Cómo converger hacia un informe integral en la empresa
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Ciclo de Conferencias: Reacting to the crisis: the new regulatory environment. En colaboración con el Instituto de Empresa. Christian Leuz Booth School of Business. Chicago. EE.UU. Madrid, 15 de abril de 2011
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Cómo converger hacia un informe integral en la empresa
- 1. How to Make Global Reporting Convergence Work Christian Leuz J. Sondheimer Professor of International Economics, Finance & Accounting
- 9. Illustration: IFRS Mandate Local GAAP IFRS Reporting Discretion Firm A Firm B With strong enforcement Reporting quality Reporting quality With weak enforcement
- 22. Securities Regulation in the EU
- 23. Effects of Tighter Securities Regulation When Prior Regulation or Implementation Differs
- 25. Average Staff Changes in High Staff Countries
Hinweis der Redaktion
- Most of the convergence has happened through IFRS adoption
- But benefits for the U.S. are likely to be muted Comparability (or network) effects are likely to be larger for smaller countries with few firms – U.S. network is large Firms and countries have incentives to implement IFRS in a way that fit their particular infrastructure and needs – Reporting incentives U.S. GAAP and IFRS are already fairly close
- There are at least two testable predictions In regimes with stronger enforcement the effects should be concentrated at the bottom Peer effects would lead to a situation where even firms improve that had higher quality to begin with
- Capital-market effects are not present in all countries No effects in countries with weak enforcement and weak reporting incentives Here firms are more likely to resist -> end up with national flavors Convergence strategy and divergence between local GAAP and IFRS matter the most in countries with strong enforcement Dual reporting and now full IFRS reporting
- Who should enforce a particular rule? Regulators can specialize more and can be incentivized better than judges (who are by design independent) In countries with weak institutions and inefficient bureaucracies, the risk of abuse is higher One issue is that the same regulation could be suited differently for different countries, which in turn could explain differential effects Enforcement Theory 4 strategies for social control: market discipline, private litigation, public enforcement through regulation, state ownership
- GPS does not come with the same baggage and concerns as cross-listing in the US Evidence from U.S. cross-listings suggests that firms have a desire to bond, especially if they come from countries with weak institutions. This segment would present an alternative bonding mechanism that is less costly and does not come with some of the “baggage” that U.S. listings have