3. What we need to know……
What we need to change……..
4. A detailed look at death and injury rates
Case Studies
Changes in gear
NIOSH findings
Putting it all together with a brief “Strategy
and Tactics” Review
5. Three groups
Inside
Outside
Cardiac Related
Inside deaths
Rapid Fire Growth
Collapse
Ran out of AIR
6.
7.
8.
9. What does this mean to us……….
Late 1970’s 1.8 deaths /1000 structure fires, occurred
inside
Late 1990’s 3.0 deaths /1000 structure fires,
occurred inside
2000 through 2009, 138 firefighters died while
operating inside at structure fires
2010 through 2013, 55 firefighter died while
operating inside at structure fire
10. Breaking down the 138 deaths from 2000-2009
78 asphyxiation, 25 burns, 20 sudden cardiac event,
15 crushing or trauma.
Of the 78 that died of asphyxiation
27 died in structural collapse
24 died in rapid fire progression
18 died getting lost and running out of air
5 died when they fell through holes burned in the floor
4 others died through misc. reasons
11.
12. Colerain Township, Ohio
160 career firefighters
5 Stations
EMS Transport service
8,700 calls for service in 2007
13. Captain Robin M. Broxterman
April 16, 1970 – April 4, 2008
Firefighter Brian W. Schira
October 15, 1978 – April 4, 2008
14.
15. Friday, April 4th, 2008
0611 hrs received 911 call
0612 hrs FD was dispatched
0613 hrs Homeowner reported the fire was in
the basement
0623 hrs first unit arrived on scene
Capt. Broxterman has face-to-face with
homeowner
23. Lutherville Volunteer Fire Company
Baltimore County Fire Department
This combination department consists of
1,050 career members and approximately
2,000 volunteers.
29. Incident Management System
Personnel Accountability System
Rapid Intervention Crews
Conducting a search without a means of egress protected by a hoseline
Tactical consideration for coordinating advancing hoselines from
opposite directions
Building safety features, e.g., no sprinkler systems, modifications
limiting automatic door closing
Occupant behavior-leaving sliding glass door open
Ineffective ventilation.
30.
31. Cincinnati, OH
Around 800 members
26 Stations / 26 Engine Companies
52. 12 Stations
237 Uniform Members
83,000 Residents
15,000 Call a year
11 Engines
4 Trucks
1 Rescue
1 Tender
NIOSH #2011-18
53.
54.
55. Hard time getting water on the fire
> 48 minutes
Lots of radio transmissions.
Multiple Stairwells and FDC
Mayday called 52 minutes into call.
Fireground personnel instructed to change
radio channel
58. • Ensure that the existing standard operating procedures for high-rise fire-
fighting operations are reviewed, implemented, and enforced.
• Ensure that a deployment strategy for low-frequency/high-risk incidents is
developed and implemented.
• Ensure that the incident commander develops an incident action plan,
which is communicated to all fire fighters on scene, and includes effective
strategy and tactics for high-rise operations, a timely coordinated fire attack,
and a coordinated search plan.
• Ensure that the incident commander utilizes division/group supervisors.
59. • Ensure that fire fighters are properly trained in air management and
SCBA emergency operations.
• Ensure that the incident commander is provided a chief's aide.
• Ensure that the incident commander establishes a stationary
command post.
•Ensure that fire fighters are properly trained in Mayday standard
operating procedures and survival techniques.
60. - NIOSH Top 5 LODD Causes
1. Improper Risk Assessment / Poor size-up
2. Lack of Command
3. Lack of accountability
4. Inadequate communications
5. Lack of SOP / failure to follow SOPs
64. New changes to 1981 for 2013 include
changing the EOSTI (End of Service Time
Indicator)
Change the EOSTI from 25% to 33%
65. NIOSH NFPA
40 lit/min
30 minute (1200L) bottle
= 31.8 minutes of work
100 lit/min
30 minute (1200L) bottle
= 12.8 minutes of work
Total
Volume
Work
Period
Work Time Exit
Reserve
Exit Time
45 min.
bottle
1800 L 1350 L 13.5 min. 450 L 4.5 min.
30 min
bottle
1200L 900L 9 min 300L 3 min
67. Changes in Gear
In 1980 lenses were
tested and found to fail
above 300°F
NIST data shows the
mask is the first
component to fail.
Melting at temps above
900ºF and seeing
degradation above 600ºF
Rollover along the
ceiling can be seen
between 900°F and
1300°F
68. Changes in Gear
2013 edition of NFPA
1981 changes the
recommendations for
face pieces.
600ºF is improved to
950ºF
900ºF is improved to
1800ºF
Rollover / Flashover
occurs between 900°F
and 1300°F
69. Impact of Horizontal Ventilation on Fire
Behavior
Modern furniture
New fire growth curve
Tenability
Forcing the door
Proper vent locations
Coordination of fire attack
Pushing Fire
70. What does this mean………..
Strategy is the overall goal
Tactics are the objectives to reach that goal
Don’t forget about the Tasks
Functions preformed to reach the objectives
71. Lacking sufficient manpower, rescue takes
precedence.
Remove those in greatest danger first!
With insufficient manpower to perform needed
tasks, perform those that protect the most first.
When sufficient manpower is available
coordinate both rescue and fire attack.
If there are no threats to occupants or no
occupants, Firefighters should not be unduly
endangered
72. What’s our goal?
What are the current fire conditions?
What is the expected outcome?
How are we going to get our information?
73.
74. How are we going to get it done?
Which line do we pull?
Are we going to knock it down form the outside
with a Transitional Attack?
When should ventilation be started, and by who?
Who is responsible for the Search vs. Fire Attack
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90. Know the limits of your gear
Manage your reserve air
Keep crew integrity
Don’t delay a Call for Assistance
Choose the right equipment
Coordinate Ventilation efforts
Complete the 360º
Make sure your efforts are consistent with the
game plan.
To look closer at the fatalities, I’m going to divide them into 3 groups.
These fatalities occur as a chain of events.
Volunteer or Career, it doesn’t matter.
Inside deaths can mostly be attributed to Rapid Fire Progression, Trapped, or Getting Lost.
Stats by the United States Fire Admin.
Firefighter Injuries 82k in 2005 of which 42k where on the fire ground.
Numbers dropped slightly to 69K and 32k in 2012
On duty firefighter deaths. 140 deaths in 1980….83 deaths in 2011
Since 2000 an average of 32 deaths/year occur on scene
Same time period 39k injuries/year average
Since 1977 structure fires have declined 53%
-A spike is seen in 2007 with the passing of 9 Charleston Firefighters
Closer look at the number of deaths.
This shows that the number of deaths per structure fire is not falling at the same rate.
Breaking down the inside deaths
63.5% of deaths from Smoke Inhalation
23% from Burns
15.5% from crushing injuries
50/50 Career vs. Volunteer
50/50 Residential vs. Commercial
2003-2012 there was an average of 29 fire ground deaths / year.
Looking closer at the 27 that died in structural collapse:
- Structural collapse includes 18 roof, 6 floor, and 1 wall
- Rapid fire progression includes flashover and backdraft
All but 3 of the 78 were wearing SCBAs
Case studies are important learning tools for both career and volunteer departments. Case studies give you a chance to learn from the mistakes and decisions of others.
- Case studies form NIOSH and FIREFIGHTERCLOSECALLS.COM
Capt. Broxterman 37 y/o 17 years as a career firefighter
FF Schira (sounds like Scarea) 29 y/o, 6 month prob. ff
Friday, April 4, 2008, Captain Robin Broxterman, 37-years-old, a 17-year veteran
career firefighter and paramedic, and Firefighter Brian Schira (Scarea), 29-years-old, a six-month probationary, part-time firefighter and Emergency Medical Technician with Colerain Fire & EMS died after the floor they were operating on collapsed at a residential structure fire.
Automatic fire alarm activation from the first floor smoke detector and basement carbon monoxide detector
An automatic fire alarm response complement of two engine companies (Engines 102 & 109), one ladder company (Ladder 25), and the Battalion Chief (District 25) were dispatched to investigate at 06:12:45.
1 minute late the home owner called to report a fire in the basement
Homeowner stated everyone was out of the house and the fire was in the basement.
The Capt., FF #1, and FF #2 pulled a 1 ¾” line to the front door at 0626
0627 reported “Making entry to basement”
Basement view
Fire started in a closet by an electrical short in a fan located in the closet.
Flooring system was 2x10 16” on center with ¾” OSB covering
1st floor view
14 minutes after initial call, the Capt, and 2 FF entered the structure on the first floor and encountered heavy smoke coming from the basement.
8 minutes later the 2nd FF was found outside of the structure stating he lost contact with his crew.
2 minutes after that an official Mayday was declared.
Basement view
Walkout basement
30 minutes later the Capt. was found in the basement buried under structural components
After another 30 minutes the FF was found in the same location.
1991 Construction -1st floor constructed on 2x10wood floor joist 16in/oc
Walkout basement
While the crew was making there entry, the Charlie division supervisor request interiar pull out and attack from the walkout basement.
1st floor view with floor collapse
HOLD for discussion and questions
Left behind two children, a fiancé that was pregnant with his third child.
Oscar was 25 and had been on the department for 3 years.
0845 hrs paged for a working fire.
1st chief on scene reported heavy fire at rear of structure
Built in 1921
First arriving engine got their own hydrant
Pulled a 350’ 1 ¾” hoseline to the front door.
Front door was locked, so the repositioned to the rear, side C
Once on side C, they were ordered to return to A side and attack from the unburned side.
1st floor
Living room walls covered with wood paneling
While waiting for water and after the front door was forced, another Ladder Company had vented the 1st floor windows.
The engine crew could not get water to the nozzle
The engine officer went to unkink the hose
The victim, and two others entered the structure with an uncharged hoseline, and were caught in a flashover.
After a 10 minute removal, FF Oscar Armstrong was pronounced dead at the hospital
28 y/o
2100 hrs.
Diagram 1. Initial placement of apparatus and scene conditions.
PD already on scene stated
950 sq. ft. structure
The 2 ½” hoseline was pulled due to heavy fire showing on rear of the structure.
Diagram 2. Layout of house.
Diagram 3. FF1, victim, and injured fire fighter/paramedic made entry into house stopping at the doorway between
the kitchen and utility room, approximately 12 feet from the front door.
Diagram 4. Fire fighters recall the smoke being very thick and black while operating within the house. In the
diagram, the smoke around the fire fighters was made transparent to convey their location. FF2 and FF3 are not
included within this diagram.
Diagram 5. Conditions within structure preceding the flashover. Windows vented on B-, C-, and D-sides.
Exterior crews were breaking out windows.
Interior search crews saw flame spread on the ceiling and headed out.
FF1 had exited the structure to adjust his mask.
As the search crew pulled out of the structure, they yelled at the attack crew to get out.
The injured FF yelled at FF Carey and then turned to head out
The injured ff became stuck to the melting carpet 4’ from the front door.
She was quickly pulled out of the structure by the others.
Photo 7. Looking toward the A/B corner, thick, black smoke continues to push out the B-side
window that was vented. The volume of smoke venting from the front door has increased, so has
fire on C-side. FF1 can be seen in front doorway. Crews are still operating inside and on the roof.
Photo 10. Looking toward the A-side front door, the flashover has just occurred. FF1 is pulling
on the 2½-inch hoseline and FF2 and FF3 are attempting to pull the injured fire
fighter/paramedic from the house. She is just inside the door way and the downed fire fighter
(victim) is still in the house.
Contributing factors-
Well involved fire with entrapped civilian upon arrival
• Incomplete 360 degree situational size-up
• Inadequate risk-versus-gain analysis
• Ineffective fire control tactics
• Failure to recognize, understand, and react to deteriorating conditions
• Uncoordinated ventilation and its effect on fire behavior
• Removal of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece
• Inadequate command, control, and accountability
• Insufficient staffing
Mayday call occurs at 50:00 minutes
When used properly more protection (must be buttoned up correct)
Longer coats thumb loops,
When used properly more protection (must be buttoned up correct)
Longer coats, thumb loops.
Die in the fabric starts to lose color at 400 degrees
Gear will start to burn around 1200 degrees.
Burns occur often in the areas where straps are.
50% lighter over the past 25 years
What type of SCBAs does your department have?
Every 5 years NFPA does updates and 1981 is due in 2013.
In January 2013 NFPA release the new recommendation of 33%
Based on respiratory minute volume. Air consumption studies have increased. USMC doing the FF Combat Challenge = 96 lit/min. The consumption goes up with prolonged work. NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program in 2012 moved reserve air volume to 600L
Based on respiratory minute volume. Air consumption studies have increased. USMC doing the FF Combat Challenge = 96 lit/min. The consumption goes up with prolonged work. NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program in 2012 moved reserve air volume to 600L
Heat flux can vary effects on lens
Has you department conducted live training burns?
What was the internal temps?
Heat flux can vary effects on lens
Has you department conducted live training burns?
What was the internal temps?
Modern flashover in 3:40, Legecy over 29 minutes. Larger homes with more open spaces allows for faster fire growth due to more available fuel and oxygen.
Module 2 – Experiment
Module 2 – New Curve
Module 4 – Instrumentation – Video Examples
Module 5 – Tactical Considerations
Stragety = overall goal
Tactics = objectives to reach goal i.e. interior fire attack