One aspect of the changes in Japanese security policies since the Cold War has been the dispatch of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) overseas to engage in a range of missions most commonly referred to as ‘PKO’. Beyond the initial political controversy and the attendant media frenzy little is generally known of the nature of the operations, of JSDF duties, and of whether the Forces carried them out effectively or efficiently. The JSDF, Defense Agency/Ministry of Defense, and other public bodies have failed to analyse overseas dispatch operation (ODO) performance, and have generally branded them as successful based upon their completion, and without loss of life, in contrast with Japanese police ODO. Looking at ODO during the 1990s it is possible to project analyses forward into the operations of the 21st century to evaluate the operations of the post-9.11 period and the prevailing strategic policies driving them, and also to more fully understand the qualities and limitations of JSDF performance in the immediate aftermath of the 3.11 triple disasters. Since JSDF ODO have become the most prominent symbols of an emergent ‘new Japanese strategy’ it is worth understanding whether the Forces have actually been ‘effective international actors’.

1. Effective International Actors?
Japan Self-Defense Force Overseas Dispatch
Operations
Garren Mulloy
Daito Bunka University

2. Structure of Presentation
Effective International Actors?:
JSDF Overseas Dispatch Operations (ODO)
1 Questions and Parameters
2 Extant Research
3 Definition of Terms
4 Methodology and Operational
Analysis
 5 Immediate Findings: OA & ODO
 6 Broader Findings: ODO and Japan
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

3. Quiz!
Know your ODO!!!
 1 When/where was the first Japanese
post-war ODO?
 2 When/where was the first JSDF
ODO?
 3 Does Japan do Peacekeeping?
 4 Why does Japan send JSDF ODO?
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

4. 1 Questions and Parameters
 What operations?
 How and why selected?
 What did the JSDF actually do?
 How did they perform?
 How did performance affect the JSDF?
 How JSDF culture/configuration affected
performance?
 Were the JSDF effective international
actors?
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

5. 2 Extant Research
 General  Specific
Politics of Defence Journalism: event
Constitutional Issues specific
US-Japan Alliance „PKO‟ studies: operations
Japan-Asia Relations „PKO‟ studies: concepts
„Normal‟ Japan Participant studies
Historical controversies JSDF operational studies
Party Politics Official histories
Limited applicability Limited coverage or
Contextual understanding applicability; unpublished
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

6. 3 Definition of Terms
 „PKO‟
 Japan does not „do‟ „PKO‟
 Japan developed a „PSO‟ variant
 Most operations were not PKO/PSO/PKF
 Japan distinguished between „PKO‟ & „PKF‟
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

7. 3 Definition of Terms
 An Agenda for Peace  The Brahimi Report
Boutros Boutros Ghali (Report of the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations)
1992/95
2000
Main Findings: Main Findings:
1 There are five forms of 1 Identified only 3 forms of
Peace Operation: Peace Operation:
PMO, PKO, PSO, PEO, PMO, PKO, PBO
PBO 3 Need to develop lessons
3 There is no simple learned capabilities and
progression from one to doctrine
the other.
Complex, confusing, but Clear, simple, but potentially
clear for JSDF a legal problem for the JSDF
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

8. An Agenda for Peace
Strata of UN Peace Operations
Peacemaking (PMO)-
settlement or suspension of conflict
Peacekeeping (PKO)-
policing/observing of settlement/ ceasefire
Peace Support (PSO)-
support of peace by aiding civil society
Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO)-
use of military power for settlement/ceasefire, or
for compliance with UNSC Chapter VII resolution
Peace Building (PBO)-
post-conflict reinforcement of civil society
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

9. 3 Definition of Terms
 Overseas Dispatch Operations (ODO)
 Japanese: International Peace Cooperation
Activities (IPCA: 国際平和協力活動)
 Neutral, covering UN/non-UN
operations, unilateral and multilateral
 The IPCA term (and IPC Law) was
developed from the ODA policies of the
1980s
 Overseen by IPCH, with JSDF and Police in
the IPCC
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

10. Japanese ODO Policy Actors
MoFA
Cabinet
Office/
IPCH
MOD/ NPA/
JSDF Police
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

11. Legal and Constitutional Limits on JSDF ODO
 Article 9:
 Aspiring sincerely to an international
peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war
as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of
settling international disputes.
 In order to accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war
potential, will never be maintained. The
right of belligerency of the state will not
be recognized.
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

12. 戦争の放棄
 第９条 日本国民は、正義と秩序を
基調とする国際平和を誠実に希求
し、国権の発動たる戦争と、武力に
よる威嚇又は武力の行使は、国際紛
争を解決する手段としては、永久に
これを放棄する。
 ２ 前項の目的を達するため、陸海
空軍その他の戦力は、これを保持し
ない。国の交戦権は、これを認めな
い。
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

13. Fear of Clouds and Codes
 There is an implicit „code‟
 The code is based upon perceptions of
interpretations of a translated document
 The code is not codified
 The code hangs above, like a „cloud‟
 The code/cloud affects laws, policies,
and operational decisions
 The code/cloud is imaginary, and very
real, and exerts a tremendous influence
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

14. 4 Methodology and Operational
Analysis
 Methodology  Operational Analysis
1 Triangulation:
JSDF UN Ops JSDF Performance
JSDF non-UN Ops Indicators
Non-Japanese Actors
2 Analytical Framework: 1 Effectiveness
Mission Context 2 Efficiency
Preparation and Logistics 3 Quality
JSDF Performance
(O'Brien, R.J., Police as
Overall Mission Contribution peacekeepers: an evaluation of the
performance of Australian police
peacekeeping on Cyprus 1964 –
1998, PhD thesis (Adelaide:
University of South Australia, 2001).
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

15. 4 Limits of Methodology and
Operational Analysis
 No systematic JSDF/JDA/MOD analysis
 Lack of documentation
 Uncritical, non-specific documentation
 Small security community
 Interview-based
 Limited media resources
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

16. 4 Limits of Methodology and OA
ODO of the 1990s
 UN ODO  Non-UN ODO
 Allied Support
○ Persian Gulf 1991
 UNTAC Cambodia
1992-1993  Humanitarian Assistance
人道支援
○ Rwanda/Zaire 1994,
 ONUMOZ Mozambique
West Timor 1999
1992-1995
 UNDOF Golan Heights  Disaster Relief 緊急援助
1996-present ○ Honduras 1998, Turkey 1999
UN command, PSO, ‘nation Varied, strongly liberal
building’ and ‘classical’ ops IPCO character
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

17. 21st Century JSDF ODO
 UN ODO  Non-UN ODO
 Anti-Terrorism
 UNMISET East Timor
 OEF-MIO
2002~2004 (680)
 Allied Support
 UNMIN Nepal (6)  Iraq, Gulf of Aden/Djibouti
2007~2011  Refugee Relief
 MINUSTAH Haiti (350)  Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iraq/J
ordan
2010~present
 Disaster Relief
 UNMISS South Sudan  Iran, Thailand/Indonesia, Ru
(c.500) 2012~ ssia, Pakistan
Pattern of the 1990s Appearing to be ‘new’ but
mainly 1990s patterns
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

18. 5 Immediate Findings:
Operational Analysis and ODO
Common Issues
 Slow deployment and logistical limits
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

19. 5 Immediate Findings:
Operational Analysis and ODO
Common Issues
 Slow deployment and logistical limits
 Legal and political obstacles
○ IPCL as ‘umbrella legislation’
 JDA-MOD/JSDF management and culture
○ GSDF ‘rotation’, poor ‘jointery’, culture
 Poor local intelligence
○ Mixed Agency, reliance upon US
 Defence investment legacies and policies
○ Industrial war priorities in post-modern age
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

20. Slow deployment and logistical limits
 IPCL limit of 2000 personnel
 Each mission requires separate
legislation (with exceptions)
 Rapid deployment disabled by use of ad
hoc units assembled from personnel
within a Regional Army
 “Alice in Wonderland” approach to unit
security (ROE/equipment etc.) pre-1998
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

21. Preparation for ODO: Investment Comparison
Japan and UK Air Transport Capability 2006
 Japan  UK
Tactical 137 Tactical 20
Theatre 16 Theatre 47
Strategic 2 (VIP) Strategic 17
Tankers (4) Tankers 12
Also differences in
quality of air-lift
capabilities
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

22. Preparation for ODO: Investment Comparison
Canada and Australia Air Transport Capability
2006
 Canada  Australia
Tactical 10 Tactical 13
Theatre 25 Theatre 20
Strategic 5 Strategic 4
(plus contracts) Tankers 2
Tankers 7
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

23. Preparation for ODO: Investment Comparison
Japan & UK Strategic Sealift & Support Capability 2006
 Japan  UK
3 Vessels (Oosumi 15 Vessels (6 classes)
class) = 291,600 tons
= 26,700 tons
Also, auxiliary support 12 varied vessels
vessels, 353,600 tons
4 AOE 72,550 tons
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

24. Logistical Limitation Examples
Mozambique and Honduras
 Mozambique  Honduras
 Antonov charter  ASDF required half
airlift and schedule C-130 force to
airline flights sustain 80-man
 C-130s: five days GSDF medical team
 No MSDF support,  C-130: four days
merchant charter  Only one vehicle
and light equipment
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

25. 5 Immediate Findings:
Operational Analysis and ODO
Common Issues
 Slow deployment and logistical limits
 Poor risk assessment and management
in first generation ODO
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

26. 5 Immediate Findings:
Operational Analysis and ODO
Common Issues
 Slow deployment and logistical limits
 Poor risk assessment and management
 Highly risk averse: form and function
 Poor risk-reduction management
 Implicit reliance upon collective security
 Explicit rejection of collective security
 JDA-MOD/JSDF conflict with MoFA
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

27. Watanabe Takashi :The PKO in Cambodia-
Lessons Learned: 101
What is basic common sense for the
militaries of nations taking part in PKOs
is not recognized by Japan...
Japanese PKO personnel were only
able to defend themselves and other
unit members …Moreover, the use of
weapons …was left to the judgment of
the individual, and appeared to be
outside the standards of conduct for
troops.
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

28. 5 Immediate Findings:
Operational Analysis and ODO
Common Issues
 Slow deployment and logistical limits
 Poor risk assessment and management
 Inadequate preparations and follow-up
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

29. 5 Immediate Findings:
Operational Analysis and ODO
Common Issues
 Slow deployment and logistical limits
 Poor risk assessment and management
 Inadequate preparations and follow-up
 Training flaws: climate, vaccination,
multinational ops, languages, security, ODO-
specific issues
 Poor intelligence and briefings
 Few de-briefs, few lessons learned
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

30. 5 Immediate Findings:
Operational Analysis: Negative
 Dissatisfaction with MoFA briefings
 Little „Learning from Others‟
 No PKO Training Centre (~2007)
 No „Lessons Learned‟ Centre (~2008)
 Little „Recycling‟ of personnel
 Poor De-briefing
 Poor Rotation System for PKO Dispatch
 No extraction force (~2007 ?)
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

31. 5 Immediate Findings:
Operational Analysis: Positive
 JSDF Innovations
 Collective Security by Stealth
(UNTAC, ONUMOZ, Rwanda/
Zaire, UNDOF)
 Defrosting „frozen activities‟ (UNMISET)
2001
 HQ presence and close cooperation with
non-US partners (ONUMOZ, Iraq)
 Local intelligence gathering as CIMIC
(UNTAC, Iraq)
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

32. 5 Immediate Findings:
Security Issues and JSDF ODO
 Risk Averse
 Law, Policy, Missions, Deployments
 Risk Negligent
 Poor camp/unit security, ridiculous limits
 Risk Accepting
 Patrolling by another name
 Collective Security
 De facto collective security
(UNTAC, ONUMOZ, UNDOF, Zaire, Hondur
as)
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

33. 5 Immediate Findings:
Operational Analysis: Positive
 Technically capable
 Water purification
 Engineering
 Medical assistance
 Logistical support
 CIMIC (Civilian-Military Cooperation)
Professional
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

34. Medical Work of JSDF
 Medical Missions
 Heavy Zaire/Rwanda
 Light Honduras
 Non-Medical Missions
 Human Security
 Human Care
 UNTAC Max. 17 medical personnel
- up to 600 patients/day, c.7000 cases in total.
- normal workload = 20~40 cases/day
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

35. 5 JSDF Refugee Relief Unit (RRU)
Zaire/Rwanda Sept-Dec 1994
 Division Personnel
• In-patients Out-patients
 Medical 70 70 2100
 Clinical 23
 Surgical 18
 Hygiene 9
 Prevention 16
 HQ 4 Combined Daily Average 30
 Security 50 Including serious surgery and
 Water 43 intensive care
 Administration 68
 HQ 29
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

36. 5 Honduras JDR ODO
17th Nov-10th Dec 1998
 Division Personnel
• In-patients Out-patients
• 0 4031
• Daily Average 288
 Medical 23
 Prevention 15
 Support 42
○ Innovation of Tele-medicine (with JSDF Central
Hospital and the GSDF School of Field Medicine)
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

37. 6 Broader Findings: ODO and
Japan
Effects of ODO upon the JSDF
 JSDF self-confidence
GSDF survey December 1974 ~ January 1975, 15,220 personnel
below rank of Lt. Col.
“Do you feel that the work of the SDF is
meaningful”:
40.3% Not very much; 45.4% Yes, I do;
6.5% Yes, very much so; 7.8% No.
Equivalent surveys in 1995, 1997, and 2000
revealed positive answers above 75% level.
Due both to domestic and overseas operations.
Defense of Japan, 1976, p.118; Defense of Japan 1995~2000, JDA, Tokyo.
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

38. 6 Broader Findings: ODO and Japan
ODO Costs
 Japan defence budget 2006
 $43.7 Billion
 Japanese spending (gross), above the
MoFA UN PKO contribution:
 UNTAC: 11.8 Billion = $102.6 Million
(@115/$1)
 ONUMOZ: 2.2 Billion = $19 Million
(@115/$1)
 =0.006~0.16% of Japanese defence budgets (1992-95)
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

39. 6 Broader Findings: ODO and
Japan
ODO-Inspired Investments and

Innovations
GSDF: CRF Central Readiness Force
 Force Trainer, Force Provider, Force Consumer
~2007
 GSDF: Peacekeeping Training Center ~2008
 GSDF: LAV and Type-96 APC
 ASDF: Freighter-tanker KC-767 (x4) ~2009
 MSDF: Oosumi-class (x3) ~1998
 Jointery
 First Joint ODO 2005 (SEA Tsunami JDR)
 Allied Cooperation through ODO
(Functionalism)
 UK, Australia, France, RoK, Netherlands etc.
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

40. 6 Broader Findings: ODO and
Japan
Personnel and Support Issues
 JDA 2007 23,262 staff for 259,590 JSDF
 UK MoD 2009 87,000 staff for 187,210 military
 Japan MOD has c. three times the ratio of military to
civilians as Australia
 MoFA is also much smaller than the British or French
foreign ministries
 Japan has very limited and fragmented intelligence
capabilities.
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

41. 6 Broader Findings: ODO and
Japan
Effective Actors, Effective Policy?
 Generally effective JSDF ODO
 Confused and contradictory
policies, laws, and rules
 Constitutional fear („code and cloud‟)
 What is gained by such limited ODO?
 What is the point?
 ODO as a strategic device?
 The enigma of leadership
Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University

42. Conclusions
 JSDF ODO: Low Cost – Medium Return
 Introduced new security „horizons‟
 ODO as a „Trojan Horse‟ for new norms?
 JSDF as Effective International Actors
 JSDF stretched by missions
 Capability gaps: logistics, „jointery‟, training
etc.
 As yet, no militarization of policy
 As yet, strategy as speculation