1. Radical Uyghur Groups and Their lnfluence
on Central Asian Development
█ Fu, Jen Kun
Abstract
The Uighur, which literally means "allied" or "united", can be epitomized as a
Turkic people. Their origins can be traced back to Turkish nomads who lived in the
Siberia region. They became the independent race of the Turks and created the
Ugu’Kndmi 74 D bt e fr doev t ihm l dn 4 A .t
i r i o n 4 A ,uw r oc tl eh r o e n i80 D I
h s g e e a e a
was then that most of them immigrated to western China, to what was called The
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).
Key word: Uighurs, Turk, China, Xinjiang, Central Asia, Silk Road.
1

2. Radical Uyghur Groups and Their lnfluence
on Central Asian Development
█ Fu, Jen Kun
The assessment of dangers of Xinjiang movement
A cri tfr g osre ,f r a Sa Pn’da it sr g f 97
cod go oe n be r a eD n i i s et nh pi o 19,
n i vs t o g h e n
there was a surge in the activity of Xinjiang Independence Movement (XIM). This
development attracted foreign obe e ’ tn o. ui t A gs o 19,n
sr r aet n D r g h uut f 98 i
vs t i n e
the Xinjiang province of PRC, the number of fresh unrests sparked between Uighurs
and Hans on grounds of interethnic differences had created a worldwide response.
American, Russian, EU (European Union), Canadian, Australian, Turkey and other
l d g on i ’ eipoi dnt toe g o t s i i n .
e i cute m d rv e i a cvr e fh en d t
an rs a d sn a e ces
In one excerpt, the Hong-Kong-bsd V i o A e c’r s ie:i r et
ae ‘o e f m r at nm td “ e n
c i a t n c
days, there had been an increase in interethnic tensions and clash between the
Ugus n H n iK sgr La D nt H a o H n-K n’T D pr et
i rad asn aha . i u, e ed f og og V ea m n
h ” n h s t ,
who worked in Turkey and other countries during 1997, did a report on the XIM.
He held a presentation of an actual movie depicting armed attempts by the followers
of the XIM trying to establish their authority. The movie also reflected the fact that
Moslems had established a rather powerful organization in support of the movement.
1
There were various opinions on the issue of this movement for independence.
Some believed the movement represented a preparation for deployment of a
large-scale movement for independence in the new century. Others saw the
movement for Xinjiang independence as rather weak, voicing only political
declarations and hence unable to exercise any real influence on the political climate
in Xinjiang. Sharing the latter view, the Professor of Xinjiang University Su Beyhay
2
blvdt spr is m vm n o Xn agpsdn r lhet o C i ,
eee h ea tt oe et f i i
i e as ’ jn oe o e t a fr h a
a r n
since the central leadership enjoyed the support of numerous Hans settlers in XUAR
who were capable of preventing, at any time, any attempt to declare independence in
Xinjiang.
In addition, it was known that among all ethnic minorities, Kazakhs occupied the
largest territory in Xinjiang. At the same time, Kazakhs were not inclined to
separatism. Thirdly, the deployment of industrial and construction facilities in
1
Jen-Kun Fu. Discovering Central Asia. – Taipei, 2005. –p.164.
2
П о есрС Бй а п ихлвС нця в14 гд; ае ип л я ояан сьнчлн к ш аа
рф со у эхй р еа и ьзн 90 оу зтм сонл бзн от ааьиа тб.
Н вдн е п рда С нцяе рвд лс п ео нтуц я
аееи ояк в и ьзн п оои оь о г и срким
(Professor Su Baihuei went to Xinjiang in 1940; He completed his responsibility as commander of the command
center. Under his leadership, order was maintained in Xinjiang.)
2

3. Xinjiang by the People Liberation Army of China facilitated solution to the problem
of the independence movement, since the concentration of a military and technical
peec i t r i w u dt ay ea tt ae p , i ot ai t sn
r nen h e o ol e r n spr is tm t wt u hv g o ed
s e gn d e as ’ t s h n
in reinforcements and resorting to severe repressions. Fourth, the Russian
government, recently working towards unity in its own country, expressed serious
concern toward sparks of separatism in Xinjiang.
Western attitude towards the Xinjiang issue
Xn ag i u dsre c srnpco,ae o t fl wn asm t n:
i i ’ s e ee d l ei et nbsd nh o o i s p os
jn s s v o s i e l g u i

The separatist movement of ethnic minority in the country posed the core
problem for China;

Russia condemned the separatist trends of Xinjiang, fearing the spread of the
self-identity idea of national minorities within the entire Central Asia region;

The development during recent years in Eurasian region including declaration of
independence by Central Asia republics, civil war in Afghanistan, and Russian
w rnC ehy,nm n r pc l ddhp t t spot s f i i gs
a i hcna i ay e ete e oe o h upr r o Xn a ’
s n e e jn
independence, prompting more activities from them;

Only a limited number of states of all Moslem countries openly supported
spr is Al dm ns o w r cm ui i spot o Xn ags
ea tt l e ad f ol o m n y n upr f i i ’
as . d t jn
independence are limited by pure political slogans and calls for human rights
protection. At the same time, the threat of spreading the Islam fundamentalism
posed the main obstacle for real assistance;
 recent years, China markedly strengthened its cooperation with Central Asian
In
countries, leading Beijing to coordinate its actions toward Xinjiang. On the other
hand, growing cooperation amongst Central Asian republics had a benevolent
effect on the situation in the area, by preventing infiltration of outside forces into
Xinjiang territory, and preventing the organization of underground bases from
carrying out undermining activity.

Modern Xinjiang established stable relations with the outside world through
various factors, such as the existence of major oil reserves, or the opportunity to
use its area for cargo transportation. Today, it was worldly recognized that
Central Asia and its neighboring countries were bound to become one of the
w r ’ splr o ee yr or s nt 2st century. For this reason, the
ol s up e f nr e uc i h 1
d is g s e e
world powers will defend their strategic interests in the region. Presently, one can
observe a clash on the part of Russia, China and the Moslem world with the USA,
Canada, EU and other countries.
 the Xinjiang Uighur issue was not resolved in the near future, it would
If
seriously affect the stability and security in all of Eurasia.
3

4.  U si e s t a Xn ag hd bcm ei n r et ,t og c
E ’ n r t o r i i
te w d jn a eo e v et e n y h uh l
d c l r ose
monitoring of the development in China and its relations with neighboring
countries of Central Asia. In Canada, the Xinjiang development aroused concern
regarding future bilateral relations with China in economy and trade, particularly
in the supply of energy raw materials. According to Canadian specialists, the
support for separatist movement from abroad may pose a certain threat for the
P Cl dr i ad h gaul ekn g fh cn aat rys o e i t
R e e h n t r aw aei o t et lu oi ’pw rn h
a sp e d n e r h t e
peripheral parts of the country.

USA closely monitored the development in Russia, China, Central Asia, as well
a R s a r co i l h o t Xn ag ee p et us epc d R ’
s us ’ e t n n i t fh i i dvl m n R s a xet P Cs
is a i g e jn o . i e
peaceful handling of the Xinjiang issue could succeed in promoting and
establishing the stability and economic development of the region. Thus, Russia
stood against terrorism or any manifestations of separatism and religious
instigations from abroad. Russia feared the unification of the Moslem world,
which could provoke Russian-speakers of Tartarstan to manifest their own
national sentiments.

Currently, there are frequent problems arising from national self-identity and
spr i i vr u pr o t w r . n sc ea p iC i ’ Xn ag
ea tm n a os a s fh ol O e uh xm l s h a i i
as i t e d e n s jn
province. Regarding this trend, the world community faces a difficult dilemma
between self and world reality. Integrity of the territorial state is regarded as the
top priority.

Hence, if the XIM chooses to pursue based on the principles of peace, security,
and stability, as well as with respect to various forms of social structure, positive
results may be achieved.
The internalization and the ways for peaceful solution of the issue
Regarding the Tibet issue, despite its peculiarity, succeeded in attracting the
w r cm ui ’ aet n D l L m ad h government in emigration
ol o m n y tn o. a y a a n i
d ts t i a s
received the assistance of international organizations and leading states of the world.
As to the XIM, until 1995, it received assistance mainly from Saudi Arabia. Only
after the collapse of USSR did it attain support from Central Asia. In 1995, Isa – the
spiritual leader of Uighur movement, died in Turkey while in exile. As a result, the
movement was left without a world-recognized leader. For this reason, and the lack
of an efficient opposition to the PRC authority, the Xinjiang issue failed to attract the
w r cm ui ’ aet n This led to a manifold reduction of international
ol o m n y tn o.
d ts t i 3
assistance to the XIM in comparison to the one in Tibet.
After the delimitation process of the common border with neighboring countries
3
Xinjiang Separatist Movement Continues Heating Up // Inside China Mainland, Vo.20, No.11. - Taiwan: Institute of
Current China Studies, 1998.
4

5. was completed, China turned its effort to fight against terrorism. Under the slogan of
creation, the mechanism of collective security in Central Asia succeeded. From four
neighboring states, the guaranty for joint struggle against separatists and Islamism
radicals was established. The XIM was depicted as a variety of international
terrorism. This move led to the essential weakening of support from the outside
world. It also provided Chinese authorities with additional advantages in dealing
with oppositional organizations without resorting to punishing measures.
A t sm t e C i ’ hr-l eplyi Xn agl t t m vm n s
th a e i , h a a i o c n i i e o h oe et
e m ns d n i jn d e ’
internationalization. The emphasis made on the peaceful solution of the issue echoed
i t nwi e r ao o t “oe i t term. After the NATO intervention in
n h e n r e t n fh S vr g y
e t p ti e en”
the Kosovo issue, many Christian countries sympathized with the Kosovo Moslems.
This inspired leaders of the Uighur movement in emigration. For a long time, the
movement had gained no concession from China. While by thew r ’nr sa ol s om , n
d
extended period of human rights violation, as within the XUAR, was unacceptable.
In line with those trends, the foreign-based organizations sought to illustrate a
peaceful image of movement, seeking the help and attention to the Uighur issue
from the world community.
Rapprochement of Uighur separatists with Islamic fundamentalists
A m n oe aoe s c 19, h a at ri hree t i ply
s et nd bv, i e 97 C i ’ u oie a nd h r o c
i n n s h ts d e i
toward Xinjiang separatists, while simultaneously strengthening their relations with
R s a K zks n K rys nadTj ia. nl h o P Csat n i t
us , aaht , ygzt n ak t I i t f R ’ cos n h
i a a is n g i e
recent years, the XIM turned to rapprochement with Islamic fundamentalists and
posed a new turning point worthy of special attention.
Regarding recent events, one can suspect that the Xinjiang separatists based in
various corners of the globe enlisted with the Islamic fundamentalists. In August of
2000, around two thousand Islamic fighters, headed by Namangani, 1/4th of which
were Uighurs, intruded from northern Afghanistan through Tajikistan into Batkent
oblast of Kyrgyzstan aiming to cross into Uzbekistan. Over 130 fighters were killed
in clashes with Kyrgyz army special forces. Oppositional forces were concentrated
at the Tajik border. By summer of 2001, the parties of Uzbek Islamists enemies of
Islam Karimov regime planned to launch an offensive for seizing areas around
Fergana valley for establishing the Islam Republic there.
Entrenched in Afghanistan, Bin Laden, the premier leader of all Islamic
fundamentalists, sent 400 fighters to Chechnya as reinforcement in the sacred war
against infidels. One hundred of those fighters were members of the XIM. Since
Talibs lended their support to Uighur separatists, some of Xinjiang Uighurs moved
5

6. to north Afghanistan and fought alongside Talibs.4 According to certain reports, the
total number of Uighurs from Xinjiang in Afghan-fighter ranks already reached
20. o eo e Bn ae’fr s h e t rj nd ze Ia is n l a
00S m j nd i L dn oc w i o e o e U bk s m s ad o l
i s e l hs i l t c
groups.
There was a lasting concept of China t etnC n a A i Mayr i n o
’ h a i et l s . n e d t f
s r r a ses
the countries in this region expected that if Xinjiang gained independence, it may
become the buffer zone between China and Central Asia. Even though the Central
A i cute’ oe m n l ddt ispot China and refused to support
s n on i gvr ete e h r uprto
a rs n n e
spr ist nt nlt fr snhs cute w ri sl a twt t lt.
ea tt h aoas ’oc i t e on i e n o dry i h ae
as , e i is e o rs e i i h e tr
At the same time, the terrorist activity of international Islamic extremists
udr i d h e iec o C i ’at n aa sthe Movement. In this light, the
ne n t fc ny f h a cos gi t
m e e fi ns i n
alliance of XIM with Islamic fundamentalists posed a serious problem for China.
The prospects for Uighur independence or autonomy were bleak. Uighurs disliked
the media spotlight of their southern neighbors, the Tibetans, even though they
themselves had gradually garnered more international attention. For instance, Erkin
Alptekin, an Uighur, was elected as the General Secretary of the Unrepresented
Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) in early 2001, a post he had held for an
interim basis since October of 1999. While a Uighur diaspora numbering well over
half a million resided in nearby Central Asian republics, China had used political
and economic incentives to persuade these countries - most prominently Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan - to reject Uighur separatism. Moreover, in early October of 2001,
Beijing announced a new campaign against Uighur "splittism" (the government's
vague term for any self-determination movement) with the front that Uighur
separatists were engaging in terrorist activities. Broader repression had increased in
the XUAR under the pretense of the international war against terrorism; this also
meant that separatist-inspired violence would continue, since neither side offered
any peaceful resolution or conflict regulating mechanism.5
Central Asia’Uighurs activity ─ in a case of Kazakhstan
s
O t dw o t K zks n i eedne t Ugu ogn aosad
n h a n fh aaht ’ n pnec,h i r rai t n n
e e as d e h zi
societies had also risen. Among those:
 Uighur Culture Center;

 Ugu a oii “ t r n”
 i rs c t n Mo e ad;
h s ao hl
 United National Revolutionary Front for Liberation of Eastern Turkestan ;

 Organization for Liberation of Uighuristan;

 Interregional Association of Uighurs of CIS;

4
И и трь с . утм м/ . атхвА гнкй зм у-2 / о тнн.2001. - №9 4)
з невю А Д су о Е П суо. ф аси иу рд /К ни ет– (7.
(rmi e i o A D s m n E Ps hfA ga’E e l // Kontinent. -2001. - №9 4)
Fo n r e f . ut a / . at o. fhns m r d
tv w o u a -2 (7.)
5
Sean L Yom. Uighurs flex their muscles. January 23, 2002
6

7. 
 International Antinuclear Movement of Uighurs;
 International Organization of Moslem-Women.

Some of the organizations dealt with the development of their national culture
and education. While others, for example, the United National Revolutionary
Front for Liberation of Eastern Turkestan, Organization for Liberation of
Uighuristan and Interregional Association of Uighurs of CIS countries, carried out
political activity in support of Xinjiang independence.
The Interregional Uighurs Association, currently chaired by Kakharman
Kozhanberdiev, a scholar of the Uighurology Institute, was established in January of
1992. The formation came about after various Uighur associations held their Session
in Almaty, in which more than 300 delegates from 5 Central Asia states attended.6
The Session appealed to the President and Parliament of Kazakhstan, as well as the
government of other Central Asia republics, for assistance to Uighurs in their
national liberation movement.
On June 20th, 1992, the founding congress of the Organization for Liberation of
Uighuristan was held in Almaty. It attracted over 70 delegates, including
representatives of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, as well as
guests from Turkey, Germany and China. Held with open doors, the congress elected
a central committee, and adopted a Charter and Program. Ashir Vakhidi, the former
scholar of the Orientology Institute of Kazakh Academy of Science, was appointed
a t ca m n T e rai t n m i gaw sh l e t n f i u pol
sh hi a. h O gn ao’ a ol a t i r i o Ug r ep
e r zi s n e b ao h e
and establishment of independent Uighuristan within the Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region of China.7
In May of 1995, 34 Uighurs residing in Almaty published a letter protesting
aginst China’colonialism towards ethnic minorities of Xinjiang in the newspaper,
s
“o eo E s r T ret ” The letter described the planned birth rate control
V i f at n uks n.
c e a
policy and also the massed resettlement of Hans in XUAR. Additionally, the letter
described the wish of the Uighurs to actively participate in the struggle for the
liberation of Eastern Turkestan.8
In June of 1995, an Imam of Uighur Moslems in Kazakhstan broadcasted a
message to all Moslems. The message urged Islamic countries to unite and stand
together against an arbitrary China, and also to as t at nT ret ’liberation
s sE s r uks n
i e as
f m “ tr o G et a cav i , r i oth i i l adl e t no
r f t s f r H n hui s da n u t n d s n i r i f
o ee a nm w g e fe b ao
ac nl d f i uia”
ni ta o Ug rt .
e n h sn 9
6
Г лс отчоо уксаа0. . 9. (The Voice of Eastern Turkestan, 02.02.1992.)
оо В сонг Т ретн,2 2 92
01
7
Х ю и В Го оии екйтеглн кК зхтн иа-Р си: рш о инсощ еп гаи н йп олм .
л п н . еп лтчси руоьи ааса-К тй ося по ле атя е орн ч о рбе ы -
Ме днрд ы ерзйкй нттт кн м чси и оии екх слдвн й 19. С21
ж уаон й ваи си и сиу эо о и екх п л тчси исеоаи ,99- . . 1
(Helopin V. Geopolitics Triangle: Kazakhstan-Russia-China: Past and Present Problems. –International Eurasian
Institute of Economic and Political Studies, 1999. –p.211)
8
Г лс отчоо уксаа№162. . 9. (The Voice of Eastern Turkestan, No156, 25.05.1995.)
оо В сонг Т ретн, 5,5 5 95
01
9
У г р вз, 5, ю ь19. c.15. (Uigur Avas, No157, June, 1995. –
йы А аи №17и н,95- p.15)
7

8. In 1996, the Secretary of United National Revolution Front of Eastern Turkestan
pointed out that completing the construction of the new Silk Way through Xinjiang
“ h e ni i fr g s t , wlse r e o b o o t “i T ret ”
…w i er h g oe n te i hd i r f l d fh b uks n
l cn i as l vs o e g a
peoples, for no peoples of Easter T ret a wln tg e p.
n uks n r ii o i u”
a e lg v 10
According to some foreign publications, the massed protests in Xinjiang during
May of 1995 were covertly inspired by United National Revolutionary Front of
Eastern Turkestan with Kazakhstan-based headquarters.11 In 1996, the Russian
media12 also pointed out that armed conflicts between Xinjiang separatists and
Chinese authorities originated from Kazakhstan.
Actions of Kazakhstan authorities
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations with PRC, the Kazakh
government faced a difficult task –to define its attitude toward the XIM. On one
hand, by normal legality, it was difficult to define just how dangerous the
organizations operating in the Kazakhstan territory were. The prohibitionist
measures are in contradiction with Articles 20 and 23 of the Kazakhstan Constitution
ga n e g“ r dm o sec adf eo fr G fudt n.Moreover,
ur t i …f eo fpeh n r dm o N O onao”
a en e e i 13
it was ko nt t i i g Ugus n K zks
nw h Xn a ’ i r ad aah shared a commonality in their
a jn s h
spiritual connections. Also, methods practiced by the Chinese authorities toward
ethnic minorities of Xinjiang aroused criticism in Kazakhstan.
As to the strategic prospects for strengthening the movement, if Xinjiang gained
independence, it would serve as a shield protecting Kazakhstan from possible threats
in the east.
On the other hand, the purpose for the formation of Uighur organizations in
Kazakhstan was for the unification of Uighurs in support of establishing an
independent state in the Xinjiang – PRC province, which would affect
Kazakhstan-China relations. For this reason, the idea of employing radical methods
promoted by some Uighur organizations (based in Kazakhstan as well) could arouse
discontent in China. It would be a threat to peace, not only in K zks n bre ,
aaht ’ odr
as s
but all over the region as well. Moreover, it was in contradiction with the foreign
policies of Kazakhstan.
In June of 19,dr g Te Te i ’ v i i K zks n Pei n
96 ui n sn sm n s it n aaht , r d t
g s a se
Nazarbayev once again confirmed Kazakhstani attitude towards Xinjiang. He
declared that Kazakhstan firmly pursued the policy of noninterference into domestic
affairs of other countries, including China. In addition, he would prevent any
10
К рвн 12.07.1996. (Karavan, 12.07.1996.)
ааа,
11
Х аяь и а, 20.06.1996. (Hualeungzhibao, 20.06.1996.)
улнж бо
12
И вси,4 8 96 (Ezvistia, 04.08.1996)
зетя0. . 9.
01
13
К нттц я епбии ааса,
о сиуи Рсул к К зхтн c.20, 23. (Constitution of Republic of Kazakhstan, Article 20, 23)
8

9. anti-China activity carried out by the Organization of Eastern Turkestan in
Kazakhstan, which would undermine Kazakhstan-China relations.14
Finally, it should be noted that in early April of 1996 and 1997, the Chinese
government held meetings with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan
leaders. The goal of which was to gain their agreement on curbing t rrt e oi’
r ss
movement both within Xinjiang and abroad. In particular, Kazakhstan assured China
that it would provide neither support nor refuge to spr isgop. proof, the
ea tt rus As
as ’ 15
Kazakhstan government banned all governmental bodies and non-governmental
institutions from providing open or covert support to any radical activity of Uighurs,
which included: closing dw a a o Ugu’newspapers; and transforming the
o n pr f i r
t h s
Institute of Uighurology, which can be seen as the ban on every activity of Uighurs
in Kazakhstan. However, in reality, even today, there still existed cultural and other
Ugu’ogn ao t to p e wtK zks nl s
i r rai t nh cm ls i aaht ia within Kazakhstan.
h s zi a i h a w
Conclusion
Central Asian specialists believe that the Xinjiang unrests would provoke a new
surge in the Chechen war, and also induce an influx of Xinjiang Uighurs into Russia,
leading to numerous new problems in the country.16 Within the context of its
international policy, Central Asian countries spot R ’ psi adB in’
uprP Cs oio n ei s tn jg
course toward the development of the XUAR economy: fight against the separatists
but see the dialogue with the opposition as necessary; stand against terrorism and
any calls for secession; and against slogans on political, social and economy
freedom practiced by the supporters of secession.
For centuries, the Uighur had been an important link between China and
Central Asia. Not only did they occupy more than 46% of the 15 million people in
the XUAR population, but there were also about one million Uighurs residing in the
Central Asia region. The Uighur lived along the Silk Road and worked as caravan
drivers, transporting goods from the east and west. The strategic location of their
homes enabled them to become the "middlemen" between the Orient and Europe.
Their status was highly regarded by the international communities. Despite being
characterized by various political, religious, and ethnic conflicts throughout their
history, the Uighur were nevertheless described as a "proud, happy, and independent
people." They possessed their own unique blend of cultural elegance. Such a rare
mixture of simplicity and sophistication had given the Uighur a unique charm,
worthy of much discussion.
14
К зхтнкя рва0. . 9. ( aaht Pad.5 7 96
аасаса п ад,5 7 96 K zks n r a0. . 9)
01 a v 01
15
Zhongqi, P. and Xiaomei, T. Ethnic Conflict in China: Characteristics, Causes, and Countermeasures // Issues & Studies. –1999.
- No.5. - p.165.
16
Н звсм я аеа18.08.1998.
еаии а гзт, (Independent newspaper, 18.08.1998.)
9

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Sin
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s
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аато ы D r t a . n d
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