CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.] 2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.] 3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
December 13, 2016

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving ISIS an
opportunity to resurge after its defeat in Sirte.
2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter
Yemenis from joining local security forces.
3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that
pose serious threats to the Nigerian state.
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3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) called for the prioritization of the Afghanistan-Waziristan theater over Kashmir. The
TTP urged militants to return to the priority front and accused Pakistan’s intelligence services of infiltrating militant groups to
perpetuate the conflict with India over the disputed Kashmir territory. Pakistani security forces continued to target Salafi-
jihadi militants throughout the country. Security forces killed or captured TTP and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) militants in
Punjab Province, Sindh Province, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province on December 8-9.
Outlook: The TTP will attack Pakistani security targets in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
Security
Political and military tensions remained high between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Indian security forces clashed
with protesters in Arwani, Kashmir during a search operation targeting Pakistani militants on December 8. The Kashmir
crisis is impacting Indian-Pakistani relations in other spheres, including water-sharing. The World Bank paused arbitration
over two dams under construction in India, citing the risk that contradictory outcomes from opposing suits would jeopardize
the Indus Waters Treaty. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has threatened to block the flow of water from India to
Pakistan due to the hostilities in Kashmir.
Outlook: High-level Indian and Pakistani officials may hold talks with Kashmiri separatist leaders in order to de-escalate the
conflict.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
Political
The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is showing signs of political division between former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh and
the al Houthi Ansar Allah party. Saleh criticized the al Houthi party for blocking members of his political party from positions
in the alliance’s new government. Saleh’s nephew expressed support for Russian involvement in Yemen’s peace process.
Saleh has offered Russia access to Yemeni bases in exchange for counterterrorism support, while al Houthi leadership has
rejected foreign basing in Yemen. President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi rejected a UN-brokered roadmap in an effort to
maintain his executive authority.
Outlook: Leadership tensions will not impact al Houthi-Saleh ground operations in the near term.
Security
Taiz, Yemen’s third largest city, remains contested. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may be attempting to drive the fighting away
western fronts that threaten their control over strategic mountains overlooking Taiz city. Hadi government forces seized and
defended terrain to the north and south of Taiz city.
Outlook: The Taiz fight will remain deadlocked.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
ISIS may be resuming a campaign of suicide attacks designed to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS
Wilayat Aden-Abyan conducted a suicide attack that killed 50 troops gathered at a base near Aden on December 12. ISIS
last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. AQAP supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security
forces in Aden. AQAP uses local businesses and tribal networks in southern Yemen to mask financial transactions that
support its operations. AQAP is also strengthening its relationships with tribes in central Yemen by delivering battlefield
successes against al Houthi-Saleh forces.
Outlook: ISIS may resume monthly explosive attacks on security forces in Aden.

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 06 DEC: AQAP
militants detonated
two IEDs in Ibb.
2) 06, 11 DEC: Hadi
government forces
repelled al Houthi-
Saleh attacks in
eastern Taiz city.
3) 08 DEC: Hadi
government forces
clashed with al Houthi-
Saleh forces in Kirsh,
Lahij.
4) 10 DEC: ISIS
conducted a SVEST
attack targeting
security forces near
Aden City.
5) 12 DEC: AQAP
militants retook Mount
Kasad from al Houthi-
Saleh forces in al
Bayda.
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6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somali officials are rejecting the international community’s efforts to curb warlordism in Somalia’s electoral process. A
regional government rejected international pleas to disqualify a candidate whose gunmen opened fire at a polling place. A
former interior minister accused President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of manipulating electoral bodies to win re-election. A
government body aligned with President Mohamud declared December 28 the new date of the presidential contest,
bypassing the federal electoral body and giving credence to claims that President Mohamud is misusing his influence.
Outlook: President Mohamud will probably win re-election.
Security
U.S. forces resumed advising and assisting Somali and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) special operations
forces (SOF) in southern Somalia. U.S.-backed operations ceased for nearly two months following a botched U.S. airstrike
in Galgudud region on September 28. U.S.-backed forces raided an al Shabaab training camp following airstrikes in
Torotorow, Lower Shabelle region on December 6. Likely U.S. forces also backed a raid on an al Shabaab training camp
and improvised explosive device (IED) factory in Caba area, Lower Jubba region on December 10.
Outlook: U.S.-backed raids will occur on an approximately monthly basis in southern Somalia.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab may be renewing an attack campaign in Mogadishu in advance of elections. An al Shabaab militant detonated a
suicide-vehicle borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) that killed 29 individuals and wounded almost 50 others at
Mogadishu’s main port on December 11. Al Shabaab may also be setting conditions to attack eastern Kenya and major
urban centers in Somalia. Al Shabaab launched multiple IED attacks in Mogadishu, targeted strategically important towns in
southern Somalia, and conducted attacks along the Somali-Kenyan border region within the past week.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may begin trying to recapture urban centers it has controlled in the past, such as Marka or Barawe.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
1) 08-09 DEC: SNA
and al Shabaab forces
traded control of Goof
Gaduud, Bay region.
2) 10 DEC: Likely-U.S.
forces backed SNA
and AMISOM forces to
raid an al Shabaab
training camp in Caba,
Lower Jubba region.
3) 11 DEC: Al
Shabaab detonated a
SVBIED near a port in
Mogadishu.
4) 11 DEC: Al
Shabaab briefly seized
El Wak, Gedo region.
5) 11 DEC: Suspected
al Shabaab militants
attacked a restaurant
with grenades in
Kismayo, Lower Jubba
region.
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8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Government of National Accord (GNA) is laying the groundwork for its 2017 budget and a new monetary policy aiming
to solve the liquidity crisis and resulting unrest in Tripoli. The GNA and the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) will announce a joint
economic plan this month. The CBL will likely continue withholding funds from the GNA despite the deal.
Outlook: The GNA will prioritize paying security forces with its limited funds, furthering criticism that it cannot improve
Libyans’ economic opportunities.
Security
GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. A coalition of Islamist and tribal militias whose leadership includes the
GNA’s Minister of Defense launched an offensive on oil terminals held by the Libyan National army (LNA) on December 7.
The GNA’s Presidency Council rejected the attack. The LNA repelled the offensive and bombed the rival coalition’s base,
killing several field commanders.
Outlook: The LNA’s growing power in Benghazi and the oil crescent will continue to spark unrest in eastern and central
Libya as rival militias and Salafi-jihadi groups push back.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS militants are dispersing throughout Libya after losing their former stronghold in Sirte. Libyan forces suffered high
casualties during the Sirte campaign and will prioritize securing their objectives in Libya’s capital and oil regions over
sustained counter-ISIS operations in Libya’s interior. ISIS militants ousted from eastern Libya in early 2016 may be
redeploying east after the loss of Sirte.
Outlook: ISIS militants will continue explosive attacks on GNA-allied forces from the west of Sirte. ISIS may build up forces
in southwestern Libya to create a new foothold or prepare for a counterattack on GNA-allied forces.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
01) 07-10 DEC: An
LNA counterattack
killed 67 fighters from
an anti-LNA coalition
in Ben Jawad, al
Nafawliya, al Sidra
and al Jufra airbase.
02) 07 DEC: ISIS
ambushed three GNA-
allied vehicles on the
coastal road west of
Sirte city.
03) 08 DEC: The
LNA’s 12th Infantry
Brigade occupied Brak
al Shatti military base.
04) 09 DEC: ISIS
conducted an SVBIED
attack in Qar Yunis,
Benghazi and
launched several
mortars on the LNA in
Bousnib, Benghazi.
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2

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
An influx of Tunisian foreign fighters returning home risks overwhelming Tunisia’s security forces. Tunisian security forces
broke up two networks linked to foreign fighters near Tunis on December 7 and December 11. Tunisian President Essebsi
recently warned that Tunisia is not capable of detaining all returning fighters. The Tunisian Army is targeting AQIM and likely
ISIS militants encamped in the mountains of western Tunisia, possibly with support from U.S surveillance aircraft. The
Tunisian Army shelled a militant position on Mount Ouargha in Kef Governorate after AQIM’s Uqba ibn Nafa’a Brigade
detonated a landmine that injured three soldiers.
Outlook: A surge in returning foreign fighters may force Tunisia to divert resources away from counterinsurgency
operations in its border regions, where multiple Salafi-jihadi militant groups operate.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
Ansar al Din followed through with its threat to break out prisoners held by Malian forces. The Macina Liberation Front, an
Ansar al Din affiliate, attacked a prison in Niono, central Mali, on December 6, freeing all 93 detainees and injuring two
guards. Ansar al Din decommissioned four French and MINUSMA vehicles with landmines this week in eastern Mali,
continuing a steady tempo of low-level attacks.
Both factions of Boko Haram retain operational capability despite territorial losses. Two female suicide bombers from the
faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau detonated SVESTs on opposite ends of the Friday market in Madagali, Adamawa State,
Nigeria on December 9, killing 56 civilians and wounding 177 others. Nigerian President Muhammdu Buhari maintained that
the attack was Boko Haram’s “death rattle.” However, militants loyal to Shekau carried out an additional SVEST attack in
Maiduguri, Borno State, on December 11. The faction led by ISIS-recognized Abu Musab al Barnawi killed a Nigerian
Lieutenant Colonel on December 13, indicating a possible campaign targeting officers following three similar attacks.
Outlook: Ansar al Din will continue to target prisons to gain additional fighters and destabilize Mali. Shekau’s Boko Haram
faction will target civilians in cities to maintain an appearance of strength in lieu of lost territory.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 07 DEC: Tunisian
security forces broke
up a network that
supported foreign
fighter returnees in
Ariana, Tunisia.
2) 11 DEC: Tunisian
security forces
discovered a support
network with ties to
ISIS in Syria in
Bizerte, Tunisia.
3) 12 DEC: The
Tunisian National
Guard arrested three
ISIS members recently
returned from Syria in
Monastir, Tunisia.
4) 11 DEC: An Uqba
ibn Nafa’a landmine
exploded and injured
three Tunisian soldiers
near Kef City, Tunisia.
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4

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
1) 06 DEC: The
Macina Liberation
Front freed 93
prisoners in Niono,
Segou Region, Mali.
2) 09 DEC: A Boko
Haram-Shekau
SVEST attack killed
56 people in Madagali,
Adamawa State,
Nigeria.
3) 12 DEC Ansar al
Din destroyed a
MINUSMA vehicle
near Gossi, Timbuktu
Region, Mali.
4) 13 DEC: Boko
Haram-Barnawi killed
a Nigerian Army
Lieutenant Colonel in
an ambush near
Damasak, Borno
State, Nigeria.
2
3
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13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569