This document discusses Belgium's consociational democracy structure and whether it has contributed to the country's political divisions. It argues that while Belgium no longer organizes its society through ideological pillars, territorial and linguistic cleavages still exist. The country's 1970 constitutional reform further divided it along language lines. The consociational system requires political elites to negotiate complex compromises, as majoritarian decision-making is impossible. However, this structure may have expanded divisions rather than providing stability, as government formation now paralyzes the country for months due to negotiations.

1. Belgium’s
consociational
structure:
the
reason
for
the
failure
of
the
current
federal
state?
Journal
entry
15/10/2010
Steven
Lauwers
Lijphart
states
that
‘Belgium
can
legitimately
claim
to
be
the
most
thorough
example
of
consociational
democracy
i,
the
type
of
democracy
that
is
most
suitable
for
deeply
divided
societies’
ii
Is
this
still
the
true?
And
what
does
that
mean?
In
the
first
century
of
its
existence,
Belgium
society
was
organized
in
pillars,
based
on
ideology.
Did
the
move
away
from
pillars
in
the
last
50
years
as
a
means
to
organize
society
mean
Belgium
ceased
to
be
a
consociational
democracy?
No.
Let
me
elaborate:
While
the
country
did
indeed
move
towards
becoming
a
federal
state,
the
cleavages
in
society
still
exist,
only
at
different
levels:
the
country
moved
from
and
ideological
to
territorial
segmentation.
Zürn
argues
that
‘(…)
in
comparative
politics
that
where
there
is
no
sufficiently
stable
national
identity
it
is
better
to
give
precedence
to
bargaining
and
‘consociational’
procedures
rather
than
majority
decisions.”
iii
A
very
important
turning
point
in
the
political
history
of
Belgium
was
the
constitutional
reform
of
1970.
iv
Most
importantly,
the
country
was
divided
into
language
communities,
not
only
increasing
the
division
of
the
country
on
the
basis
of
language,
but
also
restructuring
politics:
each
language
group
has
its
own
elites,
its
own
representatives
-­‐
Belgians
can’t
elect
a
‘Belgian’
party
anymore.
Various
mechanisms
have
been
put
in
place,
to
make
sure
the
Flemish
part
cannot
use
its
demographic
majority
to
impose
their
will
on
the
Francophone
part
(thus
obliging
Belgium
to
find
a
solution
through
compromises).
As
K.
Deschouwer
nicely
phrases
it,
‘(w)e
can
thus
explain
the
success
rate
of
conflict
management
in
Belgium
by
looking
at
the
institutional
context
obliging
the
elites
–
a
fairly
small
number
of
top
politicians
–
to
rely
on
complex
compromises

2. for
getting
rid
of
mutual
vetoes
in
a
system
where
majoritarian
decision-­making
is
impossible
and
where
ongoing
confrontational
tactics
are
counterproductive.’
v
It
is
interesting
to
conclude
that
because
of
how
the
state
is
structured,
there
is
no
possibility
for
majoritarian
decision
in
the
national
government
and
parliament,
it
seems
the
only
reason
for
finding
a
solution
is
the
extremely
high
price
of
non-­‐agreement.
And
that
is
exactly
what
we
see
now,
and
saw
in
the
previous
elections
as
well:
the
formation
of
a
new
government
is
the
moment
at
which
the
elites
force
each
other
to
accept
negotiations,
causing
the
“quest”
for
a
compromise
to
paralyze
the
country
for
months.
I
would
even
go
as
far
as
arguing
that
exactly
this
consociational
structure
has
caused
the
cleavages
to
expand,
rather
than
providing
a
“stable”
democracy.
-­
If
I
had
more
than
500
words,
I
would
love
to
elaborate
on
how
the
EU
also
qualifies
as
a
consociational
democracy
–
interestingly
Belgium
not
only
has
the
presidency
of
the
European
Council,
Brussels
is
also
houses
key
institutions
of
the
EU.
i
Government
by
elite
cartel
to
turn
a
democracy
with
a
fragmented
political
culture
into
a
stable
democracy,
Lijphart
A
(1969).
Consociational
Democracy.
ii
Lijphart
A
(1981).
Conflict
and
Coexistence
in
Belgium.
The
Dynamics
of
a
Culturally
Divided
Society.
p.
1-­‐12
iii
Zürn
M.
(2000).
Democratic
Governance
beyond
the
nation-­‐state:
The
EU
and
other
international
institutions.
p.
192.
iv
Deschouwer
K.,
And
the
peace
goes
on?
Consociational
democracy
and
Belgian
politics
in
the
twenty-­‐first
century.
p.
901-­‐02
v
Deschouwer
K.
Idem.
906.