy.76
Like the foundational argument of this paper, Newsom
also argues that the 1970’s provided a period where Congress became more susceptible to the
pressures of interests groups because the attempt to contain the executive branch increased the
Congressional role in policy making and necessitated an increased number of hearings, which
provided a venue for interest groups to “give their views and present information on international
events, countries, personalities and policies.”77
74
Tillman, 43.
75
Newsom, David D., The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy, (Indiana University Press: Bloomington and
Indianapolis): 1996, ix.
76
Ibid., ix, 201.
77
Ibid., 201.

40. Boyer 37
37
Congress is particularly susceptible to the interests of motivated members of society’s
interests for several reasons. First, individual politicians agree with the views put forward by the
groups. Second, interest groups are able to provide funding for re-election campaigns because
they have members that are engaged in the political process and can help them win votes even if
they do not belong to the same district. This can be particularly important for members of the
House of Representatives who must run for re-election every two years. Other means of aiding
campaigns out of district are also common, but are often related to the allocation of funding
towards getting a politician elected or re-elected. Third, these groups tend to have motivated
members who vote, which can make the difference in many of the small elections. Fourth, many
of the organizations that seek to influence policy making in Congress are part of the Washington
network and aid Congressional staffers in obtaining information and understanding of the issues
coming before their representative’s committees or onto the floor. The information provided
generally will espouse a specific point of view, but information that is readily available to
staffers can trump the potential bias it holds. Additionally, members of interest groups are also
frequently participants in Congressional hearings as witness who can testify about the issue up
for debate.78
All of these reasons together are what make Congress susceptible to their influence.
A successful interest group must establish both its cohesive community at its foundation
and a functional means of influencing Congress by targeting the areas that the legislature is most
vulnerable in order to incur the most access and leverage. Tony Smith discusses this in the
context of ethnic lobbies, though it appears that it would hold true for non-ethnic interest groups
as well. In order to be most effective in terms of applying pressure to the government, Smith
78
The information from this paragraph can be gleaned from multiple sources. Among those that contributed to these
reasons that Congress is susceptible to influence from interests groups are: Richard H. Curtiss A Changing Image,
Janice J. Terry US Foreign Policy in the Middle East, David D. Newsom The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy,
and Tony Smith Foreign Attachments. Discussion of some of these points can also be found in the reports on the
Arab and Israeli Lobbies from the Congressional Quarterly Weekly from 1975.

41. Boyer 38
38
argues that the interest groups must vote actively, contribute to campaigns, and establish an
organization that:
Formulates the strategy for getting precise pieces of legislation passed, provides
unity to the ethnic community, builds alliances with other social forces towards
the common political goals, and monitors [decision-making] to ensure that friends
are rewarded, opponents punished, and feedback accumulated so that the
organization be become ever more effective.79
The key components of a successful ethnic lobby, according to Smith, also specifically target the
three area in which Congress is most accessible and vulnerable to outside forces that were
identified above.
Voting is a surprisingly easy method of employing change. Terry explains that most
Americans don’t vote, which means that “a very small proportion of highly motivated and
mobilized citizens can, and do, have a disproportionate impact.”80
She continues to explain that
out of every 100 Americans, 70 percent of them are eligible to vote, but ultimately only eleven of
the original 100 are needed for a candidate to win an election.81
Others have commented on
specific groups and how their turnout may give them disproportionate representation. Robert
Goldwin provided campaign advise to President Ford when he sought re-election in 1976;
Goldwin pointed out that American Jews, while only three percent of the population, would
provide between four and five percent of the vote. On the other hand, black Americans were
79
Smith, Tony. Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy
(Harvard University Press: Cambridge and London): 2000, 94.
80
Terry, 8.
81
Ibid. The full argument that Terry makes is that for every 100 American, only 70 percent (70 people) are eligible
to vote. Of that 70 percent (70 people), only 60 percent (42 people) are registered voters. Of the registered voters,
only about 50 percent (21) actually vote. Since a candidate only needs 50 percent to win, they effectively only need
eleven votes.

42. Boyer 39
39
eleven percent of the population but only made up five percent of the total vote.82
Based upon
these analyses, it is clear that voting is a very powerful tool that interest groups can use and as a
result, representatives in Congress are unlikely to vote against policies that a large portion of
their constituents support.
Next, campaign contributions play a powerful role in an interest group’s ability to
influence Congress. Campaign support is not limited to the races in one's own district; instead,
individuals can give to races in any district, which means that if enough of an effort is made,
people outside of a district can influence how people inside the district vote.83
Campaign
donations are not a tool limited to individuals; businesses and business groups also donate money
to campaigns for the same reason of having members of Congress who are sympathetic to and
willing to represent their views. An interest group, if organized well enough into a lobbying
organization, which will be discussed shortly, is able to allot its energies to discrediting members
of Congress or support opponents effectively enough to affect the outcome of the election.
Richard H. Curtiss, in A Changing Image, outlines several examples where efforts by the pro-
Israeli lobby were able to turn the tide in races for re-election against Senators and
Representatives that opposed their interests.84
Smith takes a slightly different approach than
Curtiss and examines the actually quantitative numbers of campaign donations and the ties that
the money establishes between communities and representatives.85
The large sums of money
necessary to run for office are often solicited by members of Congress as much as interest groups
82
Ibid, 9.
83
Smith, 101.
84
See Curtiss, Richard H. A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute. (American
Educational Trust: Washington D.C.): 1986, Chapter 33. Examples include Senator William Fulbright,
Representative Paul McCloskey, Representative Paul Findley, Senator Charles Percy and several others.
85
Smith, 101-109.

43. Boyer 40
40
attempt to use campaign donations to gain influence over members of Congress; the result is a
symbiotic relationship that revolves around finances.86
Finally, and perhaps the largest and most important part, is the organization of the group
into a "lobbying" organization that is effectively able to do three things: ensure organizational
unity of the community, form and maintain alliances with other social forces, and advocate
policy positions while monitoring the actions of government officials in regards to their stances
on the formulation and implementation of policy.87
The first is straight-forward: there must be an
ideological consensus within the community that is not predicated on a single leader so that it
can be maintained over a longer period of time.88
The pro-Israeli lobby is very successful is this
regard because the need to work together is built into their community: "although differences
exist in politics and ideology among American Jews, few are prepared to voice dissent publicly
for fear that such divisions might be exploited by enemies."89
The collective nature of the Jewish
community is also helped with the sympathy that they receive from outside because many
Americans feel sympathy for the oppression Jews suffered in Europe over the past few hundred
years and especially in the first half of the twentieth-century and guilt because Americans did not
do more to prevent or stop the Holocaust.90
Just by these examples, it is clear that the Jewish
lobby is an exceptional case because no other interest group has the same circumstances, but its
exceptionalism is what makes it the perfect example of how the general agreement within the
community, or at least the disinclination to dissent, helps the interest group apply pressure
politically by appearing to be a single, unified group.
86
Ibid., 104.
87
Ibid, 109.
88
Ibid, 110.
89
Newsom, 186.
90
Ibid., 185.

44. Boyer 41
41
The second important thing that a lobbying organization must do to apply pressure to is
make connections the various forces in Washington in order to establish a network that will gain
it access to those that it is interested in applying pressure to. Newsom describes how Washington
works as being through networks: "The Rolodex becomes an instrument of influence. Skillful
representatives of interest groups find members interested in their cause, often starting with
congressional staffs."91
Newsome also uses the term the "iron triangle", which refers to the
connections between the Department of Defense, defense contractors, and congressional
committees as an example of the entrenched role that interest groups can have.92
"The ultimate
objective," Newsom says, "is [for interest groups] to become so valuable that members of
Congress will call these advocates as often as the advocates call them."93
Ultimately, the more
effectively that a group can network, the more effective they can be as a lobbying organization
because they will have more access to venues to have their message be heard by influential
people.
The network then becomes the means for disseminating the message that the lobby wants
to convey. The intended message can come through a number of forms: providing information
on topics coming before congress for staffers, testimony at Congressional hearings, letter writing
campaigns, media statements, publishing of reports for the general public and providing records
of representatives’ attitudes on the issues. The last task, recording how members of Congress
vote on issues and public statements they make means that these organizations can provide
information to members of their groups when it comes time for voting. The multiple ways that
these groups are then able to assert influence is not static because there are so many different
methods, they can react to the circumstances around them. For example, with a network on both
91
Ibid.,. 203.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid.

45. Boyer 42
42
Capitol Hill and among its members, a group can mobilize to target specific members of
Congress or their staff to have letter writing or phone campaigns to influence an upcoming vote.
With access on both sides, groups can interact dynamically to assert pressure during times when
debates are coming up that relate to their issues by targeting the individuals that they see as being
most influential and mobilizing their members as needed.94
On a daily basis, the lobby needs to become indispensible to the members of Congress so
that the Congressmen see specific groups as so useful that supporting their causes has an intrinsic
benefit. That then creates a situation where there will be members of Congress that are as
dedicated to the issues of the groups as the members of the group themselves.95
Lobbying groups
have several methods they can pursue in order to achieve this situation, but one of the most
effective appears to be providing information and reports to Congressional staffs. In some cases,
Congressional staffs will call on the lobbying groups for information before using sources
provided to them by the U.S. government such as the Library of Congress, Congressional
Research Service, committee staff or administration experts.96
If a relationship like this develops,
it is then possible that the lobbying group becomes the main source of information for some
members of Congress and is able to discreetly influence their opinions on issues of foreign
policy based upon the presentation of information in their favor.
Ultimately, measuring the influence of a group on Congress is difficult because there are
so many factors that contribute to it, especially in the case of Middle East policy, but it is clear
that special interest groups can gain a foothold and apply some pressure, especially when
rallying against specific issues. By rallying against specific issues, there is a clear goal that these
interest groups are hoping to achieve and a distinct period of mobilization. The legislative veto
94
Smith, 122-128.
95
Ibid., 123.
96
Ibid., 123-124.

46. Boyer 43
43
procedure opened up this type of situation in the case of arms transfers because the sales had not
been previously open to commentary by the public in a governmental setting like Congressional
hearings.
Conclusion about American Policy Making in the Middle East
In conclusion, American Middle East policy emerges from a complex domestic process
that makes it very difficult to assess what impacts it quantitatively, but taking into account the
different approaches that explain the multiple ways to understand how American Middle Eastern
policy can be made; there are many ways to effect change. By adding a legislative veto to
existing legislation about arms transfers abroad, the Congress opened the door for a greater role
for lobbying and special interests groups by formalizing a venue in which they could raise their
issues and forcing the executive branch to build their cases more strongly.

47. Boyer 44
44
Chapter 3: Case Studies of American Arm Sales to Middle East States
Arms sales became a prominent part of American foreign policy in the Middle East
during the 1960’s and 1970’s. As a result, they became subject to the legislative veto. Initially, it
seemed as though it was more efficient for the executive to be able to negotiate these trade
agreements because they were nuanced and often took into account more than just the
transaction, but in the 1970’s with Congress’ attempt to reassert itself in the foreign affairs arena,
Congress had a legislative veto attached to the A.E.C.A. A by-product of the institution of
congressional oversight was that arms sales were more open to commentary by the American
public and for interest groups attempting to sway the outcome. Controversial sales arose in more
regions than just the Middle East, but the Middle East seems reflected in literature as the region
where arms sales were the most impacted by the legislative veto.
Arguments given in favor of the arms sales that will be presented here generally argue
that they are an example of soft power in foreign policy where the U.S. hopes to influence its
ideal outcome by supplying another country with weapons that they see as necessary.
Additionally, arms transfers worked to directly counter Soviet influence in the region, a more
general foreign policy approach to the world popularized through containment, because it meant
that these countries would continue to seek U.S. arms and would pursue policies that made them
look favorable to the United States. Arms transfers to Arab states also had the goal of promoting
good relations behind it and making political gestures, which would help keep Arab states
friendly towards the United States and helped keep the Middle Eastern markets open for U.S.

48. Boyer 45
45
goods and investment; a development not overtly discussed because of negative perceptions in
the U.S. of pursuing policy that is based on economic interest.97
To summarize the earlier discussion, the legislative veto became a fixed part of arms
sales in 1974 with the addition of the Nelson-Bingham Amendment. This amendment was added
onto the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, which was a direct result of Congressional
frustration of learning about arms sales to Persian Gulf countries in 1973 after they had already
been essentially completed.98
In its earliest form, it required that military equipment sales over
$25-million be reported to Congress and that a 20-day period be allotted for Congress to block
the sale by concurrent resolution and it only covered government-to-government sales.99
As the
starting point for legislative veto action in arms sales, the basic functioning of the law remained
the same but the reporting threshold, the time allotted to Congress after notification and even a
pre-notification period all became parts of the veto mechanism over arms sales. Similar
amendments were added to other acts so that no arms sales could be enacted by the President
without Congressional oversight, which included the A.E.C.A. and various Foreign Aid Acts.
The clear result of these changes was that the amount of time that Congress got to
examine each sale became longer. By the time that the 1981 A.W.A.C.S sale was proposed by
President Reagan to Congress, the administration had provided more than the allotted time for
Congress to consider the deal. There was even more communication in the later deals than the
earlier deals, but the result was that the discussion meant that there was more time for interest
groups to become involved and constituents to petition their representatives in Congress.
97
This is discussed in Chapter 2 and a broader discussion of American interests in the Middle East, both economic
and otherwise, can be found there.
98
Mortsolf, Larry A., “Revisiting the Legislative Veto Issue: A Recent Amendment to the Arms Export Control
Act,” The DISAM Journal,. (Summer 1986) Vol. 8, 11-12
99
Ibid., 12

49. Boyer 46
46
A sizable sampling of arms sales is essential for examining the effects of the veto on arms
sales and to determine which factor was the most influential under the provision. Of the arms
sales that were negotiated to the Middle East between 1974 and 1983, from the addition of the
Nelson-Bingham Amendment to the A.E.C.A. to the ruling by the Supreme Court in INS v.
Chadha, there were twelve arms sales worth noting. Of these twelve, half were subject to a
significant amount of debate in Congress while the remaining six are relevant because they
demonstrate the flocculation in outcome and the influence of outside events as well as why
certain issues were more focused on.
The primary sales, which this paper is focusing on are: the 1975 Hawks deal with Jordan,
the 1976 sale of C-130’s to Egypt, the 1976 package that included sales to Iran, Israel and Saudi
Arabia, the 1978 package for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel and the 1981 A.W.A.C.S. sale to
Saudi Arabia. These sales generated the greatest opposition and Congressional debate around
American interests in the Middle East. The major debate around the 1977 sale to Iran of
A.W.A.C.S. is excluded because the underlying factors in that debate were not regional interests
but a demonstration by Congress of its ability and willingness to utilize the legislative veto to
rebalance power between the branches.
The minor sales and debates include the 1975 missile sale to Kuwait, the 1977 sale of
additional C-130’s to Egypt, the 1979 package of jets, tanks and arms to Yemen, the 1980 engine
sale to Iraq, the 1980 sale of M60 tanks to Jordan and the return in 1982 to the issues of Jordan
and Hawk missiles. All of these sales were standalone sales and were not explicitly part of
foreign aid packages or deals, which meant that they did not depend on the success of the rest of
the conditions of the bill. As a result, the issues were more clear-cut and dealt only with the issue
of the sale, or sales in two of the cases, in question.

50. Boyer 47
47
Three outcomes were possible for the proposed sales. The first was that the sale was not
blocked by the legislative veto provision and allowed to continue as proposed. The second was
that the deal was altered, either by attaching extra provisions or changing the quantity of
equipment sold, before Congress either allowed the resolutions to die on committee or their
failed when they came to a vote. The third was that the deal was withdrawn by the administration
before a concurrent resolution could be passed against it. In the large cases, the opposition of the
Israeli lobby was prominent against the sales to Arab countries and had a considerable influence
on the process and, in some cases, the outcome. The clearest indication of pro-Israeli lobby
influence is in cases where the deal was altered or withdrawn because Israeli security was cited
as one of the main reasons for opposition.
Table 3.1 – Outcome of Arms Sales to the Middle East 1974-1983
Deal Outcome Opposition
1975 Jordan – Hawks (I) Withdrawn Israeli Lobby
1975 Jordan – Hawks (II) Pass Israeli Lobby
1975 Kuwait – Missiles Pass None
1976 Egypt – C-130’s Pass Israeli Lobby
1976 Multinational Package Pass Israeli Lobby
1977 Iran – A.W.A.C.S. (I) Withdrawn Cold War, Congress Oversight
1977 Iran – A.W.A.C.S. (II) Pass Cold War, Congress Oversight
1977 Egypt – C-130’s Pass None
1978 Multinational Package Pass, Altered Israeli Lobby
1979 Yemen – Package Pass Cold War
1980 Iraq - Engines Suspended100
Congressional Oversight
1980 Jordan – Tanks Pass Israeli Lobby
1981 Saudi Arabia –
A.W.A.C.S.
Pass, Altered Israeli Lobby, Cold War
1982 Jordan – Hawks (III) Re-debated101
Israeli Lobby
100
The Carter Administration suspended the sale to Iraq at the time despite that it was not blocked because of the
Iran-Iraq War.
101
The debate in 1982 over the Jordanian arms sale was focused on whether Jordan would be allowed to obtain
mobile Hawk missiles or F-16’s that could deploy Hawk missiles. The debate was an extension from the 1975 sale
because of the conditions that were attached to that sale to ensure that the missiles were immobile. More
information can be found in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Volume 40 on page 339.

51. Boyer 48
48
As can be seen in Table 3.1, the arms sales had a series of different outcomes, each with
different factors pressing on the results. The most frequent opposition to a sale was the Israeli
lobby, generally because it was concerned with Israeli security. Cold War politics and the
general Cold War mentality played a role in several of the sales because Congress was concerned
with U.S. military secrets being leaked and combating Soviet influence in the region. Several
deals, however, had no opposition because they did not pose enough of a threat to any particular
set of interests for Congress to take more than a quick survey and they did not warrant the
introduction of resolution against them.
The five sales that prompted significant debate in Congress were examined to determine
the influences that lead to the outcome. The following sections will outline the general
information about the sale, arguments used by the supporters, arguments used by the opposition,
the underlying American national interests involved in the sale, and the outcome of the
legislative veto proceedings. Each case study also deals with the roles played by interested
parties, which included domestic interest groups and the involvement of foreign governments.
Then the conclusions that can be drawn from each case will be discussed and how they
contribute to the big picture of the effects of the legislative veto in American Foreign policy and
how the veto gave the Israeli lobby greater influence over foreign policy during this period.