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[CLASS 2014] Palestra Técnica - Jonathan Knudsen

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Título da Palestra: Gerenciando um legado de vulnerabilidades em sistemas de controle - Lições aprendidas a partir do Heartbleed e mais

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MANAGING A LEGACY OF VULNERABILITIES IN CONTROL SYSTEMS LESSONS LEARNED FROM HEARTBLEED AND MORE © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 1 @codenomicon Jonathan Knudsen, Principal Security Engineer November 6, 2014
CONTENTS © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 2 • Understanding Heartbleed • Managing SoTware VulnerabiliVes • Challenges in ICS • What now?
© 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 3 understanding heartbleed
TLS HEARTBEAT MESSAGE © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 4 Client : Hello, here is a list of cipher suites I can use. Server : Hello, here is the cipher suite I chose from your list. And here's an X.509v3 certificate that contains my public key. Client : Heartbeat: send back my 4 byte message “ABCD”. Server : ABCD Client : [Scrutinizes the certificate, checks to make sure it's signed by a known certificate authority.] Okay, thanks. Here's the premaster secret, encrypted with your public key. The next thing I say to you will be encrypted with the session key. Client : [Encrypted] I'm done with the handshake. Server : [Decrypts the premaster secret using private key, then generates the session key.] The next thing I send will be encrypted. Server : [Encrypted] I'm done with the handshake too. [Client and server exchange encrypted data.]
LIAR LIAR PANTS ON FIRE © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 5 Client : Hello, here is a list of cipher suites I can use. Server : Hello, here is the cipher suite I chose from your list. And here's an X.509v3 certificate that contains my public key. Client : Heartbeat: send back my 36 byte message “ABCD”. Server : ABCD....5...t.....[.{.....I_.k.I"].. Client : [Scrutinizes the certificate, checks to make sure it's signed by a known certificate authority.] Okay, thanks. Here's the premaster secret, encrypted with your public key. The next thing I say to you will be encrypted with the session key. Client : [Encrypted] I'm done with the handshake. Server : [Decrypts the premaster secret using private key, then generates the session key.] The next thing I send will be encrypted. Server : [Encrypted] I'm done with the handshake too. [Client and server exchange encrypted data.]
FIND THE BUG © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 6 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)! {! unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;! unsigned short hbtype;! unsigned int payload;! unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */! ! /* Read type and payload length first */! hbtype = *p++;! n2s(p, payload);! pl = p;! ! if (s->msg_callback)! s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,! &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,! s, s->msg_callback_arg);! ! if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)! {! unsigned char *buffer, *bp;! int r;! ! /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes! * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus! * payload, plus padding! */! buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);! bp = buffer;! ! /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */! *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;! s2n(payload, bp);! memcpy(bp, pl, payload);! bp += payload;! /* Random padding */! RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);! ! r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);! !
FIND THE BUG © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 7 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)! {! unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;! unsigned short hbtype;! unsigned int payload;! unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */! ! /* Read type and payload length first */! hbtype = *p++;! n2s(p, payload);! pl = p;! ! if (s->msg_callback)! s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,! &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,! s, s->msg_callback_arg);! ! if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)! {! unsigned char *buffer, *bp;! int r;! ! /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes! * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus! * payload, plus padding! */! buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);! bp = buffer;! ! /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */! *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;! s2n(payload, bp);! memcpy(bp, pl, payload);! bp += payload;! /* Random padding */! RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);! ! r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);! ! payload is the length reported by the client Allocate a buffer with the claimed size Copy payload bytes
© 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 8 IMPACT • h_p://heartbleed.com • Serious vulnerability in OpenSSL 1.0.1 – 1.0.1f, and 1.0.2beta • Wandered the wild from March 2012 unVl April 2014 • Found independently by Codenomicon and Neel Mehta of Google security team (who first reported it to OpenSSL) • We were working on staged responsible vulnerability disclosure with CERT.FI when OpenSSL went public. We published our Q&A. • By the numbers: • Apache & NGINX have about 60% market share according to NetcraT. Most of these likely using OpenSSL for TLS/SSL. • 630 of top 10k sites vulnerable on April 8th, 750k globally h_ps://github.com/musalbas/heartbleed-­‐masstest/
HOW DO WE FIND THE NEXT HEARTBLEED? © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 9 1. Be_er tesVng 2. Be_er tesVng 3. Be_er tesVng • Builders, use a secure development life cycle • Buyers, test more thoroughly and demand be_er products
© 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 10 managing soTware vulnerabiliVes
© 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 11 DOES THIS SOFTWARE MAKE MY ATTACK SURFACE LOOK FAT?
SOFTWARE VULNERABILITIES © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 12 • Design vulnerabiliVes • ConfiguraVon vulnerabiliVes • Code vulnerabiliVes • To improve security, find and fix as many vulnerabiliVes as you can • You will never find all of them • Using resources efficiently puts you ahead of the curve
HUMAN HUNTERS © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 13 • Design vulnerabiliVes • ConfiguraVon vulnerabiliVes • Code vulnerabiliVes
WHERE MACHINES CAN HELP © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 14 • Design vulnerabiliVes • ConfiguraVon vulnerabiliVes • Code vulnerabiliVes
AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY TOOLS © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 15 • Source code analysis • You need the source code • False posiVves • StaVc binary analysis • Find libraries, vulnerabiliVes, licenses • Fuzz tesVng • Can be black box tesVng • Be_er to use various target instrumentaVon tools: Asan, Valgrind memcheck, etc. • Add behavior analysis: this is how we found Heartbleed
© 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 16 challenges in ics
IT’S ALL SOFTWARE © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 17 • Pre_y much the same problems as everywhere else • Up unVl now, an industry focused on funcVonality • Now everything is going on IP networks • Network was perceived as trustworthy • Can’t trust the network, remote a_acks are relaVvely easy • Long product lifeVmes • Patching is expensive and difficult • Makes security and robustness even more important
ICS PROTOCOLS – DEFENSICS TEST SUITES © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 18 • 61850/GOOSE/SV • 61850/MMS client • 61850/MMS server • 60870-­‐5-­‐104 client • 60870-­‐5-­‐104 server • DNP3 client • DNP3 server • CIP Ethernet/IP • Modbus master • Modbus slave • Profinet DCP server (PLC) • And >260 more… • HTTP • TLS • IPv4 / IPv6 • SSH2 • XML • …
© 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 19 what now?
WHAT NOW? © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 20 • Builders must adopt a secure development life cycle • Security is part of every phase: design, implementaVon, tesVng, release • Use automated tools whenever possible • Buyers: • Ask for more from your builders • Specific types of tesVng • For example: Fuzz Tes*ng Maturity Model (h_p://www.codenomicon.com/Tmm/) • Verify using available tools • Binary analysis • Fuzzing
© 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 21 thank you Jonathan Knudsen Principal Security Engineer jonathan@codenomicon.com
[CLASS 2014] Palestra Técnica - Jonathan Knudsen

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[CLASS 2014] Palestra Técnica - Jonathan Knudsen

  • 1. MANAGING A LEGACY OF VULNERABILITIES IN CONTROL SYSTEMS LESSONS LEARNED FROM HEARTBLEED AND MORE © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 1 @codenomicon Jonathan Knudsen, Principal Security Engineer November 6, 2014
  • 2. CONTENTS © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 2 • Understanding Heartbleed • Managing SoTware VulnerabiliVes • Challenges in ICS • What now?
  • 3. © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 3 understanding heartbleed
  • 4. TLS HEARTBEAT MESSAGE © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 4 Client : Hello, here is a list of cipher suites I can use. Server : Hello, here is the cipher suite I chose from your list. And here's an X.509v3 certificate that contains my public key. Client : Heartbeat: send back my 4 byte message “ABCD”. Server : ABCD Client : [Scrutinizes the certificate, checks to make sure it's signed by a known certificate authority.] Okay, thanks. Here's the premaster secret, encrypted with your public key. The next thing I say to you will be encrypted with the session key. Client : [Encrypted] I'm done with the handshake. Server : [Decrypts the premaster secret using private key, then generates the session key.] The next thing I send will be encrypted. Server : [Encrypted] I'm done with the handshake too. [Client and server exchange encrypted data.]
  • 5. LIAR LIAR PANTS ON FIRE © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 5 Client : Hello, here is a list of cipher suites I can use. Server : Hello, here is the cipher suite I chose from your list. And here's an X.509v3 certificate that contains my public key. Client : Heartbeat: send back my 36 byte message “ABCD”. Server : ABCD....5...t.....[.{.....I_.k.I"].. Client : [Scrutinizes the certificate, checks to make sure it's signed by a known certificate authority.] Okay, thanks. Here's the premaster secret, encrypted with your public key. The next thing I say to you will be encrypted with the session key. Client : [Encrypted] I'm done with the handshake. Server : [Decrypts the premaster secret using private key, then generates the session key.] The next thing I send will be encrypted. Server : [Encrypted] I'm done with the handshake too. [Client and server exchange encrypted data.]
  • 6. FIND THE BUG © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 6 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)! {! unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;! unsigned short hbtype;! unsigned int payload;! unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */! ! /* Read type and payload length first */! hbtype = *p++;! n2s(p, payload);! pl = p;! ! if (s->msg_callback)! s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,! &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,! s, s->msg_callback_arg);! ! if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)! {! unsigned char *buffer, *bp;! int r;! ! /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes! * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus! * payload, plus padding! */! buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);! bp = buffer;! ! /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */! *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;! s2n(payload, bp);! memcpy(bp, pl, payload);! bp += payload;! /* Random padding */! RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);! ! r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);! !
  • 7. FIND THE BUG © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 7 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)! {! unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;! unsigned short hbtype;! unsigned int payload;! unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */! ! /* Read type and payload length first */! hbtype = *p++;! n2s(p, payload);! pl = p;! ! if (s->msg_callback)! s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,! &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,! s, s->msg_callback_arg);! ! if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)! {! unsigned char *buffer, *bp;! int r;! ! /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes! * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus! * payload, plus padding! */! buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);! bp = buffer;! ! /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */! *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;! s2n(payload, bp);! memcpy(bp, pl, payload);! bp += payload;! /* Random padding */! RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);! ! r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);! ! payload is the length reported by the client Allocate a buffer with the claimed size Copy payload bytes
  • 8. © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 8 IMPACT • h_p://heartbleed.com • Serious vulnerability in OpenSSL 1.0.1 – 1.0.1f, and 1.0.2beta • Wandered the wild from March 2012 unVl April 2014 • Found independently by Codenomicon and Neel Mehta of Google security team (who first reported it to OpenSSL) • We were working on staged responsible vulnerability disclosure with CERT.FI when OpenSSL went public. We published our Q&A. • By the numbers: • Apache & NGINX have about 60% market share according to NetcraT. Most of these likely using OpenSSL for TLS/SSL. • 630 of top 10k sites vulnerable on April 8th, 750k globally h_ps://github.com/musalbas/heartbleed-­‐masstest/
  • 9. HOW DO WE FIND THE NEXT HEARTBLEED? © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 9 1. Be_er tesVng 2. Be_er tesVng 3. Be_er tesVng • Builders, use a secure development life cycle • Buyers, test more thoroughly and demand be_er products
  • 10. © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 10 managing soTware vulnerabiliVes
  • 11. © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 11 DOES THIS SOFTWARE MAKE MY ATTACK SURFACE LOOK FAT?
  • 12. SOFTWARE VULNERABILITIES © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 12 • Design vulnerabiliVes • ConfiguraVon vulnerabiliVes • Code vulnerabiliVes • To improve security, find and fix as many vulnerabiliVes as you can • You will never find all of them • Using resources efficiently puts you ahead of the curve
  • 13. HUMAN HUNTERS © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 13 • Design vulnerabiliVes • ConfiguraVon vulnerabiliVes • Code vulnerabiliVes
  • 14. WHERE MACHINES CAN HELP © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 14 • Design vulnerabiliVes • ConfiguraVon vulnerabiliVes • Code vulnerabiliVes
  • 15. AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY TOOLS © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 15 • Source code analysis • You need the source code • False posiVves • StaVc binary analysis • Find libraries, vulnerabiliVes, licenses • Fuzz tesVng • Can be black box tesVng • Be_er to use various target instrumentaVon tools: Asan, Valgrind memcheck, etc. • Add behavior analysis: this is how we found Heartbleed
  • 16. © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 16 challenges in ics
  • 17. IT’S ALL SOFTWARE © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 17 • Pre_y much the same problems as everywhere else • Up unVl now, an industry focused on funcVonality • Now everything is going on IP networks • Network was perceived as trustworthy • Can’t trust the network, remote a_acks are relaVvely easy • Long product lifeVmes • Patching is expensive and difficult • Makes security and robustness even more important
  • 18. ICS PROTOCOLS – DEFENSICS TEST SUITES © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 18 • 61850/GOOSE/SV • 61850/MMS client • 61850/MMS server • 60870-­‐5-­‐104 client • 60870-­‐5-­‐104 server • DNP3 client • DNP3 server • CIP Ethernet/IP • Modbus master • Modbus slave • Profinet DCP server (PLC) • And >260 more… • HTTP • TLS • IPv4 / IPv6 • SSH2 • XML • …
  • 19. © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 19 what now?
  • 20. WHAT NOW? © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 20 • Builders must adopt a secure development life cycle • Security is part of every phase: design, implementaVon, tesVng, release • Use automated tools whenever possible • Buyers: • Ask for more from your builders • Specific types of tesVng • For example: Fuzz Tes*ng Maturity Model (h_p://www.codenomicon.com/Tmm/) • Verify using available tools • Binary analysis • Fuzzing
  • 21. © 2014 All Rights Reserved 6-­‐Nov-­‐2014 21 thank you Jonathan Knudsen Principal Security Engineer jonathan@codenomicon.com