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Post Apocalyptic Cyber Realism

    Richard Stiennon
    Chief Research Analyst
    IT-Harvest

    www.it-harvest.com
    twitter.com/cyberwar

    or

    twitter.com/stiennon
www.it-harvest.com

twitter.com/cyberwar

Blog: www.forbes.com/richardstiennon
The futility of proposed scenarios
A stab in the dark at a divergent future, while interesting,
  is doing us a disservice.
Scenario 1.
Collateral damage from cyberwar
• Wide spread state sponsored DDoS
  attack
• Communication outages
• Official web sites taken down
The reality

• August 8, 2008 Russia invades
  Georgia
• DDoS against Georgia
    president.gov.ge
    rustavi2.com
• Tulip Systems Atlanta
• 68,000 requests/sec
A little preparation
Scenario 2. Political protesters
enlist social media to target attacks

  Facebook or Twitter used to call protesters
  to arms
  DDoS tools distributed along with instructions
  Websites disabled
Twitter as tool of riot creation
Post Iranian election Twitter was used to support
  virtual riots via DDoS
                                       Note that AnonymousOps
                                       used LOIC too!
Twitter escalation
Phase 1. Hacking
instructions sites.
Phase 2. Links to
pagereload.com
Phase 3. Links to
a specially crafted
site that opens 15
frames on
pagereload.com
Scenario 3. An insider uses
privileged access to steal customer
data
  • Despite strong authentication,
    encryption, and DLP, a trusted
    employee steals customer data
  • Sells it to a third party
 Rene Rebollo
Countrywide data loss     estimated he
                          downloaded about
                          20,000 customer
                          profiles a week in excel
                          spreadsheets onto
                          flash drives.
                         2 million total
                          identities sold to Wahid
                          Siddiqi, his outside
                          accomplice.
Scenario 4. Malicious Software
Updates
•   A software vendor issues software
    updates that are malicious in nature
•   Software is back-doored
•   Systems compromised.
Athens 2004



A series of software updates turns on
Lawful intercept function
104 diplomats and Olympic officials
spied on
Engineer mysteriously commits suicide
Scenario 5. Hardware backdoors
• Hardware vendor builds backdoors
  into critical equipment
• Uses backdoor to steal confidential
  information
• Gains control of network
Hardware backdoors
•   Test 1
•   Esample 3

•   Example 3
Scenario 6. Insider abuse

Insider uses knowledge of business
  systems and back office to get
  around internal controls.

Loss of millions
Trading losses




2008, Jerome Kerviel covers up trading losses,
Largest trading fraud in history to be carried out by a single person.
$7.14 Billion
5 year sentence reduced to 3
Scenario 7. Spurious BGP route
announcements used to black hole
the Internet
The biggest single vulnerability in Internet infrastructure
  used to

1. Deny access to a service
2. Siphon data
3. Shut off a country
YouTube rerouted by Pakistan
February 24, 2008
China drinks from a fire hose
   “Internet routing, believe it or not, still works on the honor
   system.”

“On April 8th (2010), starting at 15:50 UTC, China Telecom
incorrectly asserted ownership of more than 50,000 different
blocks of IP addresses. “ -Renysis Blog


 15% of the Internet was party to a man in the middle attack for
18 minutes.
Mubarak’s Internet Kill Switch
January 27, 2011
At 22:34 UTC (00:34am local time), Renesys
observed the virtually simultaneous withdrawal
of all routes to Egyptian networks in the
Internet's global routing table. Approximately
3,500 individual BGP routes were withdrawn,
leaving no valid paths by which the rest of the
world could continue to exchange Internet
traffic with Egypt's service providers.
Scenario 8. State sponsored spying
•   A nation state infiltrates dozens of
    computers belonging to key
    personnel
•   Reads emails
•   Steals information
•   Uses information to impact
    diplomatic mission
Ghostnet
•   Office of the Dalai Lama infiltrated
    through malware installed on
    computers
•   Email servers completely owned
•   Emails modified in transit
•   Email read and acted on
•   Over 1,200 infected computers
    globally
Sound familiar?

•   Pentagon 2007
•   Rio Tinto 2009
•   Google Aurora 2010
•   Night Dragon
•   RSA 2011
•   Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, 2011
Scenario 9: Weapons grade malware
used for sabotage
Stuxnet - most advanced malware
Breaking news
October 18: Symantec announces new variants of Stuxnet in the
  wild.

-New version was written by authors with access to original
  Stuxnet source code

-This version targets PLC manufacturers.

-Most recent sample was compiled on October 17th.
Scenario 10. Cyber attacks in
support of military strikes.
Syria invaded by Israeli war planes that destroy a nuclear reactor.

Network attacks to shut down command and control

Airborn attacks against radar systems to “inject code” and shut
   down radar systems.

Breaking news, October 18, New York Times reports that
   Obama’s administration considered similar attacks against
   Libya.
Every sector has
already experienced
cyber disaster.
What are we waiting
         for?
Blog: www.threatchaos.com
email: richard@it-harvest.com
Twitter: twitter.com/cyberwar

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Post Apocalyptic Cyber Realism

  • 1. Post Apocalyptic Cyber Realism Richard Stiennon Chief Research Analyst IT-Harvest www.it-harvest.com twitter.com/cyberwar or twitter.com/stiennon
  • 3. The futility of proposed scenarios A stab in the dark at a divergent future, while interesting, is doing us a disservice.
  • 4.
  • 5. Scenario 1. Collateral damage from cyberwar • Wide spread state sponsored DDoS attack • Communication outages • Official web sites taken down
  • 6. The reality • August 8, 2008 Russia invades Georgia • DDoS against Georgia president.gov.ge rustavi2.com • Tulip Systems Atlanta • 68,000 requests/sec
  • 8. Scenario 2. Political protesters enlist social media to target attacks Facebook or Twitter used to call protesters to arms DDoS tools distributed along with instructions Websites disabled
  • 9. Twitter as tool of riot creation Post Iranian election Twitter was used to support virtual riots via DDoS Note that AnonymousOps used LOIC too!
  • 10. Twitter escalation Phase 1. Hacking instructions sites. Phase 2. Links to pagereload.com Phase 3. Links to a specially crafted site that opens 15 frames on pagereload.com
  • 11. Scenario 3. An insider uses privileged access to steal customer data • Despite strong authentication, encryption, and DLP, a trusted employee steals customer data • Sells it to a third party
  • 12.  Rene Rebollo Countrywide data loss estimated he downloaded about 20,000 customer profiles a week in excel spreadsheets onto flash drives.  2 million total identities sold to Wahid Siddiqi, his outside accomplice.
  • 13. Scenario 4. Malicious Software Updates • A software vendor issues software updates that are malicious in nature • Software is back-doored • Systems compromised.
  • 14. Athens 2004 A series of software updates turns on Lawful intercept function 104 diplomats and Olympic officials spied on Engineer mysteriously commits suicide
  • 15. Scenario 5. Hardware backdoors • Hardware vendor builds backdoors into critical equipment • Uses backdoor to steal confidential information • Gains control of network
  • 16. Hardware backdoors • Test 1 • Esample 3 • Example 3
  • 17. Scenario 6. Insider abuse Insider uses knowledge of business systems and back office to get around internal controls. Loss of millions
  • 18. Trading losses 2008, Jerome Kerviel covers up trading losses, Largest trading fraud in history to be carried out by a single person. $7.14 Billion 5 year sentence reduced to 3
  • 19. Scenario 7. Spurious BGP route announcements used to black hole the Internet The biggest single vulnerability in Internet infrastructure used to 1. Deny access to a service 2. Siphon data 3. Shut off a country
  • 20. YouTube rerouted by Pakistan February 24, 2008
  • 21. China drinks from a fire hose “Internet routing, believe it or not, still works on the honor system.” “On April 8th (2010), starting at 15:50 UTC, China Telecom incorrectly asserted ownership of more than 50,000 different blocks of IP addresses. “ -Renysis Blog 15% of the Internet was party to a man in the middle attack for 18 minutes.
  • 22. Mubarak’s Internet Kill Switch January 27, 2011 At 22:34 UTC (00:34am local time), Renesys observed the virtually simultaneous withdrawal of all routes to Egyptian networks in the Internet's global routing table. Approximately 3,500 individual BGP routes were withdrawn, leaving no valid paths by which the rest of the world could continue to exchange Internet traffic with Egypt's service providers.
  • 23. Scenario 8. State sponsored spying • A nation state infiltrates dozens of computers belonging to key personnel • Reads emails • Steals information • Uses information to impact diplomatic mission
  • 24. Ghostnet • Office of the Dalai Lama infiltrated through malware installed on computers • Email servers completely owned • Emails modified in transit • Email read and acted on • Over 1,200 infected computers globally
  • 25. Sound familiar? • Pentagon 2007 • Rio Tinto 2009 • Google Aurora 2010 • Night Dragon • RSA 2011 • Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, 2011
  • 26. Scenario 9: Weapons grade malware used for sabotage
  • 27. Stuxnet - most advanced malware
  • 28. Breaking news October 18: Symantec announces new variants of Stuxnet in the wild. -New version was written by authors with access to original Stuxnet source code -This version targets PLC manufacturers. -Most recent sample was compiled on October 17th.
  • 29. Scenario 10. Cyber attacks in support of military strikes. Syria invaded by Israeli war planes that destroy a nuclear reactor. Network attacks to shut down command and control Airborn attacks against radar systems to “inject code” and shut down radar systems. Breaking news, October 18, New York Times reports that Obama’s administration considered similar attacks against Libya.
  • 30. Every sector has already experienced cyber disaster. What are we waiting for?

Hinweis der Redaktion

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  8. CNN) -- A U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane made an emergency landing in China after colliding with a Chinese fighter jet sent to intercept it, U.S. officials said Sunday. \nThe EP-3 Aries, an electronic surveillance aircraft with a crew of 24, landed on the Chinese island of Hainan after the collision, said Lt. Col. Dewey Ford, a spokesman for the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii. None of the crew was injured, he said. \nChinese officials had no immediate comment on the incident. \nThat history dates back to the 1996 presidential election on Taiwan, when Chinese hackers took aim at Taiwan sites. They repeated their attacks during the 2000 elections, but Taiwan threatened to unleash 7,000 viruses on Chinese government sites if the attacks continued. They ended. \n
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  11. CNN) -- A U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane made an emergency landing in China after colliding with a Chinese fighter jet sent to intercept it, U.S. officials said Sunday. \nThe EP-3 Aries, an electronic surveillance aircraft with a crew of 24, landed on the Chinese island of Hainan after the collision, said Lt. Col. Dewey Ford, a spokesman for the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii. None of the crew was injured, he said. \nChinese officials had no immediate comment on the incident. \nThat history dates back to the 1996 presidential election on Taiwan, when Chinese hackers took aim at Taiwan sites. They repeated their attacks during the 2000 elections, but Taiwan threatened to unleash 7,000 viruses on Chinese government sites if the attacks continued. They ended. \n
  12. 20 million Ids including SSN stolen by the insider, Rene Rebollo, Wahid Siddiqi, 25,was a senior financial analyst at Full Spectrum Lending, Countrywide's subprime lending division. The FBI's statement alleges Rebollo was taking the personal information of mortgage customers, including social security numbers, storing them on a USB thumb drive. Rebollo told the law enforcement he profited anywhere from $50,000 to $70,000 from the sale of the Countrywide-owned data. In an FBI affidavit Rebollo estimated he downloaded about 20,000 customer profiles a week in excel spreadsheets onto the flash drives and then took the spreadsheets and emailed them to buyers from business center stores.\n
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