4. It seems that after more than 50 years of
conflict, we are starting to see the light at
the end of the tunnel. It is probable that in
less than six months we will celebrate the
end of an internal war that has created
more than 7 million victims and over 200
thousand killings.
Obviously, this will be a huge step forward
for Colombia, but it will also be a
touchstone for the region: the end of the
Colombian conflict will mean that the
Western Hemisphere has closed the ?Cold
War? chapter to start a new one? we hope.
But we have to be clear. The signing of the
agreement between FARC and the
Government of Colombia will not
automatically lead to peace. Even though
we recognize the effort of both sides to
achieve an agreement to end violence, this
does not mean the goal of everlasting
peace has been completed. Rather,
Colombia will have just started the long
and hard road of finding sustainable
peace.
As Frank Pearl, one of the government
negotiators in Havana explained, ?Signing
does not mean that we Colombians will
stop being violent.? It means that the door
of new opportunities for millions of
abandoned Colombians will be opened. It
means that Colombians can set their minds
on building a more prosperous and equal
society. It means that Colombia has the
chance to be more just, more inclusive,
more cohesive, and in one word, more
democratic.
We think the OAS can contribute to
building this big goal called democracy.
Actually, we have been doing it since 2004
when the Government of Colombia and the
OAS signed an agreement to establish the
MAPP/OAS (The Mission to Support the
Peace Process in Colombia). Since its
inception, MAPP has been working in the
farthest reaches of Colombia to monitor
and verify the government?s peace
policies. With more than 11 years of
experience in Colombia, MAPP has made
outstanding efforts to maintain its initial
philosophy: ?We do not teach Colombians
how to build peace; we support and
accompany victims, demobilized and
former combatants, communities and
government to help them figure out the
peace they yearn for.?
Through a national engagement of over 11
years, MAPP/OAS has built trust
relationships across the country with
victims, authorities, and social
organizations. These relationships provide
the Mission with privileged information
facilitating its analysis of conflict dynamics
and peace-building processes, which are
then translated into recommendations to
the Colombian government. They also
permit MAPP/OAS to create and support
spaces for inter-institutional coordination
and rapprochement between victims and
institutions. With or without the singing of
the Havana accords, the OAS is doing
relevant activities in favor of sustainable
peace.
We are certain that there are many things
to be done before we can celebrate. Many
issues are still in the air, and it will take
many years in order to implement the
Accords. One of the biggest concerns of the
MAPP/OAS regards the reintegration
process of the FARC?s demobilized
members. There is no such a thing as a
perfect reintegration process. The OAS has
witnessed the strengths and flaws of the
past and present reintegration process
policies. But we think that many good
practices can be shared with Colombian
actors in order to make the future DDR
process with the FARC much better. We
also think that new and fresh perspectives
are urgently needed; that is the main
reason we gladly accepted the proposal of
Chloe, David, Paige, and Brittney.
I thank them for taking this project with
responsibility and enthusiasm. From our
view, their work will strengthen our
capacity to be more effective in a crucial
issue such as the reintegration of guerrilla
members. Building peace has to be an
open process, and thanks to your
collaboration, the OAS is helping Colombia
to be more just, cohesive and in one word:
more democratic.
Again, thank you for choosing the OAS.
Thanks to the wonderful Colombian
LAHSP team, your professors, and the
entire George Washington University
academic community.
Rodr igo Zubieta
Chief, Special Missions Section
The Organization of American States
Foreword
4
5.
6. Recom m endations for the MAPP to dir ectly implem ent are
focused around the organization?s core competencies of
monitoring, research and analysis, and accompaniment. The
recommendations take into consideration the limited human
resources of MAPP offices outside of the national office in Bogotá.
Many of the recommendations involve the continuation of
ongoing efforts, identified by other stakeholders as extremely
valuable.
Recom m endations for the Colom bian gover nm ent and civil
society are intended to draw on their mandates and respective
strengths. Many recommendations are directed at the Agencia
Colombiana para la Reintegración,4 the Colombian government?s
principal institution focused on reintegration efforts.
Recommendations to civil society are more general, taking into
account the diversity of mandate and strengths that these
organizations offer. Several opportunities were highlighted in
which public-private partnerships between the ACR and NGOs
can improve the effectiveness of, and expand access to,
reintegration services.
Them es:
Employability, which discusses challenges the demobilized
ex-combatants face while trying to find gainful employment in the
formal sector.
Insecur ity, which highlights the personal safety concerns of
former combatants, and the threat posed by bandas criminales3
(bacrim).
Differ ential Appr oach, which explores the importance of
tailoring the reintegration process to meet the unique needs of
special populations, such as women, Afro-Colombians, and
indigenous peoples, among others.
Health, Psychosocial Aspects, and Suppor t Networ ks, which
measures the impact of reintegration on the physical and
psychosocial health of demobilized ex-combatants and stresses the
importance of building support networks.
Ur banization and the Role of Place, which discusses the
migration of demobilized ex-combatants to Colombia?s major
cities and the role that the concept of place plays in reintegration.
Stigm atization and Reconciliation, which shines a light on the
challenge of social stigmatization of demobilized ex-combatants
and existing or missing efforts to encourage reconciliation.
IFTHISMULTIDIMENSIONAL
"DILEMMABETWEENPEACE
ANDJUSTICE"ISTOBE
SOLVED...COLOMBIA'S
REINTEGRATIONEFFORTS
MUSTBESTRENGTHENED.
Recom m endation Categor ies:
3. Criminal bands
4. Colombian Agency for
Reintegration
6
7.
8. 11. Stephanie Hanson, "Colombia's Right-Wing
Paramilitaries and Splinter Groups," Council on Foreign
Relations, last modified January 11, 2008, accessed April
25, 2016, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/ colombias-right-
wing-paramilitaries -splinter-groups/p15239.
12."Confusion and Discord around Colombia?s Peace
Tribunal," Voces: The Official Blog of the
Inter-American Dialogue, entry posted October 14, 2015,
accessed April 25, 2016, http://www.thedialogue.org/
blogs/2015/10/confusion-and-discord-around
-colombias-new-peace-tribunal/.
While over thirty-one thousand paramilitaries
have laid down their weapons since 2003,
Colombia has struggled to fully reintegrate these
ex-combatants.11 Many former paramilitaries
have returned to criminality. As a result, in the
last decade the conflict in Colombia has evolved
to include criminal actors dominated by the
descendants of the paramilitaries, or so-called
neo-paramilitaries. Thousands of
neo-paramilitaries continue to operate under
new names and have forged alliances with drug
traffickers to form new criminal bands (bandas
criminales, or ?bacrim?) across the country.
These bacrim pose a threat to lasting stability
and peace in Colombia. Political kidnappings,
murder, sexual violence, and internal
displacement remain a blight on Colombia?s
human rights record.
Concurrently, with peace talks between the
Colombian government and the FARC rapidly
coming to a close, the country now faces a
similar situation with thousands of FARC
combatants on the cusp of demobilization.
Colombia has begun preparing for the collective
demobilization and reintegration of the FARC, as
it did with the AUC a decade earlier. The FARC,
however, have been individually demobilizing
for a number of years? including through
desertions. Only now, with formal negotiations
in Havana, Cuba close to concluding, are
concerted conversations and planning occurring
regarding the collective demobilization of
thousands of FARC combatants.
Colombia must ensure that any accord with the
FARC can be realistically implemented and
prevent ex-combatants? return to criminal
activity, drawing on lessons learned from
previous efforts with the AUC. This will require
prudent and thoughtful efforts to successfully
reintegrate FARC members into Colombian
society in a timely manner. If this
multidimensional ?dilemma between peace and
justice?12 is to be solved, and lasting peace
sustained, Colombia?s reintegration efforts must
be strengthened and involve all stakeholders of
society? especially civil society.
8
9.
10. The challenges faced by persons in the process of
reintegration (PPR) to find gainful employment
stood out as a cross-cutting theme in the research
findings. Representatives from the MAPP,
Colombian government, and civil society, and the
demobilized ex-combatants themselves, all
acknowledged serious obstacles that hinder PPR
from finding sustainable employment in the
formal sector. These obstacles include a lack of
experience and education, entrenched
discrimination, the changing legal framework,
and the durability of the informal economy.
While many programs have been put in place to
overcome these challenges, they are often not
effective in the short term. According to
representatives from Proyecto 840, it can
sometimes take 10?12 years for PPR to complete
the formal reintegration process due to a lack of
economic opportunity. As a result, many
demobilized ex-combatants turn to the informal
sector or even organized crime in order to
survive. The study findings related to
employability are deconstructed into four
sub-themes: job skills and training,
discrimination, legal framework, and informal
economy. Each sub-theme is described pursuant
to the unique data obtained from Bogotá and
Medellín, respectively.
Metr opolitan Bogotá
Bogotá presents a unique challenge for PPR
seeking employment because the job market is
very competitive. Representatives from Proyecto
840 explained that Bogotá?s industrial sector has
been shrinking dramatically as companies move
to less expensive factories overseas. This change
means that the number of low-skilled jobs is also
declining. Many demobilized ex-combatants
relocate to major cities, including Bogotá, in an
effort to find employment. The available jobs in
Bogota, however, often do not align with the
education and experience of PPR, many of whom
have little formal education or job experience. As
a result, it is often very difficult for demobilized
ex-combatants to find and retain a job in Bogota?s
formal economy.
Job Skills & Training
Many demobilized persons in Bogotá refer to
themselves as ?urban campesinos? who live on
the outskirts of the city and face difficulty
commuting into work. Those living in Soacha
often leave home before the sun comes up and
utilize unreliable public transportation to arrive
in Bogotá for work or class. The ACR provides a
stipend which usually only covers the cost to take
courses at a community school. The ACR provides
PPR with 480,000.00 Colombian pesos over the
Theme: Employability
10
11.
12. Job Skills & Training
The demobilized population in Medellín faces similar
obstacles to those in Bogotá. They have few specialized
skills and minimal formal education. In meetings with
the Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista13 (ERG) in the
Itagüí prison, many inmates confirmed they lacked a
?bachillerato,? or a high school diploma. The
penitentiary system does little to provide skills and job
training, mostly due to a severe lack of capacity.
The Programa de Paz y Reconciliación of Medellín has
created a community center called Centro de Formación
Para la Paz y Reconciliación14 (CEPAR), which offers
classes to demobilized individuals and provides
daycare services for their children. This enables
parents to work and provides a meeting place for
demobilized and victims (like Madres de la Candelaria)
to gather in a safe space.
However, some demobilized combatants reported that
CEPAR quickly became a target because it is a
well-known locale for demobilized and their families.
Due to these concerns, CEPAR is not as well-received as
it was in years past. Despite these obvious challenges,
the stipend that the demobilized are offered does have
its rewards. One former combatant told us that he was
very proud of himself and that previously ?[he] didn?t
know how to read or write,? but now he has finished
his high school degree.
Economic Stigma
Economic stigma remains the same in Medellín. Many
demobilized report difficulty finding a job due to fear
and misunderstandings with businesses. The ACR office
of Medellín highlighted that the ?productiva?15 section
of the route to reintegration is the most difficult to
overcome. One individual told the group, ?I can have all
of the qualifications, but I will never get hired because
they think I am violent.?
Legal Framework & the Informal Economy
Similar legal issues affect the population in Medellín.
Once they are convicted of a crime and have it on their
record, they are no long eligible for a government job.
One demobilized told us that he worked for Medellín?s
metro system, but once his criminal record was
finalized, he lost his job. Because they frequently lose
formal sector jobs once their sentence is handed down,
they tend to work in the informal sector. Currently, 70
percent of the demobilized in Medellín work in the
informal sector. The government attributes this to the
criminal record that many demobilized obtain while
going through the demobilization process. The tension
12
13. Guevarista Revolutionary Army
14. Peace and Reconciliation Training Center
15. Term ACR uses to define employability
Photo Courtesy of Nicolás Bedoya, Vela Colectivo
13.
14. associated with the bacrim, are an issue that
increasingly affects former combatants. Proyecto 840
leaders noted a rise in murders of demobilized
individuals, in random attacks throughout Bogotá.
These murders often go unsolved.
Regardless of motivation, it is increasingly clear to
demobilized individuals throughout the country that
the Colombian state cannot guarantee their personal
security. They can become victims of threats and
assassinations, not only by organized and sophisticated
criminal networks, but also by common criminals.
These disincentives to reintegration, combined with a
lack of viable economic opportunity, do not bode well
for lasting peace.
Theme: Differential Approach
Reintegration stakeholders in both Bogotá and Medellín
highlighted the need for a differential approach, which
was largely absent in previous reintegration processes.
A differential approach refers to the unique needs and
dynamics of special populations such as women,
Afro-Colombians, indigenous populations, and youth,
among others; their needs must be addressed in order
for these vulnerable groups to be successfully
reintegrated into society. According to data from the
Observatory of Peace and Conflict, between 1990?2015,
23 percent of the participants in the reintegration
program were women.19 Women also make up a
significant portion of active FARC combatants. In
addition, Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations
are also over represented in the FARC compared to their
percentage of the general population. The specific
needs of these populations must be addressed in future
reintegration programs. Past processes have shown
that, with regards to reintegration programs, one size
does not fit all, and that new programs must include a
special focus on special populations.
Building on lessons learned from previous processes,
reintegration specialists have begun incorporating a
differential approach into their programs. Medellin?s
Programa de Paz y Reconciliación recently developed a
multidimensional approach to reintegration that
attempts to incorporate the varying needs and realities
of different populations. They recognize, however, that
it is a learning process that they are continually trying
to improve. In addition, the office launched a women?s
group that brings together female victims, demobilized
ex-combatants and reintegrators from across the
country to discuss gender, the role of women in the
peace process and leadership. Initiatives such as these
offer opportunities for special populations to create
support networks, begin a process of reconciliation and
14
19. Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración and
Observatorio de Paz y Conflicto, "Mujeres
Excombatientes en Colombia 1990-2015,"
infographic, digital file.
15.
16. Structurally, these newly-demobilized populations experience
major life changes. Moving out of the jungle and into the city
brings with it a host of societal pressures, the least of which could
be considered adjusting to creature comforts and city schedules.
Interviewees commented on the need to set schedules, rising early
in order to arrive in time class or work. Similarly, after years in
the relative wilderness for some, they are now living in a house
and sleeping on a bed; these may be basic things, but they are
comparative luxuries for many demobilized combatants. The
informants in Bogotá expressed that change on this front has
been difficult but rewarding.
Metr opolitan Medellín
The data from both cities demonstrate a robust concern among all
key actors involved, regarding the health of demobilized
populations, the psychosocial aspects that affect their
reintegration, and the social support networks that undergird
successful reintegration. The Medellín branch of the ACR brings a
multidimensional focus to this theme, concentrating first on
short-term, immediate reinsertion into society for postulants,
followed by a long-term ongoing holistic reintegration. At the
same time, a major weakness with ACR?s approach is that there is
currently no dedicated pre-professional training program for
reintegrators. As Cingolani and others claim, psychosocial support
is a complex calling; on-the-job training may be an insufficient
mean to fulfilling the needs of this vulnerable population.
Diving deeper into the issue of vulnerability, the Itagüí
Penitentiary visit raised concerns for long-term prospects of
reintegrating incarcerated ex-combatants. Field notes indicate
troublesome inmate conditions? one interlocutor termed them
?un acto de tortura [an act of torture]? given the dearth of beds
and the necessity of sleeping on the floor, of sleeping while
standing up, and of taking shifts sleeping during the day due to
overcrowding. Itagüí?s poor infrastructure and previously
outsourced healthcare also may be impacting the physical well
being of its inmates; prison officials noted the state recently took
over responsibility for health care from a private company.
Unfettered access allowed the consultants to conduct interviews
with two prison populations: former members of the AUC in Patio
1, and former members of the ERG in Annex 2. Through these
conversations, both groups of inmates expressed frustration with
the reintegration process. The AUC members claimed a loss of
voice before the government, a reduction of importance to the
state following demobilization, and an increase in what they
termed ?bad faith.? This was a common theme among
demobilized groups displeased with either the pace or scope of
their overall reintegration. The perceived failures of the
reintegration laws have generated much anger, and appear to
undermine resocialization efforts with these populations.
The ex-ERG expressed similar sentiments. They noted that they
are legally helpless and lack resources to contest their long
convictions. Beyond that, they claim their health and well being
THEPERCEIVEDFAILURESOF
THEREINTEGRATIONLAWS
HAVEGENERATEDMUCH
ANGER,ANDAPPEARTO
UNDERMINE
RESOCIALIZATION.
16
17.
18. Fieldwork revealed that rapid urbanization poses
a problem for major cities within Colombia. Many
demobilized individuals choose to relocate the
major cities, seeking government support (in the
form of ACR programming offices), schools, and
mental health facilities. The cities are also the
location of the critical judicial courts, where most
of the demobilized are required to present
themselves during the demobilization process. As
many former combatants move into the cities to
join these reintegration programs, this becomes a
significant burden on already-strained municipal
resources.
Professional reintegrators in Soacha, for example,
noted that finding adequate housing is a
consistent challenge for their clients. ACR
representatives in Soacha noted that victims and
internally-displaced populations have access to a
number of government housing programs.
However, the representatives highlighted that
similar programs to support reintegrated
combatants are lacking. This theme was
reiterated across meetings in both metropolitan
Bogotá and Medellín.
Because demobilized persons are moving into
Bogotá with lower education and work
experiences that do not meet the needs of the
city?s labor market, Proyecto 840 recommended
that former combatants consider relocating to
smaller cities at the onset of the reintegration
process. They hypothesized more economic
opportunities may be available to them in areas
outside the cities. Proyecto 840 notes that 10?12
percent of the demobilized population has
relocated to the capital area, often moving to the
outskirts of the city.
Considering these realities, the civil society group
proposed a territorial-based strategy, since Bogotá
is very large and diverse. The demobilized
combatants came and received personal attention
at one of Proyecto 840?s four offices in the city.
These offices were strategically placed in the
neighborhoods that many former combatants
reside in. This way, Proyecto 840 invested in its
clients, not just economically, but also by building
relationships. They began to learn the local,
unique context of each location, which Proyecto
840, along with other civil society organizations
interviewed, fear is missing from national
policies.
The unique neighborhoods of the major cities are
different worlds, each a microcosm of the larger
city. These suburban environments do not allow
sufficient space for dialogue within the city as a
whole. The data support the notion that peace
begins in each barrio [neighborhood].
ConCiudadanía of Medellín recognizes that the
urban landscape offers few opportunities for
Theme: Urbanization and the Role of Place
18
Photo Courtesy of The Guardian
19.
20. Bogotá in particular is a city noted for the
presence of all groups associated with the
Colombian conflict. Displaced populations,
victims, and former combatants have all settled
in the country?s capital? many on the outskirts
and in the poorest areas of the city. In such close
proximity to one another, encounters based on
deep-rooted tensions are not only expected, but a
reality. Tensions in the community between the
?victim? and the ?victimizer? are not currently
being addressed ? a reality that is a serious blow
to social reintegration and convivencia
[coexistence]. Demobilized actors certainly
recognize this fact: one member of Mesa Nacional
noted, ?[Colombian] society is not prepared,? ?
suggesting quite plainly that the country as a
whole may not be ready to begin this process.
If the country is looking for lasting peace, it must
begin to create spaces for dialogue. Neither the
ACR, nor any of the civil society organizations
that were interviewed in Bogotá, have active
programs or initiatives to begin this process of
reconciliation. A number of demobilized actors
seemed ready to initiate this process and
expected others in their position feel the same.
Members of Fupiagro suggested that the lack of
government action to proceed along these lines is
a serious mistake, an outcome of indifference
towards community needs. One leader in
particular commented, ?They [the government]
do not know what post-conflict is, but they want
to talk about post-conflict.?
Within the municipality of Soacha, there are
currently no specialized reconciliation programs.
?This [topic] is relatively new to Soacha,? one
local government official remarked. Victims
groups and ex-combatants have no official
contact with one another, despite living in same
neighborhoods. However, as noted by civil
society leaders within the city of Bogotá, many
victims of the conflict are open and ready to
begin the process of reconciliation. Civil society
actors in Bogotá recognize the need for tangible
spaces for reconciliation, but they are perhaps
unable to enable this process on their own.
Metr opolitan Medellín
In contrast to the observations in Bogotá,
Medellín?s Programa de Paz y Reconciliación has
distinct programs dedicated to overcoming social
stigmatization and building reconciliation. Of
note, CEPAR functions as a community-based
training and education center that brings victims
and victimizers face to face. As previously
documented, civil society groups such as the
Madres de la Candelaria make use of CEPAR to
effect their mission of reconciliation through
truth telling. ?Las mujeres son las constructores
de la paz y la vida [Women are the builders of
peace and life],? expressed a representative of the
organization. Therefore, women must be ready to
forgive and to pardon.
Yet the Madres?forgiveness contains a kernel of
tough love: they support jail sentences for the
ex-combatants. In their view, everyone should go
to jail in order to reflect and emerge ready to ask
for? and receive? forgiveness. Another civil
society organization, ConCiudadanía, believes
reconciliation is a social matter and can be
achieved as a function of working with three
20
Infographic Courtesy of the ACR
21.
22. Based on the study?s objectives and findings, the GW consultants suggest that the Organization of
American States? Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia implement the following
recommendations:
Recommendations
Recom m endations for Dir ect Action: Str ategies for the MAPP to Suppor t Reintegr ation
- Continue to leverage institutional connections with the Colombian government and civil society
organizations in an effort to:
- Support access of PPR to the formal economy;
- Expand economic opportunity in order to speed up completion of the route;
- Develop resiliency strategies for demobilized combatants to reject employment offers by
organized criminal groups.
- Continue to promote entrepreneurial ventures
- Highlight the need for basic education leading to recognized certification.
Recom m endations for Indir ect Action:Str ategies for Colom bian Institutions
- Recommend that the ACR and civil society organizations continue to consult with the business
community on potential employment programs and corporate social responsibility initiatives for
PPR.
- Recommend that the ACR and civil society organizations continue to explore incentive programs for
mid-size companies and businesses to encourage hiring of former combatants.
- Recommend that the ACR explore possible mechanisms by which demobilized ex-combatants can be
hired as consultants by secondary organizations to advise ACR on the reintegration process.
- Recommend that the ACR initiate financial management training at the outset of the reintegration
process. This could include the development and implementation of computer training modules.
- Recommend that ACR partner with other governmental institutions to develop economic profiles for
Colombia?s major cities. These reports should focus on economic sectors that offer low- to
medium-skilled jobs in an effort to:
- Identify and publicize economic sectors with increased job opportunities in each city
- Tailor local training programs for PPR to ensure that they are appropriate for the local
economy
- Identify sectors and businesses whose needs would most closely align with the skills and
experience of PPR
- Recommend that the Colombian government more effectively enforce the employment
non-discrimination component of the Substantive Labor Code to reduce unlawful termination due to
previous participation in an illegal armed group.
Recommendations: Employability
22
23.
24. 24
Photo Courtesy of Moon.com
Recom m endations for Dir ect Action: Str ategies for the MAPP
to Suppor t Reintegr ation
- Partner with Colombian institutions, psychologists, and social
workers to develop mechanisms to monitor the mental health of
PPR and intervene in cases of extreme distress, such as
depression or suicidal behavior.
- Partner with Colombian institutions to study the psychosocial
aspects of involuntary individual or collective reintegration and
incorporate findings into the structure of the reintegration
program. This will help prepare for the likely collective
demobilization of the FARC.
- Partner with the ACR to develop training courses for demobilized
ex-combatants that have completed the reintegration process and
are willing to mentor future participants.
Recom m endations for Indir ect Action: Str ategies for
Colom bian Institutions
- Recommend that the ACR periodically monitor and consult with
individuals that have completed the reintegration process. This
could include town hall-style meetings to provide an opportunity
for discussion of topics of concern and to identify mechanisms to
overcome existing obstacles.
- Recommend that civil society organizations sponsor prison visits
by local community groups to meet with demobilized
ex-combatants to encourage the development of social ties and a
more successful reintegration into Colombian society.
- Recommend that the ACR provide emergency assistance, such as
a 24-hour telephone hot line, for PPR under immediate distress.
- Recommend that the ACR partner with Colombian universities to
develop professional and pre-professional certification programs.
These could include:
- Advanced training for current ACR employees;
- Development of dedicated university coursework for
students interested in conflict resolution and/or working
on psychosocial reintegration of ex-combatants.
- Recommend that the ACR expand their territorial reach by having
professional reintegrators use digital video conferencing (e.g.,
Skype) to meet with PPR in rural areas.
Recommendations: Health, Psychosocial Aspects,
and Support Networks
25.
26. Recom m endations for Dir ect Action: Str ategies for the MAPP to Suppor t Reintegr ation
- Facilitate meetings between victims?groups and PPR in order to create spaces for reconciliation and
the development of support networks.
- Continue to study past and present reconciliation processes in other countries in order to identify
lessons learned and recommend the incorporation of best practices into the Colombian process.
- Support government and civil society organizations in their efforts to educate the general population
on the demobilization and reintegration process. This could include efforts to:
- Increase their capacity for information sharing and transparency;
- Distribute informational materials, including documents that explain the impact of various
laws and regulations on different demobilized populations.
Recom m endations for Indir ect Action: Str ategies for Colom bian Institutions
- Recommend that ACR incorporate more reconciliation-related programming to complement their
current focus on social services. This could include convening dialogues, continuing to develop
resources for CEPAR, and increasing awareness among the general population to the positive social
externalities of reconciliation.
- Recommend that the ACR and civil society organizations support increased visibility of demobilized
former combatants through the creation of initiatives like the Mesa Nacional.
- Recommend that civil society organizations continue efforts to educate the general population on the
demobilization and reintegration process, and the need to ensure that it succeeds. Such efforts could
include school visits, television and radio ads, and awareness campaigns and flyers.
- Recommend that the Colombian government and civil society organizations jointly develop a school
curriculum that explores the recent history of the conflict and the need for reconciliation.
- Recommend that the ACR and civil society organizations develop mechanisms to incentivize victims
and demobilized ex-combatants to participate in reconciliation dialogues.
Recommendations: Social Stigmatization and Possibilities for Reconciliation
26
27.
28. EX-COMBATANTS
NEEDTHESUPPORT
ANDSECURITYOF
THEWHOLEOF
SOCIETYTO
PROPERLYREBUILD
THEIRLIVESAND
BEGINANEW.
Conclusion
Colombia is on the verge of receiving
a new wave of demobilized
ex-combatants? the FARC? who
must be effectively reintegrated into
society if long term peace is to be
realized. This study sought to
understand how the MAPP and its
partners, including Colombian
government agencies and civil
society, can more effectively support
reintegration efforts.
Interviews with stakeholders in
Bogotá and Medellín identified both
strengths and weaknesses from
previous efforts to reintegrate the
paramilitaries, as well as from the
current piecemeal process
surrounding individually
demobilized guerrillas. Both avenues
offer pronounced lessons learned, to
guide the likely future collective
reintegration of the FARC.
The study identified six overarching
themes which have particular impact
on reintegration efforts: (1)
Employability; (2) Insecurity; (3)
Differential Approaches; (4) Health,
Psychosocial Aspects, and Support
Networks; (5) Urbanization and the
Role of Place; and (6) Social
Stigmatization and Possibilities for
Reintegration. Each theme draws on
the insights and experiences of the
stakeholders whom the consultants
interviewed. Most themes are further
broken down into sub-sections that
focus on location-specific data.
This report proposed two categories
of recommendations: those which the
MAPP can directly implement, and
those which the MAPP may choose to
recommend to partner institutions in
order for the latter to operate more
effectively in the realm of
demobilization and reintegration.
The recommendations draw upon the
MAPP?s core competencies, both as
part of a regional intergovernmental
organization and as a trusted
institution that has played an active
role in Colombia for over ten years.
The second category of
recommendations builds upon the
MAPP?s relationships with the
Colombian government and civil
society. These recommendations are
intended to promote further
public-private collaboration in an
effort to improve and expand
reintegration services across the
entirety of Colombia.
The SWOT Analysis provided a useful
matrix for framing the MAPP?s
unique place in the reintegration
process. Strengths include deep and
positive relationships with partners,
the success of a renewed mandate,
and diverse perspectives as a result
of reliance on both international and
locally-employed subject-matter
experts. At the same time, the MAPP?s
targeted mandate can at times
constrict action and reduce the
mission?s flexibility. This weakness,
along with limited staff and presence
across the country, can reduce the
effectiveness of fieldwork.
Opportunities, however, abound:
from civil society organizations
extending their hand in partnership
to the potential for developing
comprehensive education on the
social benefits of reintegration.
Threats to the MAPP include the
potential role of OAS counterparts,
the risk of diverted international
attention once peace seems
inevitable, and the cyclical stresses of
uncertain funding.
Over the course of this research,
stakeholders repeatedly expressed
that effective reintegration is
necessary to ensure sustainable
peace. The alternative is dire: a likely
return to conflict. Ex-combatants
need the support and security of the
whole of society to properly rebuild
their lives and begin anew.
.
28
