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Client Certificates in
DANE TLSA Records
Shumon Huque & Viktor Dukhovni
IETF 93, DANE Working Group
July 20th 2015, Prague, Czech Republic
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-huque-dane-
client-cert-01
Client Certificates in DANE
TLSA Records
• Owner name format:
_service.<domain-name> IN TLSA <.. rdata ..>
_smtp-client.device1.example.com. IN TLSA (
3 1 1 d2abde240d7cd3ee6b4b28c54df034b9
7983a1d16e8a410e4561cb106618e971 )
Authentication Model
• Client has an identity assigned corresponding to
a DNS domain name.
• Client has a private/public key pair and a
certificate binding the domain name to the
public key.
• Domain Name + Certificate has a corresponding
signed DNS TLSA record
Client identity in Certificate
• Two options, Subject Alternative Name’s:
• dNSName type
• SRVName type
Signaling Client Id
• Server may want an explicit indication from the
client that it has a TLSA record, to avoid
unnecessary DNS queries in-band with TLS
handshake.
• If raw public keys are being used (RFC 7250),
the client needs to convey its identity explicitly.
• Some deployed client software reacts badly to
unexpected Certificate Request messages.
Signaling Client Id
• A new TLS extension is proposed to convey
DNS client identity (I-D will go out in the near
future)
Client Requirements
• Must have a signed TLSA record published
corresponding to DNS name and X.509 client
certificate
• Client’s name must appear in the certificate’s
dNSName or SRVname fields of the Subject
Alternative Name
• [Future: client uses a TLS extension to signal
identity explicitly to the server]
Server Requirements
• Send Certificate Request message in TLS handshake.
• Extract client identity from presented certificate.
• Construct DNS query name for corresponding TLSA
record.
• Lookup & authenticate TLSA record in DNS.
• Extract rdata of TLSA record and match it to the client
certificate.
More details
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-huque-dane-
client-cert-01

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Client Certificates in DANE TLSA Records

  • 1. Client Certificates in DANE TLSA Records Shumon Huque & Viktor Dukhovni IETF 93, DANE Working Group July 20th 2015, Prague, Czech Republic
  • 3. Client Certificates in DANE TLSA Records • Owner name format: _service.<domain-name> IN TLSA <.. rdata ..>
  • 4. _smtp-client.device1.example.com. IN TLSA ( 3 1 1 d2abde240d7cd3ee6b4b28c54df034b9 7983a1d16e8a410e4561cb106618e971 )
  • 5. Authentication Model • Client has an identity assigned corresponding to a DNS domain name. • Client has a private/public key pair and a certificate binding the domain name to the public key. • Domain Name + Certificate has a corresponding signed DNS TLSA record
  • 6. Client identity in Certificate • Two options, Subject Alternative Name’s: • dNSName type • SRVName type
  • 7. Signaling Client Id • Server may want an explicit indication from the client that it has a TLSA record, to avoid unnecessary DNS queries in-band with TLS handshake. • If raw public keys are being used (RFC 7250), the client needs to convey its identity explicitly. • Some deployed client software reacts badly to unexpected Certificate Request messages.
  • 8. Signaling Client Id • A new TLS extension is proposed to convey DNS client identity (I-D will go out in the near future)
  • 9. Client Requirements • Must have a signed TLSA record published corresponding to DNS name and X.509 client certificate • Client’s name must appear in the certificate’s dNSName or SRVname fields of the Subject Alternative Name • [Future: client uses a TLS extension to signal identity explicitly to the server]
  • 10. Server Requirements • Send Certificate Request message in TLS handshake. • Extract client identity from presented certificate. • Construct DNS query name for corresponding TLSA record. • Lookup & authenticate TLSA record in DNS. • Extract rdata of TLSA record and match it to the client certificate.