Presented by FASTRAC International Advisor Sam Chittick at the Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Roundtable Discussion Series at the Senate of the Philippines on Aug. 17, 2015.
The Institute for Autonomy and Governance is organizing the discussions in partnership with the Senate Economic Planning Office (SEPO), Local Government Development Foundation (LOGODEF) and the Senate-Muslim Advocates for Peace and Progress.
Political Transitions After a Peace Agreement: Opportunities for the Bangsamoro
1. Political Transitions after a Peace Agreement:
Opportunities for the Bangsamoro
Sam Chittick, International Advisor, FASTRAC
August 17, 2015
2. What do we know from international
experience about political transitions?
• No fixed formula
• Importance of context
• ‘Consent of the governed’
3. Common
understanding
of the origins of
the conflict?
Source: World Bank 2005
‘Joint Needs Assessment
for Reconstruction &
Development of Conflict
Affected Areas in
Mindanao’
4. Common characteristics of political transitions
• Turbulent
• Non-linear
• Long term
• Complex
• Joint
• Opportunity
5. Key Questions
• From what?
• To what?
• CAB: “aspiration to chart their political future through a democratic
process that will secure their identity and posterity and allow for
meaningful self-governance”
• “promoting peace and stability”
• “transformation into peaceful and progressive communities”
• “honor, justice and dignity for all concerned”
6. What are the international lessons that are relevant
for the Bangsamoro political transition?
“Securing the social contract” between citizens and the state, namely:
i. building responsive and accountable institutions,
ii. promoting inclusive political processes,
iii. fostering resilient state-society relations
Source: UNDP Governance for Peace – securing the social contract, 2012
7. What are the international lessons that are relevant
for the Bangsamoro political transition?
• Importance of institutions: formal and informal, that will reflect the
new political settlement
• Critical importance of security during the transition
• Economic conditions affect political stability; economic spoilers
threaten transition.
• A focus on growth without inclusive, pro-poor policy development
maintains the status quo.
• Promoting public participation in policy development is essential for
transitions to progress.
• New openings for engaging citizens
Source: Political Economy of Transitions – comparative experiences, UNDP 2013
8. What are the international lessons that are relevant
for the Bangsamoro political transition?
• Legitimacy
• Joint decision making
• Inclusive institutions and processes
• Importance of security, justice and jobs
12. Citizen security
• Practical and symbolic values are both important
• Day to day impact on quality of life
• Most visible element of the State
• Impacts beyond basic security:
Local taxes in ARMM historically low, 2% of total revenue is local
taxes, reflecting questions of trust and credibility
• Security must be guaranteed for all, equally
• Opportunity to shift from focusing on threats by groups to
threats by individuals. Implies a shift from military to police.
“A well functioning security sector not only directly enforces the
law, but by building the legitimacy of the legal enforcement, it
creates incentives for the population to respect the laws of their
country from internal conviction rather than external
intimidation.” (WDR 2011)
13. Security: Timor Leste
Source: Asia Foundation surveys, graphic from:
http://www.developmentprogress.org/blog/2014/05/06/
14. Citizen Security - Opportunities
• Three possible areas of focus:
• reductions in different forms of violence by different actors (including armed
violence, violence in the home, violence perpetrated by the state, etc.)
• e.g. Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System
• e.g. local efforts against ‘rido’
• improved perception of citizen security (past, present and future)
• e.g. polling of citizens (Asia Foundation)
• strengthening of state and non-state security structures
• Needs long-term commitment
• Chance to make communities part of the solution
Source: ODI Working Paper 04/April 2014
15. Citizen Security - Opportunities
• Concrete steps flagged in draft BBL & WDR:
• Community policing – redefine community relationships?
• Redeployment of forces
• Mechanisms of public accountability for Bangsamoro Police
16. Justice
• The political transition and establishment of new institutions is
necessary, but not sufficient.
• A robust process of managing and dealing with the past is also
essential.
• Formal and informal justice systems should be part of the solution,
especially for transition period
• Every transitional justice process is different
• e.g. TJRC v Timor v South Africa v Nth Ireland
17. Justice - Opportunities
• Inclusion – important for building bridges to the previously
marginalized
• e.g. birth registration for marginalized.
• Traditional justice systems - create bridges between the formal and
informal systems in the early stages of transitions.
• e.g. International Alert research into informal land trade.
• Land – a key driver of ‘horizontal’ conflict, chance for new
institution/s?
18. Justice - Opportunities
• Public financial management as a justice tool: directing funds to
underserved/excluded groups, ensuring information available for
them
• Social protection programs: can target those previously excluded
• Multi-sectoral community empowerment programs that allow
excluded groups to decide their own priorities and investments (CDD
etc.)
• Social accountability mechanisms: incentives for citizens and
communities to monitor the expenditures most directly affecting their
welfare.
19. Jobs
• Job creation requires action on four fronts:
(a) policy/regulatory environment;
(b) infrastructure;
(c) skills development; and
(d) direct market interventions - cash for work, etc.
• Private sector is responsible for >80% of GDP…
however it can take years to boost private sector
investments in conflict areas.
• Need public sector to fill the breach in transition.
20. Jobs: for who?
• Challenges of job creation in conflict-affected areas are different than
rest of the country
• Outside investors are reluctant, and there is little local capital, skills
base is low
• Ex-combatant cohort is different from other groups, need targeted,
tailored programs
• Differentiated programs are necessary
21. Jobs: Aceh lessons after 9 yrs
• Aceh is at peace, and prospects for enduring stability are good.
• However, widespread perception that GAM rule has failed to
translate into improvements in the daily life of people.
• Poverty levels (19.6% in 2011) and unemployment still well
above the national average. Growth is lagging.
• High levels of public expenditure have yet to translate in
substantial development outcomes.
• Endemic corruption and diversion of public revenues by ex-GAM
for personal enrichment, patronage and campaign funding.
• Persisting lack of trust in government above village-level (TAF
2013).
22. What development measures are most likely
to support a peaceful transition?
• To break repeated cycles of violence, political transitions need to (i)
build confidence by building inclusive-enough coalitions, and (ii)
transform the institutions that provide citizen security, justice and
jobs.
• Creating the legitimate institutions that can prevented repeated
violence is slow.
• Confidence building: build inclusive-enough coalitions; and identify
local community priorities to deliver early results programs.
• Engagement by all parties with civil society
• Focus on accountability and addressing exclusion during transition
Source: World Bank 2011 ‘Managing Peaceful Transitions – Evidence & Experience’
Hinweis der Redaktion
Introduction – Sam Chittick
FASTRAC
Not just lessons from international donors: also from g7+ group
1. The International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
2. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States
Expectations are high that the Bangsamoro entity will deliver security and prosperity to the affected population
Delivering on these expectations requires legitimate institutions to be able to deliver on that.
The Report focusses on progressing away from violence and fragility through ‘transforming institutions’ (and in some cases creating new ones), and ‘restoring confidence’
It is important to note that ‘Legitimacy’ is acquired by building trust and confidence among various parties.
Forms of legitimacy for institutions include process legitimacy (which relates to the way in which decisions are made), and performance legitimacy (which relates to action, including the delivery of public goods)
Creating the legitimate institutions that can prevent repeated violence is slow. The fastest transforming countries have taken about a generation, between 15-30 years, to raise their institutional performance. This process of transforming institutions accelerated considerable in the 20th century with increases in citizens‟ demands for good governance and in the technologies that can help supply it.
Let’s go to the first of these three elements: citizen security
Practical and symbolic values are both important
Day to day impact on quality of life
Most visible element of the State, the most concrete manifestation of its power.
Impacts beyond basic security:
- Local taxes in ARMM historically low, 2% of total revenue is local taxes, reflecting questions of trust and credibility
If done well reforms of the security sector will bolster the credibility of the government and enhance the trust of the people.
A well functioning security sector not only directly enforces the law, but by building the legitimacy of the legal enforcement, it creates incentives for the population to respect the laws of their country from internal conviction rather than external intimidation.
However if security is not guaranteed for all it will reinforce divisions and exclusion
Therefore Security must be guaranteed for all, equally
Opportunity to shift from focusing on threats by groups to threats by individuals. Implies a shift from military to police.
One international example that might have some relevance in this regard is Timor Leste.
The consensus is that Timor has strengthened the internal functions of state, and from 1999 to 2014 overall security has improved dramatically.
Key internal conflict points:
post-referendum violence
collapse of the police and military in 2006 that led to mass internal displacement (>100,000 people displaced) and the rise of youth gangs
assassination attempts on the President and Prime Minister in 2008 by disgruntled former resistance fighters.
However: “while there is growing national confidence in security and stability, feelings of insecurity remain high”:
54% ‘very concerned’ about their safety in 2013 (TAF)
Lesson: local safety and security for people day-to-day is not necessarily directly correlated with increasing state capacity.
There are a couple of concrete steps flagged in both the BBL & WDR that are of relevance:
Community policing – redefine community relationships?
Redeployment of forces: can be a ‘quick win’, and send an important symbolic message without necessarily creating any vacuum of power
Mechanisms of public accountability for Bangsamoro Police: with a newly created institution comes an opportunity to define the way that institution is held accountable
Let’s move on to the second of the three main points: Justice
The political transition and handover is necessary, but not sufficient.
A robust process of managing and dealing with the past is also essential.
Formal and informal justice systems should be part of the solution, especially for transition period
Every transitional justice process is different
e.g. TJRC v Timor v South Africa v Nth Ireland
Inclusion – important for building bridges to the previously marginalized
e.g. birth registration for marginalized. Access to justice (and services) is often denied to those who are not registered, and registration initiatives can be an important form of recognition of citizenship and community identity for marginalized groups.
Supplementing formal justice with traditional community systems can be another best-fit. Deep and comprehensive judicial reforms can rarely be achieved in the short or medium term. One challenge of justice reform, then, is to create bridges between the formal and informal systems in the early stages of transitions.
E.g. Alert research into informal land trade.
Land – a key driver of ‘horizontal’ conflict, minimal progress in other rural parts of Philippines.
It may not seem at first apparent but public financial management can also be a tool of justice
Social protection programs – vehicles for inclusion, healing past differences
CDD – allowing people to define their own priorities
And to the third element: Jobs
Important to note that the Private Sector will drive most of the job growth for the Bangsamoro.
In the short term most of that Private Sector activity will be from small and medium enterprises.
So there is a role for the public sector to fill the gap while efforts are underway to build confidence in the general economy.
Important to note what the Private Sector says are the key obstacles to investment:
Security
Rule of law
infrastructure