2. 2
Theory of Social Change and Approach to Inquiry
To develop my theory of social change I begin with the propositions that support my approach to
inquiry. Rather than delineating a theory of social change and then an approach to inquiry it
informs (or vice versa), I will attempt to examine these concepts simultaneously to emphasize my
perspective on their intertwined nature. The Hegelian dialectic is a useful logical model and is also
important in explanations of social events. In argumentation, first, one proposes a thesis, which is
a claim. In sociology, a thesis is a given event that occurs and affects humanity. The antithesis is
the response to the thesis; it is a reaction that contradicts the thesis. An antithesis may be considered
the cultural response to an event. Synthesis is the integration of the thesis and antithesis. A generic
example of a sociocultural dialectic process might include resolution by a population of tensions
initiated by a natural disaster. A hypothetical sequence from dialectical materialism could include
instigation of a cultural event by one population, leading to counteraction by another, with a final
reckoning occurring between populations.
The Hegelian dialectic implies phenomenological consequences. These consequences involve the
nature of subjectivity, idiosyncratic experience unique to an individual:
This Dialectic, which unsettles all particular judgements and opinions, transmuting
the Evil into Good and Good into Evil, left at last nothing remaining but the mere
action of subjectivity itself… – Thought. Thought contemplates everything under
the form of Universality, and is consequently the impulsion towards and production
of the Universal (Hegel, 1899, p. 438).
Hegel reflected upon contradictions in Jesuit ideology. The Roman Catholic Church developed the
Society of Jesus to resist the Protestant Reformation. Therefore, Jesuit argumentation developed
with the goal of aggressively proving specific claims. Judgement and opinion became irrelevant
because only one interpretation of any evidence could exist, that endorsed by the Roman Catholic
Church. Contradictions appear because without interpretation, the distinction between good and
evil becomes unclear. Elimination of opinion and judgement extinguished hermeneutics and left
only phenomenology, subjective experience. For Hegel, cognition is subjectivity. Thought is the
integration of sensory data with an individual’s mental constructs. This conceptual framework can
be considered universalist in that it is a form of monism, an umbrella term for attributions of
oneness. In my approach to inquiry, I use objectivist epistemology (Rallis & Rossman, 2012).
However, I do not presume that objectivist epistemological claims should be accepted
axiomatically. I am concerned with rational inquiry that yields insight into causal explanations of
the natural world. However, problems remain:
[I]t must be observed that the unity of Thought with its Object is already implicitly
present [i.e. in the fundamental constitution of the Universe]. For Reason is the
substantial basis of Consciousness as well as of the External and Natural. Thus, that
which presents itself as the Object of Thought is no longer an absolutely distinct
form of existence (Hegel, 1899, p. 439).
Universalist explanations that employ reason to link consciousness with the natural world that
exists external to the subjective observer are of the same category (monism) as universalist
3. 3
theological explanations. This is the crux of critiques involving charges of scientism, that
empiricism is a form of secular religion. This becomes apparent in Aguste Comte’s (1899)
origination of the modern formulation of positivism. Comte describes positivism as an extension
of the Deism promulgated by Founding Fathers of the United States such as Benjamin Franklin.
Deism supposed, or posited, the existence of a supreme being. However, this being acted only as
a prime mover and ceased interference with causality after creating the universe. Comte’s (1899)
description of positivism employs a similar casuistry evident in the Jesuit tradition in which
theoretical rules derived from past instances apply to future instances:
[Positivisme] dans des vues d'abord scientifiques, y voit maintenant la source de la
solution sociale d'après la fondation d'un véritable pouvoir spirituel, capable de
concilier radicalement l'ordre et le progrès. La plénitude et la gravité de cette
nouvelle adhésion résultent de son harmonie spontanée avec le fond de la situation
Américaine où les vrais conservateurs se sentient près d’être écrasés par de
redoutables niveleurs, contre lesquels ils ne voient d’autre ressource systématique
que dans la religion démontrée qui caractérise le positivisme (p. 216).
Positivism was a “social solution” implemented by “real conservatives” (the Founders) to resist
the frightening potential of the American Revolution to cause socioeconomic equality, a possibility
they viewed as an existential threat (Comte, 1899, p. 216). Comte (1899) claims that the Founders
viewed positivism as a “systematic resource” because it was a “demonstrated religion” that could
restore hierarchical control via “true spiritual power” (p. 216). Consider the dialectical nature of
this process. The succession of the Thirteen Colonies from Great Britain generated a thesis of
social instability. The political aristocracy who participated in the Continental Congress required
a new form of social control consistent with American Enlightenment dogma. Comte describes
this system (the antithesis developed by the colonial oligarchy to American revolutionary social
instability) as positivism. The framing of the Constitution of the United States might be considered
a synthesis of these sociocultural forces.
Contradictions remain in my argument for objectivist epistemology. I have a naturalistic
worldview free from supernatural and mystical elements. I find the Hegelian dialectic appealing
in its explanatory power of societal change because of its congruence with materialism and
physicalism. One may align Comte’s account of positivism within a dialectical framework. Yet,
both the Hegelian dialectic and Comte’s positivism can be considered forms of monism. They are
concerned with unified explanations. Religions might also be considered another form of monism
in that they each provide one explanation for events and the nature of reality. However, one
formulation common to religions is the existence of an immaterial soul. This construct
distinguishes the monism evident in Hegel and Comte’s ideas with a creeping dualism in theology.
Dualism is the view that there are two mutually irreducible, ontologically distinct forms of
phenomena and/or substance. The proposition of an immaterial soul is a form of mind-body
dualism. It is also conceivable that religions could involve pluralism, in which there are multiple
ontologically distinct items such as heaven, hell, reincarnation, karma, spiritual or faith-based
phenomena, and deities. In this conception, the soul is a form of consciousness that exists
independently from the natural world. Inside this soul mental events can occur, which are distinct
from physical events in objective reality. Unlike theology, dialecticism and positivism do not
4. 4
require mental and physical dualism specifically, regardless of whether other forms of dualism
can be identified in the latter two constructs.
Psychophysical reductionism is another form of monism, which supports the empirical basis of
my approach to inquiry and theory of social change. My operational definition of psychophysical
reduction is that material, physical evidence supports psychological claims, and ultimately, this
evidence is the only support for these claims. Critics of psychophysical reduction complain that it
limits the choices researchers can make when developing special science theories. This is a
mistake. As a prerequisite, this argument concedes that the special sciences ground claims in the
psychological and social sciences. Reductionist methodology does not constrain or regulate theory
choice in the special sciences. Explanations from special sciences such as chemistry, biology, and
neuroscience ultimately reduce theoretically to fundamental physics.
Biclle (1996) proposes that “as successful development occurs in both psychology and
neuroscience, psychological theories will come to stand in the reduction relation… to counterpart
neurobiological theories” (p. 62). These neurobiological theories have also had counterparts in
basic physics. Thus, in this chain of causal reasoning psychology is linked to neurobiology, which
is linked to physics. This view supposes that the role of philosophy is to assimilate and adapt
knowledge from the natural sciences to the present volume of philosophical discourse. Philosophy
can be considered an applied science, or technology. In addition, psychology and neurobiology are
perceived as in development. Researchers in these fields continue to propose new questions and
explanations, which evolve subject to empirical verification. As long as this development
continues to occur there is no restriction on the theoretical choices available to researchers.
While the motivation for the development of positivism may have been to reestablish social
hierarchical control, contemporary theorists need not grate at the possibility that their social
research is somehow less than, or even ontologically distinct from basic research. Instead
anthropology, psychology, biology, physics, etc. can be viewed as heuristic approaches with
different levels of resolution in reductionist methodology. Consider a continuum in sociology
regarding the regulation of social change, between predictable progression and radical
transformation (Rallis & Rossman, 2012, p. 33). A description of periods of stasis interrupted by
profound alterations could be applied to the concept of cultural revolution in societal development,
or to the concept of punctuated equilibria in evolutionary biology. Cultural events are subject to
physical events. Examples include changes in population size, meteorological phenomena, DNA
replication errors, and variation in background radiation due to cosmic ray events as well as
geological distribution of radioactive elements. Cultural events are also subject to technological
changes, including inventions, such as iPhones, arrowheads, forge welding, cuneiform tablets, or
monotheism. Parallels can be drawn between different areas of research and identification of these
interrelationships expand human knowledge.
Trustworthy Research
Rallis and Rossman (2012) describe the scientific method as a “systematic inquiry cycle” (p. 46).
The scientific method requires the following fundamental steps:
[First scientists are] curious and ask a question;
5. 5
Construct a hypothesis;
Observe and collect data or test the hypothesis by doing an experiment;
Analyze the data and draw a conclusion;
Communicate results; and
Repeat or replicate the experiment (Rallis & Rossman, 2012, p. 46).
Systematic inquiry helps researchers demonstrate the trustworthiness of their research studies.
When developing hypotheses, researchers should relate their work to relevant theory. Extensive
review of the background literature surrounding a given problem helps researchers to increase the
specificity of their questions, identify what is already known and what research approaches have
already been attempted, and provide support for the construct validity of research methodologies
used in their research. Research that conforms to the systematic inquiry cycle is subject to peer
review. In order to collaborate with scientific peers, researchers should propose hypotheses that
are verifiable with empirical evidence. A research hypothesis should also be falsifiable in that
evidence could conceivably be collected or arguments could be made that would lead researchers
to reject the hypothesis. Literature review can help a researcher construct a falsifiable claim.
Literature review can also help a researcher avoid the logical fallacy of the argument from
ignorance, the incorrect belief that a claim is true if it has not been proven false, or that a claim is
false if it has not been proven true. Attention to extant literature can help scientists establish initial
confidence in their methods of inquiry by demonstrating to potential reviewers that the scientist
has given consideration to the concerns of the learning community that has previously explored
and is interested in the subjects and fields related to their research.
Dissertation Research and Conceptions of Trustworthiness
For my dissertation, I will conduct research in art education. My understanding of what that
statement means continues to evolve. My plan has been to conduct recordings and from these
render transcripts during observations of art teachers and students under various instructional
settings. I would then subject those transcripts to some form of statistical analysis and make causal
claims. One problem with this approach is that it is quantitative, lexical, and conceptual. These
approaches investigate an incomplete construct of visual language. Lexical communication could
be considered irrelevant to research in visual language, in that it is contradictory to investigate
visual ideas with written language. A work of art might be the best response to another work of
art. Redundant quantitative analysis of art instruction could be used to impose a new regulatory
framework on art teachers or to destroy what many students enjoy most about art classes. In
defense of my plans, one of my goals would be to better understand intentionality in the human
mind. I do not buy into the statement attributed to Warhol that “art is anything you can get away
with,” and I would not apply this notion to my dissertation research. However, I accept the premise
that anything can be art; and therefore, also, everything is art. For this reason, I believe that art
cannot be created; it can only be found in nature. Because of this, in order for my dissertation
research to be trustworthy it must investigate questions authentic to the field of art education. To
me, art education seems more concerned with finding art (and artists) rather than attempting to
create it (and them). In addition, to me, art educational questions concern the natural world and
objective reality. Reductionist methodology seems to me to be the most honest way to address
these questions.
6. 6
References:
Biclle, J. (1996). New wave psychophysical reductionism and the methodological caveats.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56(1), 57-78.
Comte, A. (1903). Correspondance inédite dʹ Auguste Comte. Paris, FR: Au Siège de la Société
Positiviste.
Hegel, G. (1899). The philosophy of history. (J. Sibree, Trans.). New York, NY: The Colonial
Press.
Rallis, S., & Rossman, Gretchen B. (2012). The research journey: Introduction to inquiry. New
York, NY: The Guilford Press.
![2
Theory of Social Change and Approach to Inquiry
To develop my theory of social change I begin with the propositions that support my approach to
inquiry. Rather than delineating a theory of social change and then an approach to inquiry it
informs (or vice versa), I will attempt to examine these concepts simultaneously to emphasize my
perspective on their intertwined nature. The Hegelian dialectic is a useful logical model and is also
important in explanations of social events. In argumentation, first, one proposes a thesis, which is
a claim. In sociology, a thesis is a given event that occurs and affects humanity. The antithesis is
the response to the thesis; it is a reaction that contradicts the thesis. An antithesis may be considered
the cultural response to an event. Synthesis is the integration of the thesis and antithesis. A generic
example of a sociocultural dialectic process might include resolution by a population of tensions
initiated by a natural disaster. A hypothetical sequence from dialectical materialism could include
instigation of a cultural event by one population, leading to counteraction by another, with a final
reckoning occurring between populations.
The Hegelian dialectic implies phenomenological consequences. These consequences involve the
nature of subjectivity, idiosyncratic experience unique to an individual:
This Dialectic, which unsettles all particular judgements and opinions, transmuting
the Evil into Good and Good into Evil, left at last nothing remaining but the mere
action of subjectivity itself… – Thought. Thought contemplates everything under
the form of Universality, and is consequently the impulsion towards and production
of the Universal (Hegel, 1899, p. 438).
Hegel reflected upon contradictions in Jesuit ideology. The Roman Catholic Church developed the
Society of Jesus to resist the Protestant Reformation. Therefore, Jesuit argumentation developed
with the goal of aggressively proving specific claims. Judgement and opinion became irrelevant
because only one interpretation of any evidence could exist, that endorsed by the Roman Catholic
Church. Contradictions appear because without interpretation, the distinction between good and
evil becomes unclear. Elimination of opinion and judgement extinguished hermeneutics and left
only phenomenology, subjective experience. For Hegel, cognition is subjectivity. Thought is the
integration of sensory data with an individual’s mental constructs. This conceptual framework can
be considered universalist in that it is a form of monism, an umbrella term for attributions of
oneness. In my approach to inquiry, I use objectivist epistemology (Rallis & Rossman, 2012).
However, I do not presume that objectivist epistemological claims should be accepted
axiomatically. I am concerned with rational inquiry that yields insight into causal explanations of
the natural world. However, problems remain:
[I]t must be observed that the unity of Thought with its Object is already implicitly
present [i.e. in the fundamental constitution of the Universe]. For Reason is the
substantial basis of Consciousness as well as of the External and Natural. Thus, that
which presents itself as the Object of Thought is no longer an absolutely distinct
form of existence (Hegel, 1899, p. 439).
Universalist explanations that employ reason to link consciousness with the natural world that
exists external to the subjective observer are of the same category (monism) as universalist]()