1. Performance-based pay and
teachers:
AN EXAMINATION OF CONSEQUENCES ON
INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND WORKER-
EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIPS.

2. Introduction
 How performance-based pay affects teaching
profession

3. Introduction
 Extrinsic Motivators (or rewards) Influences:
 Intrinsic motivation
 Working relationships
 Superiors
 Colleagues

4. Introduction
 Poor student achievement:
 Increased awareness toward public education
 Resulted in many new education reforms

5. Introduction
 Performance-based pay is used to:
 Motivate teachers
 Raise instructional quality
 Increase student achievement
 Locating inadequate teachers

6. Outline

7. Outline
 Types of Incentives
 Use of rewards in different countries

8. Outline
 Types of Incentives
 Use of rewards in different countries
 Reasons for using performance-based pay

9. Outline
 Types of Incentives
 Use of rewards in different countries
 Reasons for using performance-based pay
 What research says about the use of performance-
based pay

10. Outline
 Types of Incentives
 Use of rewards in different countries
 Reasons for using performance-based pay
 What research says about the use of performance-
based pay
 Methods used to evaluate teachers

11. Outline
 Types of Incentives
 Use of rewards in different countries
 Reasons for using performance-based pay
 What research says about the use of performance-
based pay
 Methods used to evaluate teachers
 Factors which lead to reduced teacher morale

12. Outline
 Types of Incentives
 Use of rewards in different countries
 Reasons for using performance-based pay
 What research says about the use of performance-
based pay
 Methods used to evaluate teachers
 Factors which lead to reduced teacher morale
 Risks of using rewards in the workplace

13. Outline
 Types of Incentives
 Use of rewards in different countries
 Reasons for using performance-based pay
 What research says about the use of performance-
based pay
 Methods used to evaluate teachers
 Factors which lead to reduced teacher morale
 Risks of using rewards in the workplace
 Conclusion

14. Types of Incentives
Monetary Non-Monetary

15. Types of Incentives
Monetary Non-Monetary
Pay bonuses
Improved job stability
Pensions
Salary supplements

16. Types of Incentives
Monetary Non-Monetary
Pay bonuses Professional development
opportunities
Improved job stability
Additional teaching
Pensions resources
Salary supplements Coupons or vouchers
Social recognition (e.g.
award ceremonies, etc)

17. Comparison of Use
Developed Countries
 Monetary incentives
 Hybrids
 Monetary
&
 Non-monetary
 Majority of rewards = $

18. Comparison of Use
Developed Countries Developing Countries
 Monetary incentives  Non-monetary
 Hybrids incentives
 Monetary  More economical
&
 Non-monetary
 Majority of rewards = $

19. Rationale
Improve student academic achievement.
Improve instructional abilities and quality
Increase education standards
Increased teacher work ethic

20. Capitalism & Education
 Money is the only true form of motivation
 Corporate routines and ethos have influenced
mainstream education

21. Capitalism & Education
 Money is the only true form of motivation
 Corporate routines and ethos have influenced
mainstream education
 Competition for additional funding
 Race to the Top
 Competition will produce
 Increased levels of instruction
 New “types” of teachers who thrive in a competitive
environment
 A means to identify and remove weak performers

22. Research says…
 Performance-based pay ≠ Increased student
achievement

23. Research says…
 Performance-based pay ≠ Increased student
achievement
 Frequency of work-related incentives is increasing

24. Research says…
 Performance-based pay ≠ Increased student
achievement
 Frequency of work-related incentives is increasing
 Performance-based pay ≠ Increased work quality

25. Research says…
 “Tone” is advesarial
 Typically in developed countries

26. Research says… Benefits?
 Reduced teacher mobility between schools
 “Undesirable” schools experienced increased teacher stability

27. Research says… Benefits?
 Reduced teacher absenteeism
 When pay was linked to attendance

28. Benefits? However…
 Some teachers sought out schools with performance-
based pay
 Good teachers moved in order to qualify for higher earnings
 Struggling schools could not hold onto good teachers

29. Research says…
 Performance based-pay needs to be
 Linked to instructional quality

30. Research says…
 Performance based-pay needs to be
 Linked to instructional quality
 Transparent to teachers that evaluation methods truly assess
high quality instruction

31. Teacher Evaluation
 All tasks are not created equal
 Nor should be evaluated equally

32. Teacher Evaluation
• All tasks are not created equal
o Nor should be evaluated equally
Algorithmic Tasks Heuristic Tasks
Assembly line Creative
Predicable outcome & method of Requires problem-solving
completion

33. Teacher Evaluation
 All tasks are not created equal
 Nor should be evaluated equally
Algorithmic Tasks Heuristic Tasks
Assembly line Creative
Predicable outcome & method of Requires problem-solving
completion
• Teaching profession is arguably heuristic

34. Teacher Evaluation
 How evaluations are used:
 Administrators
 Utilized results to assess teacher’s involvement in school (outside
of regular teaching schedule)

35. Teacher Evaluation
 How evaluations are used:
 Administrators
 Utilized results to assess teacher’s involvement in school (outside
of regular teaching schedule)
 Teachers
 Want results to reflect teaching strengths
 Identify instructional areas that need improvement

36. Human Motivation Theories
 Range of human needs
 Basic  Food, water, shelter
 Complex  Interests, potential activities that lead to success

37. Human Motivation Theories
 Extrinsic rewards
 Reduce intrinsic motivation
 Potentially reduce perceived worker autonomy

38. Human Motivation & Autonomy
 Autonomy is a common thread between many
human motivation theories
 Autonomy is reduced:
 With overuse use of worker monitoring
 Increased frequency of worker evaluations

39. Human Motivation & Mainstream Ideals
 Intrinsic motivation & autonomy are given little
consideration
 Motivation ≠ Intrinsic + Extrinsic according to
economists
 Money represents the only motivator for all workers

40. Quality of Work
 Decreased motivation = decreased quality

41. Quality of Work
 Decreased motivation = decreased quality
 Worker apathy is created with perceived loss of
autonomy and reduce intrinsic motivation

42. Low Teacher Morale
 Factors leading to reduced morale:
 Low fixed wages (more common in developing countries)

43. Low Teacher Morale
 Factors leading to reduced morale:
 Low fixed wages (more common in developing countries)
 New policies

44. Low Teacher Morale
 Factors leading to reduced morale:
 Low fixed wages (more common in developing countries)
 New policies
 Reduced teacher bargaining rights

45. Risks of Using Incentives
 Opportunistic behaviour
 Teaching to test
 Reduced teamwork
 Increased teacher mobility

46. Risks of Using Incentives
 Opportunistic behaviour
 Teaching to test
 Reduced teamwork
 Increased teacher mobility
 Narrowed focus
 Focus on achieving rewards becomes teacher’s primary
concern
 Aspects of job deemed irrelevant if they did not contribute to
attaining incentive(s)

47. Risks of Using Incentives
 Opportunistic behaviour
 Teaching to test
 Reduced teamwork
 Increased teacher mobility
 Narrowed focus
 Focus on achieving rewards becomes teacher’s primary
concern
 Aspects of job deemed irrelevant if they did not contribute to
attaining incentive(s)
 Increased resentment toward authority

48. Conclusion
 Research fails to determine that performance-based
pays increases:
 Student achievement
 Instructional quality
 Planning process:
 Requires much consideration before implementation
 Should be transparent
 Should allow teacher input

49. Conclusion
 Alternative Rewards
 Greater consideration for non-monetary incentives
 Alternative rewards may also create cost-saving incentives
 Trust
 Shift in focus from competition to collaboration
 Trust (with accurate tools to measure accountability) should be
placed back into the teaching profession

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