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The Ariane 5 Launcher Failure


                                              June 4th 1996
                                            Total failure of the
                                            Ariane 5 launcher
                                            on its maiden flight


Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013                      Slide 1
Ariane 5
                                             •   A European rocket designed to
                                                 launch commercial payloads
                                                 (e.g.communications
                                                 satellites, etc.) into Earth orbit
                                             •   Successor to the successful
                                                 Ariane 4 launchers
                                             •   Ariane 5 can carry a heavier
                                                 payload than Ariane 4




Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013                                     Slide 2
Launcher failure
•      Appoximately 37 seconds after a successful lift-off, the
       Ariane 5 launcher lost control
•      Incorrect control signals were sent to the engines and
       these swivelled so that unsustainable stresses were
       imposed on the rocket
•      It started to break up and self-destructed
•      The system failure was a direct result of a software failure.
       However, it was symptomatic of a more general systems
       validation failure


    Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013                Slide 3
The problem
  •       The attitude and trajectory of the rocket are
          measured by a computer-based inertial reference
          system. This transmits commands to the engines to
          maintain attitude and direction
  •       The software failed and this system and the backup
          system shut down
  •       Diagnostic commands were transmitted to the
          engines which interpreted them as real data and
          which swivelled to an extreme position



Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013                   Slide 4
Software failure
•      Software failure occurred when an attempt to convert a 64-
       bit floating point number to a signed 16-bit integer caused
       the number to overflow.
•      There was no exception handler associated with the
       conversion so the system exception management facilities
       were invoked. These shut down the software.
•      Redundant but not diverse software
     –       The backup software was a copy and behaved in exactly the same
             way.




    Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013                       Slide 5
Avoidable failure?
•      The software that failed was reused from the Ariane 4
       launch vehicle. The computation that resulted in overflow
       was not used by Ariane 5.
•      Decisions were made
     –       Not to remove the facility as this could introduce new faults
     –       Not to test for overflow exceptions because the processor was
             heavily loaded. For dependability reasons, it was thought desirable
             to have some spare processor capacity




    Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013                                Slide 6
Why not Ariane 4?
•      The physical characteristics of Ariane 4 (A smaller vehicle)
       are such that it has a lower initial acceleration and build up
       of horizontal velocity than Ariane 5
•      The value of the variable on Ariane 4 could never reach a
       level that caused overflow during the launch period.




    Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013                 Slide 7
Validation failure
  •       As the facility that failed was not required for Ariane
          5, there was no requirement associated with it.
  •       As there was no associated requirement, there
          were no tests of that part of the software and hence
          no possibility of discovering the problem.
  •       During system testing, simulators of the inertial
          reference system computers were used. These did
          not generate the error as there was no requirement!




Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013                     Slide 8
Review failure
•      The design and code of all software should be reviewed
       for problems during the development process
•      Either
     –       The inertial reference system software was not reviewed because it
             had been used in a previous version
     –       The review failed to expose the problem or that the test coverage
             would not reveal the problem
     –       The review failed to appreciate the consequences of system
             shutdown during a launch




    Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013                           Slide 9
Lessons learned
•      Don’t run software in critical systems unless it is actually
       needed
•      As well as testing for what the system should do, you may
       also have to test for what the system should not do
•      Do not have a default exception handling response which
       is system shut-down in systems that have no fail-safe
       state




    Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013                 Slide 10
Lessons learned
•      In critical computations, always return best effort values
       even if the absolutely correct values cannot be computed
•      Wherever possible, use real equipment and not
       simulations
•      Improve the review process to include external
       participants and review all assumptions made in the code




    Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013              Slide 11
Avoidable failure
•      The designer’s of Ariane 5 made a critical and elementary
       error.
•      They designed a system where a single component failure
       could cause the entire system to fail




    Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013             Slide 12

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CS5032 Case study Ariane 5 launcher failure

  • 1. The Ariane 5 Launcher Failure June 4th 1996 Total failure of the Ariane 5 launcher on its maiden flight Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013 Slide 1
  • 2. Ariane 5 • A European rocket designed to launch commercial payloads (e.g.communications satellites, etc.) into Earth orbit • Successor to the successful Ariane 4 launchers • Ariane 5 can carry a heavier payload than Ariane 4 Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013 Slide 2
  • 3. Launcher failure • Appoximately 37 seconds after a successful lift-off, the Ariane 5 launcher lost control • Incorrect control signals were sent to the engines and these swivelled so that unsustainable stresses were imposed on the rocket • It started to break up and self-destructed • The system failure was a direct result of a software failure. However, it was symptomatic of a more general systems validation failure Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013 Slide 3
  • 4. The problem • The attitude and trajectory of the rocket are measured by a computer-based inertial reference system. This transmits commands to the engines to maintain attitude and direction • The software failed and this system and the backup system shut down • Diagnostic commands were transmitted to the engines which interpreted them as real data and which swivelled to an extreme position Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013 Slide 4
  • 5. Software failure • Software failure occurred when an attempt to convert a 64- bit floating point number to a signed 16-bit integer caused the number to overflow. • There was no exception handler associated with the conversion so the system exception management facilities were invoked. These shut down the software. • Redundant but not diverse software – The backup software was a copy and behaved in exactly the same way. Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013 Slide 5
  • 6. Avoidable failure? • The software that failed was reused from the Ariane 4 launch vehicle. The computation that resulted in overflow was not used by Ariane 5. • Decisions were made – Not to remove the facility as this could introduce new faults – Not to test for overflow exceptions because the processor was heavily loaded. For dependability reasons, it was thought desirable to have some spare processor capacity Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013 Slide 6
  • 7. Why not Ariane 4? • The physical characteristics of Ariane 4 (A smaller vehicle) are such that it has a lower initial acceleration and build up of horizontal velocity than Ariane 5 • The value of the variable on Ariane 4 could never reach a level that caused overflow during the launch period. Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013 Slide 7
  • 8. Validation failure • As the facility that failed was not required for Ariane 5, there was no requirement associated with it. • As there was no associated requirement, there were no tests of that part of the software and hence no possibility of discovering the problem. • During system testing, simulators of the inertial reference system computers were used. These did not generate the error as there was no requirement! Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013 Slide 8
  • 9. Review failure • The design and code of all software should be reviewed for problems during the development process • Either – The inertial reference system software was not reviewed because it had been used in a previous version – The review failed to expose the problem or that the test coverage would not reveal the problem – The review failed to appreciate the consequences of system shutdown during a launch Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013 Slide 9
  • 10. Lessons learned • Don’t run software in critical systems unless it is actually needed • As well as testing for what the system should do, you may also have to test for what the system should not do • Do not have a default exception handling response which is system shut-down in systems that have no fail-safe state Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013 Slide 10
  • 11. Lessons learned • In critical computations, always return best effort values even if the absolutely correct values cannot be computed • Wherever possible, use real equipment and not simulations • Improve the review process to include external participants and review all assumptions made in the code Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013 Slide 11
  • 12. Avoidable failure • The designer’s of Ariane 5 made a critical and elementary error. • They designed a system where a single component failure could cause the entire system to fail Ariane launcher failure, Case study, 2013 Slide 12