Notes for the week of March 22.

1. potential and future
generations
I felt that Singer's chapter on the environment was quite
unfounded. First of all, his theory has been based upon interests
and the fact that humans, "persons" and animals have them, and
now he seems to be trying to get around that limitation. Secondy,
he claims that "such an ethic fosters consideration for the interests
of all sentient creatures, including subsequent generations
stretching into the far future", but he has established in previous
chapters that the potential persons argument is problematic. I
recognize that we are (almost) entirely certain that there will be
future generations and therefore there will be sentient creatures
in the future who will suffer because of our decisions, but they are
still "potential" people. Why Singer is allowing the potential people
argument to count now when he wouldn't allow it earlier? Singer
really just seems determined to protect the environment (which is a
great thing), but he doesn't seem to have legitimate grounds under
his theory to defend it.

2. Wolf and Singer
Student: My pmail is in response to Susan Wolf's "Moral Saints". I
find her view on moral obligation very interesting, and I find myself
agreeing with her view as a whole. But if she is correct, then many
moral theories, including Singer's preference utilitarianism, are only
fully applicable to those who she defines as moral saints, or those
who are only fully fulfilled by dedicating their lives to improving
the lives of others. This means that we would need new moral
theories, or provisions that define the difference between a bad
person and a good person. I consider myself a good person
because I care about others and not hurting people's feelings, but
I by no means feel morally obligated to dedicate my life and all my
earnings to the third world.
DrC: I am interested in the idea that common-sense morality can be
viewed as a system of prima facie rights and duties in W.D. Ross’s
sense. This would be a theory that corresponds more closely to
your intuitions than does Singer’s. You have a prima facie duty to
help the poor, but this duty must survive competition from other
duties.

3. death and the self
Student: Today's conversation about the contrast between Thomas
Nagel's view of death and the symbolic utility view of death got me
thinking about lab animals. Could one say that the symbolic utility
view of death could justify the deaths of lab animals? It seems to
me that by being held in cages, without any freedoms would be
analogous to being "trapped" in an old age body, in which ones
expected utility or say ability to take long walks is prevented. If
the self of these animals has "shrunk" then one could say that
their death isn't so bad. One may be able to argue against this
idea for mice or pigs, but the examples of chimpanzee's and apes
cognitive abilities seems to put them in this category to me. Of
course a chimpanzee wouldn't be in such a situation without human
intervention so this complicates the situation from that of old age,
but is this premise correct or am I misunderstanding this topic?
DrC: I think you have it right. Of course, reversible shrinkage is
different from the irreversible kind (old age). The `contours of the
self’ view is meant to be a middle way between Nagel’s view and
the classical stoic view.

4. philosophy and temperament
I was just wondering whether a person is ever justified in
selecting a moral theory based on personal preferences, rather
than its philosophical merits (internal consistency, wide application,
etc) ie. I like animals, therefore I would assume a view that doesn't
discriminate against them. If one can be justified to subscribe to
moral theories based on their individual preferences, I think it
would make morality more personal, more like a way of life.
Wouldn't it be more 'natural' if morality were like that?
You might take a look at William James’s little book, Pragmatism,
where he argues that every philosophy is an expression of personal
temperament.

5. act & omission: intrinsic
and extrinsic differences
Student: Singer brings up an important question when it comes to
rich and poor and how they interact. Why give? He reminds us that
most often in regard to the distinction about killing and allowing to
die, we lack an identifiable victim that can be traced back to the
act of not helping the impoverished. Everyone can agree that we
avoid killing others, but what about allowing to die. Since there is
no identifiable victim created from our choice no to help, we have a
clear conscience and it does not trouble us. But lets say if you had
seen a poor person in your community for years scraping by and
never took the time to help out, ....
DrC: Another revealing thought-experiment is to imagine that
*everyone* in the world who is in distress was in your community.
When you think you’ve done enough for them and turn to your
commitments to your family and yourself, is your omission
“intrinsically” the same as murder? (This is how I’m reading Singer.)

6. Ch 10: what desires
should we have?
Student: So what Singer is saying in Chapter 10 [drc: page
reference?] is that we can pursue abilities, "real" fulfilment and
satisfaction to the extent that we are frugal? We can pursue
these things as long as we minimize pollution and re-use all that
can be re-used? So he is saying that one cannot ethically justify
purchasing a motorcycle to develop the ability to take a corner
going 100 kilometers an hour? Is that not a real ability or, if it is
achieved, real satisfaction that someone would obtain?
DrC: It’s a real ability and the satisfaction is genuine, but they are
expensively acquired, so they run into his argument in Ch 8 that
(“intrinsically”) they are morally equivalent to murder. In Ch 10 he
introduces certain satisfactions (video games, etc.) are less
satisfying than others (nature walks, etc.), and the related idea
that we should raise our children to have preferences for the
latter.

7. Immigration and national
identity
Student: Ch 9 of Singer. I am not really
satisfied with Singer's argument; not because
I disagree with him, but because he seems to
have no value for national identity.
drc: One source of criticism of preference
utilitarianism is that it has no place for what
might be called `perfectionist values’ as a
source of moral rights and duties, separate
from utility. (Maintaining a national culture
can be classified as one such value.)

8. pmail: Fairhaven
Student: I think that most people, if they were voting in the
Farihaven referendum, would be motivated to vote to allow as many
"refugees" in as possible because they believe that human life has
inherent value or that they deserve to live, and not because they
are concerned about "interests". Singer backs up his claim by
saying that intuitively most people would vote as "bleeding
hearts". And this may be true, but they are most likely voting as
"bleeding hearts" because of religious convictions, or the beliefs
that human life has inherent value. Singer seems to be abusing
intuition in this instance since he arrives at his point critically, and
then relies on the (religious) beliefs of others for support in
numbers. Also, Singer makes no reference to non-human animals in
this chapter. Obviously, animals aren't named as refugees, but
should he not be evaluating the interests of animals who want into
Fairhaven as well?

9. Hobbes: capital punishment
Student: I found Thomas Hobbes' Social Contract theory this week
particularly interesting,and it let me to wonder how he might deal
with an issues such as capital punishment. If a man murders
someone (in a culture where law and government exists) then he is
likely breaking his covenant, which would be breaching the social
contract. If a man breeches the social contract is he considered to
be at war with the others whom are abiding within covenant and
thus be subject to the others "right to everything: [including his]
body" and thus to death? Or alternatively, would the man's right of
nature override this and make it permissible for him to flee capture
and death?
DrC: The Leviathan can impose whatever penalty s/he chooses --
whatever schedule of penalties he has put into law -- for the man's
breech of the contract. If he chooses capital punishment, the
person to be punished has the right of nature to flee.

10. DV and EU
Student: I'd be interested to hear more of
your thoughts on justifying SU when it lies
in stark contrast to the EU. Why is DV
better than preference utilitarianism?
DrC: I think the case for DV comes out best
when the contrast with EU is slight rather
than stark. After all, one is trying to show
that SU has weight, not that it always
dominates over EU. This comes out vividly in
the DV approach to the long-standing
problem of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Let’s
discuss that.

11. poverty and ten percent
Student: It was brought up in class that Singer suggestion of
giving 10% of one's income to help the world's poor would not do
too much.However, for Singer, this is a bare minimum. Singer
would actually agree with giving much more (about 30% or more, if
possible); the reason he suggests 10% to the regular person is
because he knows that at the first thought of giving 30% of one's
income away, one would be turned off from that "strong"
commitment, and as a result, would not even think of giving any.
With suggesting 10%, many would find this to be a reasonably easy
about to give away, and so, more people would actually do it.
Singer, I think, sees more good being done, practically, with small
amounts from a lot of people rather than large amounts from only
a few.
DrC: A ten-percent income-tax deduction for poverty relief,
patterned after social insurance deductions, would be an excellent
way to implement Singer’s proposal.

12. Singer: new generations
Singer: “Can we be sure that future
generations will appreciate wilderness?
Perhaps they will be happier sitting in air-
conditioned shopping malls, playing computer
games more sophisticated than any we can
imagine? That is possible. But there are
several reasons why we should not give this
possibility too much weight.” (271)

13. intrinsic worth
“...the fact that all organisms are part of an
interrelated whole does not suggest that
they are all of *intrinsic* worth, let alone of
equal intrinsic worth. They may be of worth
only because they are needed for the
existence of the whole, and the whole may
be of worth only because it supports the
existence of conscious beings.” (282)

14. Rawls: A theory of justice
Rawls: “I shall maintain . . . that the persons
in the initial situation would choose two . . .
principles

15. Jean Grimshaw: the idea
of a female ethic
“It was above all Rousseau’s notion of virtue
as `gendered’ that Mary Wolstonecraft
attacked in her *Vindication of the rights of
women*” (153)
On the other hand, “in the very influential
work of Mary Daly,” there are essentialist
beliefs about male and female nature. (154)

16. Grimshaw: Gilligan
“In her influential book *In a different voice:
psychological theory and women’s
development* (1982) Carol Gilligan argued
that those who have suggested that women
typically reason differently from men about
moral issues are right; what is wrong is their
assumption of the inferiority or deficiency of
female moral reasoning.” (157)

17. Grimshaw: Noddings
“Nel Noddings, for example, in her book
*Caring: a feminine approach to ethics and
moral education* (1984) argues that a
morality based on rules or principles is in
itself inadequate, and that it does not
capture what is distinctive about female
moral thinking.” (157)

18. Grimshaw: Ruddick
“Sara Ruddick, for example, in an article
entitled `Maternal Thinking’ (1980) argues
that the task of mothering generates a
conception of virtue which might provide a
resource for a critique of those values and
priorities which underpin much contemporary
social life -- including those of
militarism.” (158)

19. Grimshaw: Poole
“But, as Ross Poole has argued, in `Morality,
Masculinity and the Market’ (1985),
utilitarianism was not really able to provide
an adequate morality, mainly because it could
never provide convincing reasons why
individuals should submit to a duty or
obligation that was not in their interests in
the short term.” (160)