The document discusses the potential for increased value in Cambodia's rice value chain, particularly for smallholder farmers, through the adoption of improved agricultural practices like System of Rice Intensification (SRI). It finds that SRI adoption could increase average smallholder yields by 60%, representing unrealized value across the chain. Specifically: 1) Adopting SRI and other good husbandry practices could help smallholders increase yields from the current national average of 2.6 t/ha to over 4 t/ha, representing increased income of $280/ha for farmers. 2) Improved practices could generate over $350 million in additional annual income across the rice value chain in Cambodia, benefiting farmers, traders

1.
Brian Lund
11/01/2015
Contract Services
for Smallholders.
A rethink of the SRI narrative
through a business lens
Discussion paper

2.
1
Contents
Purpose.........................................................................................................................................................1
The rice value chain.....................................................................................................................................2
Quantifying this unrealized value ...........................................................................................................3
Potential contribution to the household income ..............................................................................3
Potential contribution to GNP..............................................................................................................4
SRI as a triple bottom line........................................................................................................................ 4
The need for a new way to present this opportunity to farmers.............................................................. 5
SRI - slow growth in Cambodia................................................................................................................5
Reliance on farmer-facing extension services......................................................................................5
Moving to a market-based solution............................................................................................................6
Building technically competent teams .............................................................................................. 6
Marketing directed toward smallholders ........................................................................................... 7
Market testing ..........................................................................................................................................7
Options to strengthen the model................................................................................................................8
Service guarantees.............................................................................................................................. 8
Options to broaden the model.....................................................................................................................8
The production/value chain................................................................................................................8
Risk analysis...............................................................................................................................................10
Oxfam’s role ................................................................................................................................................11
Evaluation of the FLAIR program.......................................................................................................11
Links to the Cambodian OCS..............................................................................................................12
Experience of Oxfam and partners....................................................................................................12
Resource Development......................................................................................................................12
Purpose
This paper argues that there is significant unrealized value in the rice value chain that could be
developed for the smallholder client and that this would be best realized in Cambodia by opting for a
market-based approach to agricultural services rather than the extension-based approaches we
see more commonly applied in the rural sector in developing economies. This opens smallholder to
a different perspective as to how to address opportunities and challenges in agriculture and
potentially a very different set of market relationships, some of which will be broached here. The
paper’s initial focus for discussion is the husbandry package known as the System of Rice
Intensification (SRI). It is discussed as key amongst several entry points presenting the smallholder
potential economic gains in the rice value chain.
Finally the paper begins to lay out how Oxfam might engage with a view toward a new approach to
our rural development program.

3.
2
The rice value chain
The simplest description of the rice value chain in Cambodia can be summed up as 1) the farmer;
typically a smallholder with landholdings averaging 1 hectare, 2) the middleman who buys the
harvest at farm gate price for resale for milling, further aggregation or informal export markets, 3)
the miller who may store and further aggregate, 4) the wholesaler/retailer who may export.
Using the Average yield for the National crop at 2.6t/ha as reported by the Cambodian government1
and a farm gate price of $200/t the current value chain is portrayed in the table2
and schematic.
Schematic representation of the Rice Value Chain (red) and the potential increase (black)
This modeling suggests that the greatest potential gain lies with the farmer but that all agents
stand to make substantial gains. Middle men and millers stand to gain where farmers produce
increased quality and consistency of grain but also through aspects such as improved mill-ability
and sale-ability. AThe exporter/retailer is most likely to gain from premium and niche market
opportunities3
.
1
National
statistics,
Ministry
of
Agriculture
Forestry
and
Fisheries
2015
report
2
Need
to
do
more
work
on
verifying
these
figures.
May
be
able
to
adapt
the
results
of
the
study
in
the
Philippines
conducted
by
MicroSave
3
This
is
based
on
the
performance
of
SRI
as
a
crop
husbandry
package
for
smallholders
as
detailed
in
text.
Stage
value
as
%
of
retail
price
KH
(USD)/ha KH
(USD)/ha
wholesaler/retailer.
Value
aded
through
market
distribution
and
retailing
9% 104$
estimate
10%
increase
for
premium
markets
114$
miller.
Value
added
through
grading,
milling,
storage,
wholesaling
40% 485$
estimate
10%
increase
for
millability
and
storage
534$
local
trader.
Value
added
through
aggregation,
grading,
storage
and
timing
of
sales
9% 104$
estimate
10%
increase
for
grain
quality,
storage
and
handling
114$
farmer.
Value
added
to
the
farm
gate 43% 520$
estimate
54%
increase
based
on
SRI
husbandry
before
gains
from
improved
input
quality,
storage
and
markets
800$
100% 1,213$
1,563$
Potential
Increase
to
value
chainCurrent
value
chain
Table
showing
indicative
profile
of
the
Rice
Value
Chain
. .
1600 1600
1500 1500
1400 1400
1300 1300
1200 1200
1100 1100
1000 1000
900 900
800 800
700 700
600 600
500 500
400 400
300 300
200 200
100 100
USD
/
hecatre
of
rice
grown
Farmer
Middleman
Miller
Retailer/
Export
Farmer
Middleman
Miller
Retailer/
Export

4.
3
While there has been growth in all parts of the value chain in recent years, growth at the Farmer
level has remained relatively slow – and what growth there is can be largely attributable to
increasing commercialization and less so smallholder farming.
This can be seen in the following graph that show the average yields (t/ha) for each province over
the last 10 years. The majority of provinces (reliant on conventionally grown un-irrigated rice
farming practices) are currently producing 2.8t/ha which is well below demonstrated potentials.
Also the trend line suggests that at current rates it would take another 20 seasons for the national
crop average to approach 4t/ha
The paper argues that this amounts to unrealized value, a large part of which could flow to the
smallholder farmer.
Quantifying this unrealized value
Looking primarily at potential gains from good husbandry it is possible to make an estimate of the
unrealized value. To this end crop performance under SRI is considered. The basic crop husbandry
described in SRI leads to consistent crop production improvements. This is rarely disputed4
. Since
its introduction to Cambodia reported levels of productivity improvement from SRI varied
considerably. In response, in 2006 AusAID (now AusTrade) and GTZ (now GIZ) conducted what was
considered at the time to be a watershed study of SRI projects in Cambodia5
. They determined that
where SRI was practiced properly, farmers achieved an average increase in crop production of
1.45t/ha without increase in input costs, this was a 60% gain from the reported national crop
average of 2.4t/ha6
at the time.
Potential contribution to the household income
Using these established production parameters it is possible to provide a crude estimate of the
potential contribution of SRI to the livelihood of the farmer with a small landholding. On average
farmers in Cambodia cultivate 1 ha of arable land. At the same time, the government is reporting an
4
What
is
disputed
around
SRI
is
1)
the
precise
list
of
husbandry
practices
and
whether
or
not
application
of
a
subset
of
the
practices
constitutes
SRI
adoption,
2)
an
interpretation
of
input
costs
–
especially
labor
costs-­‐-­‐that
suggests
that
revenue
gains
may
be
negated
by
higher
costs,
resulting
in
negligible
net
income
increases,
3)
conceptualization
of
SRI
as
a
set
of
principles
applicable
to
whole-­‐farm
ecology.
5
Vannaro
P
&
Seth
S
(2006)
Survey
of
SRI
and
other
rice
management
practices
on
acid
soils
in
Prey
Veng
Province
of
Cambodia
2006.
Technical
report
funded
by
the
Australian
Embassy,
Cambodia
and
GTZ.
3.539 3.619 3.622 3.66 3.812 3.709 3.761 3.827 3.6701 0.103055 0.01062
2.75 2.5 2.75 2.43 2.915 2.738 2.575 2.712 2.6732 0.141534 0.020032
2.334 2.697 2.654 2.86 2.957 2.902 2.835 2.579 2.6946 0.194552 0.03785
2.471 2.359 2.456 2.54 2.755 2.736 2.748 2.815 2.5355 0.22796 0.051966
2.085 2.341 2.501 2.61 2.681 2.738 2.788 2.791 2.534 0.231683 0.053677
3.044 3.079 2.96 3.11 3.34 3.328 3.398 3.447 3.1317 0.253723 0.064375
3.4 3.195 3.502 3.53 3.68 3.572 3.553 3.599 3.3937 0.267113 0.07135
3.288 3.427 3.553 3.66 3.868 3.885 3.896 3.76 3.5641 0.295426 0.087277
2.566 2.767 2.975 3.03 3.106 3.121 3.137 3.084 2.8614 0.297312 0.088394
2.858 2.561 2.588 2.95 3.189 3.31 3.307 3.236 2.9326 0.308055 0.094898
2.121 2.542 2.523 2.8 2.891 2.658 2.875 2.743 2.5443 0.308341 0.095074
2.401 2 2.521 2.6 2.686 2.726 2.87 2.812 2.4755 0.326089 0.106334
1.915 1.826 2.101 2.14 2.62 2.286 2.481 2.379 2.1141 0.329717 0.108713
1.6 2.072 2.105 2.51 2.604 2.283 2.542 2.104 2.1491 0.339885 0.115522
2.441 2.336 2.462 2.69 3.11 3.015 3.074 2.852 2.6514 0.340574 0.11599
2.627 3.473 3.303 2.92 2.882 2.906 2.933 2.881 3.1067 0.3424 0.117238
3 3.276 3.725 3.48 3.597 3.466 3.453 2.988 3.319 0.265966 0.070738
1.72 1.862 2 2.5 2.6 2.391 2.203 2.448 2.0993 0.380924 0.145103
1.74 2.5 2.667 2.65 2.758 3.126 2.95 2.83 2.6221 0.398434 0.158749
2.252 2.388 2.476 2.56 2.751 2.788 2.888 2.905 2.4487 0.430793 0.185582
2.439 2.807 2.866 3 3.295 3.223 3.313 3.253 2.8663 0.43147 0.186166
1.823 2.121 2.467 2.67 2.944 2.814 2.842 2.735 2.4033 0.468296 0.219301
1.75 2.611 2.961 3.1 3.199 3.196 3.215 3.257 2.8112 0.500252 0.250252
5.514 2.645 2.643 2.78 3.183 3.43 3.405 3.231 3.1233 0.953549 0.909255
3.449 3.449
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4
1 3 5 7 9
Kandal
Kandal
Linear
(Kandal)
R²
=
0.0874
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Average
Yield
(t/ha)
for
each
province
Sketch
showing
trend
in
Rice
yields
(t/ha)
across
all
provinces
.
Data
from
MAFF
2005-­‐2004
extrapolation
to
2034
Kandal
Stueng
Treng
Batambang
K.Thom
Koh
Kong
Prey
Veng
K.Cham
Takeo
Kampot
Kratie
B.
Meanchey
Preah
Vihear
Mondolkiri
Otadar
Mean
Chey
K.Speu
Phnom
Penh
Pailin
Ratanakiri
Preahsihanouk
Svay
Rieng
K.Chhnang
SiemReap
Kep2005
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
2034
Trendline
season

5.
4
increase in the national crop to 2.6t/ha with the majority crop being conventionally grown un-
irrigated rice. The SRI assessment in 2006 indicated a minimum of 1.45t/ha additional yield which at
a farm gate value of $200/t/ha is equivalent to an increase by 56% from $520/ha to $810/ha for the
farmer.
Potential contribution to GNP
Using national parameters it is possible to provide a crude estimate of the potential contribution of
SRI to the Cambodian GNP. Given the national crop encompasses 2.6million hectares and the
potential of SRI to increase yield by 1.45t/ha the increase in the national crop would be 3.8million
ton. Applying a more conservative extrapolation; if farmers applied SRI to only half this crop area
and their yield results where only half as good as the benchmarked increase, the SRI contribution to
the national crop would be 0.95million ton. Assuming an export value of USD$200/t (check WB
report) this would equate to USD$190 million pa7
.
By comparison, in neighboring Vietnam where the government has chosen to actively invest in SRI
extension authorities are now reporting 1.8million smallholder participants each realizing an
additional 250-USD650 at the farm gate each year. Using the lower figure in this range, this equates
to a minimum annual addition to the rural economy of USD$450,000,000.
SRI as a triple bottom line
While there is rightly, continuing debate around the limitations and portrayal of SRI beit as a recipe
or as a menu for the hand-planted rice crop, there is much less debate about each of the
components of crop husbandry described as component parts of SRI having the potential to
contribute to a stronger crop for the smallholder: The soil, seed and seeding preparation is
reflective of best practice in practically any crop, while the weed and water management is much
more reflective of local circumstances and therefore variable. Importantly, smallholders are quick
to recognize and adapt the components best suited to them regardless of the debate. But despite
many smallholders having demonstrated gains over the 30 years that SRI has been described,
dissemination and adoption of SRI is still limited. The concern must be that relying on current
dissemination/extension strategies risks the passing of another 30 years after which majority of
poor farmers would still have been without the opportunity to try SRI for themselves8
.
In layman’s terms SRI is simply a compilation of recognized good husbandry practices relevant to
hand-planted rice crops. It offers a triple bottom line:
1. In social terms, because the component parts of the compilation are easy to understand and
can be applied separately, it provides an exceptional space for poor and risk averse farmers to
gain experience in adaptation and risk-taking. It also factors in improvement to much of the
crop management traditionally delegated to women, and builds a culture of sharing and
learning from each other.
2. In environmental terms, SRI requires less agricultural inputs; fosters a stronger stewardship of
resources like seed, water and soil; encourages organic produce and seed production; and
reduces methane gas emissions from rice production.
3. In economic terms it offers significantly greater crop production and farm-gate returns while
potentially incurring less input costs.
This paper focuses only on the later point, arguing from the perspective of the economic
advantage.
7
Lund
(2010)
Investing
in
quality
agricultural
extension
-­‐
The
right
blend
for
Cambodia.
An
internal
paper
for
Oxfam
America.
Figures
need
updating
as
farm
gate
price
in
2015
is
nearer
$200/t
8
A
second
concern
must
be
–
what
happens
to
the
next
bottom-­‐up
innovation
–
will
it
also
take
30
years
to
reach
this
far?

6.
5
The need for a new way to present this opportunity to
farmers SRI - slow growth in Cambodia
Given the unrealized economic value alone it is striking that SRI has seen quite slow dissemination
and take-up in Cambodia. Reports place current take-up at just 150,000 of Cambodia’s 4 million
farmers increasing at approximately 5,000 farmers per year9
. While there is ongoing debate as to the
contributing factors, this paper argues that two factors in particular are at play;
1. A reliance on farmer-facing extension services so that after 30 years the vast majority of
smallholder farmers still have never had the opportunity to see and assess SRI.
2. Where smallholders are exposed to SRI there has been insufficient support in addressing the
risk-averseness responses that they choose - or are compelled to choose - that result in them
not adopting SRI.
3. Even where farmers are inclined to adopt SRI, they are then compelled to recruit family or
community members to do the same. This requires them to invest additional effort in persuading
family and community to ‘try something new’ this is not always easy particularly where rural
communities are experiencing an increasing outward migration of the able-bodied labor needed
to make SRI work.
Reliance on farmer-facing extension services
The majority of improvements in agriculture in Cambodia are introduced via extension services
working with smallholder farmers. Unfortunately the quality and scale of extension services
continues to be quite variable – particularly services offered to poor smallholders. These extension
services can be categorized as follows;
1. Extension actors – the public sector. This is largely government department officers, trained
and mandated to deliver extension services to Cambodia’s farming community. While they are
well trained and often reasonably resourced (via development agency projects), their
effectiveness is curtailed by the patronage system that pervades Cambodia’s public sector. As
a consequence the extension officers low salaries compels them to rent-seek from farmers
rather than empower them to act independently. Government officers are also increasingly
inclined to work with larger land holders because the extension is easier and the rent seeking
prospects are greater.
2. Extension actors – the development agencies. This category includes INGOs, LNGOs and
academic institutions. Generally speaking they make up the weight of effective extension
services currently active in Cambodia. They encompass a wide range of competencies,
sometimes effective, sometimes not so effective. There is a general lack of coordination
leading to overlap, inefficiencies There is also tendency toward short term objectives (given
they are very often bound by short term project funding). This has the effect of compromising
longer term strategic thinking need to encourage services at scale.
3. Extension actors – private sector. To date the private sector has not engaged in farmer
extension in a systematic manner. The agri-business paradigm is often based on the one-off
transaction. The concept of mutual gain leading to repeat business with an established client
base is not particularly evident despite many small businesses being based in the farming
communities. The US INGO iDE has been addressing this with some success through a program
called Farm Business Advisors (FBAs) who are trained as quality input sellers able to provide
good advice. However, there are still very many communities without this support. Bigger
private sector investors are much more inclined to seek land concentration so they themselves
can move to a mechanized system and realize the productivity potentials on offer.
9
Personal
Communication,
Mr
Luy
PiseyRith,
Program
Coordinator,
Oxfam
US

7.
6
Regardless the quality of extension the fundamental approach is generally farmer-facing. As
illustrated in the sketch above the extension service is directed toward the smallholder after which
the smallholder is left to only a “take-it-or-leave-it” response to the improvement on offer.
Essentially at this point, farmers who are inherently risk averse are asked to shoulder new risk.
Moving to a market-based solution
While there are numerous market-based models operating in the agricultural sector this paper
focuses of one model that recognizes the smallholder as the client for agricultural services.
Essentially this requires the design to view the smallholder as a client able to purchase services
rather than as a student of new approaches in agriculture. As indicated by the red text in the sketch
below this requires a shift in approach whereby 1) small teams are trained and supported in service
delivery, 2) marketing is directed toward the smallholder so she is informed, and ultimately 3) she
has more options available if she chooses to pursue improvements.
Building technically competent teams
With SRI as the entry point, intensive extension training would be directed toward selected
community members (not necessarily farmers but also landless, land-poor, women and youth with
experience in farming), who have an interest in forming into small business teams able to provide
on-farm services. The first objective would be to ensure they achieved a high degree of
competence in the good husbandry techniques promoted in SRI. The second objective would be to
provide training including finance10
, small business, and entrepreneurial skills11
. Teams would then
10
Savings
for
Change

8.
7
be formed and supported with resourcing, marketing and coordination services until they
established a viable client base of smallholder farmers who have retained secure land tenure and
thereby can become more financially independent and sustainable.
Marketing directed toward smallholders
At the same time a marketing strategy would be implemented so that smallholders are aware of the
service available to them, how to access it and what to expect.
This approach would;
1) Take away some of the risk that the individual farmer confronts when trying a new practice
for the first time. Where previously the farmer had to build experience in each new
technique, here the teams are trained and less likely to make mistakes.
2) Amplify the reach of extension investments as the service teams would benefit from being
their own advocates, (also other NGOs working with communities could recruit these
services),
3) Eliminate barriers to implementation such as labor supply. As the teams would ideally
operate throughout the growing season and thereby eliminate reliance on the availability of
incidental labor from family and community members.
At the same time the approach would help
1) Realize the economic potential of the crop by bringing up yields.
2) Keep money and job opportunity in the local economy – most service team members are
likely to be locals selected by their community.
3) Open opportunity for additional services and small business opportunity. These could
include deep-ripping as a climate change mitigation measure, local laser leveling to
improve water control, ploughing and field preparation, nursery management, weeding,
accurately timed fertilizer services, local seed improvement harvest, post-harvest drying
and storage, etc.
Market testing
In keeping with Oxfam’s partnership approach the thinking developed in this paper emerges from
close cooperation with local partner organizations. In particular two local NGOs, Rachana and Srer
Khmer who helped in the formative stages of this thinking then took up the challenge to begin
market testing by establishing Service Teams during the 2016 cropping season and undertaking
some marketing. Their prelimary results are presented here.
Rachana;
• Service team with 22 women members. IDPoor1
12
(2), IDPoor 2 (6), People living with HIV (2), other poor (12)
• 22.9 ha of paddy land served: SRI direct rice seed plant (19.42 ha) and weeding use the Rice Dragon
13
(3.5
ha)
• They charge 450,000 riels/ha about $112.5/ha. Total they earned 10,316,000 riels ($2,579)
With the money they earned, the team dicided to distribute to each member and 21 members used
those money to buy materials for their children to school. One of the women used her money to buy
vegetable seed and fertilizer
Srer Khmer;
System of Rice Intensification Service Provider Group (SRI-SPG)
11
The
International
Labor
Organization
(ILO)
is
currently
promoting
a
community-­‐based
entrepreneurial
package
(C-­‐BED)
in
Cambodia
that
would
be
ideal
in
this
instance
12
IDPoor
is
a
national
system
for
identifying
the
extent
of
poverty
that
people
are
contending
with.
It
allows
identification
of
the
absolute
poorest
for
support.
13
The
Rice
Dragon
is
a
weeding
tool
that
is
operated
by
hand
(see
cover
page).
Good
weed
control
has
the
potential
to
increase
crop
productivity
by
1tonne/ha.

9.
8
• Service group of 20 members, including women (17)
• 1.2 ha of paddy land (testing service) Sareing village, Srer Sdock commune, Kandeing district Pursat
province
• They charged 360000riels/ha= $90/ha
Srer Khmer also began testing additional services, provide in-depth capacity for the Service Teams
on SRI, broadcasting techniques, using a drum seeder, direct rice seed planting and use trans-
planting machines. Their Initial marketing included distribution of 15,000 Public leaflets on SRI-SPG
information
At the time of writing the crop is still to be harvested so the gains for the farmer have yet to be fully
determined. Nonetheless both organizations have already seen encouraging success in both the
supply side (people’s interest in joining teams) and the demand side (both organizations were
unable to keep up with the level of initial interest for their services).
Options to strengthen the model
Service guarantees
Even with the increased options available via this approach it is recognized that smallholders are
still likely to remain risk averse and slow to adopt. The proportion of farmers prepared to take this
risk is typically low. Roger’s Adoption Curve14
is particularly useful in conveying this characteristic;
typically only innovators and early adopters are inclined to take on new risk. While the majorities of
the population wait for increasing confidence and assurance before they will act – without
attention to real risks and risk aversion the prospect of improvements are adopted at scale is
lessened.
One option to address this would be guarantees whereby
smallholders that use the service of endorsed service
providers will be guaranteed yield outcomes equivalent to
the provincial average plus 1 tonne/ha. Pending questions
of who funds the risk, cash flow management, field
verification etc an approach like this would also allow
farmers to gain the firsthand experience and trust in Service
teams. Arguably it would also serve as an introduction to
insurance concepts that may come into the market at a future point.
Options to broaden the model
The production/value chain
Aside from the guarantee, once the teams begin gaining credibility as service providers their
repertoire of services could be expanded so as to introduce other services beyond SRI planting15
. It
is to be expected that Oxfam’s partner organizations and the Service teams will be able to build out
a diverse repertoire as they build experience but some to the initial options for investigations
include;
1. Nursery management ensuring even and healthy seedlings – ideally using improved or locally
selected varieties.
14
Rogers,
E.
(1962)
Diffusion
of
innovations.
Free
Press,
London,
15
Both
Rachana
and
Srer
Khmer
are
addressing
this
from
the
perspective
of
additional
services
and
also
the
continuity
of
work
for
the
service
teams

10.
9
• Hand planted crops require that farmers set up a small nursery in order to germinate and
ready seedlings for transplanting. There are several photo-sanitary techniques known
to improve the vigor of nursery stock but these techniques are not used. Also individual
farmers are often caught with over-grown seedlings when their planning is upset by late
rains.
• Benefit to smallholder: reduced risk of low quality seedlings, assures of 7-10 day old
seedlings are produced under optimal conditions.
2. Field preparation
• Field preparation (cultivation) is frequently outsourced already. In this instance the
service could become part of an entire package making it convenient for farmers16
.
• Benefit to smallholder: yield improvement of 1.45t/ha. Lessened risk of crop loss due to
uncertain rainfall patterns.
3. SRI planting
• While SRI planting is main focus of this paper there are numerous refinements that could
be introduced via the Service Teams. Over time the teams will gain experience in
recognizing optimal plant densities for each soil type across entire districts17
.
• The teams may opt for night planting, allowing them optimize the window of time
available for planting and/or allowing them to avoid the heat of the day.
• Benefit to smallholder: yield improvement of 1.45t/ha. Lessened risk of crop loss due to
uncertain rainfall patterns.
4. Weeding of crops
• Oxfam has been working to introduce a weeding tool (the rice dragon) as a means of
improving crop productivity while reducing labor inputs. In its first season the project
achieved brand recognition from marketing, exceeding 50%. As recognition and market
experience grows smallholders are seek Rice Dragon teams to weed their crops. The
teams are well placed to offer weeding as a service in their repertoire.
• Benefit to smallholder: shown to increase productivity by up to 1t/ha
5. Duck-Rice systems
• There are several systems whereby ducks are either herded or fenced in the rice crop in
order to control insects and broadleaf weeds. Business models vary from ‘farmers
renting the flock’ to duck growers ‘renting the field’.
• Not a common approach in Cambodia despite substantial flocks in key provinces such
as Kampong Speu and Kampong Cham.
• Benefit to smallholder: Thailand smallholders have reported up to 15% increase in crop
productivity due to pest control and duck manure.
6. Local seed improvement – by preselecting seed from better preforming areas of crop prior to
harvest.
• There are several simple techniques available to smallholders whereby they can improve
the quality of their own seed reserves (for subsequent planting). These techniques are
not often applied.
• Benefit to smallholder: shown to increase productivity of subsequent crop up to 20%
16
Could
be
option
to
introduce
equipment
to
overcome
the
drudgery
of
planting
in
the
heat
of
the
day;
by
provide
shade
in
the
field
and/or
lighting
for
night
work.
17
Could
be
option
to
introduce
equipment
to
overcome
the
drudgery
of
planting
in
the
heat
of
the
day;
by
provide
shade
in
the
field
and/or
lighting
for
night
work.

11.
10
7. Harvesting
• While this is generally a family and community collective activity, the migration of labor
from rural areas is affecting labor availability. While the service teams could engage
here, there is also the prospect of contracting combine harvest machinery.
• Benefit to smallholder: Minimize damaged and dirty grain which otherwise reduces price
at the mill.
8. Bagging for storage using hermetically sealed bags
• Up to 30% of the harvest can suffer insect damage if stored incorrectly18
. Hermetically
sealed (air-tight) bags offer a proven solution but they require an ability to assure grain
moisture contents of 11 to 12%. The equipment and know-how to do this is available
but is rarely used by smallholders because it does require a good knowledge of how to
manage seed moisture content. Good storage also offers opportunities to smooth
supply and develop specialized markets.
• Benefit to smallholder: Eliminate post-harvest insect damage. Opens new marketing
options.
9. Harvest aggregation and marketing
• Several examples of specialized marketing have emerged: in Cambodia (Ibis Rice) has
targeted European markets and Sano rice has begun scoping for the Netherlands and
global markets, in Vietnam (Lotus Rice) has targeted USA markets. All of these markets
function on the basis of ‘environmental friendliness’.
• Benefit to smallholders: Market able to attract a premium.
10. Introducing innovation
• The teams are particularly well placed as a focus for introducing new techniques and
technologies. They can be skill-up and supported in field testing innovations that could
then translate into addition services in the repertoire. Examples include seeding and
transplanting machinery appropriate for smallholder farming; crop rotations; cover
cropping
• This would require organizations like Royal University of Agriculture, Srer Khmer and
Rachana increasingly working with the teams as their primary client for new
technologies, business models, marketing and extension approaches.
• Benefit to smallholders: Able to take advantage of new innovations without being
exposed to the risks and barriers to adoption that they would otherwise encounter when
working alone.
Risk analysis
Risks of primary concern for this program include the following:
• Risk of reliance on external service providers. Rather than the smallholder having the
expertise and the option of acting as she sees fit she would be reliant on the service teams
knowing their job and being able available at the right times19
.
• Smallholders are familiar with negotiating short-term cash flow deficient when they recruit
labor for harvest but are only able to make payment when they’ve received payment for the
crop. Other services earlier in the crop cycle will extend this deficit period – and risk.
18
Reference
from
Thailand
report.
Need
details
19
Personal
communication
University
California,
Davis
Extension
Team
Apr
2015

12.
11
• Guarantees and related products like microfinance are relatively unknown to the farming
community. It will take time to build trust in these products.
• Women are increasingly the decision makers in farm management. Introduction of a new
service could see a shift toward men taking control where that was not the case before.
• The model requires being able to recruit and maintain service teams. In turn this requires
being able to build a critical mass of clients in order to keep teams employed.
• Farmers may learn enough from the teams to decide to undertake some tasks by
themselves thereby not needed the full teams for labor, the demand for the teams could
gradually decline as the knowledge transfer is successful.
• The work is seasonal. Team members are likely to migrate in the ‘off season’ necessitating a
team rebuilding process each year.
• Monitoring of team and crop performance plus smallholder client feedback will be critical to
the success of this approach if at scale. The monitoring tools are not yet designed.
Oxfam’s role
The experience of Oxfam as an exponent of SRI provides an extraordinary platform for pursuing this
new approach. For Oxfam’s part the statistics indicate that our partners reached over 58,000
people and that they gained over $10 million at the farm gate. Oxfam’s investment over this time
totaled $3.7M over the 10 years with an average return of $3 for every $1 invested by Oxfam
Evaluation of the FLAIR program
Nonetheless, the most recent program design incorporating SRI was FLAIR. This program was
orientated toward farmer-facing extension with the objectives extending beyond extension for
technology transfer to women’s empowerment. In implementation the program was successful in;
• Encouraging good quality extension services
• Engaging government agencies and influencing national policy and strategy development
• Good work achieved by development sector actors.
It was less effective in;
• express objectives around women’s empowerment
Year
OUS
Investment
SRI
program
directly
supported
by
OA
SRI
program
across
Cambodia
SRI
program
directly
supported
by
OA
SRI
program
across
Cambodia
$(USD)/t
SRI
program
directly
supported
by
OA
SRI
program
across
Cambodia
2005
$
125,000
field
trials
2006
$
209,436
1,634
60,000
409
16,386
1.31
$
240
$
128,432
$
5,151,758
2007
$
482,466
2,712
82,386
814
47,039
1.29
$
240
$
251,891
$
14,563,274
2008 526,500$
3,835
104,750
1,342
58,291
1.3
$
240
$
418,782
$
18,186,792
2009
$
420,722
3,609
110,530
1,112
59,785
1.66
$
259
$
477,930
$
25,703,963
2010
$
517,620
6,188
124,820
1,270
61,291
1.53
$
258
$
501,320
$
24,194,009
2011
$
528,061
9,058
149,185
3,996
94,681
1.35
$
239
$
1,287,350
$
30,506,218
2012
$
333,133
13,097
149,657
6,189
100,720
1.43
$
254
$
2,247,838
$
36,583,518
2013
$
294,967
9,818
na
11,328
na 1.40
$
250
$
3,964,709
na
2014
$
325,654
8,868
na
6,877
na 0.92
$
250
$
1,581,641
na
Total 3,763,559$
58,819
781,328
33,335
438,193
$
10,859,893
$154,889,534
Source:
MAFF
reports,
grant
reports
Estimated
value
to
rural
economy
(USD)
SRI
in
Cambodia
No.
farmers
adopting
SRI
(HH)
Area
of
SRI
(ha) Increase
in
yield
above
national
average
(t/ha)

13.
12
• Encouraging public sector investment of budget resources
• Encouraging private sector engagement
The experience and learning from these outcomes underpins this new approach.
Links to the Cambodian OCS
The Cambodian OCS very specifically prioritizes resilience of smallholders and opts for a way-of-
working based around evidence based influencing of public and private policy and practices plus
positioning partner organizations to take on implementation at scale. The Service Team approach is
entirely consistent with the OCS and it opens additional opportunities for the OCS given the
emphasis on markets, women and landlessness.
Experience of Oxfam and partners
• Experience in agricultural extension pertaining to SRI research, promotion, training and
monitoring.
• Experience in targeted marketing directed toward rural communities
• Experience in micro-insurances
• Potential for partners to offer service using a social enterprise model
• A sound program design
• Identifying people to participate in SRI training; service team candidates and smallholders
• Marketing to smallholders
• Setting up the crop guarantee system (including IT4D – crop tracking)
• Lobby, campaign and advocacy at policy level
• Coordinating role
• Bridge between institution and extension service providers
Resource Development
• Able to access conventional development resources. While resource development sector
bilateral and multilateral donors is becoming increasingly competitive, Oxfam is well placed
to coordinate collective bids for partner organizations. Also specific thematics such as food
security, women in agriculture, youth in rural economies, privates sector engagement
remain prominent.
• Increasingly positioned to encourage private sector investment. Give the extent of
unrealized wealth described in this paper, the prospect that private sector investment to
capture some of that wealth must be considered.
• Increasingly versed in new investment instruments like Development Impact Bonds with the
potential to take a rollout of any initiative to genuine scale.
//End