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School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary, University of London
The Influence of Social Media on US Presidential
Campaigns of 2008 and 2012
Student Number: 120000483
Word count: 11881
A Research Project submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the Degree: B.A (Honours) in Politics

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In submitting this work, I declare that I have read and understood the
College regulations on plagiarism contained in the Student Handbook. The
work contained in this project is solely my own and all the sources used are
cited in the text and contained in my bibliography.

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Abstract
The aim of the present research is to analyse the influence of social media on US
Presidential campaigns. Subsequently, it intends to answer the following
subquestions: ‘had the online public sphere and social media facilitated Obama’s
2008 win?’, ‘what was the impact of utilising social media as a campaigning tool
on the processes of campaign organising and storytelling?’, and ‘has engaging
with social media become a campaigning prerequisite since the 2008 campaign?’.
A comparative method of the 2008 and 2012 US Presidential campaigns is
employed. The research is Obama-centered as he advanced social media as a
valuable campaigning tool, yet Clinton, McCain, and Romney are also considered.
Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are utilized as representative social media
platforms. It is argued that the high utilization of social media expanded the public
sphere to the online terrain, where social media as a preferred means of
communication altered electoral storytelling and organizing, as well as became an
integral part of campaigning kits. The research is organised in five parts with
relevant subsections: introduction, literature review, the 2008 campaign, the 2012
campaign and conclusion. The conclusion will include subsections on the
subquestions. It is concluded that Obama’s win can be partly attributed to the
interplay of three factors: the extended online public sphere, the usage of social
media as a campaigning tool, and a distinctive candidate in need of a campaigning
tool on which to express himself as well as the audience for it. Whilst social
media defined the 2008 campaign and ensured its integral role in future
campaigns, it will not define them . It can be speculated that every election cycle
will be defined by innovative technological developments.

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Table of Contents
1.Introduction...……………………………………………………………………5
2.Literature Review ……..………………………………………………………...9
Media and Elections……………………………………………………….9
Internet…………………………………………………………………...11
Social Media……………………………………………………………...13
3.The Campaign of 2008 ……….………………………………………………..17
Campaign Context……………………………………………………......17
Candidate Image………………………………………………………….20
YouTube………………………………………………………………….22
Facebook…………………………………………………………………26
4.The Campaign of 2012………………………………………………………..30
Campaign Context………………………………………………………..30
Obama’s First-Mover Advantage………………………………………...32
Facebook ………………………………………………………………...34
Twitter……………………………………………………………………37
Big Data………………………………………………………………….38
5.Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...40
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………...49

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The Influence of Social Media on US Presidential Campaigns of
2008 and 2012
1. Introduction
In recent years the public sphere became dominated by Social Network Sites
(SNS) which altered political communication. The terminology ‘social media’,
‘social media platform’, and ‘social networking sites’ is interchangeably utilised
in public discourse and refers to web-based services which permit individuals to:
construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, articulate a list
of users with whom they share a connection, and view and traverse their list of
connections with those made by others within the same system (Boyd and Ellison,
2008:211); every platform has a different configuration. The aim of the present
research is to analyse the influence of social media on US Presidential campaigns.
The general political and technological context is exceedingly appropriate for the
present research. Throughout the years there has been an increasing international
focus on US presidential campaigns and elections that have become well-
orchestrated media spectacles (Kellner, 2009:708). Obama’s 2008 campaign had
an international impact on campaigns all over the world (Cogburn and Espinoza-
Vasquez, 2011:201). His win is commonly attributed to his innovative digital
strategy. Moreover, social media is currently highly utilised in the political arena
expanding the public sphere to the online terrain. In this context the present
research connects political studies with psephology, political marketing and new
technologies studies. It adds to the existing literature by linking a candidate to an

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innovative campaigning tool and to an extended online public sphere. Also, it
analyses ready-for-social media campaigns in contrast to ready-for-media-
campaigns and assesses storytelling and campaign organising through social
media.
Consequently, three subquestions will be considered in order to answer the main
research question: ‘had the online public sphere and social media facilitated
Obama’s 2008 win?’, ‘what was the impact of utilising social media as a
campaigning tool on the processes of campaign organising and storytelling?’, and
‘has engaging with social media become a campaigning prerequisite since the
2008 campaign?’. It will be argued that the high utilization of social media
expanded the public sphere to the online terrain where social media as a preferred
means of communication was an ideal campaigning tool for the Obama brand.
This connection between social media as a campaign tool, the online public
sphere and an online candidate – Obama - changed campaign storytelling and
organizing and created a precedent for social media to become a prerequisite
campaign tool. It also allows for speculation that every election cycle will be
defined by innovative technological developments. In support of the argument a
comparative mainly qualitative method will be utilized of the 2008 and 2012 US
presidential campaigns. The 2008 election introduced social media as an
innovative campaigning tool and the 2012 established social media as an integral
part of campaigning kits. Whilst Clinton, McCain and Romney are considered as
relevant political figures, the research is Obama-centered since Obama truly

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engaged with social media as a campaign tool and fulfilled the needs of the online
expanded public sphere.
The scope of the research is limited to the previously mentioned aspects and does
not aim to evaluate Obama’s double win in contrast to other social and economic
factors. Thus social media usage was not quantified nor exhibited in comparison
with other variables. Nor does this research intend to claim that Obama’s social
media strategy was the only factor relevant for his win. Even so, the present
research is limited by the scarcity of literature on the case studies - as they are
recent events – as well as by a degree of generalisation caused by qualitative and
not quantitative analysis. The collected data consists mainly of secondary sources:
journal articles, world web pages, books, and official documents, whereas
candidate quotes, YouTube videos, tweets, and press release extracts are
employed as primary sources. Moreover the spectrum of social media platforms
considered in this research is reduced to: Facebook (FB), YouTube and Twitter.
FB prevails in both campaigns as the main storytelling platform for candidates.
YouTube introduces alternative advertising in 2008 where it is subsequently
highlighted, yet loses it sense of novelty in 2012. Twitter, a micro blogging
medium, not especially relevant in the 2008 campaign, regains popularity in 2012.
Furthermore, the research is organised in five main parts with relevant
subsections: introduction, a review of literature, the 2008 campaign, the 2012
campaign and conclusion. Firstly, the hybrid literature review places social media

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in context and presents through a combination of thinkers, themes, relevant theory
and historical background the emergence of the extended online public sphere and
the relevance of social media for political communication. The relationship
between campaigns and both traditional and new media is contemplated. Social
media in this context is validated through the Media Richness Theory (Daft and
Lengel, 1986). Also, theories of the Internet on political communication and on
the public sphere are measured. Secondly, in the chapter dedicated to the 2008
campaign, the context of the election and the new web electorate are initially
studied. Then, FB is examined in conveying the story and brand of candidates. FB
is also considered for its role in organisation of volunteers and fundraising,
especially for Obama who arguably created a new social movement. YouTube is
assessed in contrast with television (TV) in promoting alternative advertisements
(ads). Additionally, in the chapter dedicated to the 2012 campaign social media is
considered to become an integral part of campaigning kits losing its sense of
novelty yet still being utilised for its supplemental role to traditional media and
for maintaining political fandom. Moreover, Obama’s first-mover advantage as
well as the introduction of Big Data in his strategy is assessed thus attesting the
hypothesis that each electoral cycle has a different configuration due to the impact
of technological developments. Finally, the conclusion will include subsections on
the subquestions in the initially mentioned order and present the limits of the
research as well as areas for further study. It will be concluded that Obama’s win
can be partly attributed to the interplay of three factors: the extended online public
sphere, the usage of social media as a campaigning tool, and a distinctive

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candidate in need of a campaigning tool on which to express himself and an
audience for it. This 2008 precedent altered elections in terms of storytelling and
organising. It also facilitated social media to be an integral part of future
campaign kits. Yet, hypothetically social media will not define future campaigns
as it did in 2008; these campaigns will be defined by developments in
technologies.
2. Literature Review
Presidential campaigns and elections are of primary focus for media political
coverage. The developments in technology greatly impacted the role of the media
in campaigns triggering four major campaign-related consequences: ‘decline in
party influence, increase in journalist power, requirement of candidates to televise
well and the emergence of made-for-media-campaigns’ (Graber 2002:237). Party
affiliation and group membership became less relevant in contrast to the character
of candidates and their qualifications - presented to the electorate through the
media. Accordingly, media assumed a king making role in campaigns defining its
relationship with the candidate. With the rise of infotainment, campaigns are
designed to attract most media attention and coverage. As Graber highlights, an
election is reported through the filter of newsworthiness and not for its
educational purpose (2002:265). This aspect translates into talk shows, photo
opportunities and trips to interesting places (Graber, 2002: 243). There is a
tendency towards dramatizing and trivialising elections as well as ‘gotcha
journalism’, the focus being on the horse race aspect (Stuckey, 2003: 164).

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Consequently, the role of the media in candidate image making cannot be denied.
Candidates must court the media in order to utilise its king making ability and
candidate image making starts a year before the primary; candidate stories emerge
in the pre-campaign (Graber 2002:240). According to veteran political analyst
Robert Shogan: ‘the media needs candidates, candidates need the media’
(Stuckey, 2003:161). As campaigns are more candidate-centred they fragment the
coherence of national politics, which in turn produces a need for media
interpretations to elucidate the confusion (Stuckey, 2003:163). Hence the role of
punditry and analysis increases. Moreover, in the initial campaign phase media
coverage and opinion polls have a reciprocal propensity. Candidates with good
poll ratings receive more coverage whilst good coverage manifests in higher
ratings in pools (Graber 2002:239). Consequently, it is often argued that the
mediation of a campaign wins the election (Stuckey 2003:167).The most
important aspect is influencing the selection of candidates not changing votes.
This occurrence was evident in the 1992 primaries when news people focused on
Clinton as a political candidate whilst ignoring his opponents (Graber 2002:265).
This action validated him as a viable candidate. Furthermore, from Al Smith’s
televised acceptance speech to Eisenhower’s TV ad campaign candidates were
quick to adopt new technologies in order to appeal to voters. Various types of
candidates are better suited for different mediums. It is argued that with the rise of
TV presidents no longer run for office yet they ‘pose for office’ (Diamond,
1982:175). Ronal Reagan, a former actor, is the perfect example of the telegenic
candidates that recruiters searched for in the TV era. It is argued that Lincoln’s

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rugged face or Roosevelt’s wheelchair – easily interpretable as a sign of weakness
- would not have appealed to the TV. Thus it can be determined that some media
channels require specific features in candidates. Audio-visual images became of
crucial importance for the campaigns. A case in point were the Kennedy-Nixon
TV debates of 1960, the Reagan-Mondale debates of 1984, and the Bush-Gore
debates of 2000, that changed the general opinion that Kennedy, Reagan and Bush
were not appropriate contenders for the role of president (Graber 2002:240). In
addition, TV advisors became an integral part of campaigning staff and had
budgets of approx. 1 billion in 2000 (Graber 2002:243).
Nevertheless, nothing would have a more major impact on campaigns than the
web - invented in 1991. The impact of the internet as a communication medium
for 21st
century campaigning ‘has been hidden in plain sight’ (Baum and
Groeling, 2008:345). With its modest production and distribution costs it
permitted a blurring of lines between what constituted news and what did not. It
granted a higher degree of niche targeting from the online versions of the
traditional media – such as New York Times or CBS -, to very specific niche-
oriented blogs with a small loyal audience. Nader, a candidate sponsored website,
has been utilised since 1995. In 2000 all major parties utilised this space to
provide the electorate with candidate information. Even then, people could use it
in registering to vote, making donations or participating in various chat rooms
dedicated to specific demographic groups. However, users in 2000 often lacked
the high speed internet required to properly engage with the candidate websites

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such as finding the virtual dog of Al Gore – a game for the younger demographic
– on his website (Graber 2002:244). However, the context for using the internet
became much more favourable as time passed. The extent of the internet
revolution was disputed by political analysts. Whilst proponents of the
normalisation thesis (Davis, 1999), and the institutional adaptation model
(Chadwick, 2006) deny a fundamental change in the system, proponents of the
democratisation thesis (Barber, 1998) perceive the internet as transformational.
Then again, Bimber and Davis position the internet as supplemental to traditional
media (2003:149) offering the opportunity for specialised niche communication to
specific audiences and mobilizing activists. West (2005) highlights the minute
changes that the Internet will gradually create. An appropriate theory in regards to
campaigns in the internet age is of Cornfiled (2005) who stresses three changes
caused by the internet in campaign processes: one campaigning model will
dominate, two models could compete and each cycle will have an exclusive
configuration. Moreover, Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of the internet, intended for it
to be a collaborative interactive medium. Arguably, the internet sphere has similar
characteristics to a Greek agora where ideas are openly shared indicative of direct
democracy (Wattal et al, 2010:677). Thus this sphere can be perceived as the new
extended public sphere. According to Dahlgren, the public sphere possesses three
defining dimensions: structures, representation, and interaction (2005:149). In
regards to the Internet, the structural aspect refers to the manner in which it is
available for civic use - cyber-geography and the configuration of the democratic
communicative spaces. The representational aspect indicates the outputs of the

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media and the targeting of small groups. The interaction aspect hints at
Habermas; public sphere exists as a discursive interactional process (Dahlgren,
2005:149). According to surveys conducted by the Pew Institute (2008) pervious
to the 2008 election there was a significant increase in internet users from 9% to
24% between 2000 and 2008. In this period there appeared to be an inflow of
people transitioning from using traditional media in news gathering to using
digital media.
In 2002 Friendster and My Space were launched. In 2004 Facebook (FB)
followed and became the largest social media network. In 2005 YouTube – a
video-sharing network – emerged followed by Twitter in 2006 which introduced
the concept of micro blogging (Golbeck 2013:3). These SNS qualify as important
media channels. On Daft and Lengel’s media richness scale social media would
qualify as a very rich medium. According to the Media Richness Theory -
framework which ranks media in accordance to its ability to reproduce
information – the richest mediums would be face-to-face-discussions in which the
message is personalised and clearly understood by the recipient (Daft and Lengel,
1986:560). Daft and Wiginton (1979) remark that differences in richness between
types of media include: capacity for immediate feedback, number of cues and
nuances produces, language variety and personalisation. It becomes clear that
social media through its ability to reach o multitude of individuals in a
personalised manner rates very high on the media richness scale. Messages can be
sent in written, audio or visual form reproducing face-to-face-discussions. The

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audience can choose when to access the information and whether to engage with it
or not in terms of responding, commenting and providing feedback. On the same
scale, media of low richness restricts feedback yet is appropriate for processing
clear messages and standard data. Clearly, the advantages of social media should
be utilised for their supplemental role to traditional media where the latter is
lacking. Whilst remarkable at reaching a large audience, traditional media is
deficient in communicating with the audience and personalising messages. Social
media allows immediate audience responsiveness and adapts to the rapidly
changing environment. ‘Traditional media is many –to-one communication, whilst
social media is many-to-many communication’ (Golbeck 2013:203). Social media
provides users twenty-four-hours access to news and the possibility of engaging
with each other as well as with candidates creating a networked nation (Graber,
1996:33). It provides an open always accessible arena for participation in the
public and political life thus supplementing the Habermasian public sphere
(Habermas et al., 1991:37). For Habermas the public sphere is a space of
institutions and practices that develops between private interests of everyday life
and state power where individuals gather to discuss public affairs (Kellner,
2000:3). However, for Habermas traditional media altered the public sphere by
shaping, constructing and limiting public discourse to the themes validated and
approved by media corporations (Kellner, 2000:17). Yet, with an increase in
social media usage it becomes evident that the media could no longer impose
limits on the public sphere. Social media is hard to constrain and accordingly
allows for unrestricted conversation. Proponents of networks admire their

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capacities to ‘increase the accessibility of information, encourage participatory
decision-making, and facilitate communication with policy officials and like-
minded citizens’ (Weichselbraun and Scharl, 2008:122). Social media creates
visibility (Weichselbraun and Scharl, 2008:122). These online tools permit
instantaneous cycles of dissemination and consumption at a very low cost. Davis
et al. (2008), in his analysis of previous campaigns to the 2008 one, projected the
organizing power of social media in increasing the social capital of a candidate.
Campaign workers will spend their time engaging with the online environment,
managing events and FB friend requests, releasing and promoting video ads on
YouTube and reviewing tweets. The hypothesis was that candidates and advisors
that do not adapt will be at a disadvantage (Wattal et al, 2010:670).
In light of the growing popularity of social media understanding its manner of
operation is impending for political analysts. This entails examining the structures
of the network, its application and scope as well as understanding user behaviour
(Golbeck, 2013:1). An individual uses social media for one or more of the
following reasons: broadcasting or sending information, requesting feedback or
input and interaction. In these cases the leverage of social media is utilised and the
user can safely presume the audience is already interested. Similarly, social media
acts as an open channel to discuss and share comments between the electorate and
candidates (Golbeck 2013:203-204). In terms of knowing the audience user
personality becomes relevant. Initially, using McCrae and Costa’s Five Factor
model, analysts concluded that introverted people who enjoyed the benefits of
anonymity were higher internet users (Amichai-Hamburger et al., 2002). The Big

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Five framework is a model of personality that contains five factors representing
personality traits at a broad level: extraversion, neuroticism, openness to
experiences, agreeableness, and conscientiousness; each factor is bipolar (McCrae
and Costa, 1997). However, more recent studies illustrate a reversal in personality
traits of users. Arguably, because of the anonymity restrictions of social media
there is not much communication between strangers. Nowadays users appear to be
extroverted individuals with high self-esteem. In regards to age, it is considered
that the younger user generation of digital natives need to be extroverted
individuals to partake whilst the older generation needs to be open to new
experiences (Correa et al., 2009:252).
When platforms are considered the most relevant ones for political
communication are: FB, YouTube and Twitter. Facebook.com is a SNS that
allows members to share personal information, media stories and opinions. It
permits private communication through ‘messages’ and public communication
through posts on the ‘wall’. Its features include creating groups and events with
open, closed or public membership. Members can also support a particular
candidate or advocate a cause. It is a perfect tool for political actors to organise
and connect members, reach constituents and voters and keep in contact with
them. Alternatively, Twitter is preferred for micro blogging and adding valuable
content. However, it caters to the need for infotainment. Users can share their
opinions, and interpretation of the news in a personalised manner and engage in
conversations over various topics of interest in a concise manner. It can be

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perceived as sending a text message to the entire electorate. Whilst Facebook is
utilized for maintaining friendship, twitter is utilized for sharing news,
information and one’s position on an issue (Vaynerchuck, 2013:85-86).
Contrastingly, the purpose of YouTube is video-sharing. It allows for the
distribution of any type of video and commenting on it. Overall, the position of
this research on social media is in congruence with Robertson, Vatrapub and
Medina’s (2010:14) following statement:
If the public sphere provides an intermediate space between the state and civil
society for the dissemination, discussion, and deliberation of issues and enables
communicative action grounded in equality and rationality, then with the
qualifying caveats of digital divide and digital literacy, new media such as SNSs
can provide such an intermediary deliberative space.
3. The US Presidential Campaign of 2008
The 2008 presidential campaign generated much enthusiasm as it unfolded in a
noteworthy general context: by 2007 the US had confronted major economic
problems, engaged in two wars and faced a decay in power as well as the threat of
Islamist attacks (Balz and Johnson, 2010:11). This entire context generated a
feeling of anxiety amongst the electorate. Additionally, the electorate was
expecting a figure to contrast George W. Bush. ‘An on-going president nearly
always defines the next election’ (Balz and Johnson, 2010:44) ; the electorate
does not wish for a replica. Subsequently, whilst Bush appeared to be unyielding
and hyper partisan, the future president ought to be able to collaborate with the
other parties and to admit to error. These characteristic absolutely needed to be
illustrated by the presidential candidates. The most prominent candidates were

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John McCain the Republican nominee and Barack Obama and Hilary Clinton that
battled for the Democrat nomination. The manner in which they shared their
stories and conveyed their personas needed to be congruent with the development
of new technologies and changes in electorate.
It can be argued that the electorate was both prepared and eager for a digital
candidate. Internet and e-democracy enthusiasts had hoped for the Internet to
facilitate a type of politics that entailed active participation and rational
deliberation. Whilst, as Coleman (2001) suggested, the Internet did not fully live
to this expectation, it prepared voters for the idea of engagement with candidates
through social media. According to a study conducted in 2008 by The Pew
Research Centre for The People and Press internet use by voters doubled from
2004 to 2008. Also, one-quarter of all voters admitted to utilising digital media for
balloting decisions (Pew, 2008). Additionally, the internet represented the main
source for political news and information for the younger generation with ages 18-
29. This is a natural occurrence as on the internet consumers have autonomy on
how to access information, its presentation – print, audio, audio-visual, interactive
– and its content - factual reports vs. political commentary, in-depth reports vs.
headline news (Oxley, 2012:26). News consumers of a specific persuasion,
interested in a specific issue, exhibit higher internet usage. This occurs because
traditional media has a tendency towards centrism in order to appeal to a larger
audience and cover large production costs (Oxley, 2012:39). However, it is
evident that the mere existence of more news media options does not increase the

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general political awareness and that people who actively chose to consult the news
have a higher level of political knowledge. Oxley examined levels of political
knowledge in citizens together with the number of traditional and new media
sources considered. She added to the 2000 Pew survey fourteen additional
questions which covered from the identification of politicians to awareness of
political facts and contemporary policy debates such as minimum wage, troop
surge to Iraq (Oxley, 2012:38). According to how many questions they answered
right they were divided into high, medium and low knowledge groups. Oxley
finds interesting patterns when she analyses knowledge levels amongst regular
new media and traditional media consumers. Relying on several media channels
increases political awareness only for new media consumers and not for
traditional media consumers. Even if traditional media consumers access more
sources, their knowledge is not increased . This trend is inverted for new media
consumers (Oxley, 2012:38). This pattern can be attributed to both traditional
media being centrist and to new media conveying various angles of a political
story through diverse platforms and presentation modes. However, when all
citizens are considered not just the regular news followers, results are neutral. It
appears that the advantage of accessing news through diverse formats does not
appeal to the people not generally interested in politics (Oxley, 2012:44). Also,
the political awareness gap, in between the people with fewer years of education
and the ones with several years, is widening (Oxley, 2012:44). These results
clearly show the need for political figures to expand to entertainment to appeal to
the electorate not necessarily passionate about political news. Even though in the

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years previous to the election of 2008 candidates had used the internet and social
media in their campaigns, these technologies were central to the 2008 campaign
and Obama was recognised as a leading innovator in harnessing new technologies
and social media (Fraser and Dutta, 2009).
When assessing the story of each candidate and the image they wanted to portray
to the electorate it becomes clear that Obama’s profile was most appropriate for
promotion through new technologies. The US senator Barack Obama did not have
a pre-existing image in the eyes of the electorate other than that he would be the
first African-American president and a very young one. He was often perceived as
inexperienced yet exciting. The main preconception to combat was his rendition
as a ‘biracial figure viewed suspiciously by many blacks as not representative of
the black experience and by many whites as an elitist black whose values are
different than those of the America they know’ (Balz and Johnson, 2010:13).
However, he understood that innovation and harnessing social media in creating a
new manner of campaigning would be impending to his win and said to his
advisors ‘we have a chance to bring the country together in a new majority, the
same old textbook campaigns just won’t do in this election’ (Heileman and
Halperin, 2010:151). Obama was familiar with social media from his early career
and knew it advantaged his innovative, young and charismatic persona - an early
adopter that is not afraid to engage with new developments. Alternatively, on the
Democrat side Hilary Clinton was the front-runner. She had the following image
advantages: no first lady ever run for President before her, and no first lady was a

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favourite, and no President suffered the humiliation she did over the affair of her
husband Bill Clinton (Balz and Johnson, 2010:29). Her advisors positioned her as
a juggernaut; an established figure, not a transformational one, with financial
power, experience and expertise to win (Heileman and Halperin, 2010:83). She
needed to appear intimidating as Penn her main advisor argued: ‘we need more
Thatcher than anyone else …being human is overrated’ (Balz and Johnson,
2010:44). Even though she would engage with social media and the internet, she
failed to appear as a real person to the younger generation (Balz and Johnson,
2010:113) who could not relate to her as she embodied the old-fashioned style of
advertising. However, Clinton and her advisors were aware that the modus
operandi of the new style of campaigning had to be interne- based and highly
interactive. She announced on her website ‘I’m in. And I’m in it to win’ and
added a video of her in a casual ambiance stating: ‘I’m beginning a conversation
with America…So let’s talk. Let’s have a conversation about your ideas and
mine’ (Heileman and Halperin, 2010:83). Clearly, this message was specifically
tailored for the new manner of campaigning more specifically to interactive
election story-telling.
On the republican side there was no font-runner and no candidate to excite the
entire party. Whilst McCain, Romney and Giuliani were relevant figures none of
them exhibited the characteristics of Ronald Reagan – figure arguably searched
for by all conservatives in the previous twenty years (Balz and Johnson,
2010:227). John McCain was famous for running against Bush in the 2000

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primaries and for being a war hero. His larger-than-life bibliography was overly-
exposed to the media supported by documentaries about his war years, open to the
public health-records and Faith of my Fathers autobiography, all conveying him
as a ‘fallen saint’(Welch, 2008 :106) in the 2008 elections. Whilst his advisors
considered that his stories would help win the election, they clearly did not
transfer well to the electorate that had different expectations. Initially, he was
perceived as a maverick and then as the broken American war hero. This image
would appeal neither to the young frivolous entertainment seeking generation nor
to the anxious older electorate.
Both the campaigns of Obama and McCain had an additional budget of 26 million
dollars for Internet advertising (CMAG, 2008) most of which was allocated to
YouTube. YouTube changed the tone and nature of political advertising in terms
of message-delivery. Obama and his team posted 1800 videos that comprised not
only ads but also speeches and supporter videos. The McCain team posted
additional 300 videos making YouTube an invaluable communication tool with
the electorate (Crigler et al, 2012:104). When using YouTube individuals need to
have an incentive in order to search for a candidate. Therefore, in contrast with
TV, most ads will be viewed by individuals that if they are not clear supporters of
a certain candidate , they at least have a growing interest in that candidate.
Consequently, the same strategies utilised for TV are not appropriate for YouTube
forcing candidates to change their strategy. Whilst McCain and the Republican
National Committee created and posted more ads on YouTube – almost twice in

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quantity – the Obama’s campaign was more effective as it combined campaign
videos and videos sponsored and created by supporters (Crigler et al, 2012:104). It
is argued that McCain had a relatively low support in comparison to Obama from
the younger generation, aspect which could have discouraged him in pursuing a
more costly internet strategy (CMAG, 2008). Alternatively, it could be argued that
his lack of a better strategy in attracting the younger generation caused this little
support. McCain’s consultants admitted that the lack of a young electorate as well
as the lack of funds damaged McCain’s strategy (Donatelli, 2008).
Nevertheless, video-sharing was one of the most effective tools for the Obama
campaign. The employment of Kate Albright - Hanna, Emmy Award winning
producer who worked for the CNN political division, as head of Obama’s video
sharing strategy (Harfoush, 2009) was a well calculated addition to the
campaigning team as she was both an entrepreneur and a speaker in the field of
political change caused by the internet. The YouTube strategy was comprised of
three types of videos: live-streaming, campaign created and user generated.
Supporters were encouraged to make their own videos to share on BarackTV and
on afferent blogs (Harfoush, 2009). Accordingly, contributors shared the videos
with their friends and family creating a viral phenomenon. Also, in the case of
event live-streaming people would be notified through tweets and even text
messages. Live-streaming provided people with the opportunity to feel connected
to the campaign and see a different side of Obama which could not be revealed
through traditional ads. It is considered that the video strategy was perfect for

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Obama as it convoyed his strengths: eloquence and charisma. He did not enjoy
debating as much as McCain did and preferred this alternative style. Additionally,
engaging with voters, especially the young generation through video reinforced
his innovative and fresh persona. Possibly, the winning advertisement has been
the ‘Yes We Can Speech’ (Obama, 2008a) set to music by WLL.I.AM in
collaboration with other famous celebrities. The video received more than 7
million views by 2011 and enticed the young generation in an original manner.
The affiliation with pop culture enhanced his forward thinking persona; he was
endorsed by celebrities appealing to various age groups such as WILL I AM – for
the younger electorate – and Oprah – for the older electorate - who proclaimed:
‘I’m sick of politics as usual. We need Barack Obama’ (Heileman and Halperin,
2010:159). Moreover, to emphasize the intricate use of technology and strengths
of his video-sharing strategy BarackTV had incorporated a donate button which
permitted viewers to donate from 15$ to 1000$ using Google Checkout
(Harfoush, 2009).
Political advertising entails transmitting the correct emotions to the electorate.
Yet, the emotions to which the YouTube audience responds are different from the
ones to which the TV audience responds. In this context it is imperative to convey
the correct emotions on each medium. Whilst YouTube addresses mainly
supporters or at least individuals interested in the candidate, TV addresses a more
neutral public. In October 2008, 77% of Democratic and Democratic-leaning
voters and 47% of Republican and Republican-leaning voters reported watching

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an Obama video on the Internet. While 61% Republicans and 37% Democrats
revealed watching a McCain video (CCAP 2008). Thus it is expected for
enthusiasm to be the main emotion conveyed to the YouTube audience and anger
to be the main emotion conveyed to the TV audience. TV ads are expected to
facilitate anxiety and annihilate support for the opposition as well as cause the
undecided voter to search for information (Brader 2005:390). The prevailing
emotions in TV campaigns of both candidates were anger. Two-thirds of
McCain’s ads and 81% of Obama’s ads (Crigler et al, 2012:114) generated anger
reinforcing the main theory that TV ads are meant to discourage opposition and
harness support. Moreover, it is customary for the trailing candidate to use
negative emotions. When considering partisan audiences, Dan Schnur, political
consultant, believes it is perhaps easier to convey harsher advertisements online
because ‘you are preaching to the choir and your supporters know the other
candidate is Satan’ (Crigler et al, 2012:111), the candidates only having to
explain why is the opponent to be considered as such. McCain’s anger was
consistent on both mediums. He used anger in 74% and joy in 38% of the videos
(Crigler et al, 2012:111). Obama’s advertising strategy exhibited much contrast.
The TV ads called into attention the anger most Americans felt about the previous
Bush administration yet depicted a feeling of both fear and hope – hope and joy
being the feelings researchers decided would suit him best. His YouTube
campaign resorted almost entirely on hope and joy – inverse feelings to those
conveyed by McCain. He was already supported on the Internet thus there was no
reason to make his supporters fearful. Hope is a better mobilising factor. Analysts

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are surprised that McCain did not convey more positive emotions. It is true that
the primary emotion to mobilise his supporters was anger and that social
conservatives have a propensity towards anger when change in the social
environment is considered (Crigler et al, 2012:115). However, the mocking
humour and contempt employed towards Obama – who was a figure of hope – did
not aid his campaign much. It is worth considering that appealing to a younger
electorate Obama could portray more positive emotions and invitations for
change. Their strategies became evident in their ads. Obama’s ad ‘Signs of Hope
and Change’ (Obama, 2008b) depicted people of different ages and cultures
holding written signs with the word: hope. The video created a personalised
feeling of empowerment ideal for the internet electorate. Yet McCain’s ad ‘ I am
Joe’ (McCain, 2008), depicted people with different jobs - schoolteacher, store
owner, truck driver - that opposed Obama’s tax plan claiming that they should not
be punished for working hard and making money (Crigler et al, 2012: 107-108).
The 2008 campaign illustrated that all candidates understood the importance of
using Facebook as a main platform for disseminating information and engaging
with the electorate. All candidates had an active Facebook profile and subsequent
online support groups (Robertson, Vatrapub and Medina, 2010:11). In between
September 1 2006 and September 30 2008 a total of 76, 045 individuals posted
687,626 times on the walls of the three main candidates (Robertson, Vatrapub and
Medina, 2010:17). Clearly, there was much interest on behalf of the online public
sphere to engage with the candidates. According to Robertson, Vatrapub and

27. 27
Medina’s research of the 2008 electoral behaviour on the FB pages of candidates
the majority of users were one-timers posting only once on the profile of a
candidate. Then, the majority of the rest – not the one-timers out of which only a
quarter engaged again – focused on a single candidate. The results of the study
show that high frequency posters - recurrent posters were categorised in high,
moderate and low frequency posters - tended to use shorter sentences and fewer
pronouns taking clear advantage of the rapid responsiveness function of the
medium. They were thus concise and engaged for about two weeks in a
discussion about a topic that was of interest to them (Robertson, Vatrapub and
Medina, 2010:27-28). Clearly, this is a form of democracy that asks for
involvement. Moreover, presidential candidates could participate in the dialogue
with the online public sphere as much or as little as they liked; they were directed
questions but they were not obliged to respond instantly or at all. Yet, Obama was
again more tactical in having ten other pages all targeting specific demographics
such as Veterans, Women and Afro-Americans in addition to his main profile in
order to best benefit from the distribution capacities of social media and from
targeting appropriate demographics. Obama’s main social networking site
my.barakobama.com (My BO) was central to his strategy. It permitted raising
funds, exchanging information, creating and rating events and connecting with the
electorate. Another crucial addition to Obama’s team was Chris Hughes –
entrepreneur and Facebook co-founder who left his position at Facebook and
volunteered for the campaign in Chicago. Hughes brought his community
building expertise, that he had used for turning FB into a world-wide

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phenomenon, into the campaign. Hughes knew that community building with an
identity was central to the campaign (Harfoush, 2009). The new media team
invented a widget that would connect My BO with individual FB profiles showing
campaign developments and news. Supporters could share content with their
friends and family, especially since users utilised platforms such as Facebook to
enhance existing relationships (Robertson, Vatrapub and Medina, 2010:13) and to
display their private life in public. With the click of a button friends and family
become an immediate audience for campaigning (Harfoush, 2009)
Shea and Burton (2006) predicted that grassroots campaigns which prevail on
Election Day develop during the election season. This aspect was obvious in the
case of Obama whose online network was utilised for fundraising and
volunteering (Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez, 2011: 205). Starting from 2004 he
successfully used online volunteer-based tactics to win his Senate seat. He
engaged with voters through a blog and website in a strategic and personal
manner and organised ‘Obama communities’ in areas such as: ‘Educators for
Obama’ or ‘African Americans for Obama’ (Shea and Burton 2006). The Obama
team was aware that the 2008 online interactive medium would allow for a similar
strategy at a larger scale. FB was utilised in involving users in an on- going
interactive process to to support my.barackobama.com , to formulate groups
which self-operated, as well as to facilitate multiple ‘micro-payments’ (Robertson,
Vatrapub and Medina, 2010:12). They appealed to the sense of participation and
ownership of the electorate. Researchers have noted the potential of social

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networks for creating and maintaining social capital in the offline world as well
as for assembling new social movements (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and
Cook:2001) - precisely what Obama created. Clinton herself ‘worried that Obama
seemed to be building some kind of movement in the cornfields’ (Heileman and
Halperin, 2010:152). Obama turned himself into a cause through the
organisational capacity and ability to harness resources of social media. All
energy dedicated towards social action in the online environment converted to the
offline environment. Maggie Williams, Clinton’s advisor, noted: ‘it was easy to
run against a man, but devilishly hard to run against a cause (Heileman and
Halperin, 2010:152). Additionally, FB has the function to organise political events
in the offline world. The group administrators, creators of groups usually working
for the campaign, can send group messages and target numerous people with
campaign updates. Members can invite their friends to participate or forward
campaign related messages. Also, organisers can scroll through the profiles of
liberal or conservative university groups and contact the students for campaign
volunteering. In spite of Clinton’s initial financial advantage, Obama managed to
overtake her because of his online strategy. Then, he clearly overtook McCain
since ‘tens of millions were coming to Obama through the web’ (Heileman and
Halperin, 2010:418). All the records of fundraising were broken. By the end of
the campaign Obama’s record amount was of 750 million dollars which exceed
the amount both candidates combined collected in private donations in the 2004
election. Social media together with a comprehensive virtual organisation inspired
3.1 million individual contributors and more than five million volunteers to

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support Obama. This grassroot movement prevailed to some extent even
throughout his presidency (Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez, 2011:208)
4. The Campaign of 2012
The 2012 campaign had a very different configuration to the 2008 one. Whilst in
the public sphere the election revolved around the economy for some, for others it
referred to women’s rights or immigration. Yet, it was mainly a spectacle between
Barack Obama, the incumbent president considered a world celebrity and his
challenger the Republican Mitt Romney. Since the economy worsened
incumbency – usually an electoral advantage – was not favourable for Obama.
Nevertheless, incumbency has evident advantages in terms of campaign
organisation and fundraising. In reality, president Obama had a head-start of at
least a year to build his team and prepare the campaign terrain. Obama’s team
maintained a close interlink with pop culture and portrayed him as the biggest
celebrity in the world by comparing him to icons such as Britney Spears and Paris
Hilton (Balz, 2013:271). The symbols of holding the office such as descending
from the Air Force One were strong marketing triggers. Also, the common sense
in the public sphere is a natural wish for the president and country to succeed.
Yet, Obama and his team were aware that the 2012 campaign was going to be
tougher than the 2008 one. In 2008 his innovative persona stood for hope and
change. Nonetheless, the public opinion changed on Obama and he was no longer
perceived as strong. He admitted himself ‘I don’t stand for anything’ (Halperin
and Heilemann, 2013:50) in the perception of the public. Obama knew he needed

31. 31
to harness all his advantages and create an even more innovative strategy to
resonate with the public.
Alternatively, Romney and Obama did not have much in common other than a
distaste for the ideas of each other, their love of family and degrees from Harvard
Law School. Romney was an ambitious striver, the son of a self-made governor of
Michigan (Balz, 2013:22). Clearly, he saw the world from the perspective of a
business owner, and his story had to be rendered as differently as possible from
that of Obama. Romney was a candidate in 2008 but did not receive the
Republican nomination. In Rath’s opinion, Romney’s advisor, they shared the
wrong story that was not congruent with the expectations of the new public
sphere. The persona conveyed in 2012 was that of a great achiever in the private
sector that turned to rescue the public sector. Founder of Bain Capital, saviour of
the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics, and pragmatic Bay State governor, Romney
was to be perceived as multi-million dollar net worth candidate. Through his
managerial and economical aptitudes he will be the new Mr Fix-it rather than the
conservative of all seasons, like Bush was (Halperin and Heilemann, 2013: 110).
Until his nomination he was constant in the 2012 Republican race. He won and
tied all debates and had no real challenger (Balz, 2013:168).
Between the 2008 and 2012 elections the online world changed drastically and
using social media was no longer a novelty. Across the world politicians started
using FB and Twitter to engage with their constituencies as they saw the power of

32. 32
these tools. Arguably, no tool has been adopted in the political process at the
speed of social media (Chi and Yang, 2011). Also, Obama’s affinity for social
media was transmitted to his administration and to the executive branch of the
federal government through a presidential marching order to ‘harness new
technologies, to put information about their operations and decisions online and
readily available to the public’ (Obama, 2009) in hope of increasing transparency,
collaboration and participation. Almost every administration had and Open
Government Initiative yet Obama’s defined information as a public benefit to be
shared with citizens. There was also much research done to develop tactics for
using social media for various organizational purposes in government (Mergel,
2013:123).
In this context, Obama had clear first-mover-advantage. No matter the efforts of
the Romney team, in the digital world the playing field was not equal. It would
not be an easy undertaking to imitate Obama’s dedication to utilising new
technologies. If elections are considered contests over which candidate is most
able to mobilize his resources Obama clearly benefited from control over his
technological resources. Also, Obama could harness the support from the previous
campaign whilst Romney had to harness the initial digital support. Much as
McCain’s campaign in 2008, Romney’s campaign engaged in efforts to close the
digital gap between him and Obama. As a symbol of closing the digital gap the
Romney-Ryan ticket was announced via Romney’s campaign app. In between 4-
17 June 2012 the Obama campaign had nine separate platforms: Facebook,

33. 33
Google+, Pinterest, Tumbler, YouTube, Flickr, Instagram, Spotify and two
accounts on Twitter (@BarackObama and @Obama2012). Romney had half this
number: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr and Google+. He added after that
period Tumbler and Spotify. Also, in that period Obama’s campaign was much
more active clearly showing that himself and his team were more digitally
prepared. Across all the platforms the Obama campaign had 614 posts in
comparison to Romney’s 168 posts. Drawing on the 2008 group targeting, the
2012 Obama campaign allowed for digital interaction and offered 18 constituency
groups to become members such as: African-Americans, women, LGBT, Latinos,
veterans/military families or young Americans. These groups received targeted
content towards them (Pew, 2012). Romney’s campaign did not offer such
targeting options. In mid-July 2012 six voter group pages were added to his
website that offered dedicated content that was not updated too frequently. Voters
could not however become part of the group nor receive tailored content. Because
of this oversight the Romney campaign did not benefit from personalisation
facilities nor the community forming options available through social media.
Also, Obama generated twice the number of engagement in terms of views,
comments and shares; Obama’s FB content received an average response of 2938
in contrast to Romney’s 1941 respondents. On YouTube Obama had on average
466 likes versus Romney’s 253. Obama had the advantage of the public
constructed during his 2008 campaign and of the public created during his first
term. In between the elections his subscribers doubled on YouTube and increased
16 times on FB (Pew, 2012). Messina, Obama’s political advisor, knew that social

34. 34
media would not be enough so he planned to invest an extravagant amount in
technology and make the 2008 election appear as old-fashioned (Balz, 2013:77).
Their plan was to measure everything, have every available piece of data, and
integrate it in their strategy. Clearly then, Obama had first-mover advantage
impossible for Romney to match.
Nevertheless, the functions of social media also developed in between the two
elections allowing for different strategies to emerge. Merely using social media
without a tactic was no longer interesting enough for the online public sphere.
They required tailored content cherry picked especially for them. This was the
primal change in Obama’s 2012 social media campaign: tailoring content and
news feed to one’s location and interests in order to exploit social media to its
maximum potential (Balz, 2013:74). However, the Obama team knew that the
same strategy would not create the same impact. Whilst the 2008 election was the
election of YouTube ads, it was barely used in 2012. No video in the 2012
election was considered to have gone viral or to match the 1 billion views caused
by the ‘Yes We Can’ ad (Obama, 2008a). However, every video was extensively
promoted on the all platforms of each candidate. This tendency clearly exhibited
that interlinking platforms became more relevant and that previous strategies
were no longer relevant (Balz, 2013:74).
Obama’s 2008 strategy accounted for the power of FB, which would be used by
both candidates in 2012 as their main platform to harness social capital and create

35. 35
an unbreakable support base for the campaign message (Bronstein, 2013:188).
FB remained the main tool through which bonds were created with the electorate.
Motivational and emotional approaches caused the voters to identify with the
personality of the candidate. For this purpose, logic and reason were not the main
emotional triggers to be used. Erikson argues that the public sphere is constructed
as popular culture on FB , producing an alternative political mechanism of
‘political fandom’ (2008: 7). Political fandom is characterised by individuals
engaging in politics based on self-identification and affective alliance rather than
based on self-interest (Bronstein, 2013:185); rational choice theory would depict
that people engage in politics after a cost-benefit analysis. In order to enhance
political fandom, both candidates present mainstream issues on social media. The
decision to not engage in controversial issues was well-thought as message is hard
to control on FB once users engage with it. Whilst mentioning only mainstream
political issues and focusing on the personality aspects with which the users can
identify limits the functions of FB, it also protects from unwanted controversy.
Bronstein conducted research on the Aristotelian persuasion language utilised on
the FB platforms of both candidates in between the day Romney announced Ryan
to be on his ticket until the 6th
of November 2012 . The Aristotelian language of
persuasion comprised three elements: ethos – ethical appeal design to evoke
credibility, pathos – an emotional appeal to invoke fear or sympathy - and logos –
an appeal to reason (Bronstein, 2013:174). In the 87 days both candidates chose
emotional and motivational approaches to entertain fandom.. Romney and
Obama used ethos differently on their FB pages. Romney defined himself as an

36. 36
established businessman and politician by posting comments congruent with his
Mr Fix-it persona such as: ‘I’ve governed a great American state. When people
are telling you to give up, that’s when you find a way to try harder…when
Americans are hurting and families are falling apart, that’s when you put politics
aside and find a way to get them some help. In a word, you lead’ (Bronstein,
2013:179). Romeny also uses logic and presents his plan in support of his
motivational shouts: ‘My five point plan will create 12 million new jobs and get
America back on the road to economic prosperity’ (Bronstein, 2013:179). Obama
however, focused on the family aspect making him more relatable. He truly
understood the need for centrality and emotion in his strategy: ‘I’m inspired by
my own children, how full they make my heart …they make me want to be a
better man’, ‘I’m not fighting to create Democratic jobs or Republican jobs – I’m
fighting to create American jobs’ (Bronstein, 2013:179). Following McCain’s
lead Romney creates fear through depicting a picture of Medicare and national
debt under Obama: ‘this is the president’s plan: $716 billion cut, 4 million people
losing Medicare Advantage and 15 per cent of hospitals and nursing homes not
accepting Medicare patients (Bronstein, 2013:185). Obama does not create fear
online and remains truthful to his 2008 strategy of establishing predominantly
positive emotions online. He focuses on having positivity shared on FB by asking
his fans to ‘like and share if you’re for the candidate who’s fighting for clean
energy jobs right here in America’ (Bronstein, 2013:184). Romney also asked his
followers to disseminate his content : ‘I intend to lead and to have an America
that’s strong and helps lead the world. “Like” and share if you will stand with

37. 37
me’. Yet, only 7.16% of his content was shared in comparison with Obama’s
22.92% (Bronstein, 2013:184).
Unlike in the previous campaign twitter was widely used in this one as it allowed
for asymmetrical social relationships – one person can have numerous followers
– in comparison to the symmetrical and privacy focused networks such as FB
(Hong and Nadler, 2012:457). When tweets are examined it becomes apparent
that a trend similar to the one in 2008 surfaces: Romney tended to mention Obama
in a third of his content – disagreeing with him whilst Obama only mentioned
Romney in only about 16% of his tweeted content (Hong and Nadler, 2012). This
trend was expected as the challenger had much more reason to contradict the
incumbent. Moreover, Hong and Nadler examine the association between
candidate saliency – the extent to which candidates are discussed online by the
public - and candidate levels of engagement with social media which they
measure by considering the number of mentions a candidate receives on Twitter.
They analysed the behaviours of seven politicians running for president with data
emerging from daily observations from December 26 2011 to January 16 2012
(Hong and Nadler, 2012:458). Their results illustrate that active engagement on
Twitter on behalf of the candidate results only in minimal mentions by the public
(Hong and Nadler, 2012:456). They used the Twitter mentions as a dependent
variable and assumed that the more a politician tweets, the more his tweets will be
passed on to his followers which will cause a discussion in the Twitter sphere.
Their results show that there is a positive association between a politician’s

38. 38
Twitter activities and their mention yet not a scientifically significant one (Hong
and Nadler, 2012:459). They also researched the link between the mentions on
traditional media – majors TV network or newspaper - and mentions on twitter.
These results were more significant; a 4 to 6% increase in twitter mentions for a
politician is associated with a 10% increase in the number of traditional media
mentions (Hong and Nadler, 2012:459). It is thus evident that social media cannot
replace traditional media and that its supplemental role along traditional media
is very important.
In light of their advancement due to adopting new technologies in the 2008
campaign, the Obama team decided to exploit developments in 2012 as much as
possible. Thus they created a model of door to door campaigning compatible with
the online public sphere. After social media, Big Data was going to be the next
factor to influence the 2012 presidential race. Big Data refers to a technological,
cultural and scholarly phenomenon that depicts the capacity to search, aggregate
and cross-references various sets of data (Crawford, K. and Boyd, 2012: 663). In
the case of elections it can be utilised to determine de preference of voters, their
online habits, and connections. The Obama team undertook constructing the most
elaborate campaign software named Dashboard – an online strategically
integrated field office. It allowed volunteers and campaign workers to collect data
about the voters both online and in person and share this information with the
centralised campaign database. All the lists communicated with each other and
supported people in organising their friends and family to volunteer and vote. The

39. 39
aspect of utilising real people – friends and family – to harness support was a
concept borrowed from Bush’s 2004 campaign when the advisors realised that
people were more likely to believe their loved ones than the paid strangers
knocking on their doors (Balz, 2013:78). The same concept was revived and
transferred to the online and offline world through this software. The software
also integrated a mobile app for canvassing; to aid supporters in finding events in
their vicinity and share relevant news amongst other features as well as a new
extensive Facebook app that permits voters to check their registration status and
encourage their friends to vote (Harfoush, 2009). The software tracked and
matched FB friends with the Dashboard lists; the Obama team called this function
targeted sharing – when a person signed-up on Dashboard through their FB
identity the campaign could access their friends. The campaign supplied people
with information about their friends based on information independently gathered
about those people as well as their propensity to vote for Obama. Thus discreetly
every person on Dashboard would receive a list of five friends - who became their
responsibility - that were not registered (Balz, 2013:78-79). This revolutionary
technology helped the campaign reach the undecided people. Also, the
combination of new technology and old-fashion campaigning principles
functioned ideally for the electorate under thirty since many of them did not have
landlines yet 85% had active FB accounts (Balz, 2013:79). Great campaigns are
not national but are localised down to the zip code. The usage of Big Data was
innovative and arguably won the election since Obama’s persona would not
resonate with the public in 2012 as much as it did in 2008.

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5. Conclusion
Had the online public sphere and social media facilitated Obama’s 2008 win?
Amongst the key elements of a successful campaign is understanding the context
of the campaign and the terrain on which it will operate. According to Shea and
Burton a campaign ought to consider the following aspects: voter expectations in
regards to candidate image, the media relations the public wishes to establish with
candidates, and voter general interest in the campaign (Shea and Burton,
2006:185:). Another key aspect is demographic research and targeting the correct
voters. Any campaign team should know the profile of the opposition and of their
targeted voters. Democrats in contrast to Republicans generally appeal to a
younger demographic. In this sense, Obama targeted the ideal demographic that
he enticed through his persona. The focus was on the youth and on the undecided
citizens. Social media proved to be an invaluable tool in communicating with
them. The youth needed a candidate to motivate them and to use their preferred
means of communication as much as Obama needed both social media to convey
his persona and an audience. In 2008 Obama established himself as an
innovative character that stands for hope and change. It was only reasonable for
this innovative character to engage with social media and to create alternative ads
on YouTube. The ads themselves were informal and depicted pop culture icons as
well as people from different backgrounds and cultures sharing the message of
Obama. He appeared as an alternative character transcending the bounds of
traditional politics that is not only supported by a variety of ordinary people but
also by celebrities. Also, his alternative ads were positive and uplifting - preferred

41. 41
emotions for social media advertising. In addition, he used live streaming and
supporter videos to create a personal message which would resonate with this part
of the electorate more than the impersonal TV ads. He was valiant to showcase his
personality on FB and to impart moments of his life; he thus became a real person
in the eyes of the electorate and not a distant figure. Presenting himself through
social media augmented his strengths, as he was unique and charismatic and did
not particularly enjoy traditional electoral processes such as debating with other
candidates. Through social media he combated two major setbacks: that he would
be one of the youngest, and the first African American president. Yet, in the
online public sphere where social media is a means of communications these
complications translated into strengths. His win was thus partly due to the
deliberate combination of three factors: an innovative campaigning tool in need of
a suitable candidate, a candidate who needed a medium on which his persona
would translate well and an extended online public sphere. The perfect interplay
between these three factors resulted in Obama’s 2008 win. Overall, building a
strategy that combines strategic positioning, campaign theme and a win map is the
formulae for winning a modern election (Shea and Burton, 2006:185) which is
precisely what Obama did in the context of the online public sphere through social
media.

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What was the impact of utilising social media as a campaigning tool on the
processes of campaign organising and storytelling?
Evidently, social media was an appropriate means of communication with the
public sphere it created. Consequently, it was adopted – to different extents - by
all candidate teams. According to Shea and Burton ‘each electoral cycle brings
new marketing tools’ (2006:199) which entails that campaigning will strongly be
linked to technological developments. Clearly, social media as much as TV and
radio did in their emergence period, changed the face of campaigns. Candidates
and their teams needed to adapt and learn the communication requirements of
every social media platform. Since the public on social media already has an
interest in the candidate, conveying strong emotions is more appropriate,
especially positive emotions, in contrast with TV advertising where negative
emotions are preferred as a means to discourage voters to support the opposition.
Also, campaign teams had to focus on engaging with the online environment –
tweeting, making friends on FB and responding to messages. In terms of
candidates, they needed to translate well in the online world and be willing to
engage with the online public sphere. Since targeting the right voters is the
ambition of a campaign, demographics remained important. The more target
voters are pursued, the better the campaign is. Subsequently, actually contacting
the right voters stands of primal importance. Moreover, strategic thinking must be
adopted in all campaign related matters. In the case of the extended public sphere,
it refers to understanding the electoral patters that predict clear outcomes as well
as grasping past electoral targeting strategies and their influence on the present.

43. 43
Such a fact is that people who usually vote republican will probably always vote
republican. Thus it would be redundant for a Democrat candidate to target them.
Obama was strategic above all in targeting the undecided voters, people without
landlines and the youth, learning their preferred means of communication and
communicating with them 24/7 through social media. Campaign teams used social
networks to bypass traditional campaign methods, reach voters and raise funds
(Shea and Burton, 2006:185). According to Rideout et al. social networks are
beneficial due to their capacity to tap leverage numerous formal and informal
relationships (2010). Obama collected astonishing donations through online
fundraising. Also, he harnessed relationships through FB. In 2008 an ‘Obama
campaign widget’ was created to integrate in FB through which users could
inform other users about campaign developments and invite them to participate,
volunteer or donate. It was argued that through the organising functions of FB, an
Obama manifest resembling a social movement emerged. All the previously
mentioned aspects altered the process of campaigning. Also, the campaigning
teams needed to add experts in the domain of social media; Chris Hughes, FB co-
founder, joined the Obama campaign and shared his community building
techniques – the same techniques used on FB to create a world-wide phenomenon.
In 2012 volunteering and grassroots campaigning was enhanced through the
creation of software that combined social media, Big Data, online, and offline
volunteering. Volunteers gave the campaign access to their FB profiles and the
software would provide them discreetly with a list of undecided five friends – and
information about them - that they needed to convince to vote for Obama. Shea

44. 44
and Burton highlight that ‘getting to know the interests of persuadable voters
requires networks of operatives and activists who know the voters personally’
(2006:43) which was precisely the endeavour of the software. This development
completely changed the dynamic of door-to-door volunteering. Also, campaign
messages became extremely personalised and targeted to specific groups such as:
Women, African Americans, Gays. The more personalised the message is, the
more it increases chances of convincing the voters. More important for voter
contact technique was utilising the preferred means of communication for each
voter. Accessing a voter through their preferred social media platform involves
the added benefit of access to extended contact networks of that user (Harfoush,
2009). Thus the behaviour of candidates, political consultants, and advisors had
to adapt and leverage this online environment (Wattal et al, 2010:684). Both
McCain and Romney struggled to make the required adjustments and only
superficially engaged with social media. Whilst arguably their target voter was not
a frequent social media user more proper exploitation of the resource would have
proved beneficial. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that McCain or Romney could
compete with a candidate so closely connected to the online public sphere and to
the tool used in communicating with this public. Yet, Obama’s strategy clearly
created a campaigning pattern that is to be aspired to.

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Has engaging with social media become a campaigning prerequisite since the
2008 election?
The integration of social media as a campaigning tool in 2008 was undoubtedly
both innovative and unique. Nevertheless, between 2010 and 2012 social media as
a communication tool has been extensively adopted in the US government and in
the world-wide political arena. Consequently, it was not surprising that social
media was also utilized in the 2012 US presidential campaign. However, the sense
of novelty vanished from social media exploitation. Social media started being
utilized as a conventional tool part of the campaigning arsenal. This aspect
becomes evident as new platforms emerged in 2012 and both Obama and Romney
had accounts on almost all of them. Yet no content in 2012 was able to generate
as much hysteria as did Obama’s 200 8YouTube campaign, when his Yes We Can
YouTube ad featuring pop stars reached over 1 billion views. Rather, in 2012
social media instead of being used as novelty was used for its supplemental role
to traditional media and for the maintenance of political fandom. Social media
acted as the perfect opportunity for political figures to be transformed into
celebrities and to maintain their supporters; these supporters through FB
harnessing reached the status of fans. The supplemental role is evident in Hong
and Nadler’s 2012 twitter research of the candidate saliency; their results show
that when a well-known newspaper or a TV channel mentions a candidate the
number of tweets about that candidate increases (Hong and Nadler, 2012:457).
However, a candidate engaging with twitter only briefly increases the number of

46. 46
tweets mentioning him. This evidence highlights the supplemental role of
platforms that ought to be used together with traditional media.
Additionally, as the context in between the two elections changed, so did the
social media environment. The trend in social media communication was that of
interlinking platforms. Whilst no content on YouTube produced the hysteria of
2008, in 2012 content was promoted on several platforms. Platforms became
interlinked in the wish to appeal to the electorate on their preferred platform.
Also, social media was used to target specific groups and to create as personalised
content for them as possible – using their true media richness capacity. This was
the novelty aspect that the Obama team introduced. He had clear first-mover
advantage but he also knew that the developments in technology needed to be
encompassed in his campaign and could not only rely on his 2008 strategy. Thus
Big Data was introduced – as a new technological development - creating the
most complicated campaigning software. Clearly, social media became a
prerequisite tool for the 2012 campaign and arguably will be an integral part of
campaign kits for numerous years. Probably it will follow the trend of all great
technological innovations such as the TV; a campaign without TV ads is currently
unconceivable. Similarly, a campaign that does not integrate social media will be
unconceivable. Cornfiled was correct in stating that each electoral cycle will have
a distinct design generated by advancements in technology (2005). Ergo, whilst
campaigns will integrate social media as a campaigning tool, electoral cycles will
not be defined by social media – as the 2008 was – yet by the technological

47. 47
developments of the time that will produce the same sense of novelty social media
produced in 2008 – as was the 2012 campaign defined by Big Data.
Nevertheless, there are limits to the present research that call for further analysis.
Firstly, the events depicted in the case studies are recent and there is a scarcity in
literature allocated to them – especially the 2012 campaign. Secondly, the degree
of generalisation from the findings is limited by the data and measures as well as
by the nature of the qualitative and not quantitative analysis in itself. Thirdly, the
blurring of the lines between traditional media and social media makes it
impossible for social media to be considered an independent variable out of the
context especially since social media fulfils different roles in the two elections.
Whilst the research did not claim nor try to verify how much of Obama’s double
win was due to his social media strategy in comparison with other structural
socio-economic factors, it does claim that the public sphere created by the spread
of social media needed a candidate that would transpose properly on this medium
– and Obama was that candidate. In turn, Obama depicted an innovative persona
that signified change and hope and needed an innovative tool for campaigning –
that tool was social media. As a result, after the 2008 campaign social media
became a prerequisite in campaigning strategies and Obama needed to revamp his
2012 strategy by encompassing Big Data as a tool. In this context he still used
social media but also needed to create a new sense of novelty around his
campaign and elevate his technological strategy. Both Republican nominees
suffered from Obama’s first-mover advantage, advantage which they did not have

48. 48
the financial means nor the right approach to mach. First-mover advantage
becomes clear in the case of Romney who, even though he engaged with social
media as much as Obama did in 2008, was not prepared to sustain Obama’s 2012
the exploration of Big Data and user targeting. Obama already set the standards
high and the social media terrain was not equal in 2012 because of the support he
already harnessed in 2008. It is only reasonable to thus concur that social media
with all its adjacent improvements will be a prerequisite in the next election – and
the character of the candidates will need to transpose appropriately on the
Internet. Consequently, this research augments the present literature by
connecting a presidential candidate to the campaigning tools utilised and to the
needs of the transformed public sphere. The present research also sets a viable
platform for further research in the domain of Internet elections. It further allows
for testing the hypothesis that the technological tools utilised uniquely in every
campaign become a prerequisite for the following one. Finally, it provides clear
evidence for the expansion of the public sphere to the online environment and its
relevance for political campaigning.

49. 49
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