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DNS Security for CERTs
- Attack Scenarios & Demonstrations –
            Malicious Use


              Chris Evans
              Delta Risk, LLC

               7 March 2010


                                        1
What You Will Need for the Exercises

• Your Windows Terminal Server
  – From Windows, Run ‘mstsc’
  – From MAC, please download the Terminal Server Client
    from the wiki

  – Run the DNS-Bot.vbs file when instructed
  – Open a command prompt, and run

  cscript.exe c:/users/studentX/Desktop/DNS-Bot.vbs


  – Don’t forget – X is your student number


                                                           2
Description – Malicious Use

• Using the DNS to propagate malware or conduct
  attacks in a malicious manner, yet consistent with
  the DNS protocols
   – BotNet Command & Control (indirect)
   – Amplification Attacks (direct)
• These attacks do not necessarily target DNS servers
  – rather, they use your servers to conduct an attack
  elsewhere


               NS
                              Victim


                                                         3
Case Study – Conficker

• Conficker - the Conficker worm appeared in late 2008, with
  most of the attention starting in Jan/Feb of 2009.
   – The worm used pseudo-randomly generated domains from several
     top level domains (ccTLDs included) as its command and control
     points.
   – The worm would contact servers on these random domains for
     instructions.




                                                                      4
Case Study – Conficker

• The Conficker Working Group (Conficker Cabal) was
  started to address response actions to the worm
   – Comprised of businesses, DNS operations, Internet
     organizations, and security researchers
   – Requested top level organizations with suspected
     domain names involved in Conficker to register them in
     hopes of preempting Conficker activity
• Conficker mutated to thwart activity of the
  Working Group and started using P2P methods vs.
  DNS
  How Should a ccTLD React to a Request to Register (at no cost)
    Hundreds of Domain Names to Prevent Malicious Activity?

                                                                   5
Attack Demonstration

   • The “DNS Bot” receives its instructions and sends
     information back to the hacker via DNS
                             Caching
                             Server

                                                        NS
                                       Run Command &
                                         Post Results
                                                        Rogue
                                                        Server



Double-click
                                       Remember, the bot won’t do
               DNS-Bot.vbs
                                          anything malicious!



                                                                 6
Demonstration – Attacker View

• Rogue DNS Bind File & Web Post Directory




                                             7
Demonstration – Server View




                              8
Demonstration – User View

• Please run your bot now
   – Open a command prompt and run the command:
cscript.exe
  c:/users/studentX/Desktop/DNS-Bot.vbs


• wireshark view




                                                  9
Demonstration – User View

• If you’d like to start Wireshark…
   –   Double click icon on desktop
   –   Select Options from Capture Menu
   –   In “capture filter” type port 53
   –   Click “Start”




                                          10
Demonstration – User View




 Encoded
Data Sent to
DNS Server




                             11
Demonstration – User View

• The bot will periodically request instructions over
  DNS from a rogue DNS server (192.168.85.5)
   – Can you find the rogue DNS server with wireshark or
     DNS tools?
• The bot will execute the instructions:
   – Wait, Download a File, Run a Command & Post Results,
     Quit
   – Can you “reverse engineer” the instructions?
   – Can you see what is being posted?




                                                            12
Impact

• DNS resources used for malicious purposes
• Possible brand or reputation loss due to apparent
  attacks originating from servers
• Widespread bot proliferation




                                                      13
Mitigation & Response Strategies

• Domain “Blackholes” – but only if domains don’t
  change rapidly – you have to keep up!
• Strengthen registrant information validation
• Develop policies for determining what’s malicious
• Add detection mechanisms for malicious use
   – Host based (Antivirus, patching, etc)
   – Network based (traffic & domain analysis)
• Develop policies for domain takedown
• Develop cooperative agreements with other
  registries, CERTs, law enforcement, and security
  organizations to address malicious use scenarios
                                                      14
Questions?




             ?
                 15

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Day 2 Dns Cert 4c Malicious Use

  • 1. DNS Security for CERTs - Attack Scenarios & Demonstrations – Malicious Use Chris Evans Delta Risk, LLC 7 March 2010 1
  • 2. What You Will Need for the Exercises • Your Windows Terminal Server – From Windows, Run ‘mstsc’ – From MAC, please download the Terminal Server Client from the wiki – Run the DNS-Bot.vbs file when instructed – Open a command prompt, and run cscript.exe c:/users/studentX/Desktop/DNS-Bot.vbs – Don’t forget – X is your student number 2
  • 3. Description – Malicious Use • Using the DNS to propagate malware or conduct attacks in a malicious manner, yet consistent with the DNS protocols – BotNet Command & Control (indirect) – Amplification Attacks (direct) • These attacks do not necessarily target DNS servers – rather, they use your servers to conduct an attack elsewhere NS Victim 3
  • 4. Case Study – Conficker • Conficker - the Conficker worm appeared in late 2008, with most of the attention starting in Jan/Feb of 2009. – The worm used pseudo-randomly generated domains from several top level domains (ccTLDs included) as its command and control points. – The worm would contact servers on these random domains for instructions. 4
  • 5. Case Study – Conficker • The Conficker Working Group (Conficker Cabal) was started to address response actions to the worm – Comprised of businesses, DNS operations, Internet organizations, and security researchers – Requested top level organizations with suspected domain names involved in Conficker to register them in hopes of preempting Conficker activity • Conficker mutated to thwart activity of the Working Group and started using P2P methods vs. DNS How Should a ccTLD React to a Request to Register (at no cost) Hundreds of Domain Names to Prevent Malicious Activity? 5
  • 6. Attack Demonstration • The “DNS Bot” receives its instructions and sends information back to the hacker via DNS Caching Server NS Run Command & Post Results Rogue Server Double-click Remember, the bot won’t do DNS-Bot.vbs anything malicious! 6
  • 7. Demonstration – Attacker View • Rogue DNS Bind File & Web Post Directory 7
  • 9. Demonstration – User View • Please run your bot now – Open a command prompt and run the command: cscript.exe c:/users/studentX/Desktop/DNS-Bot.vbs • wireshark view 9
  • 10. Demonstration – User View • If you’d like to start Wireshark… – Double click icon on desktop – Select Options from Capture Menu – In “capture filter” type port 53 – Click “Start” 10
  • 11. Demonstration – User View Encoded Data Sent to DNS Server 11
  • 12. Demonstration – User View • The bot will periodically request instructions over DNS from a rogue DNS server (192.168.85.5) – Can you find the rogue DNS server with wireshark or DNS tools? • The bot will execute the instructions: – Wait, Download a File, Run a Command & Post Results, Quit – Can you “reverse engineer” the instructions? – Can you see what is being posted? 12
  • 13. Impact • DNS resources used for malicious purposes • Possible brand or reputation loss due to apparent attacks originating from servers • Widespread bot proliferation 13
  • 14. Mitigation & Response Strategies • Domain “Blackholes” – but only if domains don’t change rapidly – you have to keep up! • Strengthen registrant information validation • Develop policies for determining what’s malicious • Add detection mechanisms for malicious use – Host based (Antivirus, patching, etc) – Network based (traffic & domain analysis) • Develop policies for domain takedown • Develop cooperative agreements with other registries, CERTs, law enforcement, and security organizations to address malicious use scenarios 14
  • 15. Questions? ? 15