This presentation was given at the AAUS Conference preceding the Avalon Airshow in Melbourne. It combines work being done as part of the Industry Support to the CASA UAS Standards Subcommittee, in conjunction with a brief intro into elements of the JARUS Working Group 6 Specific Operations Risk Assessment Process
2. Copyright:Terrence Martin
AcceptablySafe is defined by
the SafetyTargets- See
Argument 1.
Argument 4
System
transitioned
into services in
acceptably safe
manner
Argument 5
System shown
to be operated
acceptably
safely
Argument 6
System
maintained
and sustained
acceptably
safely
Airworthiness
High Level Safety Argument
Argument 2
System
designed to be
acceptably safe
Personnel are appropriately trained to conduct and verify activities which underpin the safety argument
Argument 3
System
constructed
and
implemented
completely and
correctly
Argument 1
System has
been specified
to acceptably
safe.
Assumptions
stated
Applicable for
intended
Operational
Environment
Verification of Evidence that SafetyTargets are met, with plans for
ongoing monitoring
ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE
Introduction
Airworthiness and the Safety Argument
3. Copyright:Terrence Martin
AcceptablySafe is defined by
the SafetyTargets- See
Argument 1.
Argument 4
System
transitioned
into services in
acceptably safe
manner
Argument 5
System shown
to be operated
acceptably
safely
Argument 6
System
maintained
and sustained
acceptably
safely
Airworthiness
High Level Safety Argument
Argument 2
System
designed to be
acceptably safe
Personnel are appropriately trained to conduct and verify activities which underpin the safety argument
Argument 3
System
constructed
and
implemented
completely and
correctly
Argument 1
System has
been specified
to acceptably
safe.
Assumptions
stated
Applicable for
intended
Operational
Environment
Verification of Evidence that SafetyTargets are met, with plans for
ongoing monitoring
ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE
Introduction
Airworthiness and the Safety Argument
4. Copyright:Terrence Martin
AcceptablySafe is defined by
the SafetyTargets- See
Argument 1.
Argument 4
System
transitioned
into services in
acceptably safe
manner
Argument 5
System shown
to be operated
acceptably
safely
Argument 6
System
maintained
and sustained
acceptably
safely
Airworthiness
High Level Safety Argument
Argument 2
System
designed to be
acceptably safe
Personnel are appropriately trained to conduct and verify activities which underpin the safety argument
Argument 3
System
constructed
and
implemented
completely and
correctly
Argument 1
System has
been specified
to acceptably
safe.
Assumptions
stated
Applicable for
intended
Operational
Environment
Verification of Evidence that SafetyTargets are met, with plans for
ongoing monitoring
ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE
Introduction
Airworthiness and the Safety Argument
5. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Introduction
Future RPAS Framework
Certified Specific Open
Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys
European Approach
Australian Draft Framework
Regulated Specific Open
Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS
6. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Introduction
Future RPAS Framework
Certified Specific Open
Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys
European Approach
Australian Draft Framework
Regulated Specific Open
Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS
Low
Risk
Operations
7. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Introduction
Future RPAS Framework
Certified Specific Open
Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys
European Approach
Australian Draft Framework
Regulated Specific Open
Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS
Low
Risk
Operations
Medium
Risk
Operations
8. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Introduction
Future RPAS Framework
Certified Specific Open
Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys
European Approach
Australian Draft Framework
Regulated Specific Open
Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS
Low
Risk
Operations
Medium
Risk
Operations
High
Risk
Operations
9. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Regulated Specific
Open
Small RPAS Very small RPAS
Element of
Initial
Airworthiness
CPA like
Oversight of
Integrity. NAA
led
Industry Appointed
Oversight No Integrity Oversight
Operational
Restrictions
Introduction
Future RPAS Framework
10. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Regulated Specific
Open
Small RPAS Very small RPAS
Element of
Initial
Airworthiness
CPA like
Oversight of
Integrity. NAA
led
Industry Appointed
Oversight No Integrity Oversight
Operational
Restrictions
Proportionate &SAFE: Operational Restrictions commensurate
with technical integrity & operational environment
Introduction
Future RPAS Framework
11. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Regulated Specific
Open
Small RPAS Very small RPAS
Element of
Initial
Airworthiness
CPA like
Oversight of
Integrity. NAA
led
Industry Appointed
Oversight No Integrity Oversight
Operational
Restrictions
Enter the US Element
Derivative of US sUAS
NPRM
Introduction
Future RPAS Framework
12. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Regulated Specific
Open
Small RPAS Very small RPAS
Element of
Initial
Airworthiness
CPA like
Oversight of
Integrity. NAA
led
Industry Appointed
Oversight No Integrity Oversight
Operational
Restrictions
Enter the US Element
Derivative of US sUAS
NPRM
Open = Small SegregatedVLOS Container
Introduction
Future RPAS Framework
13. Copyright:Terrence Martin
CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited
Over population etc
Controlled Airspace
BVLOS
IFR Conditions
Above 400 feet AGL
Within 3 NM of Aerodrome
Introduction
Work Outstanding
Regulated Specific
14. Copyright:Terrence Martin
CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited
Over population etc
Controlled Airspace
BVLOS
IFR Conditions
Above 400 feet AGL
Within 3 NM of Aerodrome
Introduction
Work Outstanding
Regulated Specific
15. Copyright:Terrence Martin
CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited
Over population etc
Controlled Airspace
BVLOS
IFR Conditions
Above 400 feet AGL
Within 3 NM of Aerodrome
Airworthiness Expectations based on CPA Regulations e.g.TC/CoA
Introduction
Work Outstanding
Regulated Specific
16. Copyright:Terrence Martin
CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited
Over population etc
Controlled Airspace
BVLOS
IFR Conditions
Above 400 feet AGL
Within 3 NM of Aerodrome
Introduction
Work Outstanding
Regulated Specific
17. Copyright:Terrence Martin
CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited
Over population etc
Controlled Airspace
BVLOS
IFR Conditions
Above 400 feet AGL
Within 3 NM of Aerodrome
Introduction
Work Outstanding
Regulated Specific
Work to be done
• What Equipment
• What Restrictions
• What Procedures
• WhatTraining
• How is RISK Assessed?
18. Copyright:Terrence Martin
CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited
Over population etc
Controlled Airspace
BVLOS
IFR Conditions
Above 400 feet AGL
Within 3 NM of Aerodrome
Introduction
Work Outstanding
Regulated Specific
19. Copyright:Terrence Martin
CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited
Over population etc
Controlled Airspace
BVLOS
IFR Conditions
Above 400 feet AGL
Within 3 NM of Aerodrome
Introduction
Work Outstanding
Regulated Specific
Operational
Flexibility
Platform
Technical
Integrity
Equipage
Operator
Competence
20. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Developing the Roadmap
• Specific Category Operations will be based on risk assessment
• Category likely to represents biggest demographics for making
money
Risk Assessment
Regulated Specific Open
Standard Restricted Specific
Small
RPAS
Very small
RPAS
21. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Developing the Roadmap
• Specific Category Operations will be based on risk assessment
• Category likely to represents biggest demographics for making
money
• Risk Methodology is critical, yet process still immature
• CASA committed to harmonisation large tracts with EASA
• JARUS SORA is likely to be adopted by EASA, and hence CASA
Risk Assessment
Regulated Specific Open
Standard Restricted Specific
Small
RPAS
Very small
RPAS
22. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Regulation and Risk
Captain Obvious: Show me the Money!
“I appreciate your well thought out reservations,
supported by comprehensive marketing analysis
and risk identification, but we have decided to
proceed with the project anyway, it just sounds
really cool”
23. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Regulation and Risk
Captain Obvious: Show me the Money!
Microsoft funds
AIRMAP for $26 M“I appreciate your well thought out reservations,
supported by comprehensive marketing analysis
and risk identification, but we have decided to
proceed with the project anyway, it just sounds
really cool”
24. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Regulation and Risk
• Shortest Distance between 2 points
Captain Obvious: Show me the Money
RiskAssessment
Methodology
Traffic Density
Certification
Status
Population
Comms &
Surveillance
Coverage
CrewTraining
Airspace
Category
Operation
Criticality
26. System Certification
Regulated Specific
RiskAssessment
Methodology
Traffic Density
Certification
Status
Population
Comms &
Surveillance
Coverage
CrewTraining
Airspace
Category
Operation
Criticality
Benchmarking (EU, US)
Airspace
Management
Policy
Human Factors
CNPC
Detect & Avoid
Risk Management
sUAS & Low Level
UAVOps
Ops near
Aerodromes
Security
EmergingTech
National
Operational
Priorities
CONOPS
Unique
Sector
Requirements
Common
Requirements
ALL CONOPS
Roadmap
Development Scoping
Terms of Reference
Goals
Scope
Objectives
Bounds & Limits
Assumption
Baselining
CASA Processes
Approval
Benchmark
Available
Manpower
Risk Management
Knowledge Gaps
Safety Obligations
Trial Appetite
Identification of Low Hanging Fruit
Improved awareness of what is preventing progress
• Technology Shortfalls,
• Skills, Knowledge, Capacity
• Evidence requirements for Risk: traffic,
population
• Platform Integrity Requirements for Operations
• Trial Opportunities
• Separation Confidence
• Position Reporting: RAIM like assurance
• Navigation Performance
• Compatibility with Airspace Class Requirements
• Confidence platform can reliably maintain flight
Trials
Evidence
Requirements
Skills
Trial Sites
Teaming
Safety
Expectations
Trial
Methodologies
Feedback
Expectation
27. Copyright:Terrence Martin
National
Operational
Priorities
CONOPS
Unique
Sector
Requirements
Common
Requirements
ALL CONOPS
Objectives
•Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits
for RPAS Operations in Australia (Includes
CONOPs development) .
•Set of CONOPS developed & provided to
forum for review
Agriculture:
• Broad Area PrecisionAgriculture,
• Pest &Weed Detection,
Disaster & Emergency Services
• SAR (Maritime)
• Tropical Cyclone with Cells onWings
• CBRN
• Small Scale Urban SAR
• Cells onWings (COWS) & UTM
Conservation
Mining/Hard Rock/Pit/Open Cut
Logistics
• Package Delivery
• Long Range Freight
Training
• BVLOS
• VLOS/EVLOS
Roadmap Development
CONOPS Development
28. Benchmarking (EU, US)
Airspace
Management
Policy
Human Factors
CNPC
Detect & Avoid
Risk Management
sUAS & Low Level
UAVOps
Ops near
Aerodromes
Security
EmergingTech
Baselining
CASA Processes
Approval
Benchmark
Available
Manpower
Risk Management
Knowledge Gaps
Safety Obligations
Trial Appetite
Objectives
• Baseline Australia’s RPAS regulatory environment and benchmark against key
international developments
• Benchmark against International Standards
Roadmap
Development Scoping
Terms of Reference
Goals
Scope
Objectives
Bounds & Limits
Assumption
29. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Developing the Roadmap
14 Key R&D Activities:
• EVLOS/VLOS
• 1.RPAS activities awareness for security
• 2. Operations in Urban Areas
• 3. Human Factors
• IFR/VFR
• 4. Visual Detectability solutions
• 5. DAA
• 6. Comms C2 Datalink
• 7. Airspace & Airport Access
• 8 Contingency
• BVLOS
• 9. DAA
• 10. Comms C2 Datalink
• 11 Airspace & Airport Access
• 12. Security
• 13 Human Factors: BVLOS & IFR/VFR
• 14 Best Practice Demonstration
Europe: Technology and Operational Gaps
GAPS LINKED
TO
ACTION
&
MILESTONES
Operational & Technology
gaps:
1. Integration into ATM and Airspace
environments
2. Surface operations incl. take-off and
landing
3. Operational contingency procedures
and systems
4. Data communication links incl.
spectrum issues
5. Detect & Avoid systems and
operational procedures
6. Security issues
7. Verification and Validation Methods
32. Copyright:Terrence Martin
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground
Risk
Class
Air Risk
Class
Lethality
SAIL Verdict
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me. Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
SORA OUTPUT
Objectives to be met and the level of
robustness
SAIL I : 18 (Low)
SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med)
SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High)
SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High)
SAIL V : 6 (Med), 28 (High)
SAIL VI : 35 (High)
Training
Barriers
Design
& Prod
Barriers
Ops
Barriers
Maint
Barriers
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Overview
33. Copyright:Terrence Martin
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground
Risk
Class
Air Risk
Class
Lethality
SAIL Verdict
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me. Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
SORA OUTPUT
Objectives to be met and the level of
robustness
SAIL I : 18 (Low)
SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med)
SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High)
SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High)
SAIL V : 6 (Med), 28 (High)
SAIL VI : 35 (High)
Training
Barriers
Design
& Prod
Barriers
Ops
Barriers
Maint
Barriers
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
SAIL is the level of confidence that a specific operation will stay under control
Established SAIL will determine:
• Objectives to be complied with,
• Description of activities that might support the compliance with those objectives, and
• Evidence to indicate the objectives have been satisfied
Overview
34. Copyright:Terrence Martin
JARUS SORA process makes use of “BowTies” and employs the following key
terms:
• Threats &Threat Barriers
• Harm and Harm Barriers
• Hazards and Consequences
• Ground Risk
• Air Risk
• The next few slides provide basic insight into bow tie use within the JARUS
SORA framework
Overview
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
35. Copyright:Terrence Martin
JARUS Holistic Risk Model
Bow Ties
Initial Event 1
Initial Event 3
Initial Event 2
2. What Safety Event Could
Initiate the Hazard?
UNDESIRABLE
EVENT/TOP EVENT
3. How do we avoid the undesirable Event.
How do we control the hazard
HAZARD
1. What is the Hazard?
4. What Happens when
Hazard Control is lost?
Potential
Outcome 1
Potential
Outcome 2
Potential
Outcome 3
Preventative
Barriers
6. How can the accident Scenario Develop?
What are the potential Outcomes?
Mitigation/Recovery
Barriers
5. How do we recover if the event occurs?
How can the outcome likelihood or
consequence severity be reduced?
36. Copyright:Terrence Martin
JARUS Holistic Risk Model
JARUS SORA : Threats, Hazard and Harm
UAS out
Of
Control
HAZARD
Fatalities to 3rd
Parties on Ground
Fatalities to 3rd
Parties in the Air
Damage to
Critical Infrastructure
Technical Issues
with UAS
Aircraft on
Collision Course
Human Error
Datalink
Deteroration
Adverse
Operating
Conditions
Deteriorating of
External
Systems
THREATS
HARM
37. Copyright:Terrence Martin
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Overview: Barrier Terminology used in SORA
Threat 1
Threat 3
Threat 2 UAS
Loses Control
HAZARD
HARM
Outcome 1
HARM
Outcome 2
HARM
Outcome 3
Threat
Barriers
Harm
Barriers
Often referred to as preventative barriers Often referred to as mitigation or recovery barriers
38. Copyright:Terrence Martin
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Threat Barriers
UAS out
Of
Control
Technical Issues
with UAS
Aircraft on
Collision Course
Human Error
Datalink
Deterioration
Adverse
Operating
Conditions
Deteriorating of
External
Systems
Operational procedures are
defined, validated and adhered
to
The remote crew is trained to
identify critical environmental
conditions and to avoid them
Environmental conditions for safe
operations defined, measurable
and adhered to
UAS designed and qualified for
adverse environmental
conditions (e.g. adequate
sensors, DO-160 qualification)
UAS is designed to
automatically manage
datalink deterioration
situations
Datalink performance
established and
verified (e.g. datalink
budget)
Procedures and
limitations are in-
place and adhered
to
Datalink systems and infrastructure
is manufactured to adequate
standards appropriate to the
operation
Datalink systems and
infrastructure is designed to
adequate standards
appropriate to the operation
Datalink systems and
infrastructure is installed and
maintained to adequate standards
appropriate to the operation
Procs are in place to handle
deterioration of external
systems supporting RPAS Operations
UAS is designed to manage deterioration of
externals
systems supporting RPAS Operations
Operational procedures are
defined, validated and
adhered to
Remote crew trained and
current and able to control
the abnormal situation
The UAS is detectable by
other airspace users
UAS is equipped with
functionality to maintain
safe separation
Operational
procedures are
defined, validated
and adhered to
Remote crew trained
and current and able to
control the abnormal
situation
Multi crew
coordination
Adequate resting
times are defined
and followed
Safe recovery
from Human
Error
A Human Factors evaluation
has been performed and the
HMI found appropriate for
the mission
Automatic protection of
critical flight functions
(e.g. envelope
protection)
The operator
is competent
and/or
proven
UAS
manufactured by
competent and/or
proven entity
UAS
maintained by
competent
and/or proven
entity
UAS developed
to authority
recognized
design
standards
Inspection of
the UAS
(product
inspection)
Operational
procedures are
defined,
validated and
adhered to
UAS is designed
considering
system safety and
reliability
Remote crew trained
and current and able
to control the
abnormal situation
Safe recovery
from technical
issue
Threats
Overview: Specific Threat Barriers identified for SORA Process
39. Copyright:Terrence Martin
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Harm Barriers
UAS out
Of
Control
HAZARD
Fatalities to 3rd
Parties on Ground
Fatalities to 3rd
Parties in the Air
Damage to
Critical Infrastructure
HARM
Two Types of Harm Barriers
• Reduce Effect of Hazard with respect to relevant harm
• Reduce the likelihood the hazard will cause harm
Contingency
Procedures are
defined,
validated &
adhered to
Crew Training
is adequate to
cope with
Situation
Containment
in place and
effective
Contingency
Procedures
are defined,
validated &
adhered to
Contingency
Procedures are
defined,
validated &
adhered to
Crew Training is
adequate to
cope with the
situation
UAS Design
Features
mitigate the
severity of
MAC
UAS equipped
with capability
to Avoid
Collision
Design features
that aid visibility
and or detection
by other aircraft
Crew
Training is
adequate to
cope with the
situation
Containment
in place and
effective
(tether, geo-
fencing, etc.)
UAS equipped
with obstacle
Avoidance
capability
Effects of
Ground Impact
Reduced
Allowed Operation
Profile takes critical
infrastructure into
consideration
Effects of
Ground Impact
are reduced
41. Copyright:Terrence Martin
• Step 0 -Initial Evaluation
• Step 1 CONOPS Description
• Step 2
• Step 2A: Determine initial UAS Ground Risk Class
• Determine initial UAS Air Risk Class
• Step 3.
• Step 3A- Identify Harm Barriers and GRC
• Step 3B- Identify Harm Barrier and ARC
• Step 4 – Lethality Determination
• Step 5 Specific Assurance and Integrity Levels
• Step 6 Ident of RecommendedThreat Barriers
• Step 7 Feasibility Check
• Step 8-Verification of robustness proposed barriers
THE Process
Specific Operation Risk Assessment
42. Copyright:Terrence Martin
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me. Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 1: CONOPS
Applicant required to collect & provide sufficient
technical, operational and human information related
to the intended use of the UAS.
Information supports risk assessment.
Annex C has 2 key sections providing guidance
for CONOPS development:
• Operationally Relevant Information (Annex C.1)
• Technically Relevant Information (Annex C.2)
43. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Step 1:
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL
Evaluation
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 1: CONOPS
Critical Information
for
Decisions
Organisation Operations Training
Training
Barriers
Maintenance
Crew Details
Safety
Normal Ops
Strategy
Abnormal Ops
Accidents &
Incidents
SOPs
Maint of Currency
FSTDs
Training Program
Initial TRG & Quals
RPAS
RPA
Geo
Fence
Control C2
Link
GSE
Applicant required to collect & provide
sufficient technical, operational and human
information related to the intended CONOPS
to support risk assessment.
44. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Step 1:
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL
Evaluation
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 1: CONOPS
Critical Information
for
Decisions
Organisation Operations Training
Training
Barriers
Maintenance
Crew Details
Safety
Normal Ops
Strategy
Abnormal Ops
Accidents &
Incidents
SOPs
Maint of Currency
FSTDs
Training Program
Initial TRG & Quals
RPAS
RPA
Geo
Fence
Control C2
Link
GSE
Applicant required to collect & provide
sufficient technical, operational and human
information related to the intended CONOPS
to support risk assessment.
Agriculture:
• Broad Area PrecisionAgriculture,
• Pest &Weed Detection,
Disaster & Emergency Services
• SAR (Maritime)
• Tropical Cyclone with Cells onWings
• CBRN
• Small Scale Urban SAR
• Cells onWings (COWS) & UTM
Conservation
Mining/Hard Rock/Pit/Open Cut
Logistics
• Package Delivery
• Long Range Freight
Training
• BVLOS
• VLOS/EVLOS
45. Copyright:Terrence Martin
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS
Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground Risk
Class
Step # 2 A
Air Risk
Class
Step #2 B
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 2: Intrinsic Ground and Air Risk Determination
Step 2 A and B determine INTRINSIC
GRC and ARC respectively
46. Copyright:Terrence Martin
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS
Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground Risk
Class
Step # 2 A
Air Risk
Class
Step #2 B
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 3 : Identify Harm Barriers for GRC and ARC
Identify Harm Barriers
and Adapt GRC and ARC Scores
Step #3 A & B
Intrinsic
GRC Score
Intrinsic
ARC Score
47. Copyright:Terrence Martin
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
UAS out
Of
Control
HAZARD
Fatalities to 3rd
Parties on Ground
HARM
Two Types of Harm Barriers
• Reduce Effect of Hazard with respect to relevant harm
• Reduce the likelihood the hazard will cause harm
Contingency
Procedures are
defined,
validated &
adhered to
Crew Training
is adequate to
cope with
Situation
Containment
in place and
effective
Effects of
Ground Impact
are reduced
SORA Process: Step 3 A: GRC Harm Barriers
• In the overview, we detailed a series of Harm Barriers forGRC, ARC and Infrastructure.
• Step 3 A concentrates on the GRC
48. Copyright:Terrence Martin
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS
Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground Risk
Class
Step # 2 A
Air Risk
Class
Step #2 B
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 3 : Identify Harm Barriers for GRC and ARC
Identify Harm Barriers
and Adapt GRC and ARC Scores
Step #3 A & B
Intrinsic
GRC Score
Intrinsic
ARC Score
Adapted
GRC Score
Adapted
ARC Score
50. Copyright:Terrence Martin
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS
Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 4 :Lethality Determination
Identify Harm Barriers and Adapt GRC and ARC Scores
Intrinsic
GRC Score
Intrinsic
ARC Score
Adapted
GRC Score
Adapted
ARC Score
51. Copyright:Terrence Martin
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS
Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 4 :Lethality Determination
Identify Harm Barriers and Adapt GRC and ARC Scores
Intrinsic
GRC Score
Intrinsic
ARC Score
Adapted
GRC Score
Adapted
ARC Score
Lethality Determination
Step 4
52. Copyright:Terrence Martin
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 4: Lethality Determination
1. Lethality needs to be determined for both the Ground and Air Risk: Biggest wins
2. Three lethality Categories: High, Average or Low.
3. GROUND: Size and Energy from GRC calculations:
• Impact Consequence
• Likely Crash area
4. AIR:
1. In the absence of data to support lethality determination: a HIGH Lethality
must be assumed
Studies are being conducted and standards being written to evaluate the lethality of
UAS.
SORA will be updated when this occurs
53. Copyright:Terrence Martin
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS
Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 5 : SAIL Determination
Identify Harm Barriers and Adapt GRC and ARC Scores
Intrinsic
GRC Score
Intrinsic
ARC Score
Adapted GRC Score
( 1 to 7)
Adapted ARC Score
(1 to 7)
Lethality Score
54. Copyright:Terrence Martin
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS
Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 5 : SAIL Determination
Identify Harm Barriers and Adapt GRC and ARC Scores
Intrinsic
GRC Score
Intrinsic
ARC Score
Adapted GRC Score
( 1 to 7)
Adapted ARC Score
(1 to 7)
Lethality Score
STEP 5: Score SPECIFIC ASSURANCE and
INTEGRITY LEVEL
55. Copyright:Terrence Martin
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground
Risk
Class
Air Risk
Class
Lethality
SAIL Verdict
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 6: SAIL Determination
SAIL
SCORE
STEP 6 :
• Lookup Table of Recommended
(Required) Threat Barriers given SAIL.
• Each requires a level of Robustness
• 1 of 4 categories (Optional, Low,
Medium and High)
56. Copyright:Terrence Martin
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground
Risk
Class
Air Risk
Class
Lethality
SAIL Verdict
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 6: SAIL Determination
SAIL
SCORE
STEP 6 :
• Lookup Table of Recommended
(Required) Threat Barriers given SAIL.
• Each requires a level of Robustness
• 1 of 4 categories (Optional, Low,
Medium and High)
57. Copyright:Terrence Martin
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 8: Verification of Robustness and effectiveness of Barriers
Robustness designation for each barrier define both the level of integrity required
to meet the SAIL and the level of assurance required to demonstrate SAIL objective
has been met.Verification required for each threat barrier according to:
LOW – Applicant provides self-declaration required level of integrity achieved.
MEDIUM
• Applicant provides supporting evidence that required level of integrity achieved.
• Local authority/qualified entity may request 3rd party validation for some
supporting elements.
HIGH
• 3rd party validation of the achieved integrity is required
58. Copyright:Terrence Martin
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 8: Verification of Robustness and effectiveness of Barriers
Robustness designation for each barrier define both the level of integrity required
to meet the SAIL and the level of assurance required to demonstrate SAIL objective
has been met.Verification required for each threat barrier according to:
LOW – Applicant provides self-declaration required level of integrity achieved.
MEDIUM
• Applicant provides supporting evidence that required level of integrity achieved.
• Local authority/qualified entity may request 3rd party validation for some
supporting elements.
HIGH
• 3rd party validation of the achieved integrity is required
Guidelines for developing and assessing robustness ofThreat and Harm barriers are
in Annex A and B respectively
BUT
Both Annexes are not yet developed!
59. Copyright:Terrence Martin
STEP 6 :
• Identify Recommended Threat Barriers
• Established Integrity Levels
• Assign Robustness for each Threat Barrier
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground
Risk
Class
Air Risk
Class
Lethality
SAIL Verdict
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 7: Feasibility Check
SAIL
SCORE
60. Copyright:Terrence Martin
STEP 6 :
• Identify Recommended Threat Barriers
• Established Integrity Levels
• Assign Robustness for each Threat Barrier
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground
Risk
Class
Air Risk
Class
Lethality
SAIL Verdict
JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Step 7: Feasibility Check
SAIL
SCORE
STEP 7 : Feasibility
• Is it feasible to put all the barriers in place to enact
the original CONOPS
• Can Additional Harm Barriers be implemented to
lower the SAIL
• Can CONOPS be revised to lower the SAIL s that less
onerous barriers can be used
61. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Moving Ahead
• Expanded Operations can’t proceed until Risk Process developed
• CouldWait for Europe or Could Use their principles and progress our own
SORA and Australia
62. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Moving Ahead
Risk Model draws on principles from QUT
Practically expanded for ADF use by Nova
SORA and Australia
Hazard
Central Event
BarrierThreat
Barrier Effectiveness
Rating
Barrier Category
Consequence
Barrier Degradation (or
Escalation) Factor
• Employs BowTie XP
• Comprehensive breakdown of
areas identified in JARUS
model
• Can be used to enhance
model significantly for
Australian RPAS community
benefit
63. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Common Applicant CONOPS
Information on:
• Operator
• IntendedOps
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
Updated SORA Blackbox
Hazard
Central Event
BarrierThreat
Barrier Effectiveness
Rating
Barrier Category
Consequence
Barrier Degradation (or
Escalation) Factor
Background Models & Process
to be Updated by Risk
Specialists
Joe Public
ApplicationTemplates
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
SAIL I
SAILVSAIL IV
SAILIIISAIL I
SAILV
Moving Ahead
End State
CASA Assessor
Templates
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
SAIL I
SAILVSAIL IV
SAILIIISAIL I
SAILV
Submission
Priority
Templates
for National
Priority
CONOPSSuite of Indigenous
CONOPS
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me. Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
SORA Framework
NOVA Model
Rare or Unseen CONOPS
Reviewed by a Specialist
Assessment
Result
Assessment
Result
CASA HAZLOG
64. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Common Applicant CONOPS
Information on:
• Operator
• IntendedOps
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
Updated SORA Blackbox
Hazard
Central Event
BarrierThreat
Barrier Effectiveness
Rating
Barrier Category
Consequence
Barrier Degradation (or
Escalation) Factor
Background Models & Process
to be Updated by Risk
Specialists
Joe Public
ApplicationTemplates
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
SAIL I
SAILVSAIL IV
SAILIIISAIL I
SAILV
Moving Ahead
End State
CASA Assessor
Templates
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
out there read me.Smile
wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
SAIL I
SAILVSAIL IV
SAILIIISAIL I
SAILV
Submission
Priority
Templates
for National
Priority
CONOPSSuite of Indigenous
CONOPS
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me. Hello WorldI am padding
for this document.I hope
nobody can read this
duringthepresentation.
That would embarrassme.
Cananyone out there read
me.Smile wrylyif you can,
but pleasedon’t embarrass
me.
SORA Framework
NOVA Model
Rare or Unseen CONOPS
Reviewed by a Specialist
• Safe & Commensurate with Risk
• Repeatable
• Transparent
• Harmonised Internationally yet Ahead
of the Game
Assessment
Result
Assessment
Result
CASA HAZLOG
65. Copyright:Terrence Martin
Moving Ahead
• Allows us to assess the risk for Australian Priority CONOPS
• Supports Downstream Development of templates (Internal & External)
• Identify Australian Gaps to cross reference against International Gaps
• Transparent process that pinpoints which barriers are contributing to risk for
ANY Particular operation
• Some Operations may not need robust barriers- Low Hanging Fruit
• Some Operations we will be uncertain about the effectiveness of barriersTrials
• More Resolution about which barriers
Allows us to pinpoint shortfalls in regulatory process or in missing technical
enablers communicate to Industry
What does it give Us?