Afp weeks 4_-_5

February 12 & 14|
Analyzing US Foreign Policy
• Applying general theories
• Theories of decision-making*
• Organizational politics
• Cognitive theories & misperception
•Security dilemma
•Alliances and polarity

•Collective action and hegemony

• Thursday:
U.S.-specific theories & arguments

Theories of decision-making:
Organization theory (Halperin, Allison, Wildavsky)
 Characteristics of organizations determine or shape
decision-making, policy outputs and outcomes

Organization theory
“Conceptual models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”(Allison)
 Model 1: Rational Policy Model

 FPbehavior results from purposive strategic decisions of
unified national governments
 Model 2: Organizational Process Model
 FPbehavior reflects coordinated, but independent output
of organizations, functioning according to SOP

 Organizational behavior and decision-making
 Characteristics of organizations
 seek size, wealth, autonomy, and preservation of mission
 follow standard operating procedures.
 have parochial perceptions and interests
 Are slow to adapt, but may change and learn over time

“Conceptual models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”(Allison)
 Model 1: Rational Policy Model

 FPbehavior results from purposive strategic decisions of
unified national governments
 Model 2: Organizational Process Model
 FP behavior reflects coordinated, but independent output of
organizations, functioning according to SOP
 Organizations are self-interested, parochial, governed by SOP,
and slow to adapt
 Model 3: Bureaucratic Politics Model
 FP outcomes result from intra-national negotiations among
key leaders and policy-makers
 no consistent set of strategic objectives – “where you stand
depends on where you sit.”

 Characteristics of organizations determine or shape
decision-making, policy outputs and outcomes
 Application to U.S. FP
 Foreign policy decisions may reflect interests and neuroses
of government’s component organizations or bureaucratic
units, rather than rational pursuit of national interest
 U.S. tends to underestimate these dynamics in other
countries

Cognitive theories (Jervis)
 examine role of psychological processes – perception,
misperception, belief systems – on FP behavior
 state, organization, or individual level of analysis

 Jervis: argues misperception can undermine real-
world accuracy of game theoretic models.
 in determining how to behave, an actor must develop an
image of others and their intensions.
 But, the actor may, for a number of reasons, misperceive
both others' actions and their intentions.

Jervis: “Hypotheses on misperception” (1968)
1. Belief-fact gap: A theory will have greater impact on an actor's interpretation with (a) greater
ambiguity of the data, and (b) higher degree of confidence the theory is held
2. Belief-new idea gap: Actors are apt to err by being too wedded to established view and too closed to
new information, as opposed to being too willing to alter theories
3. Spoon-feeding: : it’s easier to integrate contradicting information into an established image of
another actor if information is transmitted bit-by-bit than if it comes all at once
4. Misperception is most difficult in the case of a missing concept or category – and is easiest to correct
when concept is known or recognized, but actor is mis-categorized.
5. Goals vs. Data: If the sender has different background of concerns & information than the receiver
does, misunderstanding is likely.
6. When people spend a great deal of time drawing up a plan or making a decision, they tend to think
that the message about it they wish to convey will be clear to the receiver.
7. An action may convey unintended message if action itself doesn't turn out as planned
8. General tendency for decision--makers to see other states as more hostile than they are.
9. We tend to view others’ behavior as more centralized, disciplined & coordinated than it is
10. Because a state gets most of its information about other states’ policies from foreign offices, it tends
to take the foreign offices’ position as representative of the government as a whole.
11. When states do something we like, we give ourselves too much credit for getting them to do so;
when states do something we don't like, we attribute it mostly to internal forces.
12. When I don't try to conceal my intentions, I assume you accurately perceive them.
13. It is hard for an actor to believe the other can see him as a menace; it is often even harder to see
that issues important to him are not important to others.
1. 14. Actors tend to forget that a piece of evidence may support multiple or even opposing views.

 elites suffer cognitive syndromes & misperceptions
 Attribution theory: states attribute own behavior to
circumstances; attribute others' behavior to character
 Behavioral corollary: states tend to ascribe others' good behavior
to their own efforts; blame others' bad conduct on the other's
innate character.
 Belief perseverance: states are slow to absorb new facts and
realities that clash with existing beliefs
 States will exaggerate shared character of information, often
unaware when others‘ perceptions diverge from their own
 States tend to exaggerate the centralized, disciplined, and
coordinated character of others' behavior.
 Leads to strategic mistakes and miscalculations

 Safeguards
 Recognize inability to make "unbiased" interpretations of
incoming information; and influence of preferred theories
 see if attitudes contain consistent or supporting beliefs that
are not logically linked
 be aware of tendency to overestimate degree of common
interest involved in newly-shared concerns
 make assumptions, beliefs, and predictions that follow
from them as explicit as possible
 Avoid tying main task, political future, or identity become
tied to specific theories and images of other actors

 Application to US foreign policy
 Reliance on flawed facts & theories drove American
misperceptions of environment & interstate relations
 misperceptions led U.S. to misapply theories to
emergent situations
 strategic miscalculations
 Domino theory – overstated influence of communism
 Bargaining and credibility – poor communication
 Spiraling & deterrence: critics claim the U.S. misapplied
prescriptions of each model to situations governed by the other

Spiraling and Deterrence
 Deterrence / Credibility theory (Schelling)
 credibility of commitments is interconnected
 Abandoning one commitment destroys credibility of others
 Compellence and deterrence

 Misperception and war
 War most likely if you overestimate others’ hostility, but
underestimate their capabilities
 Misperception: inaccurate inferences or estimations of
consequences or others’ reactions to one’s actions/policies

Spiraling and Deterrence (Jervis)
 Spiral Model
 conflicts arise when states punish others expecting
compliance; but punishment only provokes retaliation,
sparking a conflict-spiral.
 Prescription: appeasement > threat of punishment
(“carrots” safer than “sticks”)
 Deterrence Model
 conflicts arise when states appease aggressors; leads
aggressor to expect further appeasement & to ignore
warnings when appeasement ends
 Prescription: threat of punishment > appeasement
(“sticks” work better than “carrots”)

Causes of Spirals
psychological explanation:
States exhibit cognitive syndromes suffered by

individual policymakers
 states underestimate own role in causing others' hostility –
and aggressiveness of own conduct – and expect other state
to back down if bluff is called

nationalism explanation:
states tend to overlook/be unaware of past actions

that injured other societies; may discount potentially
legitimate grievances or fears based on past conduct
 view others complaints against them as unprovoked malice;
expect other state to back down if bluff is called

Spiraling and Deterrence
 When does each model apply?
 When do carrots (positive inducements) work better, and
when do sticks (threats of punishment) work better?
 Are carrots and sticks mutually exclusive?

 Important conditions to consider
 Is other state an aggressor or a status quo power?
 Is the other an aggressor or not?
 Does the other see itself as an aggressor or not?
 Are the other state's claims legitimate?
 Are the other's demands legitimate or not?
 Does the other see its demands as legitimate or not?
 How strong is the other state?
 Are the resources demanded cumulative?

Other general theories applied to AFP
 Security dilemma: waxing & waning of security threats and
military opportunities explain past US conduct.
 Leaders have tended to exaggerate security dilemma – overstating
insecurity and responding to false threats

 Alliance theories: American alliances have reflected threat-
balancing and/or making common cause with similar powers.
 Doves: US exaggerates bandwagoning tendencies and ideological
solidarity; both misperceptions fuel false fears.
 Hawks: US exaggerates balancing, uses threat of force too seldom

 Collective action & hegemonic stability
 Collective goods are under-provided; collective costs are over-provided.
 Application: the US free-rode in the past when it could, was/is often
subject to free-riding. It now supports and provides goods to maintain
position and avoid losing “global commons”

Next time:
Theories specific to US foreign policy
 Cultural and ideological factors
 Nature and role of elite culture
 Popular culture and public opinion
 Liberal tradition and American exceptionalism
 Institutional arguments
 Executive-legislative relations
 Lobbies, interest groups
 Role of media and technology

February 12 & 14|
Analyzing US Foreign Policy
• Applying general theories, cont’d
• U.S.-specific theories & arguments
Cultural and ideological factors
•
• Nature and role of elite culture
• Popular culture & public opinion
• Liberal tradition and
American exceptionalism
Institutional arguments
•
• Executive-legislative relations
• Role of media and technology

General theories applied to AFP
 Security dilemma: waxing & waning of security threats and
military opportunities explain past US conduct.
 Leaders have tended to exaggerate security dilemma – overstating
insecurity and responding to false threats

 Alliance theories: American alliances have reflected threat-
balancing and/or making common cause with similar powers.
 Doves: US exaggerates bandwagoning tendencies and ideological
solidarity; both misperceptions fuel false fears.
 Hawks: US exaggerates balancing, uses threat of force too seldom

 Collective action & polarity
 Collective goods are under-provided; collective costs are over-provided.
 Application: US free-rode in the past when it could, was/is often subject
to free-riding. It now supports and provides goods to maintain position
and avoid losing “global commons”

U.S.-specific theories & arguments
 Cultural and ideological factors
 Nature and role of elite culture
 Popular culture and public opinion
 Liberal tradition and American exceptionalism

 Institutional arguments
 Executive-legislative relations
 Role of media and technology

Culture & characteristics of policy elites
 Elite schools and big business
 Ivy dominance in FP circles → FP favors US business
 Economic interests > democratic ideology or institutions
 Chicago & Straussian neocons → spreading democracy

 Male-dominated
 “gendered” foreign policy?

 Military service and worldviews
 Growth of national security establishment during Cold War
 Changing role of military officers and experience
 Is military prone to exaggerate other states’ hostility and
effectiveness of using force in presentations to civilians?

Culture & characteristics of policy elites
 Generational effects
 generational trauma: isolationists and interventionists are
created by disasters caused by the others’ policies
 “those who remember the past are condemned to make the
opposite mistake”

 Cognitive effects: groupthink
 suppression of internal dissent and policy evaluation
 Small-group dynamics: highly cohesive, isolated policy
environment, lack of open leadership
 Policy Consequences
 Incomplete survey of objective and alternatives; Failure to fully
analyze risks; Poor information search; Selective bias in processing
information; Failure to work out contingency plans

Mass democracy and public opinion
 What role should public play in determining policy?
 Public ignorance → policy blunders & contradictions
 Marketplace of ideas → public enlightenment → wise policy
 “Rational ignorance” → doesn’t matter!

 “Manufacture of Consent” v participatory democracy
 policy overselling → policies develop lives of their own
 Diversionary wars and demagoguery

 Civic knowledge and academic irresponsibility
 Neoconservative attack on cultural relativism
 cult of irrelevance in academe → public ignorance

Liberal tradition & American exceptionalism
 The liberal tradition in America (Hartz)
 Dominance of classical liberalism in political culture
 Absence of feudalism + rough political equality → no radicalism
 No feudalism = no socialism (Foner)

 All debate within liberal framework
 Assume objectivity, superiority of policy and ideological views
 “The greatest part of...America was peopled by men
who...brought with them into the New World a form of
Christianity...by styling it a democratic and republican religion”
—Alexis de Tocqueville

Liberal tradition & American exceptionalism
 Policy preferences and implications
 foreign policy expected to conform with liberal ideals
 USFP promotes, exports democracy
 Belief in responsibility to protect and spread vision of individual
liberty
 individual liberty = moral absolute → system of government that
enshrines individual liberty is morally & practically superior
 Two variants: passive and active
 Problems
 Foreign policy undermines liberal principles
 Ambivalence about expanding government power
 Viewed as crusading: repressive, racist, essentialist

Executive-Legislative Relations
 Constitution as “an invitation to struggle” (Corwin)
 “Two Presidencies” (Wildavsky)
 one presidency for domestic policy, another for foreign policy

Constitutional Powers (Article II)
+ Judicial review & Oversight
 Head of State
 Receives ambassadors
 Power to make treaties: 2/3 Senate to ratify
 can circumvent with executive orders and agreements
 Commander-in-Chief
 Presides Over the Military
 Veto Power
 President can reject legislation with general or pocket veto
 Congress can override veto with 2/3 vote of both houses
 Executive power clause
 “the executive power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”
 basis for implied powers, exceeds enumerated powers

Informal Powers
 Power to Persuade (Neustadt)
 Professional Reputation: standing in Washington D.C.
 Public Prestige: standing in the public
 Responsibility/responsiveness and reputation/ prestige
 “Bully pulpit”
 Prerogative power (Locke)
 Presidential action in the absence of a specific authorization,
even when it may violate the law in order to achieve a higher
goal – the public good.

Constitutional powers (Article 1, Section 8)
Congress shall have power
to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and

provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States;
To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and

offenses against the law of nations;
To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules

concerning captures on land and water;
To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall

be for a longer term than two years;
To provide and maintain a navy;

To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union,

suppress insurrections and repel invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for

governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United
States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and
the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress;

Constitutional sources of power
 Budget authority: “Power of the Purse”
 Legislative and investigative authority
 House and Senate Committees on Foreign Affairs/Foreign
Relations, Armed Forces, Appropriations, Intelligence,
Homeland Security
 Confirm senior appointments (Senate)
 Ratify international treaties (Senate)

“Two Presidencies”
 Why does Congress appear to defer on foreign
policy?
 Stakes are higher in foreign policy
 Other actors (courts, Congress, public, interest groups) more willing
to defer to the president in foreign policy
 Changing political context and responsibilities
 Emergence of U.S. as world power & increased global complexity
 Growth of Federal Government and permanent mobilization
 Growth of “personal” & popular leadership

War Powers in the Constitution
 Congress has the power to
 declare war
 raise and support armies and navies
 “make rules concerning captures on land and water,”
 “regulation of the land and naval forces.”
 “provide for calling the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress insurrections and repel Invasions”
 Provide for organizing, arming, & disciplining Militia.
 Define & punish piracies and felonies on high seas

 Presidential war powers
 “Commander in chief”
 Framers changed language from “make war” to “declare war,”
 Separation of the power of the purse from the power of the sword.

 Is a war different from a use of military force?
 Is Congress’s continued appropriation of $ an

implicit authorization?
 How can Congress stop a president?

 Does Congress want to?

Media and technology
 Crucial role of press in foreign policy & national security
 Manipulated or incompetent press
 Rise and fall of investigative press
 Official dominion of press coverage → public ignorance
 Undemocratic regimes intimidation → foreign leaders
decide how the press covers them.

 Social media and cable news shape FP agenda
 Raise major issues, highlight conditions, real-time coverage
 “infotainment”
→ public ignorance
 media segmentation → partisanship and hostility

February 19 & 21|
U.S. Interests and Grand Strategy
• U.S.-specific arguments, cont’d.
• Role of media and technology

• National interests & policy-making
•Overview
•U.S. Grand Strategies

Cold War Era (1947-1991)
•

• Post-Cold War (1992-2001)

• Post-9/11 (2001-)

•Secondary strategies & interests

National interests and policy-making
 National interests
 important for state’s wellbeing, prosperity,
continuity
 Economic interests (Access to markets, comparative advantage)
 Political interests (Countries with shared interests and values)
 Political values (Democracy, human rights, liberty)

 Vital interests
 Essential for state’s well-being, prosperity, continuity
 External focus (foreign threats)
 Internal focus (education, agriculture, economy, environment, etc)

Classifying interests and threats
 Generic
 Countries
 Events
 Technology

 Specific
 Territorial integrity & sovereignty
 Safety of Americans at home and abroad
 Preservation of vital institutions
 Strong, stable European Union

Setting priorities
 WMD nonproliferation vs counterterrorism
 Iraqi WMD vs Pakistani WMD

 Climate change vs energy independence

 Stability of Russian democracy & economy vs

Mexican democracy & economy
 Other examples?

 HOW do we decide?

Policy-making
 Ongoing conversation and debate:
 What are national and vital interests?
 Who/what threatens them?
 What should we do about it?

 Key factors shaping policy
 Facts (necessary but insufficient to set priorities)
 Managing different of values & interests
 Future visions
 What ought to be
 How to get there
 Policy legitimacy of process

Basic strategic components and tools
 National power
 Capacity to influence others’ decisions and actions
 Components:
 Military capacity & force
 Cultural & ideological influence and affinities
 Trade & economic policies
 Political authority

 Alliances and coalitions
 Balancing and bandwagoning
 Trade and security alliances
 Bilateral and multilateral agreements

 Collective security & international law

Grand Strategies
 theory explaining how to cause or achieve
national interests or other objectives

 Major strategic principles & approaches
 Unilateral vs. multilateral action
 Isolationism vs. internationalism
 Realism vs. idealism
 Nation-building

Grand Strategies
 theory explaining how to cause or achieve
national interests or other objectives

 U.S. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies
 Cold War Era (1947-1991)
 Post-Cold War (1992-2001)
 Post-9/11 (2001-)

 Economic
 Rebuild Europe, foster economic liberalism and
development, Bretton Woods system &
institutions, expand U.S. global role

 National Security
 Centered on containment
 Phase 1: Whether to contain?
 Phase 2: How to contain?

Whether to contain (1947-64)
 Consensus:
 don’t want USSR to become more powerful;
 need to maintain or increase own relative power

 Debate: What is best strategy?
 Isolation vs. Containment vs. Rollback

Whether to contain (1947-64)
 Debate: What is best strategy?
 Isolation vs. Containment vs. Rollback
 Major questions
 How "cumulative" are industrial resources?
 Possible to conquer or convert these resources into
military power, then use to take more?
 How easy is conquest?
 Can the USA conquer the USSR? Vice versa?
 How aggressive is the USSR?
 Is war inevitable/avoidable?
 Will offensive action provoke or calm the USSR

How to contain (1965-1991)
 Debate: What approach should we take?
 Europe First vs. Global Intervention
 Questions
 Level of Soviet threat to developing world
 How "cumulative" are resources in developing world?
 Can U.S. interventions succeed?
 Would independent communist states threaten U.S.
security?
 How? How much?

Post-Cold War Era (1991-2001)
 Changing strategic context
 Collapse of Cold War consensus
 More (+ more complex) views of major threats & priorities

 Alternative strategies

Alternative strategies
 Isolation: U.S. role in world complete with Soviet collapse, we
won, time to come home & celebrate
 Neo-containment:
 Variant 1: contain any new threats that emerge to fill or

even challenge US dominance
 Variant 2: contain world's most crazy or hostile states

 Neo-rollback: wage preventive war against rogue states that
pursue WMD
 Selective engagement: prevent interstate conflict in industrial
regions of interest
 Global pacification: prevent interstate conflict everywhere. US
could do this (unilaterally or multilaterally)
 U.S. global engineering : hegemonic stability (economic &
political)

February 21|
U.S. Interests and Grand Strategy
• National interests & policy-making
• Overview
• U.S. Grand Strategies
• Cold War Era (1947-1991)
• Post-Cold War (1992-2001)
• Post-9/11 (2001-)
• Secondary strategies & interests
• Contemporary debates

Foreign Policy Grand Strategies
 theory about how to achieve national interests
 What are our primary interests?
 Who/what promotes or threatens those interests?
 What is best strategy to advance these interests? (causal arg.)
A+B+C→ achieve desired results
 X + Y + Z → avoid unwanted results
 Tools and components
 Examples: Military force or coercion; diplomatic capacity; political leadership;
market dominance; strategic minerals & resources; foreign investment &
fiscal capacity; boycotts; sanctions; strategic balancing, trade & security
alliances; bilateral & multilateral agreements & institutions; ideological &
cultural influence; collective security, human rights, and international law.
 Major strategic principles & approaches
 Unilateralism; multilateralism; isolationism; internationalism;
realism; idealism

U.S. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies
 Postwar consensus:
 Expand U.S. global role: rebuild Europe, foster economic &
political liberalism, support multilateral institutions.
 Containment: use diplomatic, economic, and military means to
prevent spread of Soviet power or influence

 Strategic Debates
 Whether to contain: isolation, containment, or rollback?
 How to contain: focus on strategic interests or global influence?
 Secondary strategies and tools
 Deterrence: prevent conflict with threat of large military force and
mutually assured destruction (MAD)
 Domino theory: creation of Soviet-backed regime would lead to
spread of communism in surrounding region

 Changing strategic context
 Cold War consensus collapses
 ↑ democracies worldwide; democratic peace theory
 More (+ more complex) views of major threats & priorities

 Alternative strategies

1) Isolation: U.S. global role complete; triumph of democracy &
free markets; turn focus inwards
2) Neo-containment, Variant 1: contain any new threats that
emerge to fill or even challenge US dominance
3) Neo-containment, Variant 2: contain most dangerous states.
Limit control of WMD and resources, reduce dependence
4) Neo-rollback: wage preventive war against rogue states that
pursue WMD

pursue WMD

 Tactical debates:
 Unilateralvs. multilateral strategy.
 Threats vs. inducements to gain allies

pursue WMD
5) Selective engagement: prevent interstate conflict in industrial
regions of interest
6) Global intervention: prevent interstate conflict everywhere –
unilaterally or multilaterally
7) Global guardian: hegemonic stability & global engagement –
economic and political

Post-9/11 (2001- )
 Primary political economic interests:
 Maintain economic primacy: reinforce economic institutions;
extend trade agreements; foster tech/scientific innovation

 Primary national security interests:
 Thwarting WMD terror against US
 counter-terror strategy?
 counter-proliferation strategy?

Post-9/11 (2001- )
 How large is the terrorist threat?
 far larger than most people formerly believed
 al Qaeda terrorists may have the skill to acquire
and use weapons of mass destruction
 al Qaeda's large-scale destructive ambitions.

Post-9/11 (2001- )
 What changes or factors contributed to
threat?
 Access to WMD: falling manufacturing costs, growing
expertise to make them, increasing number of states trying
to make or secure WMD.
 Increasing number of failed states that cannot control their
territory – gives terrorist groups places to locate.
 al Qaeda is first terrorist organization 1) to command
substantial wealth and 2) with such highly-skilled leadership
 Rising Arab and Islamic hostility toward the U.S. created
conditions favorable to al Qaeda
 U.S. failure to answer or counter al Qaeda propaganda and

Post-9/11 (2001- )
 Why was immediate terror threat unforeseen?
 Post-Cold War “peace dividend” led to massive cuts
in intelligence budgets and personnel
 There was no single, powerful federal agency to
seek budget increases to address terrorist threat
 U.S. press did not cover rise of anti-Americanism
 al Qaeda's capability was hard to detect

Post-9/11 (2001- )
 “Bush Doctrine” (2001-2009)
 Different interpretations:
 Doctrine of preemption?
 Use military force to eliminate threat of imminent action or
attack against U.S.
 Doctrine of prevention?
 Use military force to eliminate potential threats before
they can initiate action against U.S.
 Emphasis on “hard” vs. “soft” power
 Minimal commitment to multilateralism

Secondary interests and strategies
 Environment and climate change
 Concerns about catastrophic damage and resource
scarcity, leading to political and economic instability
 Human rights
 What actions, if any, should U.S. take to protect human
rights / address human rights violations?
 Public health and disease
 Need to prevent epidemics, address new diseases
 Retaining economic primacy?
 Maximize prosperity, balance against other interests,
maintain liberal economic institutions & regime

What are America’s prime interests today?

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