1. 73 | P a g e
Conclusion
This dissertation has demonstrated a recurring tension in the practice of network structures
by Al Qaeda, as an example of a terrorist network: Network structures offer a range of
theoretical advantages to organisations; however the source of such advantages tends to be
communication. Terrorist networks tend to be ‘dark networks’ that depend upon secrecy to
avoid security services infiltrating and disrupting the organisation.
Because communications can reveal an organisation to security services, a tension exists
between the need for secrecy and the advantages available to a terrorist network that
employs the elements of a network structure.
A dense network can absorb information effectively and display resilience against disruption
as redundant connections and nodes can be employed to recover from the loss of individual
nodes. However, a dense network increases the likelihood of detection as it relies on
communication between network nodes. Therefore a dark network cannot depend upon
densely interconnected networks without compromising security, preventing them from
applying the benefits identified by Funk (2014)
Knowledge transfer and communication are vital to the organisation, both in day-to-day
existence and when preparing for and carrying out operations. However, every exchange is
at risk of interception. To this end, communication quantity must be limited and the
contents of communications must be encrypted or kept vague or generic enough that no
specific individuals or operations can be compromised. This therefore limits the ability of
different branches of the network to collaborate or coordinate their efforts. This has forced
Al Qaeda to use less sophisticated attack methods and has reduced the command and
control of the central hierarchy to general ideological guidance.

2. 74 | P a g e
This reduced control has also led to groups claiming affiliation to Al Qaeda and acting
contrary to their ideology, modus operandi and targeting parameters, alienating Al Qaeda’s
support groups or sources of finance. This has forced Al Qaeda to either publicly disavow
organisations, revealing elements of their relationships to other groups and individuals, or
suffer damage to their reputation. These statements can provide guidance to facilitate
security services in disrupting organisations by increasing knowledge of the network. Al
Qaeda’s desire to conceal such connections unless necessary reinforces the claims of
McBride & Hewitt (2013), that by analysing a dark network’s communication links, security
services can determine vulnerable points with which to disrupt the network.
In terms of innovation, Al Qaeda’s continued use of the network structure, despite its
diminished gains in recent years reinforces Gill et al.’s (2013) suggestion that established
organisations are resistant to radical change, while ISIS a younger affiliate group, was able to
radically restructure itself. Its rapid success also supports the claim that security services
tend to be unprepared to respond to radical innovations.
Terrorist organisations seem poorly suited to fully take advantage of network structures, as
the majority of benefits are reliant upon the communication abilities of an organisation. The
primary benefit that Al Qaeda derived from the network structure is the resilience of the
organisation as a whole. Affiliated groups have been provided with information, ideology
and resources and conducted operations in support of Al Qaeda’s ideology, however it is
apparent that Al Qaeda’s actual control of the situation is limited. This limited control
prevents the use of management methods recommended by Ahuja (2000), and could
suggest a reason why network structures cannot be fully exploited by terrorist groups.

3. 75 | P a g e
The network structure seems to have been transitional for terrorist groups. As long as a
terrorist organisation seeks to operate covertly it cannot take full advantage of the benefits
of the network structure. The network structure best facilitates a decentralised insurgency,
allowing for attacks without central coordination and mitigating the impact of targeted
disruption of the network. However, the flat, decentralised hierarchy is poorly suited to
creating a state-like entity, one of the core organisational goals; therefore, it is unsuitable as
a long term solution.
These findings present a challenge to the conclusion of Comas et al. (2014) who argued that
terrorist organisations can change form fluidly. This dissertation suggests that, while the
possibility to change forms is there, unless a terrorist organisation is willing to sacrifice its
security, it would be unable to adopt certain structures, such as a dense, well-connected
network, without exposing itself to unreasonable risks.
This dissertation indicates two potential areas for further study:
For legitimate organisations, this dissertation has noted that network structures depend
upon the free flow of information among network nodes to allow the benefits of the
structure to be employed. If a network is deliberately limited in its communication, the
network becomes fragile and is at risk of fragmentation. In addition, it was demonstrated
that limited communication can cause responses to a changing environment to lack
coherency or to be contradictory. For a network structure organisation to respond
effectively, the component nodes must be able to coordinate their efforts. Research into the
extent of communication and collaboration necessary to take advantage of the benefits of
network organisations could contribute to the rational design of network structures.

4. 76 | P a g e
With regards to the organisation of dark networks, this dissertation has suggested that dark
networks are suited to survival, resisting the disruptive efforts of security services and
allowing for semi-autonomous nodes and branches to continue operations, even if other
branches were disrupted. Given that this paper has focussed on theory, both from analyses
of terrorist organisations and from internally distributed communications and manuals of
terrorist organisations, the next step in research would be to examine how each of these
research directions relates to practice. Comparative analyses of the effectiveness of network
organisations, based on their structure and communication abilities would allow for greater
understanding of the importance of communication to coordinate the efforts of
geographically diverse network nodes towards a common purpose.
Terrorist organisations and their use of various organisational structures to achieve their
ends could be further explored in comparative case studies, examining the ability of terrorist
groups to achieve their objectives depending upon their organisational structure, between
hierarchical organisations and network forms.

5. 77 | P a g e
Material Cited
Adler, P. & Kwon, S.-W., 2002. Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept. The Academy of
Management Review, 27(1), pp. 17-40.
Ahuja, G., 2000. Collaboration Networks, Structural Holes, and Innovation: A Longitudinal
Study. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(3), pp. 425-455.
Al Arabiya News, 2014. Al Arabiya News: Report: ISIS axes gender mixing in Mosul
universities. [Online]
Available at: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/08/01/Report-ISIS-
orders-no-gender-mixing-in-Mosul-universities.html
[Accessed 17 August 2014].
Al Jazeera, 2014. Al Jazeera: Islamic State 'seizes main Syria oil fields'. [Online]
Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/islamic-state-seizes-
main-syria-oil-fields-20147411112027791.html
[Accessed 8 August 2014].
Al Qaeda; Federation of American Scientists, 2000. Al Qaeda Handbook. [Online]
Available at: fas.org/irp/world/para/aqmanual.pdf
[Accessed 28 July 2014].
Al Qaeda; Federation of American Scientists, 2000. Al Qaeda Handbook. [Online]
Available at: fas.org/irp/world/para/aqmanual.pdf
[Accessed 28 July 2014].
Al Qaeda; Harvard University, 2006. The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage
Through Which the Umma Shall Pass. [Online]
Available at: http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-
savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf
[Accessed 29 July 2014].
Al Qaeda; IntelCenter, 2003. al-Qaeda’s Advice for Mujahideen in Iraq: Lessons Learned in
Afghanistan. [Online]
Available at: http://intelcenter.com/Qaeda-Guerrilla-Iraq-v1-0.pdf
[Accessed 29 July 2014].
Al-Muqrin, A.-'. & Cigar, N., 2009. Al Qa'ida's Doctrine for Insurgency. USA: Potomac Books,
Inc..
Anderson, N. & Gasteiger, R., 2008. Innovation and Creativity in Organisations: Individual
and Work Team Research Findings and Implications for Government Policy. In: B.
Nooteboom & E. Stam, eds. Micro-foundations for Innovation Policy. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, pp. 249-272.

6. 78 | P a g e
Ariza, L., 2005. Scientific American: Virtual Jihad. [Online]
Available at: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/virtual-jihad/
[Accessed 28 07 2014].
Armstrong, M., 2014. Al Jazeera: Islamic State Battles for Syria's Oil Wealth. [Online]
Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/islamic-state-battles-
syria-oil-wealth-2014729123012267438.html
[Accessed 8 August 2014].
Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D., 2001. The Advent of Netwar (Revisited). In: J. Arquilla & D.
Ronfeldt, eds. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Crime, Terror and Militancy. USA: Rand,
pp. 1-25.
Atran, S., 2003. Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. Science, 299(5612), pp. 1534-1539.
Bakker, R., Raab, J. & Milward, H., 2012. A Preliminary Theroy of Dark Network Resilience.
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 31(1), pp. 33-2.
Barron, F. & Harrington, D., 1981. Creativity, Intelligence, and Personality. Annual Review of
Psychology, Volume 32, pp. 439-476.
BBC News, 2014. BBC News: Iraq crisis: Mosul dam 'recaptured' from IS militants. [Online]
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28833519
[Accessed 18 August 2014].
Bhamra, R., Dani, S. & Burnard, K., 2011. Resilience: the concept, a literature review and
future directions. International Journal of Production Research, 49(18), pp. 5375-5393.
bin Laden, O., 2005. Terror for Terror. In: B. Lawrence, ed. Messages to the World: The
Statements of Osama bin Laden. USA: Verso.
Brachman, J., 2008. Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice. USA: Routledge.
Bryman, A. & Bell, E., 2007. Business Research Methods. New York: Oxford University Press.
Caris, C. & Reynolds, S., 2014. ISIS Governance in Syria. [Online]
Available at: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS_Governance.pdf
[Accessed 8 August 2014].
Collis, J. & Hussey, R., 2009. Business Research: A Practical Guide for Undergraduate &
Postgraduate Students. 3rd ed. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Comas, J., Shrivastava, P. & Martin, E., 2014. Terrorism as Formal Organization, Network,
and Social Movement. Journal of Management Inquiry, pp. 1-14.

7. 79 | P a g e
Combating Terrorism Center, 2012. Letters from Abbottabad. [Online]
Available at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined
[Accessed 28 July 2014].
Comras, V., 2007. Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups: A Comparative
Perspective. In: J. Giraldo & H. Trinkunas, eds. Terrorism Financing and State Responses.
Stanford: Stanford University Prss, pp. 115-133.
Cooper, D. & Schindler, P., 2008. Business Research Methods. 10th ed. Singapore: McGraw-
Hill.
Dutton, J., 2003. Energize Your Workplace: How to Create and Sustain High-Quality
Connections at Work. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. & Jones, C., 2008. Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks.
International Security, 33(2), pp. 7-44.
Enders, W. & Jindapon, P., 2010. Network Externalities and the Structure of Terror
Networks. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(2), pp. 262-280.
Enders, W. & Su, X., 2014. Rational Terrorists and Optimal Network Structure. The Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 51(1), pp. 33-57.
Eriksson, P. & Kovalainen, A., 2008. Qualitative Methods in Business Research. UK: SAGE.
Fisher, C., 2004. Researching and Writing a Dissertation For Business Students. Harlow:
Pearson Education.
Forest, J., 2006. Teaching Terrorism: Dimensions of Information and Technology. In: J.
Forest, ed. The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes - Volume Two:
Training. s.l.:Praeger Security International, pp. 84-97.
Funk, R., 2014. Making the Most of Where You Are: Geography, Networks, and Innovation in
Organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 57(1), pp. 193-222.
Gill, P., Horgan, J., Hunter, S. & Cushenbery, L., 2013. Malevolent Creativity in Terrorist
Organizations. The Journal of Creative Behaviour, 47(2), pp. 125-151.
Gunaratna, R., 2002. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. London: Hurst & Company.
Gunaratna, R. & Acharya, A., 2006. The Terrorist Training Camps of Al Qaeda. In: J. Forest,
ed. The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes - Volume Two:
Training. USA: Praeger Security International, pp. 172-193.
Hamel, G. & Valikangas, L., 2003. The Quest for Resilience. Harvard Business Review,
September.

8. 80 | P a g e
Hegghammer, T., 2010. The recruiter's dilemma: Signalling and rebel recruitment tactics.
Journal of Peace Research, 50(1), pp. 3-16.
Helfstein, S. & Wright, D., 2011. Covert or Convenient? Evolution of Terror Attack Networks.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55(5), pp. 785-813.
Hoffman, B., 2003. RAND: Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: An
Assessment. [Online]
Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P8078.html
[Accessed 28 July 2014].
Horowitz, M., 2010. Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide
Terrorism. International Organization, Volume 64, pp. 33-64.
Institute for the Study of War, 2014. Control of Terrain in Iraq: August 13 2014. [Online]
Available at: http://iswiraq.blogspot.co.uk/2014/08/control-of-terrain-in-iraq-august-
13.html
[Accessed 13 August 2014].
Intelcenter, 2005. Evolution of Jihadi Video. [Online]
Available at: http://intelcenter.com/EJV-PUB-v1-0.pdf
[Accessed 1 August 2014].
Intelcenter, 2006. Al Qaeda Messaging Dissemination Link Analysis. [Online]
Available at: http://intelcenter.com/Qaeda-MessagingDissem-Links-v1-0.pdf
[Accessed 1 August 2014].
Jackson, R., Jarvis, L., Gunning, J. & Smyth, M. B., 2011. Terrorism: A Critical Introduction.
UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kagan, F. & Kagan, K., 2009. How Not to Defeat al Qaeda. The Weekly Standard, 5 October.
Kase, K., Cantón, C., von Krogh, G. & Takeuchi, H., 2013. Towards Organizational Knowledge:
The Pioneering Work of Ikujiro Nonaka. s.l.:Palgrave MacMillan.
Kenney, M., 2007. From Pablo to Osama: Traficking and Terrorist Networks, Government
Bureaucraces, and Competitive Adaptation. USA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Kenney, M., 2010a. Beyond the Internet: Metis, Techne, and the Limitations of Online
Artifacts for Islamist Terrorists. Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 22, pp. 177-197.
Kenney, M., 2010b. "Dumb" Yet Deadly: Local Knowledge and Poor Tradecraft Among
Islamist Militants in Britain and Spain. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, pp. 911-
932.

9. 81 | P a g e
Kilberg, J., 2012. A Basic Model Explaining Terrorist Group Organizational Structure. Studies
in Conflict & Terrorism, 35(11), pp. 810-830.
Lawrence, B., 2005. Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden. USA:
Verso.
Lefler, J., 2014. The Institute for the Study of War: Life Under ISIS in Mosul. [Online]
Available at: http://iswiraq.blogspot.co.uk/2014/07/life-under-isis-in-mosul.html
[Accessed 17 August 2014].
Lengnick-Hall, C. & Beck, T., 2005. Adaptive Fit Versus Robust Transformation: How
Organizations Respond to Environmental Change. Journal of Management, 31(5), pp. 738-
757.
Lengnick-Hall, C., Beck, T. & Lengnick-Hall, M., 2011. Developing a capacity for
organizational resilience through strategic human resource management. Human Resource
Management, Volume 21, pp. 243-255.
Lewis, J., 2014. The Islamic St ate: a Counter-St rategy for a Counter-State, Washington D.C.:
Institute for the Study of War.
Mannes, A., 2008. Testing The Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders
Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activitiy. The Journal of International Policy Solutions, Volume 9,
pp. 40-49.
Marlin, R., 2004. What Does Al Qaeda Want? Unedited Communiuqués. USA: North Atlantic
books.
Maylor, H. & Blackmon, K., 2005. Researching Business and Management. China: Palgrave
Macmillan.
McBride, M. & Hewitt, D., 2013. The enemy you can't see: An investigation of the disruption
of dark networks. Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, Volume 93, pp. 32-50.
Medina, R., 2014. Social Network Analysis: A case study of the Islamist terrorist network.
Security Journal, 27(1), pp. 97-121.
Medina, R. & Hepner, G., 2011. Advancing the Understanding of Sociospatial Dependencies
in Terrorist Networks. Transactions in GIS, 15(5), pp. 577-597.
Nacos, B., 2006. Communication and Recruitment of Terrorists. In: J. Forest, ed. The Making
of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes - Volume One: Recruitment. USA:
Praeger Security International, pp. 41-52.
Nonaka, I. & Takeuchi, H., 1995. The Knowledge Creating Company. New York: Oxford
University Press.

10. 82 | P a g e
O'Reilly, C. & Tushman, M., 2004. The Ambidextrous Organization. Harvard Business Review,
1 April, pp. 74-81.
Podolny, J. & Page, K., 1998. Network Forms of Organization. Annual Review of Sociology,
Volume 24, pp. 57-76.
Raab, J. & Milward, H., 2003. Dark Networks as Problems. Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, 13(4), pp. 413-439.
Rassler, D. et al., 2012. Combating Terrorism Center: Letters From Abbottabad: Bin Laden
Sidelined?. [Online]
Available at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined
[Accessed 28 July 2014].
Ravasz, E. & Barabási, A.-L., 2003. Hierarchical Organization in Complex Networks. Physical
Review E, Volume 67.
Richtnér, A. & Löftsten, H., 2014. Managing in turbulence: how the capacity for resilience
influences creativity. R&D Management, 44(2), pp. 137-151.
Roxenhall, T., 2013. Network Structure and Innovation in Strategic Innovation Networks.
International Journal of Management Innovation, 17(2).
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A., 2009. Research methods for business students. 5th
ed. Italy: Pearson Education Ltd.
Schanzer, J., 2005. Al Qaeda's Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups & The Next Generation of
Terror. New York: Specialist Press International.
Secret, M., 2012. In Terrorists’ Testimony, a Rare, Intimate Look Into a Secretive World. The
New York Times, 29 April.
Sekaran, U. & Bougie, R., 2010. Research Methods for Business: A Skill Building Approach.
5th ed. East Lothian: Wiley.
Shin, S. & Kook, W., 2013. Can knowledge be more accessible in a virtual network?:
Collective dynamics of knowledge transfer in a virtual knowledge organization network.
Decision Support Systems, Volume 59, pp. 180-189.
Simcox, R., 2014. Al Jazeera: Osama bin Laden: Three years after Abbottabad. [Online]
Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/05/osama-bin-laden-three-
years-after-2014511123288215.html
[Accessed 18 August 2014].
Teece, D., 2013. Nonaka's Contribution to the Understanding of Knowledge Creation,
Codification and Capture. In: C. Cantón, K. Kase, G. von Krogh & H. Takeuchi, eds. Towards

11. 83 | P a g e
Organizational Knowledge: The Pioneering Work of Ikukjo Nonaka. s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan,
pp. 17-23.
Vardi, N., 2010. Al Qaeda's New Business Model. Forbes, 1 March, 185(3), pp. 60-66.
West, M. & Wallace, M., 1991. Innovation in health care teams. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 21(4), pp. 303-315.
Williams, P., 2001. Transnational Criminal Networks. In: J. Arquilla & D. Ronfeldt, eds.
Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. USA: RAND, pp. 61-97.
Wilson, J., 2010. Essentials of Business Research: A Guide to Doing Your Research Project.
Padstow: SAGE.
Yin, R., 2009. Case Study Research: Designs and Methods. 4th ed. USA: Sage.
Zanini, M. & Edwards, S., 2001. The Networking of Terror in the Information Age. In: J.
Arquilla & D. Ronfeldt, eds. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and
Militancy. USA: RAND, pp. 29-60.
Zollo, M. & Winter, S., 2002. Deliberate Learning and the Evolution of Dynamic Capabilities.
Organization Science, 13(3), pp. 339-351.