Paper present at "Land Governance for Equitable and Sustainable development" on 8-10 July 2015, Utrecht.

1. Incentive structure of land
acquisition and land allocation in
Vietnam
Dung T. Ngo & Thang N. Tran
Hue University of Agriculture & Forestry
Utrecht, 9 July 2015

2. Outline
Legal context of LA&A
Roles of local
governments
Case studies
Forest allocation
Resettlement
Forest contract

3. Rationale
Vietnam: rapid change from
central-planning  market
economy (1990s)
Land acquisition:
Industrialization: agr. land to
factory, storage
Urbanization: housing,
infrastructure
Land allocation: decentralize
state-land management to
different stakeholders

4. Legal context
Constitution 1992, 2013: land and natural
resources under public property, managed &
represented by State
Land use rights: allocated/ leased to individuals
and organizations by the State
State delegates to province: land ownership, land
management regime

5. Four cases of land
acquisition:
1. National defense/ security
purpose (Article 61);
2. Socio-economic
development for national/
public interest (Art. 62);
(purpose vs. compensation)
3. Violations of land law (Art.
64);
4. Termination, voluntary
return, risks of threat (Art.
Three decision-making
levels:
 National Assembly: highly
national benefits
 Prime Minister: offices,
infrastructure, electricity,
water service… at national
level
 Provincial Council: provincial
infrastructure, housing, forest
conservation, etc.

6. Steps of land acquisition
Step 1 • Request for land acquisition by the investor
Step 2 • Announcement on location, time, reasons
Step 3 • Submit investment plan including S/EIA
Step 4 • Submit compensation plan, resettlement, feedback
Step 5 • Prepare land dossier and submit for land acquisition
Step 6 • Conduct compensation, resettlement plan
Step 7 • Implementation of land acquisition and site clearance
Step 8 • Hand-over in field and contract

7. Analytical framework
(Ostrom, 2005)

8. Case #1: Forest land allocation

9. Forest allocation = the State assigns forest areas to
villages, groups, or individual households for 50-year
period with most property rights
Key actors Duties
State forest enterprises (SFE) Allocate forest to local people
Forest Protection Dept. (FPD) Facilitate allocation procedures: forest
inventory, local meetings
Local people (groups,
households)
Group formation, forest inventory, forest
boundary

10. Stakeholder Allocation to Perceived Benefit(s) of
Allocation
Perceived Cost(s) of
Allocation
State Forest
Enterprises
Individual Reduce forest protection duties Less benefits from timber
extraction
Group
Forest Protection
Unit (district level)
Individual - Reduced protection duties
- Direct payment from SNV
- Less direct benefits from
sanction
- High time and effort in
allocation (forest inventory
and demarcation)
Group - Reduced protection duties
- Direct payment from SNV
- Effort in allocation (but
lower than for household
allocation)
Local People Individual - Forest products
- Red book for long term
investment and loan from bank
- Rationale for sanction
- Integrated other land uses
(plantation, NTFPs)
- Time and effort in
management
- Protection cost is higher if
allocted patches are in remote
area.
Group - Forest products
- Red book for long term
investment and loan from bank
- Rationale for sanction
- Receive larger areas of natural
forest
- Transaction costs associated
with penalty agreement,
harvest approval
- Investment to generate
incomes from degraded forest

11. Findings
SFE: reluctant to return rich forests for allocation;
delayed in process
FPD: highly active due to benefits and conservation
purpose
Local people:
Interested in rich/medium forest and barren land;
Not interested in degraded forests (high cost for
conservation)
Roles of local governments (district, commune):

12. From areas
vulnerable to
natural disasters
From industrial
zone/city
development
From
hydropower
plant, reservoir
construction
Case #2: Resettlement
stories

13. Before vs. After resettlement
Case studies in 5 villages of Huong Tra district, TT Hue province

15. Findings
Actors: local government – hydropower companies -
resettlers
Infrastructure, school, water, electricity: improved
Livelihood option: decreased
Land access: Limited, insufficient for agr. production;
Roles of local government:
District/commune: not influential, just followed provincial’s
decision

16. Case #3: Forest protection
contract
Context: Implementation of
PFES in Lam Dong province;
Main actors: Forest fund –
Local government – local
groups for forest protection
contract
Assessment of stakeholders’
participation: legal framework
– capacity – implementation

17. Payment for forest environmental service
(PFES) in Vietnam
Payment for forest environmental services
Provincial
Fund
Central
Fund
entrusted payment for ESES providers
ES usersEnvironmental services

18. Findings
Legal framework:
Robust and rationale for participation in PES
Insufficient clearance & dissemination
Time pressure for PES implementation
Capacity:
District, commune staff: sufficient training in procedures but not facilitation
skills;
Knowledge of local people on their rights in PES: limited
Fund management: insufficient in enforcement of violation
Implementation
Budget collection: effectively due to state gov. support in pilot
Forest protection: somewhat limited due to payment < opportunity costs for
commercial plantation (rubber, coffee)
Long-term vision: possible if carbon credit, land ownership function well.

19. Lesson learnt & discussion
Legal framework: very important for monitoring, conflict
solving (land rights, acquistion procedures, compensation)
Participatory decision making process: legality, capacity,
practice
Civil society & NGOs: capacity building, monitoring,
transparency, funding
Benefit sharing mechanism: simple, transparent, consensus
Local governments: effectively only when they consider as
local actors (i.e. attached with local people’s benefits)
THANK YOU