SlideShare ist ein Scribd-Unternehmen logo
1 von 39
Agile Security
Can infosec keep up with agile?
www.i-to-i.nl
A new security
management approach
for agile environments
www.agilesecurity.nl
dfdd
+ 31-6-53315102
arthur@1secure.nl
www.1secure.nl
Arthur Donkers
Security Officer
Interested in info sec, technology, organisation
and combining these all into one solution Critical
Security Architect Trainer for PECB (ISO27001,
27005, 31000) Convinced that Infosec is a means
to an end, not a purpose in itself.
Pascal de Koning
Has a security manager role at several companies.
His passion is to make security an integrated part of
IT. Was lead author of the TOGAF Security Guide
(2016). He also initiated the Security Service
Catalogue project, a joint effort of The Open Group
and The SABSA Institute.
Senior Security Consultant
p.de.koning@i-to-i.nl
+31-6-29525365
www.i-to-i.nl
Agenda
• Four false assumptions that make the
traditional security approach fail
• ‘Feet in the mud’ with the Agile Security
Engagement Model (ASEM)
• Explanation of the innovations in this Agile
Security approach
Why?
System and application development is moving
towards agile and a continuous delivery model.
Why?
Can info security keep up with this new
paradigm?
Why?
The traditional approach for security
management fails in agile development projects.
Managing expectations
We summarize the cause of failure of traditional
Security Management,
and propose a new Agile Security Engagement
Model (ASEM) to solve the issues.
New with agile
Short cycles that can be managed easily, and
don’t be afraid to postpone to the next cycle
New with agile
Feed back and feed forward
(results are used in next cycle, as are fixes)
Agile development model
Misalignment
Agile and security frameworks do not cooperate
easily because of 4 ‘assumptions’
Assumption #1
The agile project is capable of translating the
generic security requirements to specific controls
This fails because:
• Agile team has other priorities
• Agile team has limited resources
• Agile team has a strict timeline
• Agile team finds security boring
Assumption #2
The agile team has the expertise and knowledge to
build secure solutions
This fails because:
• Agile team (often) does not have the skills or
expertise
• Agile team is not always aware of requirements
• Agile team is not aware of security vulnerabilities
• Agile team has no tools and methodologies
Assumption #3
There is sufficient time and money to perform a
security test and process all of the
recommendations.
This fails because:
• Continuous delivery has no clear test phase
• Focus on functional testing
• Shifting focus, only clear at start of the sprint
Assumption #4
There is sufficient time and money to identify
and address all security risks
This fails because:
• Serious time constraints
• Not enough people and resources
• Culture clash
How can we solve this?
New:
Agile Security Engagement Model
• Risk-driven
– don’t aim for 100% secure
• Bring on security solutions
– don’t just set requirements
• Provide a set of sub-policies that address specific
issues
– not an 80-pager security policy
• Security monitoring independent of development
process
– don’t try to synchronize with project planning
BREAK-OUT SESSIE
The basis of ASEM (from Scrum)
First: make security expert part of the
development team
• partly developer,
• partly security advisor
Add security-related user stories
Business
As a senior manager, I want to be sure that access to customer data is restricted so
that I won’t risk a fine of 800.000 euro in case of leakage of privacy-sensitive data.
As a senior manager, I want to be able to report to the regulatory board that this
application is free of technical vulnerabilities, so that we keep our license to operate.
Security-related user stories
As a customer, I want to be sure that the credit card data that I provide for payments
are processed and stored securely, so that access by third parties or hackers is
impossible.
Etc.
Add security to Definition of Done
Compliance
Risk
Sample Definition of “Done”
Provide security building blocks
Detailed sub-
policies where
useful
Service Catalogue
with generic
solutions
Set up a security service catalogue
• Provide re-usable operational security services
to the development team
• Provide re-usable security patterns
• Manage these via a security catalog (see next
slide)
RESPOND
DETECT
PREVENT
Security Service Catalogue - example
User
Data
Application
Platform
Network
Housing
Operational Security Building Blocks
Authorization
management
Authentication
Log
Management
Hardening
Security
monitoring
SSL certificate
Patch
management
Back-up &
restore
Vulnerability
management
Trusted time
Anti-virus
Penetration
testing
Managed PKI
Forensic
research
Security Policy Framework
Information
Security
Policy
IT Security
Handbook
Hardening
policy
Encryption
Standard
Access
Control Policy
Password
Policy
Etc
Etc
Detailed sub-
policies for
non-security
practitioners
High-level,
describes security
management
process
Boring
Interesting
Externalize and formalize the security
knowledge
Means to extend your span of control:
 Define a classification scheme
 Define security baselines
Classification scheme example
Security Measure Classification:
Baseline
Classification:
High Secure
Authentication Username / password
based on Active
Directory
Two-factor
authentication based on
PKI certificates
Authorization Regular authorization
process
Additional approval of
line manager needed
Attestation
Management
Standard review of
authorizations every 6
months
Additional monthly
reviews of authorizations
Hardening policy Standard hardening
policy for OS
idem
Etc.
Daily automated security tests
Extension of
regular functional
tests
Direct feed-back,
to current or
future user story
Continuous Monitoring
• Continuous security monitoring of the
development process!
• Define Key Risk Indicators and Quality Controls
at the detail level of the development process
(e.g. OWASP secure coding standard).
This step is NOT a SIEM or other Event
Monitoring service!
Suggestions for daily, automated
security checks
• Source code security checks (language-dependent)
– Dangerous programming logic (allow by default)
– Processing undefined variables
– Processing unsanitized (‘tainted’) parameters
• Checks on security functionality (see user stories)
– Logon
– Authorization model
• Testing for common abuse scenarios (generic)
– Access to admin section
– Session hijacking
– Cross-site scripting
– SQL injection
– Etc.
Agile Security Engagement Model
Continuous
Security
Monitoring
Continuous Monitoring
• Checking the security within agile is an
independent and separate thread
• Will feed back into agile
• Red Team
• No scope limitations, dedicated testing
• Bug bounty program
• Disclosure
• Incident response process
Summary of
Agile Security Engagement Model
• Make security expert part of the development team
• Security-related user stories
• Security building blocks in the service catalogue
• Detailed security policies where needed
• Security classification to unify and automate
decisions
• Daily automated security tests
• Continuous monitoring
Publications
in progress
Check previous PECB-webinar
of Arthur Donkers
Conclusion for Security Management
• Apply hands-on approach
• Provide a security catalog with re-usable
services and patterns
• Implement continuous monitoring process
• Accept that not all risks will be addressed, so
rely on your risk management capabilities
?
QUESTIONS
THANK YOU
+ 31-6-53315102
arthur@1secure.nl p.de.koning@i-to-i.nl
+31-6-29525365
www.agilesecurity.nl

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Was ist angesagt?

Application Threat Modeling
Application Threat ModelingApplication Threat Modeling
Application Threat ModelingMarco Morana
 
DevSecOps reference architectures 2018
DevSecOps reference architectures 2018DevSecOps reference architectures 2018
DevSecOps reference architectures 2018Sonatype
 
TARA- Automotive Cybersecurity.pptx
TARA- Automotive Cybersecurity.pptxTARA- Automotive Cybersecurity.pptx
TARA- Automotive Cybersecurity.pptxShriya Rai
 
DevSecOps and the CI/CD Pipeline
 DevSecOps and the CI/CD Pipeline DevSecOps and the CI/CD Pipeline
DevSecOps and the CI/CD PipelineJames Wickett
 
DevSecOps Training Bootcamp - A Practical DevSecOps Course
DevSecOps Training Bootcamp - A Practical DevSecOps CourseDevSecOps Training Bootcamp - A Practical DevSecOps Course
DevSecOps Training Bootcamp - A Practical DevSecOps CourseTonex
 
DevSecOps Basics with Azure Pipelines
DevSecOps Basics with Azure Pipelines DevSecOps Basics with Azure Pipelines
DevSecOps Basics with Azure Pipelines Abdul_Mujeeb
 
[DevSecOps Live] DevSecOps: Challenges and Opportunities
[DevSecOps Live] DevSecOps: Challenges and Opportunities[DevSecOps Live] DevSecOps: Challenges and Opportunities
[DevSecOps Live] DevSecOps: Challenges and OpportunitiesMohammed A. Imran
 
DevSecOps Implementation Journey
DevSecOps Implementation JourneyDevSecOps Implementation Journey
DevSecOps Implementation JourneyDevOps Indonesia
 
Maturing your organization from DevOps to DevSecOps
Maturing your organization from DevOps to DevSecOpsMaturing your organization from DevOps to DevSecOps
Maturing your organization from DevOps to DevSecOpsAmazon Web Services
 
Secure SDLC Framework
Secure SDLC FrameworkSecure SDLC Framework
Secure SDLC FrameworkRishi Kant
 
OWASP DefectDojo - Open Source Security Sanity
OWASP DefectDojo - Open Source Security SanityOWASP DefectDojo - Open Source Security Sanity
OWASP DefectDojo - Open Source Security SanityMatt Tesauro
 
Secure Software Development Life Cycle
Secure Software Development Life CycleSecure Software Development Life Cycle
Secure Software Development Life CycleMaurice Dawson
 
Secure Your Code Implement DevSecOps in Azure
Secure Your Code Implement DevSecOps in AzureSecure Your Code Implement DevSecOps in Azure
Secure Your Code Implement DevSecOps in Azurekloia
 
ABN AMRO DevSecOps Journey
ABN AMRO DevSecOps JourneyABN AMRO DevSecOps Journey
ABN AMRO DevSecOps JourneyDerek E. Weeks
 
Introduction to DevSecOps
Introduction to DevSecOpsIntroduction to DevSecOps
Introduction to DevSecOpsSetu Parimi
 
Demystifying DevSecOps
Demystifying DevSecOpsDemystifying DevSecOps
Demystifying DevSecOpsArchana Joshi
 

Was ist angesagt? (20)

Application Threat Modeling
Application Threat ModelingApplication Threat Modeling
Application Threat Modeling
 
DevSecOps reference architectures 2018
DevSecOps reference architectures 2018DevSecOps reference architectures 2018
DevSecOps reference architectures 2018
 
TARA- Automotive Cybersecurity.pptx
TARA- Automotive Cybersecurity.pptxTARA- Automotive Cybersecurity.pptx
TARA- Automotive Cybersecurity.pptx
 
DevSecOps and the CI/CD Pipeline
 DevSecOps and the CI/CD Pipeline DevSecOps and the CI/CD Pipeline
DevSecOps and the CI/CD Pipeline
 
DevSecOps Training Bootcamp - A Practical DevSecOps Course
DevSecOps Training Bootcamp - A Practical DevSecOps CourseDevSecOps Training Bootcamp - A Practical DevSecOps Course
DevSecOps Training Bootcamp - A Practical DevSecOps Course
 
DevSecOps Basics with Azure Pipelines
DevSecOps Basics with Azure Pipelines DevSecOps Basics with Azure Pipelines
DevSecOps Basics with Azure Pipelines
 
[DevSecOps Live] DevSecOps: Challenges and Opportunities
[DevSecOps Live] DevSecOps: Challenges and Opportunities[DevSecOps Live] DevSecOps: Challenges and Opportunities
[DevSecOps Live] DevSecOps: Challenges and Opportunities
 
DevSecOps Implementation Journey
DevSecOps Implementation JourneyDevSecOps Implementation Journey
DevSecOps Implementation Journey
 
Maturing your organization from DevOps to DevSecOps
Maturing your organization from DevOps to DevSecOpsMaturing your organization from DevOps to DevSecOps
Maturing your organization from DevOps to DevSecOps
 
DEVSECOPS.pptx
DEVSECOPS.pptxDEVSECOPS.pptx
DEVSECOPS.pptx
 
Secure SDLC Framework
Secure SDLC FrameworkSecure SDLC Framework
Secure SDLC Framework
 
DevSecOps: What Why and How : Blackhat 2019
DevSecOps: What Why and How : Blackhat 2019DevSecOps: What Why and How : Blackhat 2019
DevSecOps: What Why and How : Blackhat 2019
 
OWASP DefectDojo - Open Source Security Sanity
OWASP DefectDojo - Open Source Security SanityOWASP DefectDojo - Open Source Security Sanity
OWASP DefectDojo - Open Source Security Sanity
 
Secure Software Development Life Cycle
Secure Software Development Life CycleSecure Software Development Life Cycle
Secure Software Development Life Cycle
 
DevSecOps
DevSecOpsDevSecOps
DevSecOps
 
Benefits of DevSecOps
Benefits of DevSecOpsBenefits of DevSecOps
Benefits of DevSecOps
 
Secure Your Code Implement DevSecOps in Azure
Secure Your Code Implement DevSecOps in AzureSecure Your Code Implement DevSecOps in Azure
Secure Your Code Implement DevSecOps in Azure
 
ABN AMRO DevSecOps Journey
ABN AMRO DevSecOps JourneyABN AMRO DevSecOps Journey
ABN AMRO DevSecOps Journey
 
Introduction to DevSecOps
Introduction to DevSecOpsIntroduction to DevSecOps
Introduction to DevSecOps
 
Demystifying DevSecOps
Demystifying DevSecOpsDemystifying DevSecOps
Demystifying DevSecOps
 

Andere mochten auch

Cyber Security testing in an agile environment
Cyber Security testing in an agile environmentCyber Security testing in an agile environment
Cyber Security testing in an agile environmentArthur Donkers
 
Presentatie Introductieavond Genealogie 23 10-2012
Presentatie Introductieavond Genealogie 23 10-2012Presentatie Introductieavond Genealogie 23 10-2012
Presentatie Introductieavond Genealogie 23 10-2012HSK De Acht Zaligheden
 
Continuous Security: 5 Ways DevOps Improves Security
Continuous Security: 5 Ways DevOps Improves SecurityContinuous Security: 5 Ways DevOps Improves Security
Continuous Security: 5 Ways DevOps Improves SecuritySonatype
 
A New Security Management Approach for Agile Environments
A New Security Management Approach for Agile EnvironmentsA New Security Management Approach for Agile Environments
A New Security Management Approach for Agile EnvironmentsPECB
 
How to improve resilience and respond better to Cyber Attacks with ISO 22301?
How to improve resilience and respond better to Cyber Attacks with ISO 22301?How to improve resilience and respond better to Cyber Attacks with ISO 22301?
How to improve resilience and respond better to Cyber Attacks with ISO 22301?PECB
 
Impact of Changing World Politics in Managing Risk
Impact of Changing World Politics in Managing RiskImpact of Changing World Politics in Managing Risk
Impact of Changing World Politics in Managing RiskPECB
 
6 Pitfalls when Implementing Enterprise Risk Management
6 Pitfalls when Implementing Enterprise Risk Management6 Pitfalls when Implementing Enterprise Risk Management
6 Pitfalls when Implementing Enterprise Risk ManagementPECB
 
5 Top Tips for Implementing a Successful Safety Culture in Global Organizations
5 Top Tips for Implementing a Successful Safety Culture in Global Organizations5 Top Tips for Implementing a Successful Safety Culture in Global Organizations
5 Top Tips for Implementing a Successful Safety Culture in Global OrganizationsPECB
 
Secure Design: Threat Modeling
Secure Design: Threat ModelingSecure Design: Threat Modeling
Secure Design: Threat ModelingCigital
 

Andere mochten auch (9)

Cyber Security testing in an agile environment
Cyber Security testing in an agile environmentCyber Security testing in an agile environment
Cyber Security testing in an agile environment
 
Presentatie Introductieavond Genealogie 23 10-2012
Presentatie Introductieavond Genealogie 23 10-2012Presentatie Introductieavond Genealogie 23 10-2012
Presentatie Introductieavond Genealogie 23 10-2012
 
Continuous Security: 5 Ways DevOps Improves Security
Continuous Security: 5 Ways DevOps Improves SecurityContinuous Security: 5 Ways DevOps Improves Security
Continuous Security: 5 Ways DevOps Improves Security
 
A New Security Management Approach for Agile Environments
A New Security Management Approach for Agile EnvironmentsA New Security Management Approach for Agile Environments
A New Security Management Approach for Agile Environments
 
How to improve resilience and respond better to Cyber Attacks with ISO 22301?
How to improve resilience and respond better to Cyber Attacks with ISO 22301?How to improve resilience and respond better to Cyber Attacks with ISO 22301?
How to improve resilience and respond better to Cyber Attacks with ISO 22301?
 
Impact of Changing World Politics in Managing Risk
Impact of Changing World Politics in Managing RiskImpact of Changing World Politics in Managing Risk
Impact of Changing World Politics in Managing Risk
 
6 Pitfalls when Implementing Enterprise Risk Management
6 Pitfalls when Implementing Enterprise Risk Management6 Pitfalls when Implementing Enterprise Risk Management
6 Pitfalls when Implementing Enterprise Risk Management
 
5 Top Tips for Implementing a Successful Safety Culture in Global Organizations
5 Top Tips for Implementing a Successful Safety Culture in Global Organizations5 Top Tips for Implementing a Successful Safety Culture in Global Organizations
5 Top Tips for Implementing a Successful Safety Culture in Global Organizations
 
Secure Design: Threat Modeling
Secure Design: Threat ModelingSecure Design: Threat Modeling
Secure Design: Threat Modeling
 

Ähnlich wie Agile security

MS. Cybersecurity Reference Architecture
MS. Cybersecurity Reference ArchitectureMS. Cybersecurity Reference Architecture
MS. Cybersecurity Reference Architectureangelohammond
 
Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the ssdlc cosac - 201...
Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the ssdlc   cosac - 201...Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the ssdlc   cosac - 201...
Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the ssdlc cosac - 201...John M. Willis
 
Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the SSDLC
Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the SSDLCEnumerating software security design flaws throughout the SSDLC
Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the SSDLCJohn M. Willis
 
4_25655_SE731_2020_1__2_1_Lecture 1 - Course Outline and Secure SDLC.ppt
4_25655_SE731_2020_1__2_1_Lecture 1 - Course Outline and Secure SDLC.ppt4_25655_SE731_2020_1__2_1_Lecture 1 - Course Outline and Secure SDLC.ppt
4_25655_SE731_2020_1__2_1_Lecture 1 - Course Outline and Secure SDLC.pptgealehegn
 
The Open Group - ZT Commandments and Reference Model.pptx
The Open Group - ZT Commandments and Reference Model.pptxThe Open Group - ZT Commandments and Reference Model.pptx
The Open Group - ZT Commandments and Reference Model.pptxMark Simos
 
A journey into Application Security
A journey into Application SecurityA journey into Application Security
A journey into Application SecurityChristian Martorella
 
Lecture Course Outline and Secure SDLC.ppt
Lecture Course Outline and Secure SDLC.pptLecture Course Outline and Secure SDLC.ppt
Lecture Course Outline and Secure SDLC.pptDrBasemMohamedElomda
 
Secure Software Development Lifecycle
Secure Software Development LifecycleSecure Software Development Lifecycle
Secure Software Development Lifecycle1&1
 
A Warrior's Journey: Building a Global AppSec Program - OWASP Global AppSec 2020
A Warrior's Journey: Building a Global AppSec Program - OWASP Global AppSec 2020A Warrior's Journey: Building a Global AppSec Program - OWASP Global AppSec 2020
A Warrior's Journey: Building a Global AppSec Program - OWASP Global AppSec 2020Brian Levine
 
Security's DevOps Transformation
Security's DevOps TransformationSecurity's DevOps Transformation
Security's DevOps TransformationMichele Chubirka
 
Owasp summit slides day 2
Owasp summit slides day 2Owasp summit slides day 2
Owasp summit slides day 2Dinis Cruz
 
Digital Product Security
Digital Product SecurityDigital Product Security
Digital Product SecuritySoftServe
 
Dev secops security and compliance at the speed of continuous delivery - owasp
Dev secops  security and compliance at the speed of continuous delivery - owaspDev secops  security and compliance at the speed of continuous delivery - owasp
Dev secops security and compliance at the speed of continuous delivery - owaspDag Rowe
 
Accelerating OT - A Case Study
Accelerating OT - A Case StudyAccelerating OT - A Case Study
Accelerating OT - A Case StudyDigital Bond
 
2015 03-04 presentation1
2015 03-04 presentation12015 03-04 presentation1
2015 03-04 presentation1ifi8106tlu
 
Cyber Security Testing
Cyber Security TestingCyber Security Testing
Cyber Security TestingPECB
 
Application Security in an Agile World - Agile Singapore 2016
Application Security in an Agile World - Agile Singapore 2016Application Security in an Agile World - Agile Singapore 2016
Application Security in an Agile World - Agile Singapore 2016Stefan Streichsbier
 
Null application security in an agile world
Null application security in an agile worldNull application security in an agile world
Null application security in an agile worldStefan Streichsbier
 

Ähnlich wie Agile security (20)

MS. Cybersecurity Reference Architecture
MS. Cybersecurity Reference ArchitectureMS. Cybersecurity Reference Architecture
MS. Cybersecurity Reference Architecture
 
Se project-methodology-for-security-project-web
Se project-methodology-for-security-project-webSe project-methodology-for-security-project-web
Se project-methodology-for-security-project-web
 
Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the ssdlc cosac - 201...
Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the ssdlc   cosac - 201...Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the ssdlc   cosac - 201...
Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the ssdlc cosac - 201...
 
Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the SSDLC
Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the SSDLCEnumerating software security design flaws throughout the SSDLC
Enumerating software security design flaws throughout the SSDLC
 
4_25655_SE731_2020_1__2_1_Lecture 1 - Course Outline and Secure SDLC.ppt
4_25655_SE731_2020_1__2_1_Lecture 1 - Course Outline and Secure SDLC.ppt4_25655_SE731_2020_1__2_1_Lecture 1 - Course Outline and Secure SDLC.ppt
4_25655_SE731_2020_1__2_1_Lecture 1 - Course Outline and Secure SDLC.ppt
 
The Open Group - ZT Commandments and Reference Model.pptx
The Open Group - ZT Commandments and Reference Model.pptxThe Open Group - ZT Commandments and Reference Model.pptx
The Open Group - ZT Commandments and Reference Model.pptx
 
A journey into Application Security
A journey into Application SecurityA journey into Application Security
A journey into Application Security
 
Many products-no-security (1)
Many products-no-security (1)Many products-no-security (1)
Many products-no-security (1)
 
Lecture Course Outline and Secure SDLC.ppt
Lecture Course Outline and Secure SDLC.pptLecture Course Outline and Secure SDLC.ppt
Lecture Course Outline and Secure SDLC.ppt
 
Secure Software Development Lifecycle
Secure Software Development LifecycleSecure Software Development Lifecycle
Secure Software Development Lifecycle
 
A Warrior's Journey: Building a Global AppSec Program - OWASP Global AppSec 2020
A Warrior's Journey: Building a Global AppSec Program - OWASP Global AppSec 2020A Warrior's Journey: Building a Global AppSec Program - OWASP Global AppSec 2020
A Warrior's Journey: Building a Global AppSec Program - OWASP Global AppSec 2020
 
Security's DevOps Transformation
Security's DevOps TransformationSecurity's DevOps Transformation
Security's DevOps Transformation
 
Owasp summit slides day 2
Owasp summit slides day 2Owasp summit slides day 2
Owasp summit slides day 2
 
Digital Product Security
Digital Product SecurityDigital Product Security
Digital Product Security
 
Dev secops security and compliance at the speed of continuous delivery - owasp
Dev secops  security and compliance at the speed of continuous delivery - owaspDev secops  security and compliance at the speed of continuous delivery - owasp
Dev secops security and compliance at the speed of continuous delivery - owasp
 
Accelerating OT - A Case Study
Accelerating OT - A Case StudyAccelerating OT - A Case Study
Accelerating OT - A Case Study
 
2015 03-04 presentation1
2015 03-04 presentation12015 03-04 presentation1
2015 03-04 presentation1
 
Cyber Security Testing
Cyber Security TestingCyber Security Testing
Cyber Security Testing
 
Application Security in an Agile World - Agile Singapore 2016
Application Security in an Agile World - Agile Singapore 2016Application Security in an Agile World - Agile Singapore 2016
Application Security in an Agile World - Agile Singapore 2016
 
Null application security in an agile world
Null application security in an agile worldNull application security in an agile world
Null application security in an agile world
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen

Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...DianaGray10
 
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data DiscoveryTrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data DiscoveryTrustArc
 
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​Bhuvaneswari Subramani
 
Corporate and higher education May webinar.pptx
Corporate and higher education May webinar.pptxCorporate and higher education May webinar.pptx
Corporate and higher education May webinar.pptxRustici Software
 
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...Angeliki Cooney
 
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ..."I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...Zilliz
 
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...Orbitshub
 
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...apidays
 
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024Victor Rentea
 
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWEREMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWERMadyBayot
 
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : UncertaintyArtificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : UncertaintyKhushali Kathiriya
 
[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf
[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf
[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdfSandro Moreira
 
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot TakeoffStrategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoffsammart93
 
Mcleodganj Call Girls 🥰 8617370543 Service Offer VIP Hot Model
Mcleodganj Call Girls 🥰 8617370543 Service Offer VIP Hot ModelMcleodganj Call Girls 🥰 8617370543 Service Offer VIP Hot Model
Mcleodganj Call Girls 🥰 8617370543 Service Offer VIP Hot ModelDeepika Singh
 
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challengesICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challengesrafiqahmad00786416
 
Apidays New York 2024 - Accelerating FinTech Innovation by Vasa Krishnan, Fin...
Apidays New York 2024 - Accelerating FinTech Innovation by Vasa Krishnan, Fin...Apidays New York 2024 - Accelerating FinTech Innovation by Vasa Krishnan, Fin...
Apidays New York 2024 - Accelerating FinTech Innovation by Vasa Krishnan, Fin...apidays
 
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a FresherStrategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a FresherRemote DBA Services
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerThousandEyes
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...apidays
 

Kürzlich hochgeladen (20)

Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
 
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data DiscoveryTrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
 
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
 
Understanding the FAA Part 107 License ..
Understanding the FAA Part 107 License ..Understanding the FAA Part 107 License ..
Understanding the FAA Part 107 License ..
 
Corporate and higher education May webinar.pptx
Corporate and higher education May webinar.pptxCorporate and higher education May webinar.pptx
Corporate and higher education May webinar.pptx
 
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
 
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ..."I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
 
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
 
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...
 
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
 
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWEREMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
 
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : UncertaintyArtificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence Chap.5 : Uncertainty
 
[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf
[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf
[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf
 
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot TakeoffStrategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
 
Mcleodganj Call Girls 🥰 8617370543 Service Offer VIP Hot Model
Mcleodganj Call Girls 🥰 8617370543 Service Offer VIP Hot ModelMcleodganj Call Girls 🥰 8617370543 Service Offer VIP Hot Model
Mcleodganj Call Girls 🥰 8617370543 Service Offer VIP Hot Model
 
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challengesICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
 
Apidays New York 2024 - Accelerating FinTech Innovation by Vasa Krishnan, Fin...
Apidays New York 2024 - Accelerating FinTech Innovation by Vasa Krishnan, Fin...Apidays New York 2024 - Accelerating FinTech Innovation by Vasa Krishnan, Fin...
Apidays New York 2024 - Accelerating FinTech Innovation by Vasa Krishnan, Fin...
 
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a FresherStrategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
Strategies for Landing an Oracle DBA Job as a Fresher
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
 

Agile security

  • 1. Agile Security Can infosec keep up with agile? www.i-to-i.nl A new security management approach for agile environments www.agilesecurity.nl
  • 2. dfdd + 31-6-53315102 arthur@1secure.nl www.1secure.nl Arthur Donkers Security Officer Interested in info sec, technology, organisation and combining these all into one solution Critical Security Architect Trainer for PECB (ISO27001, 27005, 31000) Convinced that Infosec is a means to an end, not a purpose in itself. Pascal de Koning Has a security manager role at several companies. His passion is to make security an integrated part of IT. Was lead author of the TOGAF Security Guide (2016). He also initiated the Security Service Catalogue project, a joint effort of The Open Group and The SABSA Institute. Senior Security Consultant p.de.koning@i-to-i.nl +31-6-29525365 www.i-to-i.nl
  • 3. Agenda • Four false assumptions that make the traditional security approach fail • ‘Feet in the mud’ with the Agile Security Engagement Model (ASEM) • Explanation of the innovations in this Agile Security approach
  • 4. Why? System and application development is moving towards agile and a continuous delivery model.
  • 5. Why? Can info security keep up with this new paradigm?
  • 6. Why? The traditional approach for security management fails in agile development projects.
  • 7. Managing expectations We summarize the cause of failure of traditional Security Management, and propose a new Agile Security Engagement Model (ASEM) to solve the issues.
  • 8. New with agile Short cycles that can be managed easily, and don’t be afraid to postpone to the next cycle
  • 9. New with agile Feed back and feed forward (results are used in next cycle, as are fixes)
  • 11. Misalignment Agile and security frameworks do not cooperate easily because of 4 ‘assumptions’
  • 12. Assumption #1 The agile project is capable of translating the generic security requirements to specific controls This fails because: • Agile team has other priorities • Agile team has limited resources • Agile team has a strict timeline • Agile team finds security boring
  • 13. Assumption #2 The agile team has the expertise and knowledge to build secure solutions This fails because: • Agile team (often) does not have the skills or expertise • Agile team is not always aware of requirements • Agile team is not aware of security vulnerabilities • Agile team has no tools and methodologies
  • 14. Assumption #3 There is sufficient time and money to perform a security test and process all of the recommendations. This fails because: • Continuous delivery has no clear test phase • Focus on functional testing • Shifting focus, only clear at start of the sprint
  • 15. Assumption #4 There is sufficient time and money to identify and address all security risks This fails because: • Serious time constraints • Not enough people and resources • Culture clash
  • 16. How can we solve this?
  • 17. New: Agile Security Engagement Model • Risk-driven – don’t aim for 100% secure • Bring on security solutions – don’t just set requirements • Provide a set of sub-policies that address specific issues – not an 80-pager security policy • Security monitoring independent of development process – don’t try to synchronize with project planning
  • 18.
  • 20. The basis of ASEM (from Scrum)
  • 21. First: make security expert part of the development team • partly developer, • partly security advisor
  • 22. Add security-related user stories Business
  • 23. As a senior manager, I want to be sure that access to customer data is restricted so that I won’t risk a fine of 800.000 euro in case of leakage of privacy-sensitive data. As a senior manager, I want to be able to report to the regulatory board that this application is free of technical vulnerabilities, so that we keep our license to operate. Security-related user stories As a customer, I want to be sure that the credit card data that I provide for payments are processed and stored securely, so that access by third parties or hackers is impossible. Etc.
  • 24. Add security to Definition of Done Compliance Risk
  • 25. Sample Definition of “Done”
  • 26. Provide security building blocks Detailed sub- policies where useful Service Catalogue with generic solutions
  • 27. Set up a security service catalogue • Provide re-usable operational security services to the development team • Provide re-usable security patterns • Manage these via a security catalog (see next slide)
  • 28. RESPOND DETECT PREVENT Security Service Catalogue - example User Data Application Platform Network Housing Operational Security Building Blocks Authorization management Authentication Log Management Hardening Security monitoring SSL certificate Patch management Back-up & restore Vulnerability management Trusted time Anti-virus Penetration testing Managed PKI Forensic research
  • 29. Security Policy Framework Information Security Policy IT Security Handbook Hardening policy Encryption Standard Access Control Policy Password Policy Etc Etc Detailed sub- policies for non-security practitioners High-level, describes security management process Boring Interesting
  • 30. Externalize and formalize the security knowledge Means to extend your span of control:  Define a classification scheme  Define security baselines
  • 31. Classification scheme example Security Measure Classification: Baseline Classification: High Secure Authentication Username / password based on Active Directory Two-factor authentication based on PKI certificates Authorization Regular authorization process Additional approval of line manager needed Attestation Management Standard review of authorizations every 6 months Additional monthly reviews of authorizations Hardening policy Standard hardening policy for OS idem Etc.
  • 32. Daily automated security tests Extension of regular functional tests Direct feed-back, to current or future user story
  • 33. Continuous Monitoring • Continuous security monitoring of the development process! • Define Key Risk Indicators and Quality Controls at the detail level of the development process (e.g. OWASP secure coding standard). This step is NOT a SIEM or other Event Monitoring service!
  • 34. Suggestions for daily, automated security checks • Source code security checks (language-dependent) – Dangerous programming logic (allow by default) – Processing undefined variables – Processing unsanitized (‘tainted’) parameters • Checks on security functionality (see user stories) – Logon – Authorization model • Testing for common abuse scenarios (generic) – Access to admin section – Session hijacking – Cross-site scripting – SQL injection – Etc.
  • 35. Agile Security Engagement Model Continuous Security Monitoring
  • 36. Continuous Monitoring • Checking the security within agile is an independent and separate thread • Will feed back into agile • Red Team • No scope limitations, dedicated testing • Bug bounty program • Disclosure • Incident response process
  • 37. Summary of Agile Security Engagement Model • Make security expert part of the development team • Security-related user stories • Security building blocks in the service catalogue • Detailed security policies where needed • Security classification to unify and automate decisions • Daily automated security tests • Continuous monitoring Publications in progress Check previous PECB-webinar of Arthur Donkers
  • 38. Conclusion for Security Management • Apply hands-on approach • Provide a security catalog with re-usable services and patterns • Implement continuous monitoring process • Accept that not all risks will be addressed, so rely on your risk management capabilities
  • 39. ? QUESTIONS THANK YOU + 31-6-53315102 arthur@1secure.nl p.de.koning@i-to-i.nl +31-6-29525365 www.agilesecurity.nl